



CORPORATE INTERNET REPORTING, 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS, CORPORATE     
GOVERNANCE, AND FIRM FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE OF SAUDI LISTED 
COMPANIES 





NAWAL ABDULLAH AL-EBRAHEM 
     A thesis submitted to Plymouth University in partial fulfilment for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 










This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from 



























In memory of my beloved mother (May Allah's mercy be upon her) and my 
beloved son Mohammed who was looking forward to see the end of our journey 
and who, so sadly, did not live to see it. 




This thesis is also dedicated 
to my husband, Fahad for all his sacrifices and sharing my burdens, to my 
father, my children: Deema, Farah, Abdullah and Faisal, my sisters, my brothers 

















            First of all, I am profoundly thankful to almighty Allah who supported me in 
accomplish this research. It could not be fulfilled without the help of the almighty Allah. My 
deep appreciations and thanks go to my supervisor Dr. Ahmed El-Masry for his contributions 
in the form of feedback, his continued and kind support through my hard times and his 
encouragement throughout this research. My great thanks and gratitude go also to Dr. Khaled 
Hussainey, Dr. Marwa Tourky and Dr. Amani Hussein who gave me some of their precious 
time to participate in evaluating my research instrument and helped me in collecting necessary 
data for my research. Also, I would like to express my appreciation to all the academics, 
colleagues and staff at Plymouth Business School and Graduate School of Management for 
helping and providing a good working atmosphere. My special thanks to my home university, 
King Saud University, for providing the financial support and offering me the opportunity to 
conduct this research.  
I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my husband Fahad for his support, 
encouragement and understanding, which enabled me to finish this research. No words can 
express my thanks to him, may Allah reward him for his favours. In addition, I wish to extend 
my warmest thanks to my children Deema, Farah, Abdullah and Faisal. They went through a 
lot of hard times whilst I was occupied with my research, may Allah protect and help them in 
all their stages of life. Most importantly, I am very thankful to my sister Amal and my brother 
in law Qassem, to whom I owe a special gratitude for their support since I arrived to the UK 
and more particularly when I lost my son. Words cannot adequately describe their kindness 
and unlimited support, may Allah reward them here and in the hereafter.   
Further, I want to thank my friends Reem, Nouf and Sara who offered me kind help 
and assistance during my study, which meant so much to me. Finally, I would like to sincerely 









At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author been 
registered for any other University award without prior agreement of the Graduate Sub-
Committee.  
Work submitted for this research degree at the Plymouth University has not formed part of 
any other degree either at Plymouth University or at another establishment.  
This study was fully financed by the Saudi government. 
The following research training courses have been attended:  
 
- Philosophical and Methodological Foundations of the Social Science 
- Social Research Design 
- Qualitative Approaches in Social Research 
- Introducing Quantitative Analysis 
- Quantitative Analysis part 2: Bivariate Analysis 
- Quantitative Analysis part 3: Multivariate Analysis 
- Applying Techniques of Qualitative Data Analysis part 1 
- Applying Techniques of Qualitative Data Analysis part 2 
 
Word count of main body of thesis: 92927 
 
 
                                                                                                  Signed:  






           Nawal
 
6 
CORPORATE INTERNET REPORTING, FIRM 
CHARACTERISTICS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF SAUDI 
LISTED COMPANIES 
by 
NAWAL ABDULLAH AL-EBRAHEM 
ABSTRACT 
 
The increasing use of the internet has created a new opportunity for companies to disseminate 
different types of information to their current and potential investors via the internet. This type 
of voluntary disclosure, Corporate Internet Reporting (CIR), can improve the disclosure quality 
and the transparency to satisfy all users’ needs. Furthermore, corporate governance has 
attracted considerable global attention, especially after the collapses that have occurred in the 
financial markets. Recently, a growing interest has evolved in exploring corporate governance 
in emerging markets due to the increased demand for transparency by stakeholders. To provide 
new insights, this study aims to explore the extent of CIR, examine its relationship with some 
corporate governance and firm characteristics variables, and to determine the impact of CIR 
on firm financial performance. These associations are investigated by employing a quantitative 
method dependant on a multi-theoretical framework. The study uses a self-constructed 
disclosure index, which includes 196 items, to measure the CIR of 170 Saudi listed companies. 
The findings indicate that the level of CIR is, on average, moderate compared to their 
counterparts in developed countries. Further, the empirical results reveal that firms which are 
large in size, with low liquidity rate, distribute dividends, have board which is meet less 
frequently and have less independent members in the audit committee are more likely to have 
high CIR level.  In addition, the results indicate that firm growth, leverage, industry type, audit 
type, board size, board independence, role duality, block holder ownership, directors 
ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership, audit committee size and audit 
committee frequency of meeting appear to be insignificant predictors for CIR total. However, 
the findings show that the significance of these variables varies among the CIR components: 
content, presentation, timeliness, usability and audit. Finally, it is statistically evident that CIR 
has no significant impact on firm financial performance in Saudi listed companies. These 
findings suggest that further effort is required to enhance the awareness of good corporate 
governance and that other variables may be more relevant to CIR in the Saudi context.    
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1.1 General introduction  
 
The global adoption of the internet and the rapidly extending demands for information from 
stakeholders drive corporations all over the world to increasingly use corporate internet 
reporting (CIR) as a means of communicating with both current and prospective users. 
The internet provides companies with various opportunities for releasing financial information 
to their investors and creditors at a low cost. Furthermore, the financial information disclosed 
via the internet is mostly up to date and is presented in various multimedia formats, making the 
information easier to use in decision-making (Wagenhofer, 2003). Despite these benefits, 
internet reporting practices varies in terms of both content and the use of technology across 
companies and across countries, depending on many environmental influences. These 
influences affecting CIR include the economy, capital markets, accounting and regulatory 
framework, enforcement mechanisms, and culture (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
In the last two decades, many businesses have collapsed due to financial scandals that have hit 
the markets, raising doubts about the efficiency of the disclosure and transparency system. This 
has led to a growing awareness of the need to reform disclosure and transparency practices. 
One of the important reform procedures is to provide a sound corporate governance structure. 
However, emerging markets have not been far removed from these reforms, and they have 
made a noticeable effort to create good corporate governance systems to improve transparency 
and disclosure practices. Saudi Arabia, as an emerging market, has witnessed a significant 
improvement in its financial system and accounting standards and practices. The most 
important actions of improvements were forming the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003 
and issuing the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006. Moreover, the Saudi 
authorities endeavour to reorganise the Saudi stock market (Tadawul) and promote the 
accounting profession. Considering the rapid growth of internet usage, these developments in 
the Saudi market have led to a substantial enhancement of disclosure, transparency and 
corporate governance of Saudi companies. Consequently, this chapter first presents research 
aims and research objectives, then describes the research questions. Further, it discusses the 




1.2 Research aims 
 
The current study mainly aims to examine the corporate internet reporting (CIR) practices, to 
determine the key factors that influence CIR practices and to assess the impact of CIR and its 
components on firm financial performance of  Saudi listed companies. 
1.3 Research objectives 
 
This study seeks to achieve three fundamental objectives: 
1. Understanding the actual CIR practices in Saudi listed companies (SLC).  
Understanding the actual CIR practices in SLC includes investigating the extent of disclosed 
information in the websites of the SLC; exploring the content of disclosed information by 
explaining the various types of information provided on the websites; determining the different 
presentation tools that are used to distribute information via the companies’ websites; assessing 
the timeliness of disclosed information that make this information useful for all the 
stakeholders of SLC; exploring the usability of disclosed information on the SLC websites 
which ease accessing and obtaining information from anywhere; and examining the audit 
element of disclosed information to ensure the reliability and credibility of the information 
provided online to the users by SLC.  
2. Examining empirically the key factors that may influence CIR (in total and its 
components) in the Saudi context. 
There are many factors that have been evidenced by the literature to have an impact on CIR. 
The association between these factors and CIR varies considerably depending on the situation 
and background of the companies. Thus, this study seeks to explore the factors that may affect 
the CIR practices of SLC. These factors are derived from prior studies and are applied in the 
Saudi context to explain the use of CIR.  
3. Addressing the effects, if any, of CIR (total and its components) on firm financial 
performance of Saudi listed companies. 
This study aims to investigate empirically the economic consequences of CIR, emphasising the 
importance of adopting internet reporting. This objective is fulfilled by addressing the effects 
of CIR on firm financial performance in SLC.  
Many questions can be derived from these objectives. These questions are demonstrated in the 
next section.    
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1.4 Research questions 
 
In this study, three main questions are defined to achieve the objectives. To answer these key 
questions, each main question has been divided into sub-questions.  
These main questions are: 
Q1: What is the extent of corporate internet reporting (CIR) through the websites of Saudi 
listed companies. This question has been divided into the following sub-questions: 
1.1 :What is the content level of information that is disclosed by SLC?  
1.2 :How is the disclosed information presented on the SLC’s websites? 
1.3 :Is the disclosed information presented at a time when stakeholders need it? 
1.4 :Is it easy to obtain the required information?  
1.5 :To what extent is the disclosed information audited?  
 Q2: What are the significant factors that motivate the decisions regarding the CIR of SLC. 
This question has been divided into the following sub-questions: 
2.1 :What is the extent of the relationship between CIR total and the firm characteristics 
variables (firm size, firm growth, leverage, liquidity, dividends, industry type and audit type)? 
2.2 :Is there any relationship between CIR (content, presentation, timeliness usability and 
audit) and firm characteristics variables?  
2.3 :What is the extent of the relationship, if any, between CIR total and board of directors 
variables (board size, board independence, board frequency of meeting and role duality)?  
2.4 :Is there any relationship between CIR (content, presentation, timeliness usability and 
audit) and board of directors variables? 
2.5 :What is the extent of the relationship, if any, between CIR total and ownership structure 
variables (block holder ownership, director ownership, institutional ownership, government 
ownership)? 
2.6 :Is there any relationship between CIR (content, presentation, timeliness usability and 
audit) and ownership structure variables? 
2.7 :What is the extent of the relationship, if any, between CIR total and audit committee 
variables (audit committee size, audit committee frequency of meeting and audit committee 
independence)? 
2.8 :Is there any relationship between CIR (content, presentation, timeliness usability and 
audit) and audit committee variables? 
Q3: Is there any influence of CIR on the firm financial performance of Saudi Arabian listed 
companies? This question has also been divided into the following sub-questions:  
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3.1 :What is the impact of CIR total on firm financial performance? 
3.2 :Is there any influence of CIR (content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) on 
firm financial performance? 
1.5 Research importance and motivation  
 
The expansion of the internet encourages companies to adopt it as an effective means of 
disclosing information for the benefit of stakeholders (FASB, 2000). This study aims to 
examine CIR practice in Saudi Arabia, how corporate governance and firm characteristics 
affect it, and its impact on firm financial performance for the following reasons.  
First, internet reporting has become very important for investors and analysts as a way of 
obtaining timely information and enhanced disclosure and transparency (Kelton and Yang, 
2008). It also helps companies to disseminate additional information in a timely manner, add 
more flexibility, and reduce disclosure cost. Therefore, it is crucial for Saudi companies to pay 
more attention to the importance of CIR in providing adequate information to protect their 
investors and satisfy their needs, which highlights the need for more in-depth academic 
research regarding CIR in the Saudi context. Second, the financial crises of big companies in 
developed countries in the last few decades were mainly a result of poor transparency, 
disclosure practices and corporate governance. Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act stresses the 
importance of implementing good corporate governance practices which influence CIR 
practices and result in increasing the disclosure quality and improving the level of information 
transparency (Sarbanes, 2002). While many studies examine the association between voluntary 
disclosure and corporate governance, the effect of corporate governance on CIR still needs 
further examination, especially in developing countries. Third, reviewing the literature shows 
that most of the studies which investigate CIR and its determinants have been conducted in 
developed countries, while few studies have been carried out in developing countries. It is 
expected that the association between voluntary disclosure practices, corporate governance and 
firm financial performance will vary between developed and developing countries as a result 
of the variation in the legal system, cultures and the efficiency of the corporate governance 
system. Thus, it is important to study the effect of corporate governance and firm characteristics 
on voluntary disclosure in developing countries, especially Saudi Arabia, where studies are 
limited, to give insight about the impact of corporate governance on CIR.  
Fourth, Saudi Arabia is an important emerging market and a G20 country. The Saudi stock 
market represented 40% of the total Arab market capitalisation and 27% of the total Arab GDP 
in 2015 (AMF, 2016). Further, it is ranked 39 of the world’s 40 best-performing stock markets 
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and the fourth in the Arab region in 2013 (Bespoke Investment Group, 2013). Also, Saudi 
Arabia is one of the main oil producers in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), representing 32% of the total OPEC production in 2015, and it dominates 
one quarter of the world’s oil reserves (SFG, 2016). Although the economic importance of 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries as the largest oil producers is very significant, research 
about their financial and commercial situation is very limited (Baydoun et al., 2013). 
Moreover, there are many distinctive attributes of Saudi Arabia in terms of regulatory, 
institutional and social aspects. To be specific, it is an Islamic country and its legal system is 
based on Islamic law (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). Thus, Saudi society is greatly affected 
by Islamic principles and values in all its aspects, including business, economics and law. 
Corporate operations and financial activities are highly influenced by the adherence to these 
principles in many forms, such as prohibiting interest as well as Mosharkah and Murabaha 
transactions, thus attracting greater attention to study CIR and corporate governance practices 
in Saudi Arabia (Kamla, 2009). Another unique feature of the Saudi context is its culture. Saudi 
corporations are dominated by strong social norms where informal social relations like tribal, 
family and personal relationships are very powered (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel, 2008). Further, political connections and government intervention have a noticeable 
influence on transparency, disclosure and corporate governance practice in the Saudi context. 
These distinctive and important differences related to the Saudi environment make it very 
informative to explore CIR and corporate governance practice in Saudi Arabia. Fifth, the Saudi 
market has witnessed considerable changes that are expected to affect CIR practices among 
listed companies, starting with the fast growth in the number of listed companies, followed by 
the issuance of the Code of Corporate Governance and its recent amendments, which make 
most of its articles mandatory. Subsequent to this is the recent Saudi Arabia Monetary 
Agency’s (SAMA) decision related to the transition to International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), which requires all Saudi companies to prepare their financial reports 
according to IFRSs from the beginning of 2017 (CMA), as well as the new foreign investment 
regulations. Therefore, it worthwhile examining CIR practices after considering the effects of 
these changes to gain a complete understanding of the actual situation in the Saudi business 
environment. Finally, studying the main factors that affect CIR and its economic consequences 
can be beneficial for several parties. For companies, the empirical conclusions of this study can 
motivate companies to adopt CIR in order to obtain the anticipated benefits and improve their 
performance. Furthermore, adopting CIR may encourage more investments and enhance the 
company’s image, which results in lower capital cost, higher value and better competitive 
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opportunities. For regulators, the study may raise the awareness of the influence of corporate 
governance and firm characteristics on CIR, which may require changes in regulations to 
promote transparency and disclosure quality that satisfy the stakeholders’ needs. For 
researchers, highlighting CIR and the key factors that affect its applications in an emerging 
market, i.e. the Saudi market, may be useful for understanding the CIR practices of other 
developing countries, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which have a 
similar background, and developing new ideas of future research in this area.   
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no single study comprehensively investigates the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on CIR and its components or the effect of CIR 
on firm financial performance in the Saudi context. This research hopes to fill this gap by 
examining the association between corporate governance, firm characteristics and CIR, and the 
effect of CIR on firm financial performance in the Saudi listed companies.  
1.6 Thesis structure  
 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters, as follows:   
Chapter One introduces the research aims, objectives and the related questions and discusses 
the importance and motivation of the study. This chapter concludes with the structure of the 
thesis.   
Chapter Two provides a brief overview of the nature of CIR, its advantages and disadvantages, 
and the expansion of CIR practices. The development of the accounting profession in Saudi 
Arabia is demonstrated, which helps to explore the current CIR practices and shed light on the 
importance of studying CIR and the motivation for using the internet as a disclosure means by 
Saudi listed companies. Further, this chapter presents the corporate governance definition, 
objectives, importance and mechanisms, which include the main variables. It also presents a 
review of the corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia to give a clear perception of 
the expected influence of corporate governance on CIR in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, this chapter 
reviews the previous studies of internet reporting from both developed and developing 
countries. These studies are categorized into four groups: studies that deal with corporate 
reporting, studies that describe the actual practice of CIR, studies that examine the association 
between CIR and firm characteristics, and studies that examine the relationship between CIR 
and corporate governance variables. This chapter ends with the studies that have been 
conducted in the Saudi context. Reviewing the existing literature in the CIR field helps to 
identify the gap that will be filled by this study. 
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Chapter Three summarises the key theories used in the disclosure literature. This study adopts 
a multi-theoretical perspective that provides a comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
between CIR and the explanatory variables. Many approaches are reviewed, namely the 
economic, political economic, cost-benefit and innovation adoption approach, whereby each 
approach includes different theories that are employed to justify the hypotheses and interpret 
the empirical findings. The chapter also discusses the development of the study’s hypotheses. 
This development is based on the theoretical framework and evidence from previous studies. 
Four main hypotheses are formulated according to the association between CIR and four 
groups of independent variables. These groups are the firm characteristics variables and three 
groups related to corporate governance variables, namely board of directors, ownership 
structure and audit committee. Then, the main hypotheses are divided into several sub-
hypotheses to be tested empirically.      
Chapter Four demonstrates the methodology used in this study. It discusses various research 
paradigms, approaches and methods to justify the chosen methodology. The research design is 
presented in detail to show its compatibility with the research objectives and questions. The 
chapter also discusses the most appropriate method to measure CIR, the proxies of the 
independent variables, and the statistical analyses of the data used to test the research model in 
the study.  
Chapter Five aims to achieve the first objective of the study and answer its first question by 
presenting the actual practices of CIR and its components of the Saudi listed companies. It 
begins by explaining the reliability and validity of the research instrument used to measure 
CIR, the disclosure index, then provides a descriptive analysis of the results of the constructed 
checklist. It reveals the extent of CIR and its components in the Saudi context.  
Chapter Six examines the association between CIR and the independent variables. It presents 
a descriptive analysis of the explanatory variables, followed by a bivariate analysis between 
the dependent variable CIR and each of the independent variables. Two types of bivariate 
analysis are used, namely parametric and nonparametric, to support these relationships. 
Further, a multivariate analysis is performed using the two regression models of un-
transformation and log transformation, while the bootstrap model is used to add robustness to 
the results. The study also employs reduced models as supplementary analyses. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the obtained results and a hypotheses test. Hence, this 
chapter answers the second research question regarding the significant factors affecting CIR 
practice.     
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Chapter Seven presents the relationship between CIR components and the explanatory 
variables. The same analyses carried out in chapter eight are performed in this chapter. 
Explaining such relationships provides a more in-depth understanding and sheds light on the 
importance of each CIR component.  
Chapter Eight illustrates the impact of CIR on firm financial performance in the Saudi 
context. This chapter starts by reviewing the previous studies related to CIR’s economic 
consequences, followed by the theoretical bases for hypothesis formulation and the employed 
models used to test the relationship between CIR and firm financial performance. Afterwards, 
the empirical results of these models are analysed then discussed using both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. Thus, the chapter answers the third research question about the influence 
of CIR on firm financial performance, which may support its adoption by Saudi listed 
companies.  
Chapter Nine is the conclusion of the study. It provides a summary of the study findings. 
Moreover, it discusses the contributions of the current study, outlines its limitations and, 





























  CORPORATE INTERNET REPORTING AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BACKGROUND 




The internet plays a crucial role in economic development and business growth. It provides a 
vast quantity of information to a wide range of users in a timely manner. Thus, an increasing 
number of companies tend to use the internet to disseminate information voluntarily to their 
stakeholders to benefit from the opportunities offered by the internet (Kamel and Hussein, 
2002). Many companies rely entirely on the internet to publish their reports, while others are 
combining online reporting with hard copy (Line et al., 2002). Moreover, the advanced markets 
have experienced many collapses, which has explicated the importance of corporate 
governance that can control performance and balance different users’ interests. The 
transparency of disclosed information is one of the main objectives of corporate governance; 
hence, distributing information online may help to achieve this goal. As such, it is assumed 
that implementing corporate governance mechanisms may have an influence on the decision 
to adopt internet reporting made by Saudi companies. Therefore, this chapter deals with the 
nature of internet reporting and its present importance, which makes it fruitful area to study. In 
addition, the nature of corporate governance is discussed in this chapter to demonstrate its 
importance and to rationalize corporate governance variables that are likely to affect internet 
reporting. Moreover, the studies that have spotlighted issues and practices related to the recent 
emergence of internet reporting as well as the determents of CIR will be overviewed in general 
focusing on the more important factors, namely firm characteristics and corporate governance. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the concept of internet reporting, its 
main advantages and disadvantages, the expansion of CIR practices and describes the 
accounting profession in Saudi Arabia. Section 2.3 discusses the corporate governance system 
and demonstrates the corporate governance system in Saudi Arabia. Section 2.4  outlines the 
prior studies that have investigated CIR and the association between CIR and its explanatory 




2.2 Corporate Internet Reporting (CIR) 
 
Disclosure can be defined as “the communication of information by people inside the public 
firms towards people outside” (Farvaque et al., 2011, p. 8). Companies can communicate 
required information to all stakeholders through different means, including formal financial 
reporting, press releases, conferences and websites. Hence, the dynamic nature of the business 
environment, which has many challenges and opportunities (Elliott, 2002), encourages 
companies to adopt the internet as a tool to disclose information to their stakeholders. Recently, 
it is claimed that a considerable number of companies adopt technologies combined with more 
complex internet use in their websites (Fisher and Naylor, 2016). Corporate internet reporting 
(CIR) is considered a type of voluntary disclosure that is described as “disclosure, primarily 
outside the financial statements, that is not explicitly required by GAAP or an SEC rule” 
(FASB, 2001, p.5). Thus, corporate internet reporting can be defined as a voluntary disclosure 
tool that enables companies to disclose all or a proportion of its financial and non-financial 
information on the internet, presented in multiple formats and languages by using the most 
advanced and interactive electronic features to facilitate the communication through and usage 
of the website (Arafa, 2012).  
 
2.2.1 The nature of corporate internet reporting  
 
Given the companies’ willingness to fulfil the needs of stakeholders for accurate information 
in a timely basis, CIR demands a continuous updating of information disclosed online. The 
internet has many distinctive features that make it more relevant to CIR. One of the most 
interesting features is the flexibility of presentation, whereby companies can customise their 
reports and produce them in multiple formats and languages depending on the users’ needs. 
Dull et al. (2003) conclude that presentation format has a considerable effect on internet 
disclosure for some companies, particularly those of smaller size. In addition, the dynamic and 
interactive features of internet permit direct communication, such as mailing lists and online 
participation, which enable companies to rapidly update and thus increase the usefulness of 
information disclosed online (Khadaroo, 2005). Further, because internet disclosure is 
voluntary, companies can use the internet to provide various types of reports at low costs with 
no conclusive content and under no regulations (Debreceny et al., 2002). Moreover, Xiao et al. 
 
25 
(2002) state that the internet has a great impact on communicating corporate reporting because 
of its distinctive features, such as incorporating advanced multimedia and other technologies 
that enhance accessibility, distribution and presentation. The use of the internet enables a 
worldwide dissemination of corporate information and increases the number of potential users 
as the internet is not restricted to national boundaries (Debreceny et al., 2002). Besides, Using 
the internet promote the ability to compare and analyse data in an efficient way (Omran and 
Ramdhony, 2016). These unique features of the internet imply substantial effects that benefit 
both companies and stakeholders. The expected advantages and disadvantages of disclosing 
information on the internet are discussed in the following sections.  
2.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of adopting internet reporting 
 
There are many advantages stemming from disclosing information via the internet. First, it 
reduces the cost and time of disseminating information; when stakeholders use the internet to 
obtain required information, the cost of printing and distributing annual and interim reports can 
be avoided (FASB, 2000) and the time associated with this is saved, increasing the timeliness 
and thus the usefulness of the disclosed information (Shepherd et al., 2001). Second, internet 
reporting makes the information available to a wider range of users with unrestricted access, 
which increases stocks liquidity and decreases capital cost (Ashbaugh et al., 1999). Third, the 
internet facilitates accessing to the required information anywhere and at any time (Xiao et al., 
2004). Fourth, companies can provide various types of reports in different dynamic forms, such 
as weekly or monthly reports, and use graphics or even audio or video to improve the 
presentation of performance information and help in evaluating their financial position (FASB, 
2000); and finally, the internet enables the easy searching for and downloading of information 
(Fisher et al., 2004). However, adopting internet reporting has some disadvantages. First, 
internet reporting may lack reliability as the company can publish unaudited financial reports 
on its website or provide links to unaudited information (Ashbaugh et al., 1999). Second, 
internet reporting may create additional costs such as the cost of preparing financial reports 
and the litigation cost that occur when investor rely on unaudited financial information in their 
decisions (Mokhtar, 2017). Third, poor web security can add greater risk to internet reporting; 
hackers may fraudulently alter reliable financial information if web security is inadequate (Aly, 
2008). Fourth, another risk is represented by the links provided on the website, since users may 
assume that all linked information is as accurate and reliable as that on the company’s website. 
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Finally, users may become lost whilst using the navigation tools, such as the forward and back 
buttons, which may harm the integrity of financial reports (ibid).  
Nevertheless, as the advantages of adopting internet reporting overweigh the disadvantages, 
the online disclosure of information internet reporting has become increasingly important and 
popular over the years. The next section discusses this in detail.   
 
2.2.3 Expansion of CIR practices 
 
The rapid development of the business environment encourages companies to expand their 
internet usage. Many studies have been conducted to illustrate the impact of the expansion of 
internet usage on corporate reporting. Asmoro (2018) stated that many Indonesian companies 
that used to rely on paper-based reports, now shift to web-based reports. Deller et al. (1999) 
investigated the use of the internet for the purpose of investor relations in the US, UK and 
Germany. They found that internet investor relations in the US are more advanced than in the 
UK and Germany. Although the internet opportunities were only partially exploited in the US 
at that time, American companies were the world leaders in this field. Further, Elliott 
(1992,1994) reports that information technology affects business and leads to many changes in 
external accounting, whereby more frequent reports can be produced and there is more 
disclosure of non-financial information. Gray and Debreceny (1997) state that 69% of US 
industrial companies publish their annual reports online. They illustrate that these companies 
endeavour to convert these reports from hard copy to soft copy on the internet, and that these 
contain complete web-documents. Similarly, Ashbaugh et al. (1999) indicate that 70% of large 
American companies disclose financial information online although it is not compulsory under 
US security regulations. They claim that poor security and being unaudited make internet 
reporting practices unreliable. Moreover, Xiao et al. (2005) assert that companies are required 
to disclose more non-financial information in their reports and should have real-time financial 
reporting. Realizing the importance of internet for corporate reporting, many researchers 
believe that hard copy reports will eventually be overtaken by web-based reports in most 
companies. For example, Oyelere et al. (2003) predict that companies will soon depend on the 
internet as the main disclosure tool and that paper-based reports will no longer be produced. 
Accordingly, many professional bodies (CICA, IASC, AICPA, FASB) are investigating the 
current practices of internet reporting and the inclusions of technology for corporate reporting 
in the future. The report of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) identifies 
the present practices and the expected future of internet reporting. It recommends generating 
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special reports that implement new regulations and focus on different users’ needs beyond 
traditional financial reports and principles (CICA, 1999). Also, the International Accounting 
Standard Committee (IASC) (1999) suggests that corporate reporting, in the near future, will 
employ the internet as its main dissemination channel and use paper-based reports as a minor 
channel. Meanwhile, a study by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) discusses 
the electronic distribution of information and the effect of the internet on corporate reporting 
(FASB, 2000), and a report of the American Institute of Public Certified Accountants (AICPA) 
indicates that the accounting profession should carefully consider theories and means that could 
improve corporate reporting (Jenkins report) (AICPA, 1994). Further, other regulatory bodies 
attach great importance to the relevance and usefulness of online disclosure, especially after 
recent scandals and the failure of some leading businesses (e. g., Enron). For example, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes, 2002) requires certain procedures that enhance reporting 
practices, and Regulation FD, issued in 2002 by the SEC, asserts the benefits of real-time 
reporting and prompts companies to adopt internet reporting (SEC Release No. 33-7881). 
These regulations encourage the use of corporate websites as a main channel of disclosing 
information to all users and reinforce the importance of internet reporting. Moreover, the 
dynamic changes in the business environment and the increased level of transparency required 
by stakeholders raise questionability about the adequacy of traditional financial reporting in 
satisfying the different needs of stakeholders (Lev, 2000). Hence, based on the distinctive 
features of the internet, these changes have resulted in significant changes in disclosure quality 
on company website and improved communication ways with stakeholders via the internet 
(Marston and Polei, 2004; ). Likewise, in the Saudi context, many changes have taken place to 
develop the accounting profession and disclosure practices. The development of the accounting 
profession is demonstrated in the next section.  
2.2.4 The accounting profession in Saudi Arabia  
 
It is important to discuss the development of the accounting profession as this helps to 
determine the level of requirements for and demands on disclosure and transparency as well as 
explore the actual practice of CIR. Shinawi and Crum (1971) state that the accounting 
profession did not exist in Saudi Arabia until the early 1970s, and that the accounting practices 
were derived from other countries, such as the UK, Egypt and Sudan. However, the Income 
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Tax and Zakat 1Law, which was issued in 1950, is considered a critical cornerstone in the 
development of the accounting profession in Saudi Arabia. This law demands that all 
individuals and companies maintain precise accounting records demonstrating their capital, 
income and expenses during the year in order to assess the tax or Zakat (Al-Mulhem, 1997). 
the Department of Zakat and Income Tax declares that financial statements prepared according 
to internationally accepted practices is acceptable when assessing income tax, although the 
international approach to be applied is not specified. As such, some Saudi companies use the 
standards of the International Accounting Standard Committee; others refer to the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and a few use Canadian Standards (Merei, 1985) 
The Ministry of Commerce is regarded as one of the most important official bodies affecting 
the accounting profession. It has been responsible for regulating, implementing and governing 
the rules for all companies working in the Saudi market. In 1965, the Ministry of Commerce 
released the Companies Act, which is considered the primary official guideline for accounting 
practice. The Act includes 234 articles and deals mainly with the regulations for different types 
of commercial companies, the required annual financial statements, the  
appointment of the auditor and his role, and penalties for violation (Al-Harkan, 2005; Alshehri, 
2012). However, the Company Act gives no definition of the concepts and objectives regarding 
the accounting information, neither does it mention accounting and auditing standards (Al-
Amari, 1989). 
The Accountants Law is another regulation issued by the Ministry of Commerce in 1974 
(entirely amended in 1992). This law established the Supreme Committee for Professional 
Accountants to supervise accountants and auditors. It contains 38 articles that include the basic 
requirements for practicing the accounting profession, such as registration conditions and 
procedures, the responsibilities of accountants, violation penalties, and the establishment and 
regulations of the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants. These laws were the 
only existing legal sources for accountants and companies until 1986. Thus, they demonstrated 
insufficient support for the accounting profession, which can be noticed in the differences 
between companies in reporting Zakat and income tax and in their annual reports. In 1981, the 
accounting department of King Saud University formed the Saudi Accounting Association 
(SAA). This association aims to publish academic resources, provide training opportunities 
and promote accounting studies. In addition, the SAA issues the Accounting Research Journal, 
                                                
 
1 Zakat is “one of the five Islamic Principles. It is a religious tax levied on capital and earnings. The fixed rate of 
Zakat is 2.5 %”. (Al-Mulhem, 1997, p.138). 
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which is a peer-review journal that contributes to the development of the accounting profession 
(Al-Angari, 1999; Al-Eissa, 2009).  
Until 1983, there was no formal stock market in SA. The first step to regulate the stock market 
was in 1984, when a ministerial committee, as a division within the Banking Control 
Department of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), was formed and took on the 
responsibilities of stock trading. In 1985, the government established the Saudi Shares 
Registration Company (SSRC), whereby its shareholding is limited to banks (Tadawul official 
site). Another leading development in the stock market was the foundation of the Electronic 
Securities and Information System (ESIS) in 1990, which was the first automated system for 
share-trading in SA. In 2001, ESIS was substituted by a more advanced electronic trading 
system, Tadawul, which facilitated share trading via the internet. This new system was able to 
deal with a large volume of transactions and promote market liquidity due to its ease of use, 
transparency and high-speed processing (ibid). SAMA was the only official body that regulated 
and supervised the stock market until the formation of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 
2003 by the Saudi Capital Market Law, as the sole authorized body to regulate and monitor the 
Saudi stock exchange. This organization has a full legal, administrative and financial 
independence to ensure objectivity and fairness in conducting its duties (Al-Harkan, 2005). 
The main objectives of the CMA include issuing rules and regulations related to the 
implementation of the Capital Market Law provisions and investor protection, enhancing 
transparency and disclosure standards in listed companies, and monitoring stocks issues to 
ensure the full disclosure of any related information. In 2007, the Saudi Stock Exchange 
Company (Tadawul) was established as a joint stock company responsible for all exchange 
activities. Currently, the Saudi stock market is the largest exchange in the Arab region (see 
Figure 2-1), with 175 listed companies distributed across 20 sectors and the market 
capitalization that expanded remarkably from SR 274,530 million in 2001 to reach SR 
1,681,950 million by the end of 2016 (Tadawul official site). However, the Saudi stock market 
suffers from two major problems: insider trading, which depends on sensitive information not 
available to the public, and information leakage through informal channels (Al-Razeen,1999). 
The development of the Saudi stock market, the provisions of the Accountants Law and the 
endeavours of the SAA have led to a rapid evolution in accounting practice represented by the 
issuance of the concepts and objectives of financial accounting, the general presentation 
 and disclosure standards, and the establishment of the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA).  
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In 1980, the Ministry of Commerce assigned the Al-Rashed office (CPA firm) to prepare a 





Figure 2.1: Market Weights in the AMF Index, Fourth Quarter 2016 
 
Source: (Arab Capital Markets, 4th Quarter Bulletin 2016, Arab Monetary Fund) 
 
environment. The recommendations of this study, which are Accounting, Objectives and 
Concepts, and General Standard of Presentation and Disclosure and Auditing Standards, were 
approved by the ministry in 1986 and became the official guide for accounting professionals 
and practitioners. By 1990, all companies were mandated to comply with these standards when 
preparing their annual reports. The most significant progress in the accounting profession in 
Saudi Arabia was the formation of the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants 
(SOCPA) in 1992. The SOCPA is chaired by the Minister of Commerce and operates to 
promote the accounting and auditing profession and enhance its status. The main objectives of 
the SOCPA are to develop and issue accounting and auditing standards and to supervise the 
auditing profession by reviewing audit firms’ performance using quality control programs, 
holding CPA exams, organizing continuous professional education, and conducting research 
and studies related to the profession (SOCPA official site).  
Accordingly, it can be stated that the government has made a considerable effort to develop 
the accounting profession and to enhance the quality of disclosure and transparency in 
particular. Indeed, to preserve high-quality disclosure and transparency, it is essential to have 
good corporate governance systems that are able to protect the interests of all stakeholders. 
Thus, the corporate governance system is illustrated in the following section.  
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2.3 Corporate governance  
 
Corporate governance is a vital issue that is extensively considered by regulators and capital 
market participants. Corporate governance has been used since companies developed their 
current form (Cadbury, 2002) and, as stated by the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), there have 
been many debates on the concept of corporate governance over the past three decades. Yet, 
many problems have been occurred in accounting, auditing and corporate governance that have 
weakened the quality and integrity of financial reporting and have caused the collapse of many 
businesses, such as the scandals of Maxwell, Enron, WorldCom and the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce. This situation proves the serious need for a sound corporate governance system as 
a tool that organizes the relationship between shareholders and management and prevents such 
problems from reoccurring.  
2.3.1 Corporate governance definition 
 
The term corporate governance has no generally accepted definition. Nevertheless, it can be 
perceived from a narrow or broad perspective, depending on the viewpoint of the policy maker, 
professional, researcher or theorist (Solomon, 2010). The narrow approach focuses on the 
interests of shareholders, which is asserted in agency theory. It simply views that the demand 
for corporate governance mechanisms is derived from the segregation between managers and 
shareholders (Gillan, 2006). Thus, the Cadbury Report defines corporate governance as “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 2000, P.1). Moreover, 
Parkinson (1994) states that the role of corporate governance is to ensure that managers behave 
in favour of the interests of shareholders. Also, Ng and Koh (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
and Monks and Minow (2004) embrace the same approach and concentrate only on 
shareholders’ interests. However, the broad perspective takes into account all stakeholders, 
such as shareholders, customers and suppliers. That is, the broader definition, conforming with 
stakeholder theory, considers corporate governance to concern all parties and be responsible to 
the whole of society. Among these definitions, Gillan and Starks (1998, P. 4) state that 
corporate governance is “the system of laws, rules and factors that control operations at a 
company”. Further, Donnelly and Mulcahly (2008, P. 416) define corporate governance as “a 
set of control mechanisms that is specially designed to monitor and ratify managerial decisions, 
and to ensure the efficient operation of a corporation on behalf of its stakeholders.” Solomon 
(2010, P. 6) defines corporate governance as "... the system of checks and balances, both 
internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
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accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their 
business activity ".  
Overall, all these definitions, whether the company is accountable towards narrow or broad 
parties, maintain a central point, which is the structure of corporate governance that forms to 
manage and control company activities and strategies. In line with this, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition asserts that corporate 
governance is “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the 
company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring” (OECD, 2004, P. 11). 
2.3.2 The objectives of corporate governance 
 
Many objectives can be accomplished by applying an effective corporate governance structure. 
Initially, effective corporate governance is able to enhance monitoring quality and controlling 
management actions and performance; thus, it is considered mechanism of accountability 
(Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). Further, because of the separation between owners and 
managers and the need to balance the interests of all parties inside and outside the company, 
efficient corporate governance seeks to alleviate conflicts of interest between shareholders, 
directors, managers and other stakeholders (Monks and Minow, 2004). Other objectives of 
corporate governance are to reduce information asymmetry, which improves a corporation’s 
transparency (Hidalgo et al., 2011), and to select committees that protect shareholders’ 
welfares and increase their wealth. In 1999, the OECD issued the principles of corporate 
governance, which are considered as the benchmark for best practice. These principles were 
revised in 2004 and adjusted according to the recent changes and developments in business. 
The main subjects of the OECD principles are reinforcement of the bases for an efficient 
corporate governance structure; shareholders’ rights and main ownership functions; fair 
treatment of shareholders; stakeholders’ role in corporate government; disclosure and 




2.3.3 The importance of corporate governance 
In the last few years, corporate governance has gained more attention as one of the most broadly 
debated issues in both academic and business settings. The importance of corporate governance 
has emerged from scandals and financial setbacks where evidence of improper corporate 
governance has appeared. The collapses in international business have impaired the confidence 
of investors in capital markets and have exposed the need for substantial improvements in the 
corporate governance system (Rawy, 2004). Further, implementing a sound corporate 
governance structure can improve confidence in corporate reporting as a tool for distributing 
information. Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes, 2002) recommends that corporate 
governance should influence shareholders’ views of the information content of accounting 
earnings, and the UK Corporate Governance Combined Code (2003) stresses the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on improving the quality of accounting information. 
Therefore, corporate governance is important for many reasons, namely there is no definite 
framework to ensure that directors’ behaviour is regulated; the absence of firm accounting 
standards; the failure of financial reports to meet the needs of all users; the inadequate role of 
independent auditors; the diffusion of shareholders beyond geographical boundaries 
(Macdonald and Beattie, 1993; Demirag and Solomon, 2003); the vital effect of corporate 
governance on attracting foreign investments (Almajid, 2008); and finally, the existence of 
sound corporate governance structures is significantly enhanced employees’ welfare, improves 
transparency and ensure better disclosure quality (Zhong et al., 2017). 
Based on the importance of corporate governance structure, numerous studies have 
investigated the association between the quality of corporate governance, disclosure decisions 
and other aspects of the corporate. The following section deals with the main variables of 
corporate governance that are expected to have a considerable influence.     
2.3.4 Corporate governance mechanisms  
 
Empirically, it is generally accepted that governance mechanisms have a great impact on 
enhancing different aspects of companies. Many studies have been conducted recently, mostly 
in developed countries, to examine the role of corporate governance in improving companies’ 
performance and encouraging responsible behaviour. Thus, many corporate governance 
variables can be deduced from these previous studies that can help study the impact of these 
variables on internet reporting. Cohen et al. (2002, P.587) state that “...one of the most 
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important functions that corporate governance can play is in ensuring the quality of the 
financial reporting process”. In the current corporate environment, good corporate governance 
mechanisms include a thoughtfully composed board of directors, a balanced ownership 
structure and an adequate audit committee (Habbash, 2010). The board of directors is one of 
the most commonly researched governance mechanisms in the governance literature (Dalton 
et al., 1998). Usually, the board of directors is nominated directly by shareholders and, thus, 
should act in a way that maximizes their shareholder interests. It serves as a link between 
owners (shareholders) and agents (managers). The board of directors can be composed of 
different types of directors: inside directors (executive director) and outside directors (non-
executive director or independent director). The main role of the board is to monitor and control 
the performance of managers (Cadbury, 1992) to ensure that they behave in their shareholders’ 
best interests. Many variables are related to the mechanism of the board of directors, among 
these are size, independence, board duality, family members on the board, foreign members on 
the board and the frequency of board meetings. The other effective factor of corporate 
governance is ownership structure. The structure, concentration and identity of ownership are 
all important to ensure that managers are adequately monitored and controlled. It is assumed 
that ownership structure varies depending on the legal, regulatory environment and other 
country-related factors. The problem of ownership structure may be attributed to the agency 
problem in two different forms. First, if ownership is dispersed among many shareholders, the 
interests of managers may not correspond to those of shareholders. Second, if ownership is 
concentrated among a few people or families, this may affect management and harm minority 
rights (Alshehri, 2012). As such, protecting shareholders’ rights, which is determined by the 
legal system, is a critical issue in discussing ownership structure. Mallin (2007) states that the 
legal systems in developed countries ensure a fundamental protection for minority 
shareholders, thus the ownership become more diversified. The ownership structure can be 
classified into different forms: family or individual ownership; institutional; managerial; 
governmental and foreign ownership. Moreover, an active audit committee is an essential 
mechanism of effective corporate governance. The role of the audit committee is to ensure the 
precision of the financial reports (Buchalter and Yokomoto, 2003) and to provide the necessary 
monitoring to protect investor interests and enhance confidence in stock markets. The audit 
committee acts as a communication channel between the board, the internal monitoring system 
and the external auditor (Habbash, 2010). The main characteristics of an audit committee are 
size, meeting frequency, independence, and expertise. Consequently, in the current study, 
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board of directors, ownership and audit committee are investigated to assess their association 
with CIR.  
2.3.5 Corporate governance in Saudi Arabia 
 
Corporate governance improvements are an important part of Saudi economic developments. 
These improvements concur with the increasing concerns for corporate governance resulting 
from the collapses in both developed and developing countries (e.g., Barings Bank, Enron and 
WorldCom and the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis). However, the current practice of Saudi 
companies is still beyond the practices of developed countries (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). 
Saudi society is mainly characterised by the role of family and personal relationships over 
regulations, privilege afforded to particular individuals over tasks, and the presence of a high 
level of secrecy. It is noticeable that many Saudi companies are dominated by family business 
and that the government is highly involved in the private sector (Al-Amari, 1989; Al-Rumaihi, 
1997; Al-Nodel, 2004). Until the early 2000s, less attention was paid to corporate governance. 
The Company Act of 1965 was, until 2006, the main source to regulate and govern companies’ 
performance in Saudi Arabia (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). It determines the legal framework 
for business and stipulates the distribution of annual financial statements audited by an 
independent licensed auditor (Al-Rehaily, 1992; Al-Nodel, 2004). A critical limitation of this 
Act is that it does not directly mention corporate governance mechanisms expect for a few 
provisions about board characteristics and shareholders’ general assembly. Further, issues 
related to transparency, disclosure, accountability and shareholders’ protection are not 
addressed by this Act. Because there was no supervisory body, SAMA was responsible for 
regulating and controlling stock market transactions from 1985 until 2003, when the CMA was 
founded and took the responsibility of monitoring corporate governance practices and 
regulating the stock market (Tadawul, 2014). Consequently, there was a strong demand for 
developing the Saudi stock market and establishing an accurate corporate governance system. 
These demands included strengthening the financial market (e.g., by increasing the number of 
listed companies and permitting foreign investor participation); enhancing disclosure and 
transparency; providing corporate governance rules to protect shareholders’ rights; and 
improving external corporate governance mechanisms (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). A 
limited number of studies have been conducted to discuss issues related to corporate 
governance and its mechanisms in Saudi Arabia (e.g. Al-Harkan, 2005; Al-Ajlan, 2005; Al–
Twaijry et al., 2002; Falgi, 2009; Alshehri, 2012). Furthermore, some international bodies (e.g., 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the OECD) suggested that developing 
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countries, and Saudi Arabia in particular, should pay more attention to improving corporate 
governance practices and introduce a code of good corporate governance (Clarke, 2004; 
Albassam, 2014). Although the corporate governance restructuring commenced in 2003 with 
the foundation of CMA, it was not formally established until the introduction of the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006 (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Moataz and 
Hussainey, 2012). In February 2006, the stock market suffered from sharp decline resulting in 
a loss of about 53% of its market value. The index dropped from approximately 20,600 in 
February 2006 to 7,900 in December 2006 (Tadawul, 2007). This dramatic crash highlighted 
the need to take remedial action to enhance corporate governance regulations and mechanisms 
(Alkhaldi, 2015). As an immediate response to the market crash, the CMA issued the SCGC in 
November 2006 to ensure fairness and confidence in the Saudi market, improve corporate 
governance practices and protect investors effectively. Saudi Arabia was the second country to 
implement corporate governance for the listed companies in the GCC countries after Oman 
(Buallay et al., 2017).The code is mainly derived from the 1992 UK Cadbury Report (Al-
Abbas, 2009). It aims to provide a guideline and does not stipulate mandatory provisions 2 of 
best governance practices that listed companies should follow. However, listed companies 
should report to CMA regarding their compliance with the provisions of the SCGC and the 
reasons for incompliance. The SCGC covers many corporate governance topics, including 
shareholders’ rights and the general assembly; disclosure and transparency; board of directors; 
internal controls; and risk management (CMA, 2012). Moreover, other regulations, such as the 
Market Law and Listing Rules, were released in 2004 and implemented by the CMA to reform 
corporate governance practices.  
 
2.4 Literature review of internet reporting 
 
In the light of the recent innovations in technology and the new network communication 
emergence, changes are required of accounting – both internal and external reporting – to 
counter the new stream of demands on business decision-making. In this developing era of 
information, the conventional communication system based on printed reports has become less 
efficient to satisfy users’ needs due to its relative lack of timeliness, accessibility, interactivity 
                                                
 
2 In February 2017, an amended SCGC was issued. It contains new topics such as company committees, the 
company’s external auditor, professional and ethical standards. Also, it states that these regulations are 
mandatory except the provisions that contain a reference to being guiding (CMA, 2017). 
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or sufficient detail (Lodhia et al., 2004). Consequently, many companies have shifted to the 
internet to disseminate their corporate information on the companies’ websites in order to be 
in line with the new requirements of today’s corporate environment. Coincidentally, regulatory 
bodies have made remarkable endeavours to improve reporting quality by encouraging, and in 
some cases requiring, companies to use the internet as a prime tool for information 
dissemination. On January 31, 2000 (updated on May 21, 2002) the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) released the first published section of its Business Reporting 
Research Project (BRRP) entitled, Electronic Distribution of Business Reporting Information. 
In this project, two separate studies were conducted to determine the kind of business 
information that corporations are reporting outside of financial statements. The first one 
explores the electronic delivering of business reports and highlights the expected promise 
opportunities and problems associated with the use of internet and technology in business 
reporting. The second one investigates the reporting requirements of the SEC and the FASB 
and suggests way of terminating any duplication or overlap.  
The growth of concerns regarding the use of the internet as a medium for distribution business 
reporting information has modified the process of information flows from companies to 
investors, creditors and other stakeholders. Furthermore, it is believed that this process is 
influenced by many factors, both inside and outside corporations (see figure 2-2). As a 
consequence of this evolution in corporate reporting, the present study is an attempt to extend 
the in-depth understanding of the new corporate reporting environment created by the internet 
in Saudi Arabia in particular and to examine some of the drivers and underlying factors related 
to this form of reporting. Since disclosure is an "accounting activity involving both human and 
nonhuman resources or techniques as well as the interaction between the two" (Perera, 1994; 
p. 268), it is vital for research in this area to point out this important issue. Hence, incorporating 
corporate governance variables that address the human aspect in disclosure practice may 
provide better explanations of the extent of corporate reporting practice using the internet. 
Underlining this view, Choi and Levich (1990) and Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) aver that 
disclosure practice diversity does not evolve in a vacuum, but rather reflects the fundamental 
environmental factors’ influences, such as the behavioural, economic, and cultural factors that 
affect companies’ practices in different countries. While economic aspects have been 
extensively researched, there is a strong argument for more empirical research into the social 
and behavioural implications of information technology in relation to corporate disclosure. 
Thus, this research will concentrate on corporate governance as the main human factor 
affecting internet reporting.  
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This section overviews those studies that have spotlighted issues and practices related to the 
recent emergence of internet reporting as well as the determents of CIR in general focusing on 
the more important factors, namely firm characteristics and corporate governance. Three areas 
will be considered, namely CIR practice, CIR determinants, and CIR in Saudi Arabia and its 
gaps. Considering the clear relevance of internet reporting to corporate reporting, a review of 
previous studies related to corporate reporting will be discussed first in the next sub-section. 
 
Figure 2.2:   The Evolution of Accounting and Reporting Practices 
 
2.4.1 Corporate Reporting  
 
Corporate reporting is one of the most interesting accounting research areas. Corporate 
reporting can be defined as “the process by which accounting measurements are communicated 
to their intended users” (Choi and Meek, 2008). The disclosure of financial information has 
gained considerable attention among many countries and international bodies around the entire 
world. The accounting and disclosure requirements of the UK SSAP and FRS, the US GAAP 
and SEC, the IASC, and Companies Acts in different countries are significant signs of the 
growing importance of financial disclosure. Adequate disclosure of financial information 
through corporate reports is of high priority to enhance different users’ abilities to make 
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decisions about investing their resources in an efficient way. The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) in its Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting declares that 
the main objective of financial reporting is “to provide financial information about the 
reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors 
in making decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, 
selling, or holding equity and debt instruments and providing or settling loans and other forms 
of credit.” (FASB, 2010). Thus, it is asserted that corporate reports should include all elements 
that are relevant and material to the decision-making process of the above-mentioned different 
users. Moreover, it is emphasized that the usefulness of financial information is enhanced if it 
is comparable, verifiable, timely and understandable (FASB, 2010). Pijper (1993) stated that 
corporate annual reports (printed or internet-based) are prepared mainly for external parties 
according to their informational needs. 
However, the nature and extent of corporate reporting has ignited worthwhile debate among 
researchers and corporate managers, discussing forked issues such as to whom reports are being 
provided to, the users' needs, the quantity of disclose information, the time of report disclosing 
and the medium by which reports are communicated to users. 
There is a considerable literature devoted to investigate corporate reporting in many aspects 
and in deferent countries. Many studies have discussed theoretically and empirically the nature 
and extent of corporate reporting and its role, determinants, consequences and relationship to 
many corporate characteristics (e.g. McNally et al., 1982; Abd-Elsalam, 1990; Cooke, 1992; 
Wallace et al., 1994; Al-Modahki, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Owusu-
Ansah, 1998; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Al-Razeen, 1999; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Eng and Mak, 2003; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003; 
Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; Gul and Leung, 2004; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Al-Htaybat, 2005; 
Grahama et al., 2005; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Khlif and Souissi, 
2008; Wang et al., 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Hassan et al., 2009; Hossain and Hammami, 
2009; Zaman Mir et al., 2009; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Wu, 2010; Stein, 2011; 
Katmun, 2012; Robertson et al., 2012; Swenson, 2012; Al-Janadi, et al., 2013; Kamel and 
Shahwan, 2014; Omran and El-Galfy, 2014; McChlery et al., 2015; Samaha et al., 2015; 
Schoenfeld, 2017).  
One of the leading studies that examine corporate disclosure in the developed countries is the 
study by Cooke (1992). This study investigated corporate reporting and the influence of size, 
stock market listing and industry type on mandatory and voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Japanese listed companies. The findings show that large and multiple listed 
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companies tend to disclose more information in their annual reports. Further, manufacturing 
companies are more likely to disclose additional information than other types of companies. 
Gul and Leung (2004) conducted another empirical study in Hong Kong to address the 
disclosure practice of 385 Hong Kong listed companies and to assess the association between 
role duality, board independence and voluntary corporate disclosures. The results of regression 
analyses reveal that the presence of role duality result in lower level of voluntary disclosures. 
Moreover, it was found that companies with a higher percentage of independent directors 
disclose less information in their annual reports. Recently in the US, Schoenfeld (2017) 
examined the level of voluntary disclosure using S&P 500 index and the impact of this 
disclosure on stock liquidity. It was found that voluntary disclosure increases when a company 
joins the S&P 500 index, and this increase is accompanied by increased stock liquidity.  
In developing countries, Haniffa’s study (1999) is one of the most important studies in the 
disclosure field. Haniffa conducted a comprehensive study concentrating on listed companies 
in Malaysia. The study aims to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosure (both non-social 
and social reporting) and analyse it item-by-item, assess the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and three groups of characteristics (corporation-specific, corporate governance and 
personal); and explore the features of companies and boards of directors of Malaysian listed 
companies. The three groups of variables are: 12 company-specific variables (size, assets-in-
place, industry type, listing age, complexity of business, level of diversification, multiple 
listing status, foreign activities, gearing, profitability, type of auditors and ownership 
structure); 7 corporate governance variables (cross-holdings of directorships, role duality, 
board composition, ratio of family members on the board, cross-holdings by chairperson, 
position of chairperson and significance of finance director sitting on the board); and 7 personal 
variables (race of chairperson, managing director, and finance director, ratio of bumiputra 
directors on the board, ratio of bumiputra ownership, qualification of finance directors and ratio 
of directors on the board trained in business/accounting). The findings show that profitability, 
top 10 shareholders and industry type are significantly associated with voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, two corporate governance variables (chair with cross-holdings and a non-executive 
chair) have a significant relation with disclosure, while two variables of personal 
characteristics; namely, ratio of bumiputra directors on boards and bumiputra finance directors 
have a significant impact on social reporting only.  
Moreover, Al-Htaybat (2005) carried out a theoretical and empirical investigation on the 
disclosure practice in Jordan. The level of printed (mandatory, voluntary and overall) financial 
disclosure was examined at two different points of time 1997and 2002 to identify the effect of 
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disclosure requirements that took place in 1998 and the existence of new technology 
developments in 2000. The study also examined the association between printed financial 
disclosure and company characteristics (size, age, profitability, industry type, ownership 
structure, and auditor size). Further, the level of Internet financial disclosure was assessed and 
its association with printed disclosure practices and company size in 2004. The results reveal 
that the overall level of financial disclosure has improved after the implementation of 
disclosure requirements in 1998. Regarding mandatory disclosure, no association was found 
with any of the company characteristics in 1997, however, positive associations were found 
with company size, company age and auditor size in 2002. With respect of voluntary 
disclosure, in 1997 it was found that company size, profitability, and the natural resources and 
food & clothing industries have significant associations, while only foreign ownership seems 
to have an impact on voluntary disclosure in 2002. In Egypt, Kamel and Shahwan (2014) 
empirically explored the level of voluntary disclosure and attempted to determine the effect of 
voluntary disclosure on the cost of equity and debt capital. The researchers constructed a 
disclosure index to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 73 
Egyptian listed companies. It was found that there is no association between voluntary 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital or debt capital.   
In the case of Saudi Arabia, as the first investor survey in Saudi Arabia, Abd-Elsalam (1990) 
focused on the investor’s level of use and understanding of the accounting information 
disclosed in the annual reports of Saudi companies. Using a questionnaire, the researcher 
concluded that corporate financial reports are considered very important and useful tools that 
investors rely on them to make their investment decisions. Later, Al-Razeen and Karbhari 
(2004) examined the interaction between the mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the annual 
reports. The sample consists of 68 Saudi companies (55 listed and 13 unlisted). The researchers 
constructed three disclosure indices relating to: mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure and 
voluntary disclosure that closely relates to mandatory disclosure. The findings show that there 
is no evident relationship between mandatory disclosure and the other types of disclosure in 
the different industrial sectors. These weak associations imply the lack of effective 
coordination between the management and the board of directors in preparing annual reports. 
However, this study was limited to the types of disclosure and no other determinants were 
taking into consideration with a relatively small sample size. In more recent study, Al-Janadi, 
et al. (2013) investigated the effect of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms 
on voluntary disclosure in Saudi listed companies. The study used the annual reports of 87 
companies to collect the data and measured voluntary disclosure by a new methodology which 
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use three levels of disclosure (2 if fully disclosed; 1 slightly disclosed, 0 not disclosed). The 
disclosure index consists of three main groups: General and Financial Information, Corporate 
Governance Information and Social and Environmental Information. The results reveal that 
non-executive directors, board size, CEO duality, audit quality, government ownership, firm 
size and financial sector have a significant impact on the quality of voluntary disclosure, while 
family members on the board, independent audit committee members, profitability and services 
sector seem to be insignificant. These findings highlight the important role of corporate 
governance in providing adequate disclosure.  
2.4.2 Corporate internet Reporting  
 
Internet reporting refers to the use of a company’s website to distribute information about the 
financial and nonfinancial performance of the corporations (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; FASB, 
2000; Debreceny et al., 2002). It is now common practice for an increasing number of 
corporations all over the world to disseminate corporate information using the internet to obtain 
the advantages of the low cost, wide spread, and rapid reach. Over the last years, there has been 
a considerable amount of research on corporate internet reporting. The research literature 
reveals that numerous studies have attempted to explain and discuses many aspects of the 
disclosure of information on corporate websites in different countries (in the USA: Ashbaugh 
et al., 1999; Smilan and Belevetz, 2000; Allam and Lymer, 2003; Hurtt, et al., 2001;  Ettredge, 
et al., 2002a; Wagenhofer, 2003; Matherly and Burton, 2005; Pendley and Rai, 2009; in the 
UK: Xiao et al.,1997; Craven and Marston, 1999; Hussey and Sowinska,1999; Crowther, 2000; 
Xiao et al.,2002; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; in Canada: Ryan, 2010;   in developing 
countries: Despina and Demetrios, 2009; An et al., 2011; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2012; Robertson 
et al., 2012; Kuruppu et al., 2015; Al-Sartawi, 2016). 
It appears that the relationship between CIR and accounting may be a fruitful area of future 
research, as Gallhofer and Haslam (2006) address there is a comprehensive need for CIR to be 
studied and analysed more in-depth in relation to accounting. Thus, in 1999, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) published a study, Business Reporting on the 
internet, as the first step to developing standards in this area as well as to examine the current 
level of internet reporting and the actual practice of companies reporting around the world. A 
survey of a total of 660 largest firms listed by 22 countries was conducted. The study revealed 
that 86% of these firms had a website, 410 (62%) of which had some form of financial reporting 
on the websites. Some of the corporations 234 (35.5%) disclosed substantial elements of their 
financial statements on the web. It concluded that in many countries, a significant number of 
 
43 
corporations use the internet for the dissemination of business information, although they 
varied in their level of reporting, from high levels in most developed countries (100% for the 
USA, Canada, Sweden and Germany) to relatively low levels in developing countries (e.g. 53% 
in Chile)( IASC, 2000).  
Another descriptive study by Craven and Marston (1999) regarding developed countries 
explores the extent of financial reporting of the UK’s largest companies on the internet. They 
attempted to understand the incentive for companies to use the internet for financial disclosure 
by examining the relationship between CIR and the two factors of company size and industry 
type and found that, in contrast to industry type, size is a significant determinant of the extent 
of internet disclosure by the largest companies in the UK. As with the former study, Hindi and 
Rich (2010) examined the websites of the Fortune 100 US corporations in 2003, 2006 and 
2009 to determine the level of financial reporting on the internet during these periods. These 
websites were reviewed to determine the percentage of the companies’ various reporting-
related features on their websites. It is noteworthy that the number of companies having 
websites has increased over time, yet these websites vary significantly in both the design and 
quality of the disclosed information. Similarly, in New Zealand, Fisher et al. (2004) analysed 
the website contents of all the listed companies to evaluate the status of current internet 
reporting practice and determine the audit implication of web-based reporting. The study 
revealed that internet reporting is significantly related to several factors which affect auditing, 
such as lack of regulation, internet-related risks and users’ needs. They conclude that there 
seems to be a need for further improvement in both internet reporting and auditing. The same 
approach was followed by Matherly and Burton (2005), who analysed the website contents of 
396 publicly traded companies in the US using a list of 35 attributes to determine the types of 
information that these companies put on their websites. They find that company websites 
contain less business data and prospective data as well as fewer disclosures of intangibles. 
There is a significant variation in the amount of published information based on the type of 
disclosure, the company's industry, and its size.  
Xiao et al. (1997) represent one of the earliest empirical studies on the impact of IT on 
corporate financial reporting (CFR) in the UK. The study attempts to examine the effects of 
some contingent factors on the relationships between IT use and CFR. Those factors are user 
type, size, listing status, gearing ratio, and management compensation plan. The findings reveal 
that the contingency perspective is a useful framework to investigate the impact of IT on CFR 
and that IT use is correlated more with internal reporting change than with external reporting 
change.   
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Xiao et al. (2002) took a different approach. Their study critically reported the current position 
of financial reporting in the UK and explored the opinions of UK experts on the extent and 
nature of the impact that the internet may have on financial reporting in the coming future. 
They concluded that internet technology will significantly affect the future of corporate 
reporting as it will be embodied by drivers for as well as barriers to change. These factors 
include the growth of the quantities and types of information provided on the internet, the 
associated auditing problems, information provided by third parties, benefits for both users and 
preparers, internet reporting problems, access to the internet, incentives to adapt internet 
reporting, and lack of regulations. In contrast, Crowther (2000) chose to examine the influences 
of the technological and communicative abilities of the internet on corporate reporting and 
revealed that the internet is more beneficial for corporations than it is for individuals. 
Corporations have adapted internet technology to generate a stakeholder-interested image of 
themselves. 
From a different perspective, Kelton (2006) conducted an experimental study to examine the 
influences of format and type of presented information on a company’s website on non-expert 
investors’ abilities to make rational decisions. Although this study was limited to a specific 
type of hyperlink used in corporations’ reports, it concluded that presentation format and type 
of internet disclosure have considerable effects on investor judgments, and asserted that there 
is a vital demand to take action to regulate internet reporting practices. Likewise, Allport and 
Pendley (2010) utilised the same experimental approach. They considered the impact of some 
web-based reporting features on users’ perceptions of the credibility of CIR. The study found 
that surface features of a website can significantly impact users’ perceptions as well as 
investment attractiveness.  
In the developing countries, a number of studies have attempted to explain the actual practice 
of internet reporting in different countries (Malarvizhi and Yadav, 2009; Despina and 
Demetrios, 2009). Ismail (2002) conducted a descriptive study in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries to examine the extent of financial information disclosed on the internet by the 
GCC countries. This cross-sectional study states some factors that affect the probability of a 
firm to disseminate financial information on the internet, which are a combination of firm 
characteristics (size, leverage, and profitability), industry type, and country. Moreover, Zager 
and Gulin (2006) explored the financial internet reporting system in the Republic of Croatia by 
describing the financial reporting of listed Croatian companies. The authors state that joint 
venture companies are leaders in internet financial reporting. It is affirmed that the PDF format 
is the predominant format in the published reports, whereas some other more advanced formats, 
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such as XBRL, are rarely used. Hunter and Smith (2009) undertook an extensive study to assess 
the impact of using internet financial reporting on emerging markets in Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Russia, and South Africa. Depending on the efficient market hypothesis, the findings suggested 
that the internet has positive effects in emerging markets and that market performance on stock 
exchanges does improve after firms’ have begun to utilise internet technology. Furthermore, 
Aly et al. (2010) conducted a study in Egypt to examine the level of CIR in the largest Egyptian 
companies and determined the most effective factors explaining CIR practice using the content 
analysis approach. Focusing on the supply side only, they revealed that nearly more than half 
of these companies use websites to disclose a considerable portion of corporate information.  
Similarly, the extent of internet reporting by Indian companies was investigated by Garg and 
Verma (2010), showing that there is a satisfactory and adequate level of disclosure on the firms’ 
websites in India. In Jordan, Al-Htaybat et al. (2011) concluded that hard-copy annual reports 
are still the primary source of information for users. The findings revealed that two economic 
concerns affect the use of CIR from the point of view of participants; internet access cost and 
printing accounting reports cost. 
Using a logical view, Arafa (2012) sought to obtain additional insights into an understanding 
of CIR practices in Egyptian listed companies, whereby both qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of CIR were investigated. The study attempted to elaborate CIR as a whole process that 
integrated the perspective of the various involved participants to acquire a comprehensive 
picture of the CIR practices at the organizational level in Egypt. Samaha and Abdallah (2012) 
compared CIR practices in developed and developing countries. By analysing the nature of 
web-based corporate disclosure in both Egypt and the UK, it was evidenced that CIR practice 
in Egypt, as an example of a developing country, is still lagging behind those of the UK, which 
represents the developed countries, and that determinants of voluntary adaption of CIR in 
Egypt are diverse compared to those documented in the UK. Moreover, Singh and Singh (2015) 
explored the extent of internet financial reporting by the top 30 Indian public and private 
companies. Considering the limited size sample and focusing on one disclosure dimension, the 
findings showed that, to some extent, both sectors use websites for financial disclosure at 
different levels. Similarly, Kuruppu et al. (2015) examined the extent of IFR in Sri Lanka listed 
companies. They analysed the IFR practice of 244 companies divided to 20 industry sectors. 
The findings indicated that 59% of these companies have a website, while only 43% of them 
disclose financial information on their websites. These relatively low rates of IFR adoption are 
attributed to the regulatory authorities and the companies’ management, who are not aware the 
benefits of IFR. Recently, Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek (2018) investigated the practice of 
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voluntary internet financial disclosures by large companies in Slovenia. The research was 
conducted on a sample of 192 large companies in Slovenia. A binary logistic regression was 
conducted to determine the association between IFR and company’s size, profitability, age, 
legal form, ownership dispersion and industry sector. The findings show that 52% of the 
companies use IFR and that there is a substantial difference between the companies that use or 
do not use IFR. It was found that profitability and age are not significantly associated with IFR, 
while large size companies, public limited companies, companies in the financial, energy or 
ICT sectors and more concentrated ownership companies are more likely to use IFR. However, 
this study formulates the dependent variable as a binary encoded (companies using the IFR and 
companies that do not use the IFR) and has not examined the extent or quality of IFR. A 
summary of these studies is shown in appendix 1.  
It can be stated that these studies focus on the existence of a company’s website and, in the 
case of having a website, they seek to analyse content and the presentation of the information. 
As those previous studies have shown, it seems that CIR practice is an area of concern for 
researchers and that there is a general consensus on the importance of adopting CIR all over 
the world as well as the need to make the most of CIR as a communication of business 
performance to stakeholders. However, a growing body of literature indicates the determinants 
of CIR and points out the relationship between CIR and other factors in order to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the extent, content, and format of information disclosed via 
the internet by corporations. The next section will present these studies in detail. 
 
2.4.3 Determinants of CIR 
 
2.4.3.1 Firm characteristics and CIR 
 
A large and growing body of literature has examined the determinants of internet reporting in 
developed countries (Ashbaugh et al. 1999; Debreceny et al. 2002; Ettredge et al. 2002a; 
Marston, 2003; Oyelere et al., 2003; Fisher et al., 2004; Lodhia et al., 2004; Trabelsi et al., 
2004; Matherly and Burton 2005; Chan and Wickramasinghe, 2006; Trabelsi, 2007). On the 
other hand, a few studies have been conducted in developing countries (Ismail, 2002; Davey 
and Homkajohn, 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; Hamid, 2005; Al-Htaybat and Napier, 2006; Zhang 
et al., 2007; Bekiaris et al., 2014; McChlery et al, 2015; Omran and Ramdhony, 2016). 
Ashbaugh et al. (1999) point out CIR practices and provide primary evidence on the reasons 
why some firms publish financial information on their websites while others do not. The 
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findings suggest that firm size and profitability are crucial factors in the CIR engagement 
decision. Moreover, participating firms refer to the distribution of information to shareholders 
as the main reason for adapting internet reporting. Ashbaugh et al. (1999) conducted one of the 
leading studies to examine the internet reporting issue; however, no theoretical rationale was 
provided for the analysis. 
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, a number of studies that followed use theories on 
voluntary disclosure in hypotheses generation. Ettredge et al. (2002a) classify CIR into 
compulsory disclosures by official bodies (i.e. required filings by the SEC) and voluntary 
disclosures. They examined the possibility of using theories of incentives for voluntary 
disclosure to demonstrate both types of CIR practice. The results indicated that size and 
information asymmetry are vital aspects in determining the level of required disclosures on the 
corporate website, whereas size, information asymmetry, demand for external capital and 
disclosure reputation are the main determinants of voluntary internet disclosure. Focusing on 
the speed feature of internet reporting, Ettredge et al. (2002b) in another study investigated the 
factors affecting the speed of updating the corporations’ website. The findings showed that this 
is associated with profitability and with providing multiple report formats rather than high 
earnings announcements and linking to EDGAR, while numbers of shareholders, financial 
analysts and firm size are not explanatory variables for updating speed.  
Debreceny et al. (2002) conducted a study in 22 countries to investigate firm characteristics 
(size, listing on US securities markets, foreign listing, the level of technology, growth prospects 
and intangibles, firm-specific market risk, leverage) and environmental characteristics (internet 
penetration and national disclosure level) as determinants of CIR. Unlike Ettredge et al. 
(2002a), who classified CIR content into required and voluntary items, they surveyed the CIR 
content and presentation methods. They found that disclosure environment and technology 
level are associated with CIR presentation more than CIR content. Matherly and Burton (2005) 
analysed the effects that size, industry type, and type of disclosure have on the amount of 
information disclosed on the companies’ websites in the USA, concluding that the amount of 
disseminated information varies substantially based on those factors. 
Among the earliest studies in developing countries, Xiao et al. (2004) explored the 
determinants of internet reporting in Chinese listed companies using more inclusive approach 
by analysing multiple dimensions of CIR, namely mandatory items, voluntary items, content 
and presentation methods. The findings revealed that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between the proportion of institutional ownership and CIR, while ownership by 
domestic private investors, foreign investors, and the state are less associated with CIR. As 
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mentioned in the previous section, Ismail (2002) investigated the factors that influence the 
financial reporting on the internet in the GCC. The researcher found that firms’ decisions to 
use the internet to publish financial information depends not only on the level of firm 
characteristics (size, leverage, and profitability), but also on the interaction between these 
characteristics and industry type and country. 
In Egypt, Aly et al. (2010) focused on the determinants of CIR in their study. They used a 
content analysis approach to investigate the CIR practices of the top 100 Egyptian listed 
companies. The study identified the association between seven firm characteristics variables 
and CIR to assess the effects of these factors on CIR. They suggested that the main factors that 
have an impact on the content and presentation of internet reporting in Egypt are profitability, 
foreign listing, and industrial sector (communications and financial services). Elsayed (2010), 
in another study in Egypt, explored the relationship between CIR and the corporate governance 
and ownership structure variables and attempted to identify the economic consequences of 
CIR. The study utilised not only more explanatory factors than the previous study (Aly et al., 
2010), but also expanded the investigated components of CIR to encompass timeliness and 
usability in addition to content and presentation. By analysing the annual reports of Egyptian 
listed companies based on a self-constructed disclosure index, the study concluded that CIR in 
Egypt is affected by various variables, such as company size, leverage, legal form, assets in 
place, financial type, foreign listing, audit type, share volatility, share activity, share issuance, 
block holder ownership, managerial ownership, governmental ownership, board size and 
family members on the board. Moreover, the study revealed that there is a considerable 
variation in these determinants among the main components of CIR, namely content, 
presentation, timeliness and usability. Finally, the study indicates that firm value is positively 
influenced by CIR.  
Furthermore, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) studied Jordanian listed companies’ internet reporting 
in an attempt to determine the factors that affect the corporate decisions regarding the 
development of a website. Based on semi-structured interviews, they concluded that website 
presences heavily depend on several factors, namely reputation and image enhancement, firm 
promotion and international impacts. The absence of a corporate website is attributed to top 
management beliefs or attitudes, management change, lack of competition and a relatively long 
period of being listed on the Jordanian stock exchange. In Qatar, Hossain et al. (2012) also 
conducted a study to examine the relationship between CIR and some firm characteristics and 
found a significant association between CIR and firm size, assets in-place and business 
complexity. Moreover, Miniaoui and Oyelere (2013) focused on internet financial reporting 
 
49 
(IFR) in UAE listed companies, aiming to identify the nature and extent of IFR practices. Also, 
their study examined only firm characteristics as determinants of IFR and found that size, 
leverage, profitability and being in the financial sector are the main predictors of IFR adoption. 
Similarly, Dolinšek et al. (2014) used a disclosure index comprising 32 content items and 18 
presentation items to evaluate the level of internet financial reporting by Slovenian companies 
and to assess the impact of six firm characteristics, namely size, profitability, legal form, 
ownership concentration, age and sector, on IFR. They found that size, ownership 
concentration, legal form and sector of operation significantly affect the level of IFR. In India, 
Soriya and Dhaigude (2016) examined CIR in the Indian services sector excluding the financial 
and production sectors. They utilized a disclosure index divided into three sub-indices: general, 
financial and presentation and used OLS regression to assess the relationship between CIR and 
firm characteristics. The findings revealed that size, profitability, productivity and liquidity are 
significantly associated with CIR, while growth and leverage are not. More recently, Ahmed 
et al. (2017) explored the nature and determinants of CIR among non-financial listed 
companies in Egypt. A disclosure index was constructed to examine the websites of those 
companies in 2010 and 2011 including three main sub-indexes: content, user support and 
presentation. The study applied a regression models to assess the association 
between firm characteristics and CIR. The results reveal that 40.7% and 42.7% of the 
companies disclosed some form of financial information online in 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
Further, it was found that size, industry type and foreign listing are significantly associated 
with CIR total, content and user support, while profitability has a significant and negative 
relation with presentation only. Although this study was conducted at two points in time, it was 
limited to non-financial companies and the disclosure index was classified into only three 
categories. 
Most of the previous research emphasizes the significance of firm size as a crucial factor in 
determining the level of corporate internet reporting. These studies have conducted in-depth 
analyses to assess the impact of other firm characteristics without taking into consideration the 
influences of other external characteristics, except Debreceny et al. (2002), who stressed the 
importance of environmental characteristics as determinants of CIR. However, there is a 
potential for further factors that may affect the decision to distribute corporate information on 
the internet, which requires further investigation. On the top of these factors is corporate 
governance; therefore, the next section reviews the studies that shed light on the relationship 
between corporate governance and corporate internet reporting. A summary of these studies is 
presented in appendix 2. 
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2.4.3.2 Corporate governance and CIR 
 
For the past decade, researchers have devoted an increasing amount of attention to the influence 
of corporate governance characteristics on corporate disclosures in general. However, the main 
emphasis has been targeted at developed countries (Udueni, 1999; Klein, 2002; Lee and O'neill, 
2003; Padgett and Shabbir, 2005; Abraham, 2008; Ammann et al., 2011; Stein, 2011; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2012; Ahmed, 2015; Mkumbuzi, 2016) with a few studies on large emerging 
economies and developing countries (Forker, 1992; Ho and Wong, 2001; Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Suphakasem, 2008; Ronnie Lo, 2009; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009, Al-Shammari 
and Al-Sultan, 2010; Samaha et al., 2015; Omran and Ramdhony ,2016). Given the growing 
focus on corporate governance to improve disclosure transparency and the evidenced 
associations between corporate governance factors and corporate disclosure accompanied with 
the increased use of the internet as a media of corporate information dissemination, corporate 
governance has recently gained a reasonable consideration as a determinant of internet-based 
disclosures. The following presents a detailed discussion of those recent studies that examine 
the influence of corporate governance factors on CIR.  
In light of recent changes in the regulatory environment of the London Stock Exchange to 
enhance the credibility of disclosure, Abdelsalam et al. (2007) explored CIR and its 
determinants. Based on a sample of 110 London-listed companies, the study investigated the 
link between the comprehensiveness, usability and credibility of CIR disclosures and corporate 
governance measures. By applying a disclosure checklist of 143 items, they concluded that the 
comprehensiveness of CIR disclosure is associated with analyst following and other measures 
of corporation governance such as director holding, director independence, and CEO duality 
with holding size, profitability, industry, and high growth/intangibles as control variables. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that there is a strong case for more improvement in CIR by 
London-listed companies, particularly with respect to corporate site usability and the credibility 
of disclosed information.  
Similarly, Kelton and Yang (2008) examined the effect of corporate governance on the level 
of disclosure measured by internet Financial Reporting (IFR) practice. The study analysed the 
websites of 284 firms listed on the NASDAQ National Market in 2004 to assess the extent of 
IFR and its relationship to corporate governance. They utilised a disclosure index of 36 items 
to measure IFR presentation format and information content, and used ownership structure, 
shareholder rights, board composition, and audit committee characteristics to measure 
corporate governance. The results revealed that firm’s engagement in IFR depends on the 
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presence of weak shareholder rights, a lower percentage of block holder ownership, a higher 
percentage of independent directors, more audit committee meetings, and a higher percentage 
of audit committee members who are financial experts. The findings indicated that corporate 
internet disclosure practice is influenced by corporate governance mechanisms and that firm 
size plays a critical role in determining the association between IFR and corporate governance.  
Abdelsalam and Street (2007) studied CIR by UK listed companies on the London Stock 
Exchange concentrating on the dimension of timeliness. The research investigated the effects 
of corporate governance characteristics and firm characteristics on the timeliness of corporate 
internet reporting. Using a sample of 115 UK companies, timeliness was measured based on a 
constructed disclosure index containing 13 criteria. The primary multivariate analysis showed 
a significant relationship between corporate internet reporting timeliness and two corporate 
governance characteristics, namely board experience and board independence. Conversely, 
block ownership and role duality are associated with less CIR timeliness disclosure. Additional 
analysis, which applied logistic regression, was conducted to provide a greater understanding 
of CIR timeliness dimensions and corporate governance characteristics. This analysis showed 
that role duality and block ownership are significantly negatively associated with CIR 
timeliness, while US listing and being in a technology industry have a positive relationship 
with it. Overall, the study indicates that UK listed companies need to enhance the timeliness 
of their CIR in order to provide the types of information that is useful to investors, and 
recommends that regulations are required for the improvement of CIR timeliness disclosure.  
The importance of CIR timeliness was also examined in a study by Abdelsalam and El-Masry 
(2008). The study utilised a modified index to investigate the effects of board independence 
and ownership structure on CIR timeliness practices by Irish-listed companies. They used the 
percentage of independent directors, role duality and average tenure of directors to represent 
board composition, whereas managerial ownership and block holder ownership were used as 
ownership structure proxies. After controlling for several firm characteristics (size, audit fees 
and profitability), the multivariate regression analysis showed a positive association between 
CIR timeliness and both board independence and CEO ownership. The findings revealed that 
firm size plays a significant role in assessing CIR timeliness behaviour. Ultimately, this study 
agrees with Abdelsalam and Street (2007) in that Irish companies, just as UK listed companies, 
should pay more consideration to improving their CIR timeliness in many aspects.   
Regarding developing countries, Barako et al. (2006) sought to assess the determinants of the 
internet disclosure presence of Indonesian listed companies using a sample of 343 companies. 
The findings demonstrated that CIR is positively associated with size and age of listed 
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companies, whereas profitability, ownership structure, leverage, industry type, audit committee 
independency, and percentage of independent directors are not among the critical determinants 
explaining the CIR practices of Indonesian companies. Furthermore, this study points out that 
companies in Indonesia need to be encouraged to focus on and expand CIR disclosures 
practices. In another study, Ezat and El-Masry (2008) surveyed 50 Egyptian listed corporations 
to investigate the association between CIR timeliness and corporate governance characteristics 
and firm variables. The study utilises a disclosure index to evaluate the timeliness of CIR. 
Depending on multiple and logistic regression models, the findings indicated that CIR 
timeliness is significantly and positively related to firm size, service activity, type of industry, 
liquidity, ownership structure, board composition and board size. 
Further, Elsayed (2010), concentrating on corporate governance and ownership structure 
variables, explored CIR practices in Egypt to determine the key factors affecting the CIR of 
343 Egyptian listed companies. The researcher constructed a disclosure index that includes 100 
items to measure CIR components, namely content, presentation, timeliness and usability. The 
study concluded that CIR in Egypt is associated with corporate governance and ownership 
structure variables, although these associations vary considerably among the main components 
of CIR. Company size, leverage, legal form, asset in place, financial type, foreign listing, audit 
type, share volatility, share activity, share issuance, block holder ownership, managerial 
ownership, governmental ownership, board size and family members on the board are the main 
variables found to influence the four components of CIR. Furthermore, the study suggested 
that firm value, measured using Tobin's ratio and market-to-book equity ratio, has a positive 
effect on CIR.  
In Turkey, Erer and Dalgic (2011) took the same approach and examined the CIR behaviour 
of 173 non-financial companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange to determine the 
potential influences of corporate governance characteristics. To measure the extent of CIR, a 
developed disclosure index including content (45 items) and format (15 items) is used, while 
corporate governance is measured by ownership structure (represented by managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, and the percentage of free floating shares of the company), 
board composition (represented by board size and the percentage of the independent directors 
on the board), corporate governance rating, and foreign listing variables. Based on firm size, 
profitability, leverage and the use of a Big4s auditor as control variables, the results provide 
evidence that the percentage of the independent directors and corporate governance rating are 
positively and significantly related to internet financial reporting. Conversely, no significant 
association was found between internet financial disclosure and board size, foreign listing and 
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ownership structure variables. None of the control variables have been found to affect internet 
financial reporting except for the significant and positive influence of company size. In 
Malaysia, Kamalluarifin (2016) limited his study to the timelines of CIR. He investigated the 
impact of corporate governance (board independence, board experience and role duality) and 
firm characteristics (size, leverage and profitability) among the top 95 Malaysian listed 
companies. The findings revealed a significant association between board independence, board 
experience, leverage and profitability and the timeliness of CIR. Similarly, Al-Shammari and 
Al-Saidi (2015) investigated the impact of corporate governance (board size, board 
composition and role duality) and firm characteristics (size, leverage, profitability, liquidity, 
industry type and ownership structure) on the timeliness of CIR in Kuwait. They concluded 
that Kuwaiti listed companies disclose only 39% of the timeliness index’s items. Further, it 
was found that disclosing timely information on the website of Kuwaiti companies is associated 
with a smaller board, more non-executive directors, the separation of CEO and chairman roles, 
larger financial companies and more outsider ownership.  
Recently, Omran and Ramdhony (2016) examined the extent of IFR of Mauritian listed 
companies. They applied a content analysis using a disclosure index consisting of 52 items. 
Despite the small size sample (34 companies), some firm characteristics (size, liquidity, 
leverage, industry type and profitability) and corporate governance variables (board size and 
audit quality) were used as explanatory variables. Only company size, liquidity and board size 
show a significant relationship with IFR. Moreover, Sanad and Al-Sartawi (2016) also explored 
the association between IFR and some corporate governance variables in Bahrain. The results 
suggested a weak relationship, where only board size and Big4 audit firms have a positive 
relationship with IFR.  
It can be seen that the above-mentioned studies emphasized the vital impact of corporate 
governance attributes on CIR practices in many developed and developing countries and 
stressed the noteworthy influence of the relationship between corporate governance and CIR. 
Appendix 3 summarizes these studies. 
Although many studies have reviewed CIR in developed and developing countries, few studies 
have been investigated in Middle Eastern countries, while even fewer have addressed this issue 
in the Saudi context. In the following, prior studies regarding CIR in Saudi Arabia are reviewed 





2.4.4 CIR in Saudi Arabia 
 
Several studies have been published addressing disclosure issues in Saudi Arabia (e.g. Abd-
Elsalam, 1990; Al-Modahki, 1995; Kantor et al., 1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Al-Mubarak, 1997; 
Al-Razeen, 1999; Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; Al-Saeed, 2006a; Robertson et al., 2012; Al-
Janadi, 2013). In fact, most of these studies are descriptive and expose the current disclosure 
practices of Saudi companies. However, the notion of CIR is barely mentioned in the Saudi 
studies, as only few studies have been conducted in this regard and these were very limited and 
incomprehensive.  
Al-Saeed (2006b), examines CIR using a sample of 46 Saudi firms related to three different 
sectors, namely agriculture, cement and industry. The study shows that nearly 87% of sampled 
companies have websites, noting that the cement sector has the best implementation of CIR. 
Furthermore, the utilization of CIR can be explained significantly by profitability and firm size. 
The main concern regarding disclosed areas was found to be that the information relates to the 
company’s general information and products. This study experienced some limitations, 
including a relatively small sample size (46 firms) and a focus on corporate transparency 
provisions only.  
Furthermore, Al-Motrafi (2008) attempted to explain corporate internet disclosure practices as 
well as to conceive the different perspectives of users with respect to CIR in Saudi Arabia. 
Three different groups of users, namely institutional investors, financial analysts and private 
investors, were examined to assess the impact of financial internet disclosure on their attitudes 
and needs using a questionnaire survey. In addition, a developed financial disclosure index was 
utilised to explore the nature and scope of CIR by Saudi public companies and to point out 
differences, if any. The findings showed the various views of the three groups of users 
concerning internet reporting practices. While the view of institutional investors was relatively 
similar to that of the financial analysts, private investors had significantly different views. 
Furthermore, the descriptive analysis revealed that 84% of Saudi companies have a website, 
but only 45% of them have a financial information section. Regarding firm characteristics, it 
is demonstrated that there is a significant association between financial internet reporting and 
size, stock market listing, and the proportion of institutional ownership structure. In contrast, 
profitability, type of industry, type of auditor, level of government ownership, individual 
ownership, free float, and board structure show no significant relationship with internet 
reporting behaviour.   
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The implications of financial internet reporting for auditing have been identified by 
Alshowaiman (2008). The study surveyed Saudi listed companies to, first, investigate the 
actual situation of internet financial reporting and determine the key factors that may affect 
IFR practices and, second, to document IFR-related auditing issues. The researcher combined 
a questionnaire, a semi-structured interview and a disclosure index for 74 companies to obtain 
the relevant data. The results indicated that IFR is positively associated with the Big4 audit 
firms, industry, and location variables. None of the other IFR's determinants, which are the 
proportion of government ownership and the proportion of foreign ownership, have been found 
to influence the extent of IFR. Additionally, it is revealed that Saudi companies have poor and 
insufficient performance in their internet reporting and that IFR needs to be increasingly linked 
with auditing to improve audit efficiency and effectiveness.  
Focusing on corporate governance disclosure, Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) conducted 
another study to investigate the extent of internet disclosure regarding corporate governance 
information by Saudi listed companies and the diversity practices of such disclosure among 
different sectors. A corporate governance disclosure index was constructed to analyse the 
content of 64 company websites. It is concluded that although most of the Saudi companies 
use the internet to disseminate corporate governance information, the disclosed information is 
considerably varied among corporations, depending on industry type, with the banking sector 
placed at the highest level and the industry and service sectors at the lowest.  
To compare corporate internet reporting practices between countries, Al-Jaber and Mohamed 
(2003) surveyed three countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait, to assess the 
variations in the level and content of internet disclosure. The findings suggested that these 
regional countries vary to some extent in their internet reporting and are straggling far behind 
the developed countries. Regarding the most frequently reported information, they stated that 
company products information comes first followed by financial information. Recently, Al-
Sartawi (2016) conducted a descriptive study to measure the level of online financial disclosure 
in the GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia. The study focused only on the financial 
disclosure, and the disclosure index includes 71 items for content and 19 for presentation. The 
results revealed that the overall level of online disclosure in the GCC countries is 77% and that 
it varies according to country and industry type. However, this study did not investigate the 
effect of any variables, such as firm characteristics or corporate governance, on the level of 
online financial disclosure. A summary of these studies is presented in appendix 4.  However, 
a few studies have pointed out the nature and practice of corporate governance in Saudi 
 
56 
companies without investigating its relationship with CIR practices (Al-Harkan, 2005; Falgi, 
2009; Almajid, 2008; Al-Gazawe, 2010; Abu-Musa, 2010, Al-Ajlan, 2005; Almarshad, 2011; 
Alkahtani, 2013; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). 
Based on the above-mentioned discussion, it is notable that most of the studies concerning CIR 
are performed in developed countries or Asian countries. A few studies have been conducted 
in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia. However, nearly all CIR studies in Saudi 
Arabia attempt to describe the actual practices, while only limited variables are identified as 
being potential explanatory variables for CIR. That is, these previous studies (Al-Saeed, 2006a; 
Al-Motrafi, 2008; Alshowaiman, 2008) use only firm characteristics as determinants of CIR, 
with the exception of Al-Motrafi (2008), who includes a few corporate governance variables 
in his study. The present study seeks to fill the gap by examining the impact of firm 
characteristics and corporate governance variables (board of directors, ownership structure and 
audit committee) on CIR.   
Furthermore, the sample sizes used in the prior Saudi studies are relatively small (e.g. 46 in Al-
Saeed’s study and 74 in Alshowaiman’s study), while the sample size of the current study is 
comparatively larger (170). Moreover, Al-Motrafi (2008) categorized CIR into more than one 
component (content, credibility and usability). In addition, Alshowaiman (2008) classified CIR 
into three components (content, presentation and audit). Similarly, limited international studies 
have classified CIR into more than one component (e.g. Debreceny et al., 2002; Xiao et al., 
2004; Abdelsalam et al. 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008). This study expands the CIR 
classification into five components, namely content, presentation, timeliness, usability and 
audit, which fills this gap in the CIR literature. In addition, the checklist used to measure CIR 
contains nonfinancial information that has not been tested widely in the previous studies. Most 
of the prior studies concentrated on the extent of internet financial reporting and neglected the 
disclosure of non-financial information. Accordingly, it can be argued that little contribution 
has been made in addressing the implication of firm characteristics and corporate governance 
on CIR, especially from the perspective of Saudi firms. 
As far as the researcher is aware, there are no previous studies in the Saudi context that explore 
the link between CIR and all the mechanisms of corporate governance, classify the CIR into 
different components including timeliness, and encompass non-financial information in 
calculating an CIR index. This study aims to contribute to disclosure studies by exploring the 
association between corporate governance variables and CIR and its components and using 
some variables for the first time in the CIR studies. Furthermore, it aims to provide insights to 
investors and regulators about why companies are adopting CIR and what the key determinants 
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of such an adoption are. It is also proposed that accountants and auditors can benefit from this 
study in their decisions regarding the disclosure of financial and non-financial information on 
the internet to improve the communication function of corporate reports. 
2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the concepts of CIR and corporate governance and reviewed the 
empirical studies that have explored the current practice of CIR. Starting with internet 
reporting, this chapter provided a brief discussion about the nature of CIR and its actual 
practices, as online disclosure is an important issue in the present business environment. Next, 
an overview of the development of the accounting profession in Saudi Arabia and the related 
regulation was presented as this is considered the platform for CIR implementation. Then, the 
chapter discussed corporate governance notion, objectives and importance. It also introduced 
corporate governance variables, which are used to explain the expected impact of corporate 
governance on CIR. The current situation of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia was 
reviewed next, it helps to represent the motivation to choose Saudi Arabia as a context for this 
study. Identifying the conceptual framework of both CIR and corporate governance is 
perceived as a base to achieve the objectives of this study and help in examining the 
relationship between CIR and corporate governance in the Saudi context. After that, the chapter 
has discussed the empirical studies that have investigated the current practice of CIR in 
different countries to determine the areas that need more investigation. These studies have 
revealed mixed results, which can be attributed to the differences in the sampling techniques, 
the statistical analyses, and the settings in which these studies were conducted. Reviewing these 
studies has helped to expose the gap in the CIR literature that the present study aims to fill and 
forms a base that can help in answering the research questions. It is noted that a few studies 
have been conducted in the Middle Eastern region. However, the majority of these have two 
limitations; they examine the association between CIR and firm characteristics and pay less 
attention to corporate governance variables, and they use CIR without classifying it by its sub-
components. Therefore, the main contributions of the current study are that it investigates the 
impact of all corporate governance mechanisms on CIR in addition to firm characteristics, and 
that CIR is classified into the five components (content, presentation, timeliness, usability and 
audit), which will provide a better understanding of the impact of corporate governance and 
firm characteristics on CIR. The next chapter presents the relevant theories that are related to 
CIR and may justify the need to examine CIR practice in Saudi Arabia and discusses the 
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  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESE FORMULATION OF VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE 
 
3.1 Introduction   
 
One aim of this chapter is to review theories concerning voluntary internet reporting in order 
to provide a theoretical foundation to develop the research hypotheses and perform the 
empirical analysis. Moreover, a review of the disclosure literature reveals that CIR as a type of 
voluntary disclosure is a complex phenomenon that may be influenced by many factors. In 
order to achieve the first two objectives of this study, namely to understand the actual CIR 
practices and to determine the significant factors that affect the decisions regarding CIR in the 
Saudi context, it is important to measure some explanatory variables and determine the 
relationships between these variables and CIR practices, if any. As such, the other aim of this 
chapter is to propose a number of hypotheses that assume a relationship between the disclosure 
indices and four groups of independent variables. Six disclosure indices are used in this study 
to assess the extent of CIR which are: total, content, presentation, timeliness, usability, and 
audit. These sub-indices are used to obtain a more in-depth understanding and evaluation of 
the quantity and quality of CIR practices which can help in justifying the adoption of internet 
reporting and improve the usefulness of CIR for different users.  
This chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 presents the theoretical framework and 
reviews the four main approaches. Section 3.3 discusses formulating the hypotheses which are 
related to firm characteristics variables and corporate governance variables. A summary of this 
chapter is provided in section 3.4.      
3.2 Theoretical framework 
 
Over the past few years, there had been many substantial changes in the economic environment 
that have had the potential to affect the nature of disclosure. These changes breed different 
theories based on the different situations where disclosure practices are being examined. 
Furthermore, many accounting researchers argue that accounting studies should be elaborated 
to include different dimensions, such as social, political and cultural aspects (Hopwood, 2000). 
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Therefore, many theories are used to explain the different disclosure practices which reflect the 
gradual shift in the emphasis of disclosure over time. However, all these theories are logical 
and acceptable and there is no consensus on one comprehensive or best theory of disclosure 
(Haniffa, 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001 and Verrecchia, 2001). Thus, the most common 
theories used in the disclosure literature are categorized into four main approaches: economic 
approach, political-economic approach, cost-benefit approach and innovation adoption 
approach. The next sections demonstrate these theories in details.  
 
3.2.1  Economic approach 
 
The economic approach perspective depends mainly on the objective of maximising profit and 
avoiding loss. This approach also focuses on the needs and interests of shareholders and 
managers only. There are four disclosure theories that can be included in this approach; these 
are agency theory, signalling theory, stewardship theory and capital need theory.  
 3.2.1.1 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory is one of the most widely used theories in the disclosure literature, and a 
considerable amount of disclosure studies is based on it. This theory is concerned with the 
relationship between a principal and an agent, which Jensen and Meckling (1976) define as “a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) 
to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent.” That is, agency theory focuses on the relationship between two parties, 
the principals and the agents, whereby the agents are empowered to perform services and make 
decisions on behalf of the principals. The separation between the principal and the agent in this 
agency relationship may generate a conflict between their interests and give rise to agency 
costs to monitor the agent actions (Fama and Jensen,1983). In accounting research, agency 
theory is commonly used to explain the management incentives for voluntary disclosure (e.g. 
Cooke, 1991, 1993; Hossain et al., 1994; Xiao et al., 2004; Li et al., 2008). According to agency 
theory, the owners (principals) entrust the managers (agents) with managing the firm and 
expect the managers to carry out their responsibilities in the best interest of the owners 
(shareholders). Due to the separation of ownership from management, a potential conflict of 
interest may occur, causing some agency problems. It is assumed that shareholders are willing 
to maximise their profits, while managers are interested in increasing their compensations 
(Firth, 1979). Because managers have access to more information that is not available to 
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shareholders, and as a means of alleviating this problem of information asymmetry, 
shareholders may incur costs (agency costs) to monitor managers’ behaviour and ensure that 
they are not using this superior information to increase their own interests. One proposed way 
to reduce monitoring costs is by increasing disclosure (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). On the 
other hand, agency theory assumes that managers may make decisions that maximise their 
benefits even if they are against owners’ interests; thus, managers may refrain from disclosing 
certain information if they believe that this information may harm their interests. However, it 
is suggested that managers may be motivated to disclose more information to distinguish 
themselves from poor managers, especially if they have fulfilled their tasks well (Demski, 
1974). Further, high agency costs could decrease the compensation of managers, thus, 
managers are keen to reduce agency cost by disclosing more information to convince 
shareholders that they are acting in the best interests of shareholders. 
Providing that managers have the incentive to reduce agency costs using voluntary disclosure, 
disclosure can be considered as a vital way to mitigate agency problems (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Since online disclosure is a type of voluntary disclosure, it can be stated that internet 
disclosure is a means to help management reduce agency costs as well as enhance transparency. 
Consequently, internet disclosure is expected to be associated with many variables, such as 
firm characteristics as well as some characteristics of board of directors and ownership 
structure. Several studies that address the use of voluntary disclosure by management to reduce 
agency cost have used such variables to explain this practice (e.g. Cooke, 1993; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Hossain et al., 1994; Xiao et al., 2004; Marston and Polei, 2004; Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Aly et al., 2010; Ahmed, 
2015). 
In Saudi Arabia, one of the primary aims of the Corporate Governance Code is to mitigate 
agency conflict between shareholders and managers by improving disclosure quality, 
transparency, accountability and the responsibility of board of directors (Alshehri and 
Solomon, 2012). The importance of such regulations emerges from the high level of ownership 
concentration in Saudi listed companies (Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010), which may have a 
negative impact on the rights of small shareholders and is likely to result in a conflict of interest 
between small shareholders and large shareholders. For instance, directors are more often, as 
in most developing countries, appointed by large shareholders due to their social or political 
relationships rather than their proficiency or experience (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). As such, 
those directors may either act in the interest of large shareholders or perform their roles 
ineffectively because they lack the required expertise. These practices can adversely affect 
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voluntary corporate disclosure and financial performance and, hence, emphasise the substantial 
need for an agency theoretical framework in the Saudi context (Albassam, 2014).  
 3.2.1.2 Signalling theory 
 
Initially, signalling theory was developed to explain the information asymmetry problem in 
labour markets (Spence, 1973). Signalling theory describes the behaviour of two parties, one 
of whom (insiders) have access to superior information compared to the other parties 
(outsiders), leading to an information asymmetry problem, which is a basic condition of 
signalling theory (Omran and El-galfy, 2014). This problem can be mitigated by the party 
which has more information signalling to the other parties (Morris, 1987). Thus, signalling 
theory can be useful in explaining voluntary disclosure practices in corporate reporting (Ross, 
1977). Managers, who have more information than stakeholders, try to reduce information 
asymmetry by signalling specific information to investors and other stakeholders using 
voluntary disclosure. In addition, in spite of information asymmetry, signalling theory also 
provides an explanation of the company’s incentive to report more information voluntarily; 
that is, managers have the motivation to disclose information as a means to distinguish 
themselves from other competitors in the market in order to attract more investors and enhance 
their reputation (Verrecchia, 1983). This economic incentive to voluntary disclosure is one of 
the crucial assumptions of signalling theory for voluntary reporting (Ferrer, 2016). Further, 
signalling theory, similar to agency theory, realizes the effect of the separation between 
ownership and managers and that market pressure would force managers to disclose all the 
required information to investors (Haniffa, 1999). However, the signalling costs that are related 
to the quality of disclosed information may differentiate signalling theory from agency theory 
(Morris, 1987). This suggests that managers have a strong incentive to disclose quality 
information as it may result in minimizing signalling costs. As so, higher quality companies 
are motivated to disclose more information to distinguish themselves from other low quality 
companies and signal their proficient performance (Xiao et al., 2004). Likewise, companies 
that have bad news also have the incentive to disclose the bad news in order to have legal 
protection and to avoid any reputational costs that may be incurred in the case of failure to 
disclose timely information (Skinner, 1994). Even if companies have no information to 
disclose, they still have the motivation to signal no news to investors and other stakeholders in 
order to be distinguished from other companies with bad news (Ross, 1979). Moreover, it is 
argued that companies that have disclosed information in the past should continue to do so, as 
refraining from disclosure will be considered a signal of unfavourable news by outsiders (ibid). 
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Consequently, all companies, no matter which kind of news they have, are strongly motivated 
to disclose information and compete successfully in the market (Ferrer, 2016). In the disclosure 
literature, many variables are considered based on signalling theory. For example, Oyelere et 
al. (2003) state that managers are using disclosure to signal their companies’ profitability and 
industry differences. Similarly, Craven and Marston (1999) point out that companies try to 
adopt disclosure practices similar to those of other companies in the same industry, as else it 
may be conceived as a signal of bad news. Further, Aly et al. (2010) argue that companies with 
a high liquidity ratio tend to disclose more information to differentiate themselves from 
companies with a low liquidity ratio, while Ferrer (2016) explains that the increase in a 
company’s leverage may indicate a negative signal to stakeholders. According to Craven and 
Marston (1999), adopting the internet as a means of disclosing information can be perceived 
by users as a signal of good quality and high performance. Therefore, managers may use 
internet disclosure to create or maintain a good image for their companies and also to keep up 
with other companies in the same industry. In Saudi Arabia, the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA) has aimed to improve transparency and disclosure and reduce information asymmetry 
(Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010) by imposing many regulations. In particular, there are the 
Listing Rules 2004 (CMA, 2013), which mandate that all listed companies provide the stock 
market with information regarding any substantial changes to the company in a timely manner. 
This has enhanced voluntary disclosure as a result of decreasing information asymmetry, thus, 
it may encourage investment decisions and reduce financing cost (Morris, 1987). 
3.2.1.3 Stewardship theory 
 
In contrast to agency theory, which proposes the presence of a conflict of interest between 
agents and principals (Donaldson and Davis, 1991), stewardship theory suggests that the 
interests of agents (managers) and principals (owners) are coincident. Basically, stewardship 
theory assumes a mutual trust between managers and owners and that there is no conflict of 
interest between them (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Davis et al. (1997) state that “stewardship 
theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by individual goals, but rather 
are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their principals”. Therefore, this 
theory supposes that managers are trustworthy (Letza et al., 2004) and, as such, they act in 
favour of maximizing the company’s value and to increase the shareholders’ interests instead 
of individual interests (Davis et al., 1997). Moreover, managers, according to this theory, are 
motivated by preserving a good reputation and achieving success in their future career; thus, 
to satisfy these needs, managers try to use the companies’ resources in an efficient way to 
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increase shareholder welfares (Conyon and He, 2011). Besides, managers have access to 
information that is not available to shareholders, and because of the mutual interests, they will 
pass this superior information on to the shareholders, which may enhance the interests of the 
companies and their owners as well. One possible way to provide such information is by using 
the company’s website to disclose the required information. Based on stewardship theory, 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) find a positive relationship between the chief executive officer 
(CEO) duality and shareholder returns, as suggested by stewardship theory, while Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003) report that larger boards are associated positively with firm performance 
measured by return on equity as posited by stewardship theory. Similarly, the study of Al-
Janadi et al. (2013) find support for this theory, as their result showed that companies with 
CEO duality disclose more information than companies that separate the two positions. In the 
Saudi context, the Corporate Governance Code seeks to enhance the accountability of 
managers by improving management monitoring. In this regard, Article 12 requires that the 
majority members of the board of directors must be non-executive and that one third of them 
must be at least independent. Furthermore, the same article asserts that it is forbidden for the 
same person to hold the positions of CEO and chairman. Apparently, these regulations 
contradict the main assumption of stewardship theory, which postulates that managers are 
trustworthy and hence there is no need to extensively monitor their performance. However, as 
the level of family ownership is very high in Saudi Arabia and relatives are usually appointed 
as directors or executives, these directors are potentially to be regarded as trustworthy, which 
supports the assumptions of stewardship theory (Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012; 
Albassam, 2014).    
 3.2.1.4 Capital need theory 
  
This theory proposes that the key incentive for disclosure is the constant need to obtain capital 
at the lowest possible cost. By disclosing more information, companies try to minimise investor 
uncertainty and information asymmetry, and hence risk, which results in reducing the required 
rate of return. When the investors have a lower rate of return, the company will have a lower 
cost of capital and a higher share price (Cooke, 1989a). The investors’ needs for information 
operate as pressure on companies to increase the quantity and quality of the released 
information (Haniffa, 1999). Not disclosing information or hiding some information can be 
costly for the company and harm its competing abilities, as the current and potential investors 
may consider this company to be more risky than other companies that disclose more 
information and thus its cost of capital will be higher (Meek and Gray, 1989). According to 
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capital need theory, investors seek precise and timely information in order to reduce 
information asymmetry and make rational decisions regarding their investments. The 
availability of the required information in a timely manner can result in the reduction of the 
capital cost. Therefore, companies are motivated to disclose more timely information to their 
stakeholders to gain a lower cost of capital, which can be achieved by using the company’s 
website to disclose the required information due to the widespread nature, ease and full speed 
features of the internet.  
Several studies point out that companies can reduce the cost of capital by expanding the level 
of disclosure (e.g. Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Craven and Marston, 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Verrecchia, 2001 and Oyelere et al., 2003). Capital need theory was used to explain the 
association between voluntary disclosure and different variables; for example, Debreceny et al. 
(2002) find that internet disclosure has increased in those companies that attempt to reduce the 
cost of capital through listing on foreign exchanges. Furthermore, Healy and Palepu (2001) 
indicate that managers who participate in capital market transactions are expected to provide 
voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and, hence, reduce the cost of capital. 
Watson et al. (2002) found that companies with a high leverage ratio are more likely to disclose 
more information to satisfy their debenture holders and trustees’ needs. This disclosure is 
deemed to reduce investor uncertainty and thus reduce the cost of capital. In addition, Al-
Htaybat (2005) suggests three main reasons to justify using capital need theory in explaining 
voluntary disclosure. First, companies need to raise capital at the lowest potential cost. Second, 
with a high level of disclosure, agency cost can be reduced and the company will be able to 
raise new capital, accordingly, in the most desirable way. Finally, investor uncertainty can be 
reduced by voluntarily disclosing more information, thus the required rate of return on 
investment will be reduced.      
Although the economic approach theories are widely used, this approach has some limitations. 
First, it emphasises one main goal, namely maximising profit, and ignores other desirable 
goals. Also, this approach focuses on two parties of stakeholders – shareholders and managers 
– and neglects the other stakeholders such as government, creditors, employees and other 
consumer groups (Haniffa, 1999). Furthermore, Abdelsalam (1999) mentions the difficulties 
of applying economic-based theories in developing countries. These countries have different 
environmental features compared to developed countries, meaning that aspects of these 
theories, such as the assumption of an efficient capital market, may not be realizable in 
developing countries. Finally, it concentrates on the economic aspect and studies it in isolation 
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from other social, political and institutional domains which affect the economic actions (Gray 
et al.; 1995). 
Because of the limitations of the economic approach, there has been a shift to the political 
economic approach, which considers the interaction of economic actions with politics, society 
and other institutions. The next section discusses the political economic approach in detail.  
3.2.2 Political economic approach 
 
The political economic approach emphasises the interaction of economic actions with politics, 
society and other institutions. That is, it deals with many environmental aspects of the society 
where the economic activities take place. Thus, this approach considers other stakeholders who 
have a contractual links with the company, such as government and society, and not only the 
contracts between shareholders and managers. This theory mainly recognizes the substantial 
effect of government on accounting practices and policies (Haniffa, 1999). Furthermore, it 
takes into consideration the existence of societal conflict as well as the potential influence of 
accounting reports on the distribution of wealth and power within the society (Cooper and 
Sherer, 1984). The main theories derived from the political economic approach are legitimacy 
theory, stakeholder theory and political costs theory; these are summarized in the following 
paragraphs.  
3.2.2.1 Legitimacy theory 
 
Legitimacy theory is based on the notion that management behaviour is influenced by many 
external environmental aspects (economic, social and political); therefore, all these factors 
should be considered, and not only those of shareholders, in order to legitimise management 
actions. That is, it is proposed that management has a social contract with the society in which 
it operates and, accordingly, the management must act within the acceptable value system of 
this society in order to be socially approved and to ensure that its activities are legitimized 
(Patten,1991; Rizk, 2006). Any potential conflict between the management and other parties 
of society may lead to threats to the legitimacy of the company and thus harm its credibility 
(Arafa, 2012). This theory provides an explanation of the incentives of managers for voluntary 
disclosure. One explanation is that managers may disclose more information voluntarily to 
avoid legal actions against them due to insufficient or untimely disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Another explanation is that managers’ fear of litigation may potentially reduce their 
motivation to disclose information, specifically forward-looking information (ibid). Lindblom 
(1994) proposes that companies have four strategies to legitimise their actions; first, inform 
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their relevant stakeholders of any changes in performance or activities of the company; second, 
try to alter the views and perceptions of the relevant stakeholders without changing the 
company’s actual behaviour; third, manipulate the perceptions of users by diverting their 
attention from the issues of concern to other related issues; and the final one, change the 
performance expectations of the company by external parties. According to Watson et al. 
(2002), two of Lindblom's strategies may be related to accounting ratios disclosure; disclosing 
information about accounting ratios can inform and educate users about changes in the 
performance (Lindblom's first strategy) and may also help divert users’ attention away from 
other areas (Lindblom's third strategy). Legitimacy theory suggests that voluntary disclosure 
may vary with different firm characteristics, such as size, industry type, listing status and 
performance. For example, a study by Qu and Leung (2006) shows that Chinese listed 
companies have to provide voluntary information in addition to the required disclosure as a 
result of changes to the cultural and social norms in China. Moreover, both studies by 
Debreceny et al. (2002) and Oyelere et al. (2003) indicate that large companies are strongly 
motivated to increase voluntary disclosure to improve the company’s reputation and public 
image, thus decreasing intervention by the government. Haniffa and Cook (2005) studied the 
impact of culture and corporate governance on social disclosure. The results revealed a 
significant association between boards dominated by executive directors, boards dominated by 
Malaysian directors, chairs with multiple directorships and foreign share ownership and social 
disclosure in Malaysian companies’ reports. Furthermore, Ng and Koh (1994) state that 
profitable companies are believed to be subject to public scrutiny and thus tend to implement 
some self-regulation mechanisms, such as voluntary disclosure, to avoid more external 
regulation. Internet disclosure may be adopted as one form of such voluntary disclosure by 
companies who want to disclose more information via the internet to appear legitimate from 
the stakeholders’ perspective.   
 3.2.2.2 Stakeholder theory 
 
Stakeholders are defined as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation's objectives" (Freeman, 1984, P. 46). Alternatively, Clarkson 
(1995, P. 106) defines stakeholders as “persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, 
or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future. Such claimed rights or 
interests are the result of transactions with, or actions taken by, the corporation, and may be 
legal or moral, individual or collective”. As such, stakeholder theory considers the relationship 
between managers and all other parties who have a stake in the firm, such as shareholders, 
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employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and government. In contrast to agency theory, 
which concentrates on the relationship between managers and shareholders only, stakeholder 
theory has a broader perspective, whereby all stakeholders’ interests are included and managers 
are accountable to various sectors of society (Solomon, 2007). Stakeholders can be categorized 
into two groups; the first is the primary stakeholder group, such as shareholders, investors, 
employees, suppliers and the government, who are vital for the company to survive and without 
their participation the company would be unable to continue in the long run. The second is 
secondary stakeholder group comprises those who influence or are influenced by the company. 
This group is not essential to the company’s survival and is not involved in transactions with 
the company, such as the media and special interest groups (Clarkson, 1995; Rizk, 2006).  
Moreover, Donaldson and Preston (1995) indicate that stakeholder theory can be used from 
three different aspects, namely descriptive, instrumental and normative. The descriptive aspect 
is when the theory is used to describe or explain certain characteristics or behaviours of the 
company, such as describing the nature of the company or how some companies are managed. 
From the instrumental aspect, theory is used to define the connections between stakeholder 
management and the achievement of corporate goals, such as growth and profitability. Finally, 
the normative aspect uses the theory to interpret the function of the company, including the 
identification of ethical and moral guidelines for management and operations. Although these 
three aspects of the stakeholder theory are interrelated, they are distinct and their implications 
are different. 
However, this theory encounters some criticisms (Sternberg, 1997). One of the criticisms is 
that the theory’s main assumption conflicts with the basic objective of companies, which is 
maximizing the benefits to shareholders. Further, this theory assumes that companies must be 
accountable to all the stakeholders instead of being accountable to their shareholders, and this 
is against the agent-principal relationship. Moreover, the balance of all stakeholder benefits is 
an unworkable objective and no guidance is available. To refute these criticisms, Turnbull 
(1997) asserts that much empirical evidence does not support the view that there is a conflict 
with either the company’s objective or the agent-principal relationship under stakeholder 
theory. Besides, stakeholder relationships can protect and legitimate the concept of agency and 
shareholder interests and not weaken them.   
Stakeholders theory implies that the company should protect the interests of different 
stakeholders who have different needs. This forces the company to balance between these 
conflicted interests by disclosing more information voluntarily (Collier, 2008). By voluntarily 
disclosing certain information, managers can interconnect with stakeholders to obtain their 
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assurance and support regarding the company’s performance (Gray et al., 1995; Watson et al, 
2002). In order to satisfy the different needs of stakeholders, companies can communicate with 
their stakeholders and gain competitive advantage by using the internet as an easy and wide-
spread channel of information dissemination (Bolivar and Garcia, 2004). Moreover, to achieve 
a high level of transparency that satisfies stakeholders’ expectations, companies should pay 
attention to the links between their activities, society, the environment and technology. 
Adopting internet can help in acquiring such links (Ahmed and Hardaker, 1999). In addition, 
internet technology offers an interactive communication channel between a company and its 
stakeholders, provides timely updates of information, and allows the retrieval of certain 
information that suits the needs of all users (Shepherd et al., 2001). However, managers should 
be aware of the impact of powerful stakeholders on the disclosure decision as well as consider 
the information cost and competition effect when adopting different disclosure types to satisfy 
different stakeholder needs (Gray et al., 1995) and particularly in the implementing and 
developing of internet disclosure practices. As suggested by Rizk (2006), stakeholder theory 
may be applicable in developing countries, highly regulated industries and transitional 
economies. Furthermore, Haniffa (1999) indicated that the most important implication of this 
theory is the increasing interest in social reporting and the cultural perspective in accounting 
practice. In Saudi Arabia, the code of corporate governance in its Articles 1 and 10 mentions 
the rights of stakeholders and provides some articles to protect their rights, while asserting the 
social responsibility of the companies. Thus, Saudi listed companies are expected to consider 
the interests of all stakeholders and not only their shareholders. In addition, as all Saudi 
companies should pay Zakat, it can be assumed that these companies are committed to their 
social responsibilities (Albassam, 2014). However, applying stakeholder theory effectively in 
the Saudi context may encounter some obstacles due to the fact that compliance with the code 
is voluntary and not compulsory, which means that Saudi companies with highly concentrated 
family and government ownerships may neglect stakeholder interests for the sake of the 
interests of their shareholders (ibid).    
3.2.2.3 Political costs theory 
 
The political costs theory is based on the notion that political bodies (e. g. government and tax 
organizations) have the power to influence the redistribution of the companies’ wealth (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978, 1990). This theory perceives the effect of government and other 
political bodies on determining accounting reports and policies and setting disclosure 
regulation (Sterling, 1974), which may be attributed to many reasons. First, it helps to both 
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protect the public and prevent or limit fraud and scandals as much as possible. Additionally, it 
enhances resources allocation in the economy by reducing costs to investors regarding rational 
decision-making process (Haniffa, 1999). Furthermore, it permits the availability of the 
information to anyone who is interested in obtaining such information (Benston, 1976). Finally, 
the government involvement in disclosure regulation provides the required information for 
national economic planning and control (Gray et al., 1984). It is assumed that political process 
generates costs for corporations and, thus, managers will adopt some procedures that alleviate 
this potential political cost, such as adopting accounting policies and government lobbying 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1990). Therefore, several studies use political costs theory to 
explain the incentives of managers to voluntarily disclose information, such as Cooke (1989b), 
Al- Modahki (1995) and Milne (2002). Moreover, it can be stated that companies may alter 
accounting information as a response to changes in expected political costs (Cahan, 1992) and 
that they may disclose more information to mitigate adverse political actions in the form of 
regulation by government and tax institutions or claims by other political groups (Gray and 
Roberts, 1989). However, political costs theory has been implied to explain the relationship 
between size and disclosure practice; that is, large companies are subject to higher tax rates, 
which increase their political costs and, hence, they are more likely to disclose voluntary 
information to decrease these political costs (Al-Hatybat, 2005). Other studies argue that 
industry sensitivity may be more related to political costs than size. For example, they reveal 
that companies in the oil and gas industry tend to disclose more information in order to avoid 
further regulation that may increase their political costs (Ghazali, 2004). Since Saudi listed 
companies are more exposed to the government and public concerns, they are expected to 
disclose more information to satisfy all users and avoid increasing their political costs. That is, 
these companies may provide more information voluntarily to limit government intervention 
and may use the internet as a tool to disseminate this required information.  
Although many researchers in the disclosure literature have used various theories to explain 
disclosure practice, others choose to rely on cost benefit analysis to justify disclosure decisions. 
Producing accounting information has its related costs as well as its expected benefits. Thus, 
the cost benefit approach considers these costs and benefits in addressing disclosure practice. 
The cost benefit analysis approach will be discussed in the following section.     
3.2.3 Cost benefit analysis approach 
 
Basically, the cost benefit approach concerns the weighing of benefits of any decision taken by 
the company against its costs. Since disclosure practice involves some costs, companies 
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generally aim to ensure that the additional costs resulting from disclosing more information do 
not exceed the expected benefits of such a disclosure (Gray et al., 1984). The main theory 
derived from the cost benefit approach is information costs theory, which will be reviewed in 
the next section in detail.   
 3.2.3.1 Information costs theory 
 
Information costs theory is used by many researchers to explain disclosure practice. It is 
assumed that companies are motivated to disclose more information voluntarily if the potential 
benefits exceed the estimated costs (Cooke, 1992). However, it is worth mentioning that it is 
difficult to identify or measure the benefits and costs of disclosure, which makes quantifying 
the influence of disclosure very hard. Furthermore, determining changes in behaviour that arise 
from disclosure in isolation from other influences is a problematic issue (Gray et al., 1984). 
In general, two types of disclosure costs can be identified, that is, direct and indirect costs 
(Mautz and May,1978). The direct costs of disclosure include the expended resources to gather, 
process, manage, monitor, develop, audit and distribute information (Cooke, 1992). According 
to Watts and Zimmerman (1990), disclosing information to all users involves contracting costs, 
which consist of transaction costs, agency costs, information costs, renegotiation costs and 
bankruptcy costs. However, the direct cost of disclosure may be affected by many factors; such 
as the internal organizational structure, where a more complex structure usually leads to high 
disclosure costs and vice versa. Additionally, the optimal harmony between the internal and 
external information needs helps to decrease the costs of disclosure when gathering information 
(Gray et al., 1984). Also, the advances in information technology contribute to low costs of 
disclosing information, encouraging companies to provide more information (Elliot and 
Jacobson, 1994). It is suggested that the direct costs of disclosure are more significant in 
developing countries than in developed countries (Rutherford and Abu-Nassar, 1995). On the 
other hand, two types of costs represent the indirect costs of disclosure, namely litigation and 
competitive disadvantage costs. Litigation costs occur as a result of legal actions taken by users 
who perceive the disclosure to be misleading or insufficient (Elliot and Jacobson, 1994). Thus, 
companies tend to disclose the required information to prevent or mitigate such litigation costs. 
Many researchers use litigation costs to explain disclosure practice. For example, Skinner 
(1994) states that managers have incentives to disclose even bad news voluntarily to their 
stakeholders to avoid rising potential litigation costs, while Francis et al. (1994) find that 
voluntary disclosure may not be a powerful protection, as advocated, against future litigation 
costs.         
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Further indirect disclosure costs are those related to competitive disadvantage, that is, using 
additional disclosed information by competitors in a way that is harmful to the disclosing 
company and taking advantage on the account of the company (Verrecchia, 1983). Moreover, 
Beaver (1998, P.164) mentions that competitive disadvantage is “creating a disincentive to 
innovate or invest in product development” via disclosure such as technological skills, 
production techniques, advertising plans, copyrights and patents (Mautz and May, 1978). 
Furthermore, it is expected that competitive disadvantage costs of disclosure may increase 
depending on a number of reasons such as the timing of disclosure, highly competitive 
industries and a high level of specific details disclosed (ibid). The indirect costs of disclosure 
are claimed to be more important than that direct costs in developed countries (Gray and 
Roberts, 1989).      
Obviously, there is a variety of benefits that companies may acquire from disclosure. One of 
the main benefits of disclosure is reducing the uncertainty regarding financial performance and 
the future expectations of companies. Other disclosure benefits include enhanced decision-
making processes regarding resource allocation, improving share marketability, raising new 
capital at lower cost, lowering agency and political cost and enhancing the image of the 
company (see: Mautz and May, 1978; Gray and Roberts, 1989; Haniffa, 1999). Many studies 
address the benefits of disclosure; for example, Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) investigated the 
benefits of disclosure from the perception of three groups of investors /shareholders, corporate 
managers and financial analysts. The increase in management credibility was ranked as the 
most important benefit derived from improved disclosure by all the three groups. However, 
other benefits were ranked differently by the three groups, except improved relations with 
supplier and reduced regulatory intervention, which received the lowest ranking from the three 
groups. Similarly, Elliot and Jacobson (1994) examined the costs and benefits of disclosure 
from the view of three interest groups, namely entity's interest, non-owner investors' interest 
and national interest. The results revealed that improved disclosure is the best interest of the 
national group and that they can gain many benefits compared to the other groups, while costs 
are only recognized by entity’s interest. Gray and Roberts (1989) empirically rank the 
constraints and benefits of voluntary disclosure. They find that the first rank of benefits is the 
improved image and reputation of company, while cost of competitive disadvantage is in the 
first rank of constraints. Furthermore, in the study of Vlachos (2001), disclosure benefits were 
classified into two types: internal and external benefits. Internal benefits include reducing 
company costs, which are cost of capital, agency cost and political costs, other benefits include 
improving the company’s image and reputation, stabilising the share price and assuring the 
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company’s ability to meet its obligations, while the external benefits involve an efficient capital 
market, a high level of investment, and the improved liquidity of the capital market. It can be 
noted that most of the studies agree regarding the main disclosure benefits but vary regarding 
the ranking of these benefits. The variation may be attributed to the differences in the 
participants or the economic environments where the studies took place.   
Regarding internet reporting as a type of disclosure, many researchers point out the benefits 
that companies can acquire from using the internet to disclose information to their users. By 
disclosing information on the internet, the company can gain a reduction in the cost of 
preparing and disseminating paper-based reports. Besides, providing internet reports enhances 
the accessibility of the required information and meets users’ specific needs through facilitating 
the use of hyperlinks, search tools and other interactive means (Oyelere et al., 2003). Also, 
Elliot and Jacobson (1994) indicate that the advances in information technology have 
contributed significantly to reducing the cost of disclosure, which encourages companies to 
disclose more information via their websites. In summary, it is expected that companies will 
create a balance between costs and benefits when disclosing information on the internet. That 
is, companies will develop, manage and maintain their websites according to the information 
cost theory. 
In order to meet the stakeholders’ needs for information in a timely manner, using an 
appropriate format and with easy access, companies should adopt an adequate means of 
disclosure to satisfy all users. Applying the innovation adoption approach may help to justify 
the use of internet disclosure. The next section presents this approach in more detail.   
3.2.4 Innovation adoption approach 
 
Innovation, as defined by Rogers (1995), is “a practice, idea, or object perceived as new by an 
individual or entity”. The technology adoption theories can explain the attitudes and behaviour 
of users regarding emerging innovative technologies in addition to their motivation to utilise 
such technologies in business. Therefore, adopting internet technology to disclose information 
on a company’s website may represent an innovation for the company that is using internet 
reporting. Some previous studies have found that there are many organisational aspects (e.g. 
technological knowledge resources and infrastructure) affecting the adoption of the business 
process reengineering innovation (Grover et al., 1999; O'Donnell, 2003). Moreover, Mehrtens 
et al. (2001) points out that there is a lack of studies that identify the organisational justification 
for internet adoption. In their study of voluntary innovation adoption, Tolbert and Zucker 
(1983) indicate that adopting innovation in its early stages can be predicted using some 
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organizational characteristics proposed by economics-based analyses, however the later stages 
appear to be determined more by legitimacy concerns emerging from growing 
institutionalisation. In particular, Abrahamson (1991) identifies three ways of innovation 
change. First, forced implementation, where a company is forced to adopt an innovation by 
powerful external bodies, such as the government, regardless of the expected benefits to the 
company. Second, the fashion perspective is when the company tends to imitate leading-edge 
organizations, which can strongly attract companies to adopt an innovation. Third, the fad 
perspective relates to companies trying to follow former adopters in the same business because 
of low uncertainty about the innovation or to show their legitimateness by conforming to up-
to-date norms. Jeyaraj et al. (2006) examined a number of studies dealing with information 
technology adoption and noted that the technology acceptance model (TAM) and diffusion of 
innovations (DoI) theory are commonly used in justifying the adoption of information 
technology. The following paragraphs highlight the main points under both of these two 
theories. 
 3.2.4..1 Technology acceptance model 
 
As mentioned previously, the technology acceptance model (TAM) is one of the most widely 
used models to explain technology adoption. Initially, it was developed to validate and predict 
behaviour related to the use of computers or other relevant technologies (Davis, 1989). This 
model suggests that the adoption of any information system depends on two determinants: 
perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use (ibid). Perceived usefulness means the degree 
to which the potential user of an information system believes that he or she will gain some 
benefits from this system and improve his or her performance accordingly. Perceived ease of 
use is the extent to which the user perceives that using a certain information system will be free 
of effort. Since information technology systems are becoming increasingly complex and 
necessary at the same time, users tend to accept the easier-to-use system if all else is equal 
(ibid). Many studies have been conducted to discuss the adoption of information technology 
systems (Al-Gahtani, 2001; Chan and Lu, 2004; Kim and Malhotra, 2005; Lundmark et al., 
2008; Cresswell et al., 2013; Chen and Kamal, 2016 and Molinillo and Japutra, 2017). Lee et 
al. (2008) conducted a study to determine the different factors that influence the use of financial 
websites to acquire the required information by investors. Using the TAM, the results reveal 
that technical convenience and consistency affect the perceived ease of use, while information 
quality, investment information and decision quality influence perceived usefulness. Perceived 
usefulness to the individual investor is mostly influenced by decision quality, whereas 
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perceived ease of use is affected by both consistency and technical convenience. Furthermore, 
Pinsker (2008) used the TAM and absorptive capacity to study XBRL adoption by managers 
(as the continuous disclosure technology example). The findings showed that participants 
perceive the benefits of XBRL adoption in terms of being easy to learn (absorptive capacity), 
its usefulness (TAM) and creating positive attitudes of participants toward technology in 
general (TAM). Recently, Diatmika et al. (2016) examined the factors that affect individual 
intentions to accept the Accounting Information System (AIS) based on information 
technology (IT). The model of this study is a combination of the TAM, theory of planned 
behaviour, innovation diffusion theory, task technology fit and self-efficacy theory. They 
concluded that perceived usefulness, subjective norm, task technology fit and self-efficacy 
have an effect on behavioural intention. On the other hand, ease of use, perceived behavioural 
control and personal innovativeness in IT have no influence on behavioural intention. Thus, 
the TAM is applicable to the internet reporting context as the management use of the internet 
to disclose information is driven by the perceived benefits and the ability to use such an 
innovation.   
3.2.4.2 Diffusion of innovation theory 
 
Rogers (1995) defines innovation diffusion as “a process by which an innovation is 
communicated, adopted and spread among members of a social system”. Innovation diffusion 
theory explains and describes how a new invention is implemented and becomes successful 
within cultures (Clarke, 1999). Rogers (2003) identifies five characteristics that influence the 
rate of innovation adoption: (1) relative advantage, that is, a new innovation is more likely to 
be adopted if it has a relatively higher advantage than the idea it supersedes; (2) compatibility 
of an innovation with existing values, past experiences and the needs of potential adopters, 
which makes it easier to adopt; (3) complexity, meaning that the more the innovation is simple 
and easy to understand, the more rapidly it will be adopted; (4) trialability, that is, how easily 
an innovation can be experimented with, because hard to use and try innovations are less likely 
to be adopted; and (5) observability, that is, the extent to which the results of an innovation are 
visible to others, whereby easily observed innovations may be adopted faster. The diffusion of 
innovation theory has been used by many researchers in explaining the adoption of information 
technology. For example, Wejnert (2002) provides a conceptual framework of the variables 
used in diffusion research to demonstrate their impact on the decision regarding innovation 
adoption. These variables are classified into three major groups: the characteristics of the 
innovation itself, the characteristics of the adopters, and characteristics of the environment 
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concerning geographical settings, societal culture, political conditions and global uniformity. 
He concludes that there is a great need to incorporate some factors in diffusion research, namely 
the interactive character of diffusion variables, the gating function of diffusion variables, and 
the effects of the adopter’s characteristics on the temporal rate of diffusion. Chircu and 
Kauffman (2000) outline some barriers that companies face in adopting information 
technology. One of these are the organisational barriers, which relate to the valuation of the 
information technology process, and the other are user barriers, which relate to the conversion 
from the present situation to a new one. Xiao et al. (2004) tried to explain internet reporting 
decisions in Chinese companies using innovation diffusion theory. They state that both 
economic-based and diffusion of innovation theories can be used to supplement each other and 
improve the understanding of internet reporting practices. Diffusion of innovation theory has 
been applied to develop hypotheses about the relationship between internet reporting practices 
and some variables, such as auditor type, foreign ownership and industry type.  
Based on the above discussion, the rate of adoption of internet reporting by Saudi listed 
companies depends on how they perceive its relative advantage, compatibility, trialability, 
observability and complexity. That is, if these companies observe the benefits of internet 
disclosure and they have the required tools and facilities, then they will adopt this innovation, 
while taking its trialability and complexity into consideration. For example, a company may 
choose to use HTML, PDF or XBRL in presenting its internet reporting, based on their 
perceived trialability and complexity. 
3.3. Hypothese formulation 
 
To formulate testable hypotheses, four groups of independent variables are used as possible 
explanatory variables of CIR practices. These groups are: firm characteristics variables (7 
variables) and variables related to corporate governance; board of directors (4 variables), 
ownership structure (4 variables) and audit committee (3 variables). The main hypotheses 
related to the independent variables are:  
H1: There is a significant relationship between firm characteristics variables and corporate 
internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness, usability and audit) by Saudi listed 
companies.  
H2: There is a significant relationship between board of directors variables and corporate 




H3: There is a significant relationship between ownership structure variables and corporate 
internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness, usability and audit) by Saudi listed 
companies. 
H4: There is a significant relationship between audit committee variables and corporate 
internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness, usability and audit) by Saudi listed 
companies. 
Next sections present the hypotheses related to firm characteristics variables and corporate 
governance variables.  
3.3.1 Firm characteristic variables 
 
The impact of firm characteristics on the extent of disclosure has been extensively investigated 
in the prior disclosure studies. Thus, seven variables related to firm characteristics and the 
generated hypotheses are discussed below.  
3.3.1.1. Firm size 
 
Firm size is one of the most common and important variables influencing disclosure practices. 
Many theories are used to explain the relationship between firm size and voluntary internet 
disclosure. Based on agency theory, the conflict between owners and management leads to 
information asymmetry, which increases the agency costs such as monitoring costs. Voluntary 
reporting of more information on the company’s website can help to reduce monitoring costs 
and alleviate this conflict. However, as the cost of voluntary disclosure may be very high, large 
companies are more likely to adopt it. Furthermore, large companies generally have a variety 
of products and more complex information systems, which may cause their disclosure costs to 
be lower than those of small companies (Oyelere et al., 2003). However, legitimacy theory 
assumes that managers of large companies are greatly motivated to disclose more information 
on their websites (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Gray et al., 
1995; Debreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge et al., 2002a; Oyelere et al., 2003). One explanation is 
that managers expect that disclosing more information voluntarily will reduce the possibility 
of legal action against them due to untimely or inadequate disclosure and will protect the 
company’s credibility (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Further, Debreceny et al. (2002) reveal that 
large companies are subject to more interest from public and regulatory bodies, which 
motivates managers to enhance the companies’ reputation and public image by disclosing more 
information. According to cost benefit theory, large companies may have incentives to disclose 
more information voluntarily on their websites as they have the required resources for 
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disclosure and can benefit from reducing the cost per unit for disclosed information due to their 
large-volume products, whereas small companies are unable to afford the high costs needed to 
collect, present and disseminate information online (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Haniffa, 
1999). Empirical evidence from the literature reveals that size is a significant explanatory 
variable and has a positive association with the extent of disclosure in both developed and 
developing countries, both for hard copy reporting (e.g. Cooke, 1992; Wallace et al., 1994; Al-
Modahki, 1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004) and internet reporting (e.g. 
Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Hassan et al., 1999; Ettredge et al., 2001; Debreceny et al., 2002; 
Marston, 2003; Oyelere et al., 2003; Xiao et al., 2004; Bollen et al., 2006; Kelton and Yang, 
2008; Desoky, 2009; Arafa, 2012; Kamalluarifin, 2016; Ahmed et al., 2017; Dolinšek and 
Lutar-Skerbinjek, 2018).  
Several proxies of company size were used in previous studies, such as total assets (Ashbaugh 
et al., 1999; Ismail, 2002, Al-Motrafi, 2008; Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek, 2018), total sales 
(Haniffa, 1999; Aly, 2008; Kamalluarifin, 2016), turnover (Craven and Marston, 1999; 
Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek, 2018), market capitalization (Ettredge et al., 2002a; Bollen et 
al., 2006, Desoky, 2009), natural log of total assets (Beasley et al., 2000; Davidson et al., 2005; 
Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Al-Shetwi et al., 2011; Kamel and Shahwan, 2014; Albassam et al., 
2015; Ahmed et al., 2017) and average number of employees (Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek, 
2018). However, no dominant theory or criterion is provided in the disclosure literature to 
select among these different proxies. As such, in the present study company size is measured 
using the natural log of total assets.  
Consistent with many internet disclosure studies that found that size has a significant and 
positive association with internet reporting, it can be presumed that company size may have 
the same impact on CIR in the Saudi context. Thus, the first hypothesis is:  
H1.1 There is a positive relationship between firm size and corporate internet reporting 
(total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi listed companies.  
3.3.1.2 Firm growth 
 
Companies with high growth rate may have reasons to disclose more information in their 
websites than other companies. Based on agency theory, high-growth companies may have 
higher information asymmetry and agency costs, and thus have more incentive to alleviate the 
asymmetry problem by disclosing voluntary information through additional means such as 
internet reporting (Debreceny et al., 2002). Furthermore, the high growth effects may not be 
effectively transferred to investors using traditional accounting disclosures, hence these 
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companies tend to use the internet to communicate more suitable information to their investors 
(Bollen et al., 2006). The growth of a company usually requires more capital; therefore, high 
growth companies consider disclosing more information to obtain their requirements regarding 
external capital. In addition, these high-growth companies have a great incentive to increase 
voluntary disclosure to enhance their reputation and attract potential investors (Eng and Mak, 
2003). On the other hand, an opposing view suggests that firm growth is negatively associated 
with corporate disclosure. This negative association could be attributed to the high competitive 
costs for high-growth companies when increasing voluntary disclosure (Debreceny et al., 
2002). Another explanation is that fast growing companies are subject to extensive exposure 
by analysts and media followings and other means, and hence the required level of disclosure 
may be lower (ibid). Further, the growing companies need to allocate most of their resources 
to manage their growing activities and, as such, they may lack the required financial and human 
resources to invest in developing their websites (Bollen et al., 2006).    
The existing empirical studies provide inconclusive results of the relationship between firm 
growth and disclosure. While some studies find this relationship to be significant (e.g. 
Debreceny et al., 2002; Bollen et al., 2006; Abdelsalam et al., 2007; La Rosa and Liberatore, 
2014; Ahmed, 2015), other studies (e.g. McNally et al., 1982; Eng and Mak, 2003; Ronnie Lo, 
2009; Habbash, 2010; Arafa, 2012; Albassam, 2014) find no significant relationship between 
firm growth and voluntary disclosure. Different measures were used as proxies for firm growth, 
such as market to book ratio, growth in total assets, capital expenditure and growth of sales. In 
this study, growth is measured by the growth of sales, which is calculated as the increase in 
total sales in percentage over the total sales in the previous fiscal year: 
(!"#$%	'$%()	*+	,*)-$%	.($/	0	1	!"#$%	'$%()	*+	,*)-$%	.($/	(013)]	6377	
!"#$%	'$%()	*+	,*)-$%	.($/	(013)	
 ).  
Based on the inconclusive findings on the relationship between firm growth and internet 
disclosure, it can be assumed that: 
H1.2 There is a significant relationship between firm growth and corporate internet 
reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi listed 
companies.  
3.3.1.3 Leverage  
 
Leverage is a financial risk measure which shows the ability of the company to meet its 
obligations. Based on agency theory, high debts can create agency costs. That is, the conflict 
between debtholders and shareholders may increase the monitoring costs. By disclosing more 
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information, management can mitigate this conflict and reduce monitoring costs. Voluntary 
disclosure can also enhance transparency and help to assure debtholders about the company’s 
ability to meet its obligations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, highly leveraged companies 
may use internet voluntary disclosure as a means to lower their cost of debt and allow debtors 
to constantly monitor the company’s affairs, which may lead to a reduction in agency costs 
(Debreceny et al., 2002). As such, a positive relationship is expected between leverage and 
internet voluntary disclosure. In contrast, some researchers argue that leverage may affect 
internet reporting negatively, whereby high leverage is more likely to decrease equity agency 
costs by creating more debt, which results in reducing total equity financing (Bollen et al., 
2006). In addition, debtholders of high-leverage companies may not depend mainly on internet 
reporting because they are more likely to acquire information through alternative 
communication channels (private channels), whereas companies with lower debt and higher 
equity percentage may disclose more information on their website to satisfy investor demand 
(ibid).   
Prior studies that examine the relationship between leverage and voluntary disclosure find 
mixed results. While some studies find a positive association (e.g. Ettredge et al., 2002a; Ismail, 
2002; Xiao et al., 2004; Al-Saeed, 2006b; Barako et al., 2006; Alshowaiman, 2008; Elsayed, 
2010; Omar and Simon, 2011; Kamalluarifin, 2016; Ahmed et al., 2017), other studies find a 
negative association (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003). However, many other studies find no influence 
of leverage on internet disclosure (e.g. Debreceny et al., 2002; Oyelere et al., 2003; Bollen et 
al., 2006; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; Aly et al., 2010; Samaha et al., 
2012). Following prior research (e.g. Debreceny et al., 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Xiao 
et al., 2004; Kamalluarifin, 2016), leverage in this study is measured using the debt ratio (total 
debts/total assets). Because of the inconsistent findings, it is proposed that:  
H1.3 There is a significant relationship between leverage and corporate internet 




Liquidity refers to the ability of a company to meet its current financial obligations. Based on 
signalling theory, it is expected that companies with high liquidity may have the incentive to 
voluntarily disclose more information to signal their ability to fulfil their current liabilities 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995) and to distinguish themselves from those companies that have 
liquidity problems. Furthermore, the use of the internet to provide more information is 
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motivated by the concerns of different users, such as investors, creditors and regulators, 
regarding the company’s going concern and its ability to cover all its short-term liabilities 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995). However, agency theory suggests that weak-liquidity companies 
are more likely to increase the level of voluntary disclosure to satisfy the needs of their 
shareholders and investors, while high-liquidity companies may assume the satisfaction of 
investors, whereby there is no need for further information (Wallace et al.  1994). Many prior 
disclosure studies examine the association between liquidity and disclosure; however, the 
findings are conflicted. Some researchers report a positive association between liquidity and 
voluntary disclosure, such as Oyelere et al. (2003), Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012), 
Elshandidy et al., (2013) and Ahmed (2015), while Wallace et al. (1994) and Ahmed et al. 
(2017) confirm a negative association. Other studies (Abdelsalam, 1999; Wallace and Naser, 
1995; Al-Saeed, 2006b; Barako et al., 2006; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Aly et al., 2010; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012) find no relationship between liquidity and disclosure. In this study, liquidity 
is measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities. These arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
H1.4 There is a significant relationship between liquidity and corporate internet 




Dividends provide the required information to public investors regarding the amount and 
timing of future cash flows (Miller and Rock, 1985). Dividends is one of the ways that 
companies can communicate with the market about their future performance. Also, the 
payment of dividends is an indicator of the quality of protection which the company provides 
to its external investors (Hussainey and Walker, 2009). Both agency and signalling theories 
suggest that high-dividends companies may disclose more information. According to agency 
theory, there is a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders regarding dividends 
policy (Brudney, 1980). Therefore, to mitigate this conflict, managers are motivated to disclose 
more information to justify the compensation payment (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013) and to 
demonstrate the financial ability of the company and its contribution to society (Ntim et al., 
2012), while signalling theory assumes that managers of companies with high dividends try to 
signal institutional confidence and attract investors using voluntary disclosure (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). However, other researchers argue that dividends and disclosure provide 
considerably related information. Thus, dividends may substitute other means of disclosure, 
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particularly in less developed capital markets (Previts and Bricker, 1994). As such, companies 
that pay dividends may tend to reduce the level of voluntary disclosure (Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003). Several studies examine the relationship between dividends and 
disclosure (e.g. Brudney, 1980; Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Hussainey and Walker, 
2009; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; Albassam, 2014). The findings of these studies are 
inconclusive; while some researchers report a positive relationship (e.g. Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010), others find an insignificant negative 
association (e.g. Albassam, 2014). Based on these arguments, the following hypothesis can be 
formulated regarding the association between dividends and corporate internet disclosure, 
whereby dividends are measured by a dummy variable coded 1 if a company paid dividends 
during the financial year, and 0 otherwise:    
H1.5 There is a significant relationship between dividends and corporate internet 
reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi listed 
companies. 
3.3.1.6 Industry type  
 
Disclosure levels may vary based on industry type. The impact of industry type on the extent 
of disclosure has been examined in many disclosure studies using political cost theory and 
signalling theory to explain this relationship. According to political cost theory, companies in 
certain industries face political pressure to disclose specific types of information to mitigate 
the associated political costs (Oyelere et al., 2003). Moreover, some companies have social 
responsibilities that should be considered, which may lead to additional political costs such as 
deforestation and pollution; therefore, they tend to disclose more information in order to reduce 
these costs (Haniffa, 1999). However, signalling theory suggests that companies in the same 
industry are more likely to adopt similar disclosure practices. If a company within an industry 
fails to keep up with others from the same industry, it may be interpreted by the market as a 
signal indicating bad news (Craven and Marston, 1999). Presumably, companies in the same 
industry tend to adopt the same disclosure practice of leading companies, including internet 
disclosure Cooke (1991). The relation between industry type and disclosure extent has been 
investigated in many previous studies, yet, mixed results are reported. While some studies find 
a significant association (e.g. Debreceny et al., 2002; Ismail, 2002; Oyelere et al., 2003; Bollen 
et al., 2006; Alshowaiman, 2008; Ezat and El-Masry, 2008; Hassan et al., 2009; Aly et al., 
2010; Ahmed et al., 2017; Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek, 2018), other studies find no 
relationship between industry type and internet disclosure (e.g. Wallace et al., 1994; Craven 
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and Marston, 1999; Eng and Mak, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Desoky, 2009). 
These different results may be attributed to the different industry classifications used in prior 
research (e.g. financial or non-financial, IT industry or other industries). In addition, 
differences in aspects such as capital structure, size and ownership structure may affect the 
association between industry type and disclosure (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). Also, some 
companies in certain industries are subject to additional regulations, such as in oil and gas, 
which require them to disclose more information to the interested parties (Arcay and Vazquez, 
2005). The current study uses financial and non-financial as a classification for Saudi listed 
companies. The rationale for choosing this classification is that the financial sector is one of 
the most important industries in the Saudi market because of its leading role in most financial 
and commercial activities. Further, the financial industry is the only one that is regulated and 
supervised by both the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority. Usually, financial companies have more internet experience; for example, banks 
have an internet banking system that provides quick and secure services for their customers 
online. Because of this expertise, it is assumed that financial companies are more likely to 
adopt internet disclosure. Industry type is measured by a dummy variable coded “1” if the 
company is financial and “0” otherwise. Based on these discussions, the following hypothesis 
can be stated: 
H1.6 There is a significant relationship between industry type and corporate internet 
reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi listed 
companies. 
3.3.1.7 Audit type  
 
There are two types of audit firms; large firms (the Big4) that are broadly spread and small 
firms (i.e. other than the Big4) that operate locally. It is assumed that audit firms can affect the 
level and quality of disclosure. Based on signalling theory, large audit companies need to 
preserve their good reputation and thus have the incentive to require high quality disclosure. 
Therefore, the engagement of a Big4 company is a signal of the effectiveness of the audit 
process and the reliability of the disclosed information (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Xiao et al., 
2004). Moreover, these large audit companies have more experience and special skills, so they 
can influence companies to disclose more information (Wallace et al., 1994). In the same vein, 
agency theory suggests that auditing can help in mitigating the conflict of interest between 
management and investors. Generally, large audit companies are more concerned about their 
reputation, hence they are highly motivated to maintain their independence and to require high 
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quality disclosure practices, encouraging management with the higher number of possible 
benefits that can be obtained from external monitoring to hire them (Xiao et al., 2004). In 
contrast, small audit companies lack the ability to impose high levels of disclosure on their 
clients because they need to satisfy their clients’ needs in order to be reappointed (Wallace and 
Naser, 1995). Furthermore, innovation diffusion theory suggests that the large audit companies 
are more likely to support the diffusion of innovative practices, such as using the internet to 
disclose more information. That is, reputable audit companies can protect their clients against 
uncertainty with online disclosure and assist them in implementing internet disclosure (Xiao et 
al., 2004). The findings of the empirical studies that examine the relationship between audit 
type and voluntary disclosure are ambiguous. Xiao et al. (2004) find that companies audited 
by big audit companies tend to increase internet reporting. This positive association has been 
also documented by (Trabelsi and Labelle, 2006; Al-Shammari, 2007; Al-Motrafi, 2008; 
Kelton and Yang, 2008; Ahmed et al., 2017). Other studies conclude that audit type has no 
significant impact on the decision to disclose information (Wallace et al., 1994; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Al-Saeed, 2006b; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Aly et al., 2010). However, 
Wallace and Naser (1995) indicate a significant and negative association between audit type 
and the disclosure level. Consequently, audit type is measured in this study by dummy variable 
coded “1” if the company audited by one of the Big4 audit companies (Ernst & Young, Price 
Waterhouse &Coopers PwC, KPMG and Deloitte) or “0” otherwise. All the above arguments 
lead to the following hypothesis:  
 H1.7 There is a significant relationship between audit type and corporate internet 
reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi listed 
companies. 
3.3.2 Corporate governance variables 
 
The literature on voluntary disclosure shows that it is affected by corporate governance 
characteristics. Corporate governance helps to assure the accuracy of the disclosed information 
and manages the relationship between management, board of directors and shareholders. It is 
suggested that board characteristics, ownership structure and audit committee characteristics 
represent the main factors that influence the level and quality of voluntary disclosure (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Xiao et al., 2004; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; 
Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Kelton 
and Yang, 2008; Al-Shetwi et al., 2011; Samaha et al., 2015). Although many studies 
conducted in developed countries have examined the relationship between corporate 
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governance and voluntary disclosure, a limited number of studies have been done on 
developing countries. Therefore, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature 
on developing countries by exploring the impact of corporate governance on voluntary 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia. In line with previous studies, the current study employs three main 
sets of variables as corporate governance explanatory variables: board characteristics, 
ownership structure and audit committee. The board of directors’ characteristics variables 
include board size, board independence, board frequency of meeting and role duality. The 
ownership structure variables consist of four types of ownership: block ownership, director 
ownership, institutional ownership and government ownership and, finally, the audit 
committee variables are: audit committee size, audit committee frequency of meeting and audit 
committee independence. The following sections discuss these variables in detail.  
3.3.2.1 Board variables 
3.3.2.1.1 Board size 
 
Board size refers to the total number of directors on a board (Panasian et al., 2003). According 
to agency theory, the board of directors is assigned to represent shareholders’ interests and thus 
is expected to provide a high level of disclosure (Davidson et al., 1996). Agency theory 
suggests that board size is an influential aspect in monitoring management performance, and 
increasing managerial monitoring can increase the level of voluntary disclosure (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). Therefore, a large board can provide more proficiency in monitoring and 
controlling the diverse and huge activities of large companies with less conflict. Some 
researchers claim that a large board may result in greater expertise and diversity of knowledge, 
which can improve the disclosure quality. In addition, the percentage of independent directors 
is more likely to increase in larger boards, which leads to an increase in the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Furthermore, large boards can help in mitigate CEO dominance and preserve 
shareholder interests (Yermack, 1996; Mak and Roush, 2000; Singh et al., 2004; Abdel-Fattah, 
2008; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Samaha et al., 2012). On the other hand, 
others argue that large boards may suffer from poor communication and conflict between 
directors, which may adversely affect the decision- making process, while small boards are 
more efficient and manageable (Jensen, 1993; Vafeas, 1999, 2000; Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006). Empirically, previous studies report mixed results regarding the relationship between 
board size and disclosure level. While some studies find a positive association (Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 2012; Samaha et 
al., 2012; Ahmed, 2015), other studies find a negative impact of board size (Yermack, 1996). 
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However, many other studies show that there is no influence of board size on the disclosure 
level (Lakhal, 2003; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Al-Motrafi, 2008; 
Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Al-Shetwi et al., 2011; Arafa, 
2012). In Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) specifies that the board 
of directors should not be less than three and not more than eleven members. It can be noted 
that the SCGC is flexible in composing the size of corporate board since there is no agreed 
optimal board size. John and Senbet (1998) state that determining the board size varies among 
companies as it depends on external forces such as culture and regulations. Previous studies 
find that board sizes differ from one country to another; for example, Heidrick (2007) reports 
that while companies in the UK, Holland and Switzerland favour a small board, companies in 
Germany, Spain, Belgium and France are more likely to have a large board (thirteen to nineteen 
members). Since the association between board size and voluntary disclosure is not well 
documented in the Saudi context, the current study seeks to examine this association. The board 
size is measured by the number of board members.  
Based on the above mixed findings, the relationship between board size and internet reporting 
can be tested using the following hypothesis:  
H2.1 There is a significant relationship between board size and corporate internet 
reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi listed 
companies. 
 3.3.2.1.2 Board independence 
 
The independence of the board of directors depends on the number of independent directors in 
the board who are those directors other than managing and functional directors (Abdel-Fattah, 
2008). It is suggested that using independent directors is considered as a sign of good corporate 
governance that may result in increasing the quantity and quality of disclosure (Xiao et al. 
2004). From an agency theory perspective, having independent directors on the board can 
reduce the agency problem and alleviate the conflict of interest (Fama, 1980). The presence of 
independent directors can help in monitoring and controlling management performance and 
thus increasing the transparency levels (Gul and Leung, 2004). Moreover, as representatives of 
shareholders, independent directors can protect the interests of shareholders and encourage 
more voluntary disclosure, which may reduce agency costs and information asymmetry 
(Forker, 1992). Also, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) claim that independent directors can convey 
their knowledge and experience to the board and improve board decision-making. In contrast, 
others suggest that independent directors may have a negative impact on the disclosure 
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practice. That is, independent directors may lack the appropriate knowledge about the 
company’s operations and activities and may also have limited time to practice their 
responsibility effectively (Jiraporn et al., 2009). Furthermore, increasing managerial 
monitoring through independent directors may obstruct managerial performance (Bozec, 
2005). However, the directors’ independence may be impaired by factors such as the nature of 
the appointment process and the tenure length in the same company (Crowther and Jatana, 
2005). This situation is clear in developing countries, especially Saudi Arabia, where social 
relations play a crucial role in appointing directors and they can keep their position for long 
periods (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). Regarding board formation in Saudi Arabia, the 
SCGC (Article 12) mandates that the independent directors3 should comprise two members or 
one third of the board, whichever is greater, and that the majority of the members of the board 
have to be non-executive directors. Empirical studies indicate inconsistent results regarding the 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and voluntary disclosure. Some 
studies reveal that independent directors have no impact of on the level of disclosure (e.g. Ho 
and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Lakhal, 2003; Xiao et al., 2004; Mangena and 
Pike, 2005; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Barako and Tower, 2008; Elsayed, 2010; Al-
Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Arafa, 2012; Zabri et al., 2016), while other studies show either 
a positive relationship (e.g. Forker, 1992; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007; 
Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Samaha et al., 2015) or a negative 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and disclosure (e.g. Eng and Mak, 
2003; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Kamalluarifin, 2016). In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, independent directors’ impact has gained some attention recently; a few studies 
have pointed out the association between good corporate governance practices and the presence 
of independent directors in Saudi companies (Al-Moataz and Lakhal, 2008; Al-Moataz and 
Hussainey, 2012; Albassam, 2014). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no previous 
studies have examined the relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
internet disclosure in the Saudi context. Based on these arguments, the current study examines 
the relationship between board independence and corporate internet reporting. Board 
independence is measured by the percentage of independent members on the board (i.e. the 
                                                
 
3 An independent director is a member of a board of directors who has complete independence. The SCGC 
indicates some cases in which the independency of a director is contravened, such as holding controlling shares 
in the company or its subsidiaries; having been a senior executive of the company or any of its subsidiaries 
during the preceding two years; and being a close relative of any board member or the executive management. 
Hereby, a non-executive director is a member of the board of directors who does not have a full-time position 
nor is entitled to a salary from the company on a periodic basis. 
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ratio of independent members on the board to the total members on the board). Therefore, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H2.2 There is a significant relationship between board independence and corporate 
internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi 
listed companies. 
 3.3.2.1.3 Board frequency of meeting 
 
Through board meetings, directors perform two main functions: decision management 
functions, such as strategic, investment and finance decisions, and decision control functions, 
such as the appointment of top-level management and monitoring capital allocation decisions, 
which include monitoring disclosure quality (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The frequency of board 
meetings indicates the intensity of board activities and the effectiveness of its monitoring role 
(Vafeas, 1999). Based on agency theory, increasing the number of board meetings held during 
the year indicates the soundness of governance practices, which alleviates the information 
asymmetry gap and thus reduces the agency cost (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). Those boards of 
directors that meet more frequently tend to perform their responsibilities while taking into 
account the interests of shareholders (Vafeas, 1999). Therefore, the frequency of board 
meetings is more likely to produce high quality monitoring and enhance financial performance, 
which in turn can improve the company’s transparency. The active board that performs its 
duties effectively, as represented by regular board meetings, may seek high quality disclosure 
(Carcello et al., 2002). On the other hand, stewardship theory proposes that directors are 
trustworthy, which limits the need for frequent board meeting and reduces the board’s 
participation in the company’s routine activities (Letza et al., 2004; Monks and Minow, 2011). 
That is, more regular board meetings may not enhance management performance or monitoring 
and thus may not improve reporting process. In addition, Vafeas (1999) argues that the 
usefulness of board meetings is not certain as these meetings can be costly in terms of meeting 
fees, travel expenses, management time and other expenses, which can affect disclosure level 
adversely. Further, directors usually have a limited time to spend effectively in monitoring 
managers, which may enhance disclosure levels; instead, most of their time is absorbed by 
routine activities and various formalities (ibid). Prior studies that investigate the impact of 
frequency of board meetings demonstrate mixed findings. Some studies reveal a positive 
impact of frequency of board meetings on earnings forecasts (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), 
capital allocation (Chen and Chen, 2012) and firm performance (Upadhyay et al., 2014). Other 
studies document a negative relationship between frequency of board meetings and firm 
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performance (Vafeas, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Christensen 
et al., 2015) or earnings management (Xie et al., 2003). However, some studies report that 
frequency of board meetings has no impact on firm performance (El Mehdi, 2007; Albassam, 
2014) or R&D disclosure (Ahmed, 2015). There are very limited studies that examine the 
relationship between frequency of board meetings and the level of disclosure. Kent and Stewart 
(2008) find a positive association between the frequency of board meetings and the quantity of 
disclosure. Similarly, Katmun (2012) shows that frequency of board meetings is significantly 
and positively associated with disclosure quality, while Bédard and Gendron (2010a), by 
reviewing the results of previous literature, deduce that there is no evidence to support the 
relationship between the frequency of board meetings and financial reporting quality. To the 
researcher’s knowledge, the impact of the frequency of board meetings on disclosure has not 
yet been investigated in the Saudi Arabian context. The SCGC does not specify any required 
number of board meetings in a year. However, Article 16 states that “The board shall convene 
its ordinary meetings regularly upon a request by the Chairman. The Chairman shall call the 
board for an unforeseen meeting upon a written request by two of its members”. Likewise, the 
Saudi Companies Act does not recommend a specific number of board meetings that a 
company should hold during the year. In the current study, the board frequency of meetings is 
measured by the number of board meetings held during the financial year. Based on the above 
arguments, the following hypothesis can be stated: 
H2.3 There is a significant relationship between board frequency of meeting and 
corporate internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) 
by Saudi listed companies. 
3.3.2.1.4 Role duality  
 
Role duality exists when the same person is the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman 
at the same time in a corporation, in other words, there is no separation between the two 
positions (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Based on agency theory, role duality may generate a 
potential for conflict of interests, hence, the separation of the chairman and CEO roles helps to 
reduce agency costs as it leads to the separation of the two functions, namely decision 
management and decision control, which enhances the company’s performance and reinforces 
effective control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Moreover, agency theory assumes that CEOs should 
act in the best interests of shareholders, however, concentrating both CEO and chairman 
powers in one person may offer chances for self-serving managers to dominate the board and 
behave at the expense of shareholders, which may impair board independence and weaken the 
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board’s monitoring function (Kelton and Yang, 2008). Thus, separating the roles of chairman 
and CEO can result in higher quality disclosure. In contrast, stewardship theory suggests that 
CEOs are trustworthy managers who tend to behave in the best interests of the company and 
shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). Therefore, combining the two roles will maintain board 
effectiveness and monitoring adequacy (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In addition, duality role 
CEOs are keen to run their companies effectively in order to create a good reputation and future 
career opportunities (Conyon and He, 2011). Moreover, role duality is expected to promote 
communications between the board of directors and managers, which can improve decision-
making process and disclosure level (Al-Motrafi, 2008). Prior empirical studies report mixed 
results about the impact of CEO duality on disclosure. While most of the studies show an 
insignificant association between the level of voluntary disclosure and role duality (e.g. 
Haniffa, 1999; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Abdelsalam and Street, 
2007; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Kent and 
Stewart, 2008; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Elsayed, 2010; Arafa, 
2012; Ahmed, 2015 and Kamalluarifin, 2016), other studies find that CEO duality tends to be 
associated with lower levels of voluntary disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Gul and Leung, 
2004; Abdelsalam et al., 2007). In the Saudi context, the SCGC in Article 12 (paragraph d) 
recommends the separation of the positions of the chairman of the board and CEO or any other 
executive position in the company. Role duality in this study is measured by the dummy 
variable, which is “1” if the chairman is also the CEO, and “0” if the two positions are held by 
different persons. All the above discussions lead to the following hypothesis:   
H2.4 There is a significant relationship between role duality and corporate internet 
reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi listed 
companies. 
3.3.2.2 Ownership structure 
 
Ownership structure is considered to be an important corporate governance mechanism that 
determines the quality of disclosure practices (Eng and Mak, 2003). Ownership structure 
indicates the equity concentration or dispersion among different owners in a company. Many 
studies investigate the association between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure 
practice to assess the impact of ownership structure on the quality of corporate disclosure (Mok 
et al., 1992; Lam et al., 1994; Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Nagar et al., 2003; Oyelere et al., 2003), 
however, the findings of these empirical studies are inconclusive. The ownership structure of 
Saudi listed companies comprises various types of owners: individual investors, employees, 
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institutional and government. This section discusses the four types of ownership structure: 
block holder ownership, director ownership, institutional ownership, and government 
ownership.  
3.3.2.2.1 Block holder ownership    
 
Block holders refer to those shareholders who own 5% or more of the total stocks in a company 
(Eng and Mak, 2003; Konijn et al., 2011).  From an agency theory perspective, block holder 
ownership can create a great incentive to control and monitor management performance, which 
reduces information asymmetry and other agency problems; thus, as they obtain the required 
information internally, there is no need for additional disclosure on the websites of the 
companies. Moreover, block holders have a powerful impact on voluntary disclosure (Konijn 
et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012), whereby this power can be used to control managers’ behaviour 
and reduce agency costs.  Also, block holders may use their potential influence to manipulate 
and form disclosure timing and patterns to protect their competitive advantages. Therefore, the 
quality of disclosure of these companies is more likely to be low (Katmun, 2012). Prior 
literature on the relationship between block holder ownership and the level of corporate 
disclosure report mixed results. For instance, Oyelere et al. (2003), Abdelsalam and Street 
(2007), Kelton and Yang (2008) and Elsayed (2010) find a negative association between block 
holder ownership and internet disclosure. In contrast, a positive relationship was found by 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002); Huafang and Jianguo (2007); Desoky (2009) and Dolinšek and 
Lutar-Skerbinjek (2018). Many other studies show that block holder ownership was not 
significantly associated with the level of disclosure (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Al-Saeed, 2006b; 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; 
Barako and Tower, 2008 and Arafa, 2012). These inconclusive results of previous studies can 
be attributed to contextual differences between developed and developing countries. While 
developed countries rely on a coherent and effective corporate governance mechanism that 
promotes a good quality of disclosure, developing countries may experience difficulties in 
applying corporate governance mechanisms and usually have weak legal systems, impairing 
their disclosure quality (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). In Saudi Arabia, CMA states that it is 
compulsory for companies to disclose the owners of 5% or more in the annual report and notify 
the authority of any changes of the percentage of ownership held by significant block holders 
(Listing Rules, Article 45). Based on these discussions, the present study examines the 
association between block holder ownership and internet reporting in Saudi listed companies, 
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whereby block holder ownership is measured by the percentage of shareholders who hold 5% 
or more. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be stated:  
H3.1 There is a significant relationship between block holder ownership and corporate 
internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi 
listed companies. 
3.3.2.2.2 Director ownership 
 
Director ownership is “the percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO and executive 
directors, and includes their deemed interests” (Eng and Mak, 2003, P.330). It is argued that 
director ownership is very important because of the vital role that the board of directors plays 
in forming disclosure policies and practices (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Albassam, 2014). Grounded on agency theory, companies with higher director ownership may 
have less incentive to disclose more information since the director ownership mitigates agency 
conflict between shareholders and managers, which reduces agency costs. It is assumed that 
director ownership supports the interests of managers and shareholders and hence reduces the 
demand for monitoring and controlling the management behaviour by shareholders and 
therefore reduces the need for additional disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Samaha et al., 2012). 
However, McConnell and Servaes (1990) claim that directors may tend to increase their 
interests at the expense of shareholders’ interests. When director ownership is low, directors’ 
motivation to enhance performance may be reduced and can result in greater agency problems. 
Thus, shareholders need to increase managers’ monitoring to alleviate these agency problems, 
which may increase the costs to the firm as well (Eng and Mak, 2003). This monitoring cost 
can be reduced by voluntarily disclosing more information, whereby disclosure considered as 
a substitute for directors’ monitoring. In contrast, based on signalling theory, higher director 
ownership can lead to a higher level of online disclosure; that is, the directors are motivated to 
disclose more information to signal their efficient performance to shareholders. Furthermore, 
the incentive for the directors to disclose more may increase if they intend to trade their shares 
since this voluntary disclosure will increase the liquidity of the company, which can positively 
affect share price and give a good signal to shareholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Moreover, 
stewardship theory suggests that director ownership may result in a high incentive to monitor 
the interests of both shareholders and directors due to the convergence of interests between 
shareholders and directors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, companies with higher 
director ownership are more likely to improve the quality of online disclosure (Chen and Jian, 
2006). Empirical studies report mixed results for the association between director ownership 
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and disclosure. Several studies provide evidence that director ownership is negatively 
associated with voluntary disclosure (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012), while other studies document a positive impact of director 
ownership (e.g. Chau and Gary, 2002; Nasir and Abdullah, 2004; Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005; Chen and Jian, 2006; Elsayed, 2010). However, the relationship between director 
ownership and voluntary disclosure was found to be insignificant by Wallace and Naser (1995), 
Kelton and Yang (2008), Chen and Jaggi (2000), Nagar et al. (2003), Mangena and Pike (2005), 
Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Samaha et al. (2012), Arafa 
(2012) and Ahmed (2015). In Saudi Arabia, to the researcher’s best knowledge, the impact of 
director ownership on internet disclosure has not yet been examined. A considerable number 
of listed companies’ shares are owned by families who usually dominate the membership of 
boards (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Soliman, 2013), which is expected to have a great 
influence on disclosure practices. Consequently, the current study seeks to examine the impact 
of director ownership, measured by the percentage of total shares held by directors, on the 
internet reporting by Saudi listed companies. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated:	
H3.2 There is a significant relationship between director ownership and corporate 
internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi 
listed companies. 
3.3.2.2.3 Institutional ownership 
 
Institutional ownership refers to the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. It is 
assumed that institutional shareholders may have influential control through board membership 
and can increase incentives to improve disclosure quality (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ajinkya, 
et al., 2005). Based on agency theory, the existence of institutional ownership mitigates 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, since it is expected that institutions 
can help to enhance disclosure levels, which in turn reduce information asymmetry. Moreover, 
institutional shareholders have a great incentive to preserve their investment and thus they tend 
to ensure that adequate accountability is achieved between directors and investors, which can 
decrease agency costs (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). In addition, innovation theory predicts that 
institutional shareholders are more likely to encourage the adoption of internet as a disclosure 
tool. Ettredge et al. (2001) indicate that companies should satisfy different information needs 
for different users, which motivates them to utilize online disclosure to disseminate the required 
information. They find that companies with a considerable number of sophisticated investors 
tend to disclose more information on their websites than those with individual investors. 
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Institutional investors are considered sophisticated investors and usually have high technical 
expertise and can thus help monitor management (Guan et al., 2007). However, some studies 
argue that in companies where a substantial proportion of shares is owned by institutions, the 
incentive to voluntarily disclose more information may be very low because of the weak public 
demand for disclosure and the short-term focus of the institutions’ investment (Eng and Mak, 
2003; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011). Empirical studies that investigate the impact 
of institutional ownership on corporate disclosure report inconclusive results. Although many 
studies find a positive association between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure 
(e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012), other studies reveal that 
the level of institutional ownership has a negative effect on disclosure (e.g. Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005; Sriram and Laksmana, 2006; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Elsayed, 2010). Conversely, 
Haniffa (1999), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Celik et al. (2006), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), 
Abdel-Fattah (2008) and Arafa (2012) indicate that institutional ownership has no significant 
influence on corporate disclosure. In the Saudi context, the influence of institutional ownership 
on internet disclosure has been rarely investigated (only Al-Motrafi (2008) addresses this 
relationship), as individual investors dominate the Saudi stock market (Albassam, 2014). The 
SCGC recommends that institutional investors must disclose in the annual report any 
information related to their investment (Article 6). It also promotes institutional shareholders 
to exert pressure on companies to improve their disclosure practices. Because of the increasing 
proportion of shares held by institutions in the Saudi companies, the current study seeks to 
explore the relationship between institutional ownership and internet reporting in Saudi listed 
companies using the percentage of total shares owned by institutional investors as a measure 
of institutional ownership. Based on these discussions, the following hypothesis can be stated: 
H3.3 There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and corporate 
internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi 
listed companies. 
3.3.2.2.4 Government ownership 
 
Government ownership is the proportion of shares owned by the government in a company. 
Government ownership can be an influential factor that affects disclosure practices, especially 
in emerging markets, where concentrated ownership is the most common type of ownership 
structure (Cornett et al., 2010; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). According to capital need 
theory, companies with substantial government ownership can obtain the required capital from 
government funding without the need to attract external investors to raise their capital. As such, 
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the need for public disclosure is very weak and they are less likely to voluntarily disclose 
additional information (Eng and Mak, 2003). Moreover, cost benefit theory predicts that 
government ownership may allow easier access to financial and other critical resources and 
hence to the easier acquiring of needed information, which is available internally (Xiao et al., 
2004). Therefore, companies with high governmental ownership are not expected to burden 
themselves with additional costs by disclosing more information on their website as this 
information is internally accessible. Furthermore, managers of high government-ownership 
companies, due to the expected intervention of the government in their businesses, may have a 
limited independence and tend to protect the interest of the government-owners by disclosing 
less information (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Since these companies might be subject to high 
political control, political theory assumes that high government ownership may have a negative 
influence on internet disclosure (Xiao et al., 2004). On the other hand, companies with a large 
proportion of shares held by governmental investors are usually under public focus and have 
to consider social goals and the nation’s interest rather than improving performance and 
shareholders’ interests (Boot et al., 2005). Therefore, they may be subject to public pressure to 
enhance disclosure levels, which may affect internet reporting positively (Abdel-Fattah, 2008). 
The findings of empirical studies regarding the relationship between government ownership 
and corporate disclosure are mixed. While Suwaidan (1997); Eng and Mak (2003); Abdel-
Fattah (2008) and Ntim et al. (2012) report a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure 
and government ownership, Ghazali (2004) and Elsayed (2010) find this association to be 
negative. However, many other studies document an insignificant impact of government 
ownership on disclosure (e.g. Xiao et al., 2004; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Huafang and 
Jianguo, 2007; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Alshowaiman, 2008; Arafa, 2012). As the Saudi government 
holds a large amount of the shares of many companies, representing an average of 42% of the 
total value of the Saudi stock market (Albassam, 2014), it is worth shedding light on the 
influence of government ownership, measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
government, on internet disclosure practice of Saudi listed companies. Therefore, the current 
study assumes that:  
H3.4 There is a significant relationship between government ownership and corporate 





3.3.2.3 Audit committee  
 
Audit committee is one of the most vital board subcommittees as it helps external auditors to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s internal control system, which can improve 
disclosure practices (Harrison, 1987). The main role of the audit committee, which is 
monitoring the reporting processes of unbiased information, may help in reducing agency costs 
and information asymmetry (Klein, 1998). From the agency theory perspective, the monitoring 
function of the audit committee can be perceived as a means to alleviate agency costs (Ho and 
Wong, 2001). Therefore, the prior literature asserts that audit committee effectiveness has an 
important impact on disclosure quality. For example, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Kent 
and Stewart (2008) document that audit committee characteristics have a positive influence on 
voluntary disclosure. Also, Barako et al. (2006) state that the existence of an audit committee 
has a positive effect on enhancing disclosure quality. The audit committee effectiveness can be 
evaluated using three characteristics, which are audit committee size, frequency of audit 
committee meetings and audit committee independence (Zaman et al., 2011). In the Saudi 
context, although the SCGC has mandated since 2009 that all listed companies should form an 
audit committee (Article 14) and it determines the main responsibilities of the audit committee, 
the association between audit committee and disclosure has not yet been investigated in the 
Saudi context. The following sections discuss the three characteristics of audit committee.  
3.3.2.3.1 Audit committee size  
 
The size of the audit committee is perceived as a key factor affecting the effectiveness of the 
audit committee and thereby the disclosure quality (Kent and Stewart, 2008; Bédard and 
Gendron, 2010a). Audit committee size may vary depending on each company’s culture and 
needs, thus the optimal size is the one that meets the board’s expectations and helps it to fulfil 
its duties (KPMG, 2009). Based on an agency theory perspective, larger audit committees are 
more likely to achieve more effective monitoring, which can reduce agency costs (Xie et al., 
2003; Bédard and Gendron, 2010a). It is claimed that an audit committee with a large number 
of members has a greater organizational position and authority (Kent and Stewart, 2008) and 
more extensive experience (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). However, the audit committee may 
experience a diffusion of responsibilities or a hindering of decision-making process if the size 
of the committee is too large (ibid). Further, Vafeas (1999) argues that increasing the audit 
committee size may result in incremental costs such as travelling costs and committee 
compensations, which could negatively affect disclosure practices. Bédard and Gendron 
(2010a) suggest that companies should weigh the benefits of increasing the size of the audit 
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committee against the drawbacks of incurring additional costs, poor communication, lack of 
coordination and inefficient decision-making processes, which are often associated with larger 
committees. The findings from previous studies that have examined the impact of audit 
committee size on disclosure are mixed. A positive association between audit committee size 
and disclosure quality has been documented by many studies (e.g. Lin et al., 2006; Song and 
Windram, 2004; Li et al., 2008; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 2010). However, 
Anderson et al. (2004), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Kent and Stewart (2008) find a 
negative association, and Felo et al. (2003), Mangena and Pike (2005), Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009), Katmun (2012) and Ahmed (2015) fail to find any supporting evidence for the effect 
of audit committee size on disclosure. Moreover, by reviewing the prior literature that 
examines the influence of audit committee on disclosure, Bédard and Gendron (2010a) find 
that out of 27 studies, only six reveal a positive relationship with disclosure, five a negative 
one, and 16 no significant relationship. The SCGC stipulates that the audit committee must 
have no less than three members, including a member who is an expert in financial and 
accounting matters and that executive board members are not eligible to become members of 
this committee (Article 14a). As previously mentioned, the association between internet 
reporting and audit committee size has not been statistically explored within the Saudi 
corporate context to the best of the researcher’s knowledge. With the abovementioned 
conflicting views, it is expected that audit committee size may have either positive or negative 
influences on disclosure quality. Consequently, the current study examines the relationship 
between the internet reporting of the Saudi listed companies and audit committee size as 
measured by the total number of audit committee members; it is hypothesized that:  
H4.1 There is a significant relationship between audit committee size and corporate 
internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) by Saudi 
listed companies. 
3.3.2.3.2 Audit committee frequency of meeting  
 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) state that the number of meetings can be perceived as an indicator of 
the exerted effort of committee members to perform their tasks. Thus, audit committees have 
to devote enough time to execute their duties and responsibilities effectively (Kelton and Yang, 
2008). Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) argue that frequent meetings of a committee permit more 
time to monitor and control company functions effectively, including disclosure transparency, 
to satisfy shareholders’ requirements. In addition, there is a potential risk of undetected fraud 
or the manipulation of in corporate reports if the audit committee meets less frequently 
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(Katmun, 2012). However, a high frequency of meetings may not be considered as a reliable 
indicator of the effectiveness of an audit committee since more frequent meetings may be a 
sign of poor performance (Bédard and Gendron, 2010b). For instance, the audit committee may 
need to meet more frequently to approve numerous non-audit services or to review internal 
control weaknesses and issues related to disclosure requirements (ibid). Most of the prior 
research supports the importance of audit committee frequency of meeting. Menon and 
William (1994) indicate that frequent audit committee meetings are very important in 
monitoring the financial affairs of companies. Likewise, Collier and Gregory (2000) point out 
that the number and length of meetings is a crucial monitoring mechanism of an audit 
committee. Beasley et al. (2000) reveal that the increase of fraud cases in US companies is 
associated with having fewer audit committee meetings. Xie et al. (2003) state that audit 
committees that meet more often can carry out better monitoring and have a greater influence 
on disclosure practices. Also, Bronson et al. (2006) and Kent and Stewart (2008) find a positive 
relationship between the frequency of audit committee meetings and voluntary disclosure. 
Moreover, by examining the prior literature, Bédard and Gendron (2010b) report that 32% of 
the analyses show a positive relationship between audit committee frequency of meeting and 
disclosure, 3% a negative relationship, while 66% find this relationship to  be insignificant. 
Similarly, Felo et al. (2003), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), Baxter and Cotter (2009) and 
Ahmed (2015) find no significant association between the two. In the Saudi context, the 
association between frequency of audit committee meetings and disclosure has not yet been 
investigated to the best of the researcher’s knowledge. Furthermore, it is expected that the 
number of audit committee meetings and their length may vary among companies, depending 
on the scope and complexity of the responsibilities of the audit committee (KPMG, 2009). The 
recently revised SCGC recommends that audit committees should meet regularly and that at 
least four meetings should be held during the financial year (Article 57). Assuming that an 
audit committee that meets frequently can increase the level of disclosure and reduce reporting 
problems, and thus be more likely to adopt internet reporting, the current study examines the 
impact of frequency of audit committee meetings, as measured by the number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year, on internet reporting. Based on the previous 
theoretical discussion and empirical evidence, it is hypothesised that:  
H4.2 There is a significant relationship between audit committee frequency of meeting 
and corporate internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and 
audit) by Saudi listed companies. 
 
99 
3.3.2.3.3 Audit committee independence  
 
It is claimed that the independence of an audit committee is a very important requirement for 
the committee to fulfil its responsibilities effectively (Felo et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004; 
Bédard et al., 2004). The independence of a member is defined as “the absence of relationships 
with the company that may interfere with the exercise of their independence from management 
and the company” (Bédard and Gendron, 2010a, P.51, 2010b, P.187). Three principal types of 
relationships are recognized: employment, personal and business relationships (ibid). Most of 
the prior literature assume that audit committee with a higher percentage of independent 
directors can enhance disclosure quality and ensure effective management monitoring (e.g. 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Kent 
and Stewart, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010). Based on agency theory, independent directors are 
perceived as an effective monitor of management performance and financial reporting quality. 
It is expected that the presence of independent directors in the audit committee can reduce the 
conflict of interest and information asymmetry and thus increase the quality of disclosed 
information (Bédard et al., 2004). Moreover, since the audit committee is responsible for the 
financial affairs of the company, independent directors in the committee can play a crucial role 
in detecting any irregular issues in the financial reporting and prevent managers from 
disclosing low quality information (e.g. Xie et al., 2003, Kanagaretnam et al., 2007; Habbash, 
2010). However, some researchers claim that independent directors may lack the ability to 
improve disclosure quality and corporate governance effectiveness. Committees that mostly 
comprise independent directors might be impaired by those independent directors who have 
previously worked in companies in different industries (Bathala and Rao, 1995). In addition, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that the appointment of independent directors may be 
affected by external factors, including specific representatives such as politicians, family 
relatives or environmental activists, which may harm the independence of the committee 
members. Prior studies document that the association between audit committee independence 
and voluntary disclosure is mixed. Although it is documented that companies with a more 
independent audit committee are more likely to present high level of disclosure (e.g. Klein, 
2002; Xie et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Bédard and Gendron, 2010b; Nelson et 
al., 2010; Katmun, 2012; Ahmed, 2015; Samaha et al., 2015 and Nekhili et al., 2016), many 
studies find no significant relationship between disclosure level and audit committee 
independence (e.g. Felo et al., 2003 and Kent and Stewart, 2008). Further, based on an 
extensive review of audit committee studies, Bédard and Gendron (2010b) conclude that out 
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of 34 studies, 16 show a positive relationship between reporting quality and audit committee 
independence and 18 find the relation insignificant. In the Saudi context, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, no study has examined the impact of audit committee independence 
on internet reporting before. However, it is worth mentioning that the SCGC states that at least 
one of the audit committee members should be an independent director and that no executive 
director should be among its members. Therefore, the current study investigates the 
relationship between internet reporting by Saudi listed companies and audit committee 
independence as measured by the percentage of independent members on the audit committee. 
Based on these arguments, it is expected that independence of audit committee is significantly 
associated with internet reporting and the following hypothesis can be stated:  
H4.3 There is a significant relationship between audit committee independence and 
corporate internet reporting (total, content, presentation, timeliness usability and audit) 
by Saudi listed companies. 
3.4 Summary  
 
This chapter presented a review of the theories related to disclosure practices. These theories 
are classified into the four main approaches of the economic approach, political-economic 
approach, cost-benefit analysis approach and innovation adoption approach. The current study 
adopts a multiple-theoretical framework to support the hypotheses formation and results 
interpretation. Although each theory can provide an explanation for some disclosure practices, 
each of these are insufficient to completely explain all disclosure practices. Therefore, 
combining different theories can help to overcome the limitations of each theory and enhance 
the understanding of disclosure practices (Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). It is 
perceived that using a joint approach with different theoretical frameworks to examine CIR 
will be more beneficial due to the variety of the variables in the current study. Therefore, these 
variables can be explained according to the appropriate theories that are more related to them, 
which will help add more depth to the research analysis. Furthermore, the chapter also presents 
the formulation of the research hypotheses. Hypotheses formulation is a connection between 
the theoretical background and the empirical tests. These hypotheses are developed based on 
the previously explained theories and the previous studies reviewed in chapter two. Hence, four 
main hypotheses are formulated in this chapter to test the relationship between the dependent 
variable CIR and its components and the independent variables (firm characteristics and 
corporate governance variables: board of directors, ownership structure and audit committee). 
Further, these main hypotheses are divided into sub-hypotheses, which will be tested in the 
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following chapters to answer the second research question. The next chapter discusses the 











































CHAPTER 4  
 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Reviewing the relevant literature and laying out the suggested theoretical framework for the 
study will help in making adequate methodological choices and in creating the proper research 
design. Methodology as a term has many suggested definitions depending on the purpose, 
background, discipline and nature of the conducted research. It can be defined as “the process, 
principles, and procedures by which we approach problems and seek answers” (Bogdan and 
Taylor, 1975, P.1), which means that methodology is concerned with the process of doing 
research. In accounting research, there are many types of methodological approach which can 
be used and there is no one ideal methodology (Ryan et al., 2002). The importance of choosing 
the appropriate research method arises from its role in the achievement of reliable results. 
Therefore, this chapter outlines the research design and methods adopted by the current study. 
Specifically, it presents the different philosophical assumptions of the research paradigms, 
explores various types of approaches and methods to verify the selection of the methodology 
to be used in the current study, and then provides the design of the current research, which 
outlines how to collect and analyse data based on the chosen methodology. This chapter mainly 
enlightens in detail the compatibility of the employed methodology regarding the purpose and 
objectives of the research as well as answering its questions. It commences with presenting 
research paradigms in section 4.2. While section 4.3 presents the research approaches, section 
4.4 describes different research methods and the chosen methodology. The details of the 
research design are demonstrated in section 4.5 and are followed by the summary of the chapter 
in section 4.6.  
4.2 Research paradigms 
 
A research paradigm can be defined as a framework that guides how research is conducted, 
based on individual philosophies, perceptions, attitudes and assumptions about the world and 
the nature of knowledge (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The assumptions underlying each research 
paradigm are important to the development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge 
(Saunders et al., 2012). Some researchers suggest three main reasons for understanding the 
research paradigm, namely that it helps in explaining research design, determining a suitable 
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design that will work effectively, and finally identifying designs that may be outside past 
experience (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Later, researchers recognized that it is essential to 
distinguish between natural sciences and social sciences, thus the development of social 
science has helped in the emergence of many research paradigms (Morgan and Smircich, 
1980). According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), there are four types of research paradigms: 
positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism or interpretivism. These 
paradigms range from objectivity to subjectivity as they move from positivism towards 
interpretivism. Positivism implies that reality is external and can be determined objectively, 
while post-positivism also assumes that reality is external but is only imperfectly and 
probabilistically apprehendable. The critical paradigm presumes that reality is historical, so the 
apprehendable reality involves historically actual structures that are limiting and restricting as 
if they were real. Finally, interpretivism posits that realities are various and can be contradicting 
as they are human intellect products. However, the two main strands of research paradigms are 
positivism and interpretivism, which are commonly used in management research (Bryman, 
2012). The next sections present a summary of each paradigm.  
4.2.1 Positivism 
 
The term ‘positivism’ was first introduced by Auguste Comte (1798–1857), was based on what 
is perceived, and was derived from a value-free, independent reality (Ryan at al., 2002). 
According to Bogdan and Tylor (1975), positivists seek facts or causes of social phenomena 
with little respect for the subjective states of individuals. Thus, positivism follows the view of 
natural science, which is concerned with the observable social reality to create law-like 
generalisations. Thus, positivism depends on the law of cause and effect (Saunders et al., 2012). 
That is, it deals with explaining and predicting relationships between variables; hence, 
generalization and deterministic relationships between cause and effect are crucial (Howell, 
2013). Positivists suppose that reality is separated from social norms and assumptions, and 
develop theories grounded on empirical procedures, such as observation and experimentation 
(Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) claimed that most accounting 
and auditing studies rely on positivism. To collect data, researchers identify, via observations, 
hypotheses which are tested through reliable scientific methods that can help in the further 
development of theories. In addition, positivists believe that social phenomena can be observed 
and measured using objective rather than subjective methods, therefore they can be interpreted 
through quantitative methods of analysis. This paradigm will be used in this study, since 
positivism depends on empirical evidence rather than subjective interpretations, to measure to 
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which extent Saudi listed companies use internet reporting and to identify the main factors that 
explain this adoption.     
4.2.2. Interpretivism 
 
Interpretivism deals with studying social phenomena in their natural environment, which 
implies that the values of researchers play a vital part in the research process (Saunders and 
Lewis, 2012). It involves subjective understanding of the meaning, ideas and different features 
of phenomena (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). In this paradigm, the researcher is allowed to be 
a part of the setting and there is no attempt to separate the influence that the researcher has 
upon the observable phenomena. Further, since the interpretive paradigm is driven by human 
interests, researchers can gain more in-depth knowledge of the perceptions and beliefs of the 
social issues of a topic. Some researchers argue that interpretivism is very suitable in business 
and management research, especially in fields like marketing, organizational behaviour and 
human resource management where the main purpose is to explore, explain and understand 
organizational affairs rather than achieve changes (see: Ryan at al., 2002, AbuRaya, 2012 and 
Saunders et al., 2012). Collis and Hussey (2009) claim that interpretivism emerged due to the 
perceived insufficiency of positivism in meeting social scientists’ needs. While positivism’s 
concern is to measure social phenomena, interpretivism focuses on exploring social phenomena 
and understanding their complexity. Therefore, this paradigm is more related to qualitative 
rather than quantitative measurement, as the former depends more on perceptions, beliefs and 
ideas.   
4.3 Research approach 
 
The research approach concerns the research process and the way of considering the research 
design as well as how to achieve and explain the consequences. In general, research approaches 
are classified into two main approaches: deductive and inductive (Saunders et al., 2012); these 
are outlined in the next sections.    
4.3.1. Deductive approach 
 
Sekaran (2003, P. 27) defines the deductive approach as “the process by which we arrive at a 
reasoned conclusion by logical generalization of a known fact”. It involves the development of 
testable hypotheses and an examination of the outcome of the inquiry, which leads the 
researcher to confirm or modify the theory based on the results (Robson, 2002). This approach 
progresses through sequential stages, beginning with developing a theory that explains causal 
relationships between concepts or variables, followed by deducing a number of hypotheses that 
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are suitable to investigate such relationships, then examining the logic of the arguments that 
generate them, next testing these hypotheses by collecting data and analysing them; finally, if 
the results are consistent with the hypotheses, then the theory is confirmed, or if not consistent, 
this means either rejecting or modifying the theory (Saunders et al., 2012). In addition, an 
important characteristic of the deductive approach is that concepts and variables should be 
operationalized in order to be measured quantitatively, although qualitative data may be used 
(ibid). As such, this approach is usually associated with quantitative research and has been 
widely used in the disclosure literature (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003, 
Barako et al., 2006, Abdel- Fattah, 2008 and AbuRaya, 2012). The deductive approach is 
considered more suitable for the current study since the research questions are developed based 
on a theoretical framework; after this, different hypotheses are formulated to examine the 
association between internet reporting and the independent variables, and lastly these 
hypotheses are tested to determine whether to accept or reject them accordingly.   
4.3.2 Inductive approach  
 
The inductive approach can be defined as a “process where we observe certain phenomena and 
on this basis, arrive at conclusions" (Sekaran, 2003, P. 27). In this approach, in contrast to the 
deductive approach, the research process begins with observations and then moves to collecting 
and analysing the data to formulate a theory from these observations (Vaus, 2001). Thus, the 
inductive approach aims to collect data first, then build a theory based on the examined data, 
which means that the theory follows the data and not the opposite (Saunders et al., 2012). One 
of the strengths of the inductive approach is that it develops an understanding of the human 
effects and permits alternative theories to be suggested within the limits of the research design. 
Further, research using this approach is more concerned with the context in which events take 
place, hence small samples may be more appropriate to study than large samples. Also, 
qualitative data is more likely to be used in the inductive approach, with a variety of collecting 
methods which help in establishing different views of phenomena (ibid).  
In the research process, inductive and deductive approaches designate the role of theory in 
relation to research. As mentioned above, the deductive approach is associated with 
quantitative research, while the inductive approach is associated with qualitative research. 




4.4 Research method 
 
Saunders et al. (2012) state that the quantitative method is related to the deductive approach 
that follows objectivism ontological and positivism epistemological positions. In contrast, the 
qualitative method is related to the inductive approach that follows subjectivism ontological 
and interpretivism epistemological positions. The following points outline both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. 
4.4.1 The qualitative method 
 
Schwandt (2001) defines qualitative research as “a diverse term covering an array of techniques 
seeking to describe, decode, translate, and somehow come to terms with the meaning, rather 
than the measurement or frequency of phenomena in the social world”. The qualitative research 
is commonly used in social studies and, based on interpretivism, seeks a better understanding 
of human behaviour and acquires the essential knowledge to develop a theory. Moreover, 
findings are derived, in contrast to quantitative research, without using any statistical 
procedures or other quantitative means. Instead, different means are used, such as text and 
sound generated from observations or interviews. Thus, qualitative methods are applicable 
“when the phenomena under study are complex, social in nature and do not lend themselves to 
quantification” (Liebscher, 1998, P.669). Applying qualitative methods in economic, 
accounting and information technology research is relatively limited, however, it can be used 
in management or organizational research such as management accounting as these involve, to 
some extent, social behaviours. 
4.4.2 The quantitative method 
 
Quantitative research, which relies on positivism, is regularly used in natural sciences. It is 
concerned with quantifying social phenomena by collecting and analysing quantitative data, 
and mainly focuses on the causal relationships between different variables. As such, this 
method ignores the potential interaction between the researcher and the studied phenomenon. 
Further, quantitative research is considered to be economical and fast in collecting statistics 
from large samples. Besides, adopting the quantitative method increases the research reliability 
through inherent objectivity, which make the results more generalizable and representative. 
Liebscher (1998, P.669) indicates that quantitative research “is appropriate where quantifiable 
measures of variables of interest are possible, where hypotheses can be formulated and tested, 
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and inferences drawn from samples to populations". Hence, this method is widely used in 
accounting, finance and other natural science research.  
Based on the abovementioned discussion, the quantitative method is considered to be more 
appropriate to the current study as it aims to collect numerical data and analyse it in order to 
test and interpret the associations between variables.    
4.4.3 Mixed methods 
 
Saunders et al. (2012, P.674) define mixed methods research as the “use of both quantitative 
and qualitative data collection techniques and analysis procedures either at the same time 
(concurrent) or one after the other (sequential)”. Mason (2002) suggests three reasons to use 
mixed methods in social research. Firstly, it allows researchers to explore new dimensions and 
different views. Secondly, it can be used to focus on more than one attribute, which enhances 
the researcher’s ability to theorize. Finally, adopting mixed methods can enhance 
understanding and extend the explanation of the research problem. Combining the two methods 
is considered beneficial in strengthening the findings and can result in greater confidence in 
the research’s inferences. It may also be useful in establishing more credibility and 
generalizability of the research (Saunders et al., 2012). Although many researchers emphasise 
that aggregating qualitative and quantitative techniques may help in increasing the objectivity 
of research interpretation and accuracy, attention should be paid to answering research 
questions in a proper way (Denscombe, 2007). However, mixed methods research encounters 
many challenges that affect its ability to manage all research problems. These challenges are: 
the philosophical framework is not yet agreed because this method is relatively new; 
difficulties in integrating quantitative results and qualitative findings; and other practical issues 
which include obtaining certain skills, time limitation and the resources required for large data 
collection and analysis (Morgan, 1998; Bryman, 2007; Creswell and Clark, 2011; Albassam 
2014).  
To sum up, the current study chooses the most suitable methodology that is consistent with the 
research problem, objectives and questions. That is, this research, as an applied study, uses 
empirical evidence to reach answers to the research questions that are related to the main factors 
affecting internet reporting in Saudi companies. As such, the most appropriate paradigm is 
positivism, which relies on empirical evidences to justify using internet reporting. The 
deductive approach is embraced as this research process starts with developing questions upon 
a determined theory, formulating hypotheses, and then using statistical techniques to test these 
hypotheses, which results in accepting or rejecting the relationship between internet reporting 
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and the independent variables. Finally, the quantitative method is implemented since this study 
collects and analyses numerical data to make inferences about the relationships between 
internet reporting and the explanatory variables. Based on the determination of the appropriate 
paradigm, approach and methods for the current study, the suitable research design can be 
created. The following section presents the research design in detail.     
4.5 Research design:  
 
Research design is “the general plan of how you will go about answering your research 
question(s)” (Saunders et al., 2012, P.159). It deals with the manner of operationalizing 
research questions and objectives into a project, which involves the purpose of the research, 
research strategies, the unit of analysis, population and sample, the sources for data collection, 
and the time horizon; the following points provide a brief overview of each one.   
4.5.1 The purpose of the research 
 
Based on the purpose that is appropriate to the nature of the research, there are three types of 
research: exploratory research, descriptive research and explanatory research (Saunders et al., 
2012). Exploratory research aims to discover new insights into phenomena. This research is 
flexible regarding change and can be conducted using expert interviews, focus groups and in-
depth individual interviews (ibid). While the purpose of descriptive research is to produce an 
accurate representation of events, persons or situations, whereby it is essential to obtain a clear 
depiction of the phenomenon and describe it before collecting its related data, explanatory 
research focuses on establishing and explaining causal relationships between variables related 
to a specific phenomenon (ibid). Accordingly, the purpose of the current study is both 
descriptive, to describe the extent of CIR in Saudi Arabia, and explanatory, to explain the 
relationship between CIR and the key determinant variables besides the effect on firm financial 
performance. 
4.5.2 Research strategies 
 
A research strategy is the link between the research philosophy and the consequent selection 
of methods to collect and analyse data (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Different research natures 
lead to different strategies that can be used, depending on how to achieve a desired level of 
research coherence which answers the research questions and meets the objectives (Saunders 
et al., 2012). Some of these strategies are more linked to quantitative research design, such as 
experiment and survey, while others are linked to qualitative research, such as ethnography, 
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action research, grounded theory, and narrative inquiry, or involve both quantitative and 
qualitative research, such as archival research and case study (ibid). Since the current study is 
quantitative and all Saudi listed companies are considered, the chosen strategy is the survey. 
The next section discusses this strategy in details.    
4.5.2.1 Survey  
 
A survey is a strategy that involves the structured collection of data from a sizable population 
(Saunders et al., 2012). A survey is usually associated with the deductive approach and is often 
used in exploratory and descriptive research, which makes it suitable for this study. It is the 
most common strategy used in business and management research, particularly in accounting 
studies (Abdolmohammadi and McQuade, 2002). Furthermore, Johns (1984) indicates that in 
developing countries, a survey is a practical and economic strategy in terms of time, effort and 
resources in social research. That is, a survey allows the collection of data from a sizable 
population at a lower cost with more control over the research process (Saunders et al., 2012). 
Many data collection techniques are related to this strategy, such as questionnaires, structured 
observation and structured interviews.   
4.5.3 Study population and sample 
 
The sample used to investigate the relationship between corporate internet reporting, corporate 
governance and firm financial performance was selected from Saudi listed companies. Only 
listed companies were chosen in this study, consistent with prior studies, assuming that these 
companies are more likely to possess the required resources to adopt CIR and that they 
represent the largest contribution to the Saudi economy. A total of 171 companies (population) 
were listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) as of 31 December, 2014. Appendix 5 
presents the classification of these companies by industry according to Tadawul classification4. 
All these companies have a website, with the exception of one company that does not have a 
website, thus it was excluded. Although some researchers suggest excluding financial 
companies, this study includes both financial and non-financial companies for many reasons. 
First, most of the studies that exclude financial companies were carried out in developed 
countries, where the number of companies is very large. However, in developing countries the 
number of listed companies is substantially less; hence, excluding financial companies would 
limit the sample size, particularly in Saudi Arabia, where financial companies comprise 27.5% 
                                                
 
4 In 8th Jan 2017 a new industry classification has been adopted by Tadawul containing 20 sectors.   
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of all listed companies (see appendix 5). Second, both financial and non-financial companies 
are subject to the same regulations. Basically, disclosure requirements by the Capital Market 
Authority, the Companies Act, the Listing Rules and the Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
are all applicable to all companies, including financial companies. Finally, many studies in the 
CIR literature incorporate both financial and non-financial companies (e.g., Debreceny et al., 
2002; Oyelere et al., 2003; Xiao et al., 2004; Oyelere and Mohamed, 2007; Desoky, 2009; Al-
Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Aly et al., 2010). The final sample consists of 170 listed 
companies, which represents all the industries in the Tadawul database.  
The sample size used in the current study is relatively larger than those of existing Saudi studies 
(e.g., Al-Saeed, 2006b; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Alshowaiman, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; 
Robertson et al., 2012). For example, Al-Saeed (2006b) used a small sample of 46 companies 
in 2003 to examine the level of disclosure and the impact of some firm characteristics on the 
extent of disclosure by Saudi companies. Similarly, Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) 
investigated the extent of online reporting of Saudi listed companies using a sample of 64 
companies, and Alshowaiman (2008) employed a sample consisting of 74 companies to 
examine the internet financial reporting (IFR) and auditing issues related to IFR in 2004 and 
2005. Moreover, Robertson et al. (2012) and Al-Motrafi (2008) used samples of 100 and 113 
companies respectively. Therefore, the sample size used in this study is another contribution 
to CIR Saudi studies.   
4.5.4 Data sources and time horizon 
 
The main source of data used in the present study consists of secondary data. Secondary data 
are the data that were originally collected for some other purpose and are ready to use. 
Recently, the number of sources of secondary data has massively expanded and gaining access 
to these sources has become very easy with the growth in the internet, which has resulted in 
the availability of more useful data for researchers (Saunders et al., 2012). In the current study, 
data are collected from the websites of Saudi listed companies, annual reports of the listed 
companies, DataStream, the Tadawul website, the Capital Market Authority (CMA), the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and some 
useful websites such as the Argaam website (www.argaam.com).  Regarding the time horizon 
of the collected data, the current study is considered a cross- sectional study. Most disclosure 
studies use cross-sectional analyses, which focus on disclosure practices over a specific period 
of time (usually one year) (e.g., Debreceny et al., 2002; Xiao et al., 2004; Kelton and Yang, 
2008; Garg and Verma, 2010). As this study is a cross-sectional study, a snapshot of the Saudi 
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listed companies’ websites has been taken using the “Portable Offline Browser” software 
version 6.9. This software is used to take a snapshot of each company’s website on the same 
specific date (31 December, 2014) and download these websites for later offline searching, 
checking and analysing. Considering the dynamic nature of the internet and the frequent 
updates, using Offline Browser ensures that any changes to the companies’ websites after the 
study period do not affect the study. Offline Browser also allows an unlimited number of 
websites to be downloaded for later offline use and provides support for all web technologies, 
such as Java, XML/XSL/DTD, RealMedia and Macromedia Flash. Although there are a variety 
of software enabling website downloading, Offline Browser is considered to be the most 
efficient software with the fastest downloading as well as the most flexible and easiest usage 
(Usama and Matsumoto, 2004).  As such, the present study is a cross-sectional single country 
study focusing on CIR practice in Saudi listed companies, whereby Saudi Arabia is a 
developing country with an emerging stock market.  
4.5.5 Variables and research instrument 
  
This study attempts to investigate the determinants of voluntary corporate internet disclosure 
in Saudi listed companies. The following subsections present the variables examined in this 
study and the measures used for these variables. Specifically, the next paragraph discusses the 
disclosure index used to measure the dependent variable: corporate internet reporting (CIR). 
Then, the definitions and measurement of the independent variables are outlined.   
4.5.5.1 Dependent variable: disclosure index 
 
One of the major limitations of voluntary disclosure studies is the difficulty in measuring 
corporate disclosure since there is no agreement on an effective approach to measurement 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Two primary approaches to measure disclosure have been proposed: 
a subjective analysis which depends on analysts’ ratings and a semi-objective analysis relying 
on content analysis which measures disclosure using disclosure indices (Beattie et al., 2004). 
Analysts’ ratings are based on the evaluations of financial analysts and other agents. Although 
analysts’ ratings are provided by professionally experienced analysts using a wide range of 
disclosure sources (Al-Saeed, 2006a; Hassan and Marston, 2010), they may be affected by the 
analysts’ perception when evaluating corporate disclosure, and tend to be restricted to large 
companies (Botosan, 1997). Moreover, the majority of analysts’ ratings have been constructed 
in developed countries, which makes it difficult to adopt in other countries due to the 
differences in cultural, social and institutional situations (Ammann et al., 2011). The most 
 
112 
common analysts’ ratings are provided by the Association for Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR), the Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR), and 
the Standard and Poor's Transparency and Disclosure Rating (Gruning, 2007). Due to the 
criticism of the analysts’ ratings approach, many studies use content analysis to measure 
disclosure (see: Gray et al., 1995; Beattie et al., 2004; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Abraham, 
2008). Krippendorff (2004, P.18) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful mater) to the contexts of their 
use”. It involves “codifying quantitative and qualitative information into pre-defined categories 
in order to derive patterns in the presentation and reporting of information” (Guthrie et al., 
2004, P.287). The wide use of content analysis can be attributed to many reasons: (1) it is 
reliable and systematic in coding and measuring data; (2) the quantitative nature of the data 
collected makes this approach more objective; (3) it has more external validity because the 
measurement is isolated from the measured phenomenon; and finally (4) content analysis can 
deal with large volumes of data (Krippendorff, 2004).  
Further, content analysis can be performed manually or be computer-aided (Beattie et al., 
2004). Computerized content analysis can cope with large samples at low cost and enhance 
reliability and validity, however it may not be applicable in many countries because it requires 
the availability of disclosure items in the same language, which is English in most cases 
(Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Therefore, a considerable number of studies use manual content analysis, 
whereby researchers develop a self-constructed disclosure checklist (i.e. disclosure index) to 
measure corporate disclosure (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Haniffa, 1999; Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Arafa, 2012; Samaha et al., 2015). As 
such, a disclosure index, which is heavily used in accounting research, is a research method 
derived mainly from manual content analysis; it is also a partial form of content analysis (Al-
Htaybat, 2005). Figure 4-1 presents the approaches that are used in the corporate disclosure 
field.  
The disclosure index used in this study to measure CIR is a self-structured disclosure checklist 
used to score the disclosed items on the website of each company and then utilise these scores 
to measure the disclosure level. This method was chosen because analysts’ ratings are not 
available in the Saudi context, and the computerized analysis is not applicable to Arabic 
websites. Therefore, the manual content analysis using a disclosure index is the most 
appropriate method to analyse the content of Saudi listed companies’ websites to assess the 















Adapted from Beattie et al. (2004, P.209) and Al-Htaybat (2005, P.128). 
 
The next paragraph shows the procedures that were followed to measure the dependent 
variable, CIR, using the disclosure index.  
4.5.5.1.1 Construction of the disclosure index  
Determining the disclosed items to be included in the checklist is the first step to constructing 
the disclosure index. However, previous studies indicate that there are no agreed guidelines on 
the number or the items to be selected for use in a disclosure index (Wallace et al., 1994). The 
number of items and the content of the disclosure index vary from one study to another and 
depend mainly on the study aims (Wallace and Naser, 1995). Thus, most of the disclosure 
research selects the disclosure items based on prior studies, laws and regulations, professional 
organisations, and recommendations from certain user groups (Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Abdelsalam, 1999; Ahmed et al., 2017). The current study follows previous studies and 
develops a self-structured disclosure index to measure CIR of Saudi listed companies 
considering the requirements of the Saudi General Presentation and Disclosure Standard, 
Corporate Governance Regulations, Listing Rules and Companies Act and some special 
features of the Saudi context.  
To construct the disclosure index, a preliminary checklist was developed by reviewing the 
disclosure literature to select the items that Saudi listed companies may disclose on their 
websites. The main studies were consulted, such as Ashbaugh et al. (1999), Debreceny and 
Gray (1999), Haniffa (1999), FASB (2000), Oyelere et al. (2003), Fisher et al. (2004), Marston 
and Polei (2004), Xiao et al. (2004), Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008), Al-Motrafi (2008), 
Alshowaiman (2008), Kelton and Yang (2008), Elsayed (2010) and Hindi and Rich (2010) 
Corporate disclosure 
  Semi-objective 
(content analysis) 
Subjective 
(analysts’ rating)  
Computerized analysis Manual analysis 
Disclosure Index 
Weighted/unweighted index Binary /ordinal measurement of items 
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which were similar to those followed by Omran and Ramdhony (2016) and Ahmed et al. 
(2017). Then, a list of items that are appropriate for internet disclosure was created. To form 
the final checklist, this list was compared with the requirements of Saudi regulations and it was 
checked to ensure the applicability of the selected items to Saudi listed companies, thus 
enhancing the validity of the disclosure index. Afterwards, the checklist was sent to 6 
academics in the field of accounting in three different countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UK) 
and 7 company administrative staff to receive their feedback and refine the list, which made 
the checklist more valid. Finally, a pilot study of 15 companies that represent all the industries 
of the Saudi market was performed to update the checklist and ensure the applicability and 
validity of the checklist items. Consequently, the final checklist consists of 196 items 
categorized into 5 sub-indices: the content sub-index, which shows what information is 
disclosed on the company’s website, contains 70 items; the presentation sub-index, which 
refers to how the information is presented, contains 26 items; the timeliness sub-index, which 
deals with the timeliness with which the information is updated, contains 18 items; the usability 
sub-index, which shows the ease of use and clear structure of a website, contains 54 items; and 
finally the audit sub-index, which represents how much the presented information on the 
website is reliable, trusted and transparent, contains 28 items. Appendix 6 demonstrates the 
final checklist with its 5 categories.   
Although the final checklist has many items that were used in previous studies, other items are 
unique to this study to reflect the distinctive features of the Saudi environment. That is, some 
items are relevant to Arabic countries only, such as item number 3 (Arabic language webpages) 
and number 26 (auditor's report in Arabic) in the presentation sub-index, item number 37 
(navigation area positioned on right/top side of screen for Arabic website) in the usability sub-
index, and item number 21 (note on language translation and audit) in the audit sub-index. 
Moreover, other items are included because they may be useful to the users of the website and 
they are unique to Saudi Islamic society, such as item number 27 (displays names and details 
of Sharia committee) in the content sub-index, item number 43 (visibility of names and details 
of Sharia committee) and number 54 (information that enables Muslims to determine the 
amount of Zakat) in the usability sub-index. Additionally, another two items dealing with social 
media use are added by the researcher; these have been not found in prior studies, although 
social media has become important in the new world of technology and companies tend to use 
it to a great extent; these are number 70 (social media links) in the content sub-index and 
number 5 (provides feature to register for future email/ social media alerts regarding press 
releases, newsletters, etc.) in the timeliness sub-index.      
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4.5.5.1.2 Scoring the disclosure items 
 
After determining the disclosed items, scoring these items can be done using two different 
scoring mechanisms. The most commonly used scheme is binary coding (dichotomous), which 
relies on the presence or absence of an item. The item scores 1 if it is disclosed or 0 if it is not. 
The other coding scheme is a qualitative approach which employs ordinal measures (commonly 
three levels), whereby quantified disclosure scores 2, qualitative disclosure scores 1 and no 
disclosure scores 0 (Beattie et al., 2004). Moreover, another issue related to the scoring process 
is applying a weighted or un-weighted approach to score disclosed items.  
Weighted scoring distinguishes the effect of each item and assigns a weight depending on the 
importance of each item. The weightings can be determined by seeking the opinions of expert 
analysts and specialists (ibid). Several prior studies use this approach (e.g. Wallace et al., 1994; 
Debreceny et al., 2002; Marston and Polei, 2004; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Mkumbuzi, 2016). 
However, this approach faces much criticism because it depends on selected groups’ judgment, 
which may differ and result in subjective weights. In addition, the level of the assigned 
importance may vary over time and among industries and countries. As a result of these 
criticisms, a considerable number of studies use unweighted scores (e.g. Ashbaugh et al., 1999; 
Xiao et al., 2004; Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Desoky; 2009; Hossain et 
al., 2012; Desoky and Mousa, 2013). In unweighted scoring, all disclosure items are equally 
important and hence have equal weights. Consequently, the current study adopts the 
unweighted binary approach to score disclosed items which score the item 1 in the checklist if 
disclosed on the company’s website or 0 otherwise.  
Using unweighted scoring can be attributed to many reasons: first, it avoids the subjective 
assessment of weights of disclosed items, which may in turn affect the reliability of the 
disclosure index (Marston and Shrives, 1991); second, unweighted scoring is more appropriate 
to this study in two ways; the aim of the study is examining the overall CIR practice rather than 
the importance of each item, and all stakeholders are considered, not specific groups (Cooke, 
1989a); third, many studies used both weighted and unweighted scoring and found no 
substantial differences in the results (e.g. Wallace and Naser, 1995; Debreceny et al., 2002; 
Bollen et al., 2006); and finally, using unweighted scoring is consistent with most disclosure 
studies, which makes it easy to compare the results with these studies (e.g., Al-Saeed, 2006b; 




4.5.5.1.3 Measuring the disclosure index  
 
Having scored the disclosed items, the disclosure index which measures the dependent variable 
(CIR) can be calculated. In order to calculate the total CIR, the score of each dependent variable 
(content, presentation, timeliness, usability, and audit) is calculated as follows:  
CIRS (CIRCS, CIRPS, CIRTS, CIRUS, CIRAS) = 890:;3  
Where: 
CIRS = actual CIR total score, CIRCS = actual CIR content score, CIRPS = actual CIR 
presentation score, CIRTS = actual CIR timeliness score, CIRUS = actual CIR usability score, 
CIRAS = actual CIR audit score 
di: =1 (if an item is disclosed on the website), = 0 (otherwise) for the i company 
n	≤ =>?@AB	CD	EFG	(CIRCS, CIRPS, CIRTS, CIRUS, CIRAS)	9QA?R. 
Since the measurement of the disclosure index relies on the scoring of each sub-index 
(dependent variables), six indices representing the total CIR and the sub-indices of disclosure 
(CIR content, CIR presentation, CIR timeliness, CIR usability, and CIR audit) are calculated. 
Each index is the ratio of the actual scores to the maximum applicable disclosure score for each 
company. As such, the CIR total index can be computed as follows: 
CIRI = 	STUVSW	XYZ	U[USW	\T[]^	
	_S`:aVa	XYZ	U[USW	SbbW:TScW^	d:\TW[\V]^	\T[]^	
                  where: CIRI is CIR total index.  
 
The same procedures are followed to calculate the other indices: CIRCI (CIR content index), 
CIRPI (CIR presentation index), CIRTI (CIR timeliness index), CIRUI (CIR usability index) 
and CIRAI (CIR audit index).  
4.5.5.1.4 Reliability and validity of the disclosure index 
 
As this study constructs a disclosure index as the research instrument to measure CIR practices, 
two principal criteria should be considered to assess the quality of the instrument, which are 
reliability and validity.  
Reliability is “the ability of a measurement instrument to reproduce consistent results on 
repeated measurements” (Hassan and Marston, 2010, P.24). The reliability of a measure 
concerns the stability and consistency of measuring a concept using the research instrument 
(Sekaran, 2003). Stability means that the measure is able to produce the same finding when 
repeated over time or by a different researcher (Saunders et al., 2012), whereas consistency 
refers to the extent to which all components of a research instrument are measuring the same 
thing (Hassan and Marston, 2010). There are three common forms of reliability: inter-coder 
 
117 
reliability; test-retest; and internal consistency. Inter-coder reliability is when more than one 
coder performs the coding and yields similar results. Test-retest reliability is used as an 
indicator of the stability of the instrument, and internal consistency, the most common form, 
can be used to measure consistency (Hair et al., 2009; Hassan and Marston, 2010). Usually, 
internal consistency reliability is measured using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, which is one of 
the most frequently used statistics to assess the consistency of different items that are combined 
to construct a reliable measurement. The Cronbach’s alpha value ranges from 0 to 1; the higher 
the alpha coefficient, the higher the reliability. A level of 0.7 or more is considered acceptable 
to obtain good reliability (Hair et al., 2009). The current study uses Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha test to measure the reliability of the disclosure index as it is shown in chapter 5. Although 
reliability is an important characteristic of the quality of the research instrument, validity 
should be considered as well to ensure the good quality of the instrument. 
Validity focuses on the accuracy and it can be defined as “the extent to which data collection 
methods accurately measure what they were intended to measure” (Saunders et al., 2012, 
P.684). Thus, the constructed disclosure index is valid if it measures the same thing that the 
researcher intends (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Generally, three forms of validity can be 
identified: criterion-related validity; content validity; and construct validity. Criterion-related 
validity is “the ability of a statistical test to make accurate predictions” (Saunders et al., 2012, 
P.668). Criterion validity “is established when the measure differentiates individuals on a 
criterion it is expected to predict” (Sekaran, 2003, P.206). Content validity refers to the extent 
to which "the measure includes an adequate and representative set of items that tap the concept" 
(Sekaran, 2003, P.206). Several methods can be applied to achieve content validity, such as a 
careful definition of the research based on the literature review or discussions and using a panel 
of individuals to assess how necessary each item is (Saunders et al., 2012). Construct validity 
is to ensure that the results of a measure are fit well to the theories for which the test is designed 
(Sekaran, 2003). It is important to recognize the theoretical justification of using a measure in 
order to assess construct validity (Hair et al., 2009). Previous studies in the disclosure literature 
used the correlation between the total disclosure index and its components and the relationship 
between overall disclosure and explanatory variables to validate the disclosure index (Hail, 
2002; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Elsayed, 2010, Albassam, 2014). In this study, the validity of the 
disclosure index was improved using both content validity and construct validity.  
4.5.5.2 Independent variables 
 
Following the disclosure literature, several variables were identified as being relevant to 
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voluntary disclosure practices and are included in this study. The explanatory variables are 
classified into two main categories. The first group relates to firm characteristics (7 variables) 
and the second group relates to corporate governance characteristics (11 variables), which 
comprise three groups: board structure, ownership structure and audit committee variables. It 
is perceived that choosing the proxies of the explanatory variables and the applied criteria to 
determine these variables play a crucial role in explaining the relationship between the 
independent variables and the extent of disclosure. The results of different studies concerning 
this relationship tend to vary, which may be attributed to the variation of the measures 
operationalised (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). This study’s criteria for choosing independent 
variables rely on the theoretical background which supports the association between these 
variables and internet reporting, the prior literature review in the area of voluntary disclosure, 
and the relevance of these variables to the Saudi context. 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of all independent variables used in the hypothesis tests and how 
they are measured in this study. The next chapter discusses these variables in detail.  
 
Table 1:4-1: Explanatory variables and their measurements 
NO. Independent variable Proxy Category 
1 Firm size  Natural log of book value of firm assets Firm characteristic 
2 Firm growth Ratio of: (current year sales - last year sales) divided by last 
year sales 
Firm characteristic 
3 Leverage Debt ratio (total debt : total asset) Firm characteristic 
4 Liquidity Current ratio (current assets : current liabilities)  Firm characteristic 
5 Dividends Dummy variable coded “1” if the company pays dividends 
during the financial year, “0” otherwise 
Firm characteristic 
6 Industry type  Dummy variable coded “1” if the company is financial, “0” 
otherwise 
Firm characteristic 
7 Audit type  Dummy variable coded “1” if the company audited by big 
four company, “0” otherwise 
Firm characteristic 
8 Board size  Number of members on the board Board structure 
9 Board independence The percentage of independent members on the board Board structure 
10 Board frequency of meeting Number of board meetings during the financial year  Board structure 
11 Role duality Dummy variable coded “1” if the CEO is the chairman at 
the same time, “0” otherwise 
Board structure 
12 Block-holder ownership The percentage of shareholders who hold 5% or more  Ownership structure 
13 Director ownership The percentage of total shares owned by directors Ownership structure 
14 Institutional ownership The percentage of total shares owned by institutional 
investors 
Ownership structure 
15 Government ownership The percentage of total shares owned by the government Ownership structure 
16 Audit committee size Number of members on the audit committee audit committee 
17 Audit committee frequency 
of meeting 
Number of audit committee meetings during the financial 
year 
audit committee 
18 Audit committee 
independence 








4.5.6 Statistical analysis  
 
This section provides an overview of the statistics procedures that are used to conduct the 
empirical analysis. Descriptive statistics along with testing hypotheses procedures are 
performed to answer the research questions. The details of these procedures are outlined in the 
following paragraphs.   
4.5.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
In order to describe and compare the variables numerically, descriptive statistics are used 
according to the research questions and objectives (Saunders et al., 2012). Descriptive statistics 
analyses are applied to the total CIR index and the five sub-indices for each item. These 
statistics focus on two aspects: the central tendency measures (e.g. mode, median, mean); and 
the dispersion measures (e.g. inter-quartile range, standard deviation) (ibid). The findings of 
the descriptive analyses are discussed in chapters five, six and seven.  
4.5.6.2 Testing hypotheses  
 
Although it is important to have a descriptive overview of the research variables, using 
hypothesis testing is essential to examine the relationships between variables. Hypothesis 
testing is the process of investigating how each variable relates to another by testing the 
likelihood of a relationship occurrence and comparing the results of the collected data with 
what is theoretically expected. Following most of the disclosure studies, the current study 
formulates some hypotheses to test the relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables using bivariate and multivariate analyses. The bivariate analysis is performed to test 
the strength of the association between two variables, i.e. CIR and each independent variable. 
It can be either non-parametric statistics, which are used when the data are not normally 
distributed, or parametric statistics, which are used when the data are numerical and normally 
distributed. In this study, both non-parametric and parametric statistics are conducted for two 
reasons: to benefit from the strengths of each method (Haniffa, 1999) and to ensure the 
similarity of conclusions and reduce the probability of errors (Cooke, 1989b). Moreover, the 
multivariate analysis is used to test the relationship between CIR (total and its components) 
and the independent variables and explain the explanatory power of these relationships. It can 
be conducted using multiple regression techniques as these techniques can determine which 
dependent variables can best explain the variation of the dependent variable and decide the 
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significance of each independent variable when other independent variables are controlled 
(Howitt and Cramer, 2005). However, because Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is the dominant 
multiple regression technique in the disclosure literature, it is used in this study to test the 
relationship between CIR and the explanatory variables.   
4.5.7 Research model  
 
The research model presents the dependent and independent variables that are examined in the 
study. Following prior literature, and in order to test these variables, a multiple regression 
analysis is used to investigate whether variations in the level of internet reporting can be 
explained by the independent variables. Therefore, there are six main models, which are used 
to examine the association between CIR and its main components and the explanatory 
variables. These models are stated as follows:  
 
CIR (CIRc, CIRp, CIRt, CIRu, CIRa) ic = e +	g3hFijk + glmGnopqk +
grsjtk + gusFvk + gwxFtk +	gyFzx{hpG|k + g}~{xFpk +
	gÄhFij	k + gÅÄFzxjÇ	k + g37ÄÉjjp	k + g33Gx{s	k + g3lÄsnEÑ	k +
g3rxnozjG	k +	g3uFnozjG	k + g3wmnozjG	k + g3y~{hFij	k +
g3}~{Éjjp	k + g3~{FzxjÇ	k + 	Ö	9k.  
 
CIR   = total corporate internet reporting index. 
CIRc = content of corporate internet reporting index. 
CIRp = presentation of corporate internet reporting index. 
CIRt = timeliness of corporate internet reporting index. 
CIRu = usability of corporate internet reporting index. 
CIRa = audit of corporate internet reporting index. 
  i 	  = number of indices of corporate internet reporting, c = number of company, e = the 
intercept, g3 …. 18 = the coefficients of the independent variables and Ö = the error term.  
Two types of independent variables will be tested in the current study. The first is continuous 
variables which includes:  
SIZE= firm size, GROWTH = firm growth, LEV = leverage, LIQ = liquidity, BSIZE = board 
size, BINDEP = board independence, BMEET = board frequency of meeting, BLOCK = block-
holder ownership, DOWNER= director ownership, IOWNER= institutional ownership, 
GOWNER = government ownership, AUSIZE= audit committee size, AUMEET = audit 
committee frequency of meeting, AUINDEP = audit committee independence. While the 
second is for dummy variables and includes:  
DIV = dividends, INDUSTRY= industry type, AUDIT = audit type and RDUL= role duality.  
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As mentioned before, to construct these disclosure indices, many steps were taken. First, prior 
disclosure literature was reviewed to develop the preliminary checklists. By selecting the items 
that are appropriate for internet disclosure and could be disclosed by Saudi listed companies, 
the disclosure indices were created. Furthermore, these indices were compared with the 
requirements of Saudi regulations to form the final checklists. Then, the checklists were sent 
to academics in the field of accounting and company administrative staff in three different 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UK) to obtain their feedback and enhanc the validity of the 
disclosure indices. Finally, a pilot study of 15 companies represent all the industries of the 
Saudi market was carried out  to refine the checklists and ensure their applicability and validity. 
For more details, see section (4.5.5.1.1) for how these disclosure indexes were constructed, 




This chapter seeks to introduce the suitable methodology that has been adopted for the current 
study to examine the relationships between corporate governance, firm characteristics and 
voluntary internet reporting in addition to the effect of internet reporting on firm financial 
performance in Saudi Arabia. It starts with the philosophical assumptions of the research 
methodology and presents positivism as the most appropriate paradigm for the research 
problem and questions, which relies on empirical evidences to justify the use of internet 
reporting. Positivism permits the application of a deductive approach as the research process 
starts with formulating questions based on a determined theory, developing the hypotheses, 
and then using statistical techniques to test these hypotheses, which explain the relationship 
between CIR and its components and the explanatory variables, namely firm characteristics 
and corporate governance variables. This relationship can be examined using the quantitative 
method, where numerical data is collected and analysed to reach to a conclusion. 
This study is both a descriptive study which allows describing the actual practice of CIR and 
an explanatory study to explain the association between CIR and the independent variables 
besides the effect on firm financial performance. Thus, as a cross-sectional single-country 
study, the survey strategy is used to examine the websites of all 171 Saudi listed companies in 
2014, which represent the sample population. Moreover , the chapter describes the sources of 
data and the construction of the research instrument; i.e. the disclosure index. The study applies 
content analysis to measure the current CIR practice and its components by using a self-
constructed checklist of CIR items. It also discusses the reliability and validity tests of the 
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constructed index in addition to using the unweighted and dichotomous scoring method to 
enhance the objectivity of the study. Considering that Saudi society is heavily affected by its 
Arabic culture and Islamic values, the disclosure index contains some items concerning Islamic 
issues. The chapter concludes by presenting the statistical analyses that are used to describe 
and examine the associations between CIR and the independent variables. While univariate 
analysis is used to present the descriptive analysis of these variables, parametric and 
nonparametric tests are used as bivariate analyses to investigate the relationship between CIR 
and its components and each explanatory variable. Further, to examine the association between 
CIR and all the dependent variables, this study uses multivariate analysis, i.e. regression 
models. Two regression models are performed, namely the un-transformation model and the 
log transformation model in addition to the bootstrap model as robustness for the obtained 
results and reduced models as supplemental analyses. With respect to the impact of CIR and 
its components on firm financial performance, the OLS model is used to determine this 
association. However, before testing the research hypotheses, the next chapter demonstrates 





























CHAPTER 5  
 THE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF 
CORPORATE INTERNET REPORTING BY 
SAUDI LISTED COMPANIES  
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the descriptive analysis of corporate internet reporting (CIR) and its 
components in Saudi listed companies (SLC). More precisely, this chapter aims to achieve the 
first objective of this study by providing an in-depth understanding of the actual practice of 
CIR total and its components in SLC by describing the frequencies of CIR and its components, 
which may help in exploring the potential effective items in satisfying stakeholders’ different 
needs and assessing the extent of using the internet as a tool to disseminate information in the 
Saudi context. Therefore, this chapter seeks mainly to answer the research first question: what 
is the extent of corporate internet reporting (CIR) by Saudi listed companies (SLC)? The 
chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents the assessment of the reliability and 
validity of CIR total and its component indices. The extent of CIR total is reported in section 
5.3, and is followed by the extent of CIR components, which is presented in section 5.4. Finally, 
section 5.5 provides a summary of this chapter.  
5.2 Reliability and validity of CIR total and its component indices  
 
As stated before in section 4.5.5.1.4, reliability and validity tests are used to assess the goodness 
of a measure. It is essential to determine the accuracy of the disclosure index in measuring all 
the components of CIR to achieve the goodness of the research measure. Many forms of tests 
can be applied to evaluate the reliability and validity of a measure. The current study considers 
internal consistency tests to evaluate the reliability of the CIR indices and content and construct 
validity tests to evaluate the validity. Detailed discussions are presented in the following points.  
5.2.1 Assessing the reliability of disclosure indices 
 
Hassan and Marston (2010) state that reliability is related to consistency. Consistency can be 
measured using internal consistency tests as the most common form to examine reliability. In 




5.2.1.1 Correlation coefficients 
 
Correlation coefficients help to measure the internal consistency between items in each CIR 
component and the total index of each group and the consistency between CIR components as 
well. This study conducts two correlation methods to fulfil this goal: Pearson’s product moment 
correlation and Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients. The results reveal a significant 
correlation between all the items of each component and the total index of each group in both 
correlation methods (see appendix 7).  
5.2.1.2 Cronbach’s alpha  
 
One of the most commonly used statistics to measure reliability is Cronbach’s alpha. Many 
studies use Cronbach’s alpha to test inter-item correlation and assess the reliability of a 
measurement instrument (Sekaran, 2003). This study examines the internal consistency for 
each CIR component by computing the Cronbach’s alpha for each component. The results are 
presented in table 5-1. 









From Table 5-1 it can be seen that all CIR components have a high Cronbach’s alpha (86% 
and above). It is considered that a high value of Cronbach’s alpha indicates a better reliability 
(Sekaran, 2003; Saunders et al., 2012). An alpha value over 0.7 suggests that the internal 
consistency reliability of the disclosure index is acceptable (Hair et al., 2009). The results, as 
shown in the table, approve a high internal consistency between the items of each component 
index and the total of this sub-index and between all these items and the CIR total index. Hence, 
it can be confirmed that the indices of the CIR total and its components are reliable in the 
present study. However, validity tests should be conducted along with reliability tests to assure 
the goodness of a measure.  
5.2.2 Assessing the validity of disclosure indices 
	
The constructed disclosure indices are valid if they measure what is intended to be measured. 
This study uses two main methods to evaluate the validity of disclosure indices, namely content 
and construct validity.   
CIR 
Components Number of items Cronbach's alpha 
  Total 196 .917 
  Content 70 .861 
  Presentation 26 .895 
  Timeliness 18 .905 
  Usability 54 .915 
  Audit 28 .909 
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5.2.2.1 Content validity  
 
Content validity is supposed to confirm that all the included items in the indices are adequate 
and represent the studied subject. This study uses two ways to determine the content of the 
disclosure indices. First, the websites of SLC are visited to check the applicability of the 
indices’ items, which were constructed from the prior literature, and to ensure they are relevant 
to the Saudi context. Second, a checklist of disclosure items is sent to six persons in academia 
in the field of accounting and seven company administrative staff in three different countries 
(Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UK) to seek their opinions regarding the included items and the 
appropriateness of these items to the research questions and objectives.  
5.2.2.2 Construct validity  
 
Construct validity focuses on the consistency between the results obtained from disclosure 
indices and the theories in which the test is designed (Sekaran, 2003). That is, determining the 
construct validity means that the obtained results are consistent with the results of prior 
research that employs the same theories for the same methods of measuring the indices. 
Therefore, this study evaluates the indices’ validity by assessing both the correlation between 
the CIR total and the total index of each component and the correlation between indices of CIR 
components and some key company characteristics variables explored in most of the previous 
studies. Table 5-2 shows the correlations between total index of each CIR component and CIR 
total, as well as between each component.   
 
Table 3:5-2: The correlations between CIR components 
CIR components correlation method CIR total   CIR content  CIR presentation  CIR timeliness  CIR usability  
CIR content  Pearson Correlation .984***     
 Spearman's rho Co .959***     
CIR presentation  Pearson Correlation .899*** .859***    
 Spearman's rho Co .856*** .784***    
CIR timeliness  Pearson Correlation .822*** .787*** .682***   
 Spearman's rho Co .860*** .807*** .680***   
CIR usability  Pearson Correlation .854*** .791*** .765*** .755***  
 Spearman's rho Co .892*** .799*** .781*** .744***  
CIR audit  Pearson Correlation .913*** .900*** .813*** .628*** .643*** 
 Spearman's rho Co .784*** .791*** .623*** .643*** .589*** 
 




Table 5-2 reveals that there is a high and significant correlation between the CIR total and each 
component in both correlation methods, indicating that each component interprets CIR total 
efficiently and effectively. It can be assumed that this high correlation shows that the disclosure 
strategies for SLC over the different components of CIR are similar (Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006). Furthermore, there is a great interrelationship between CIR components in the Saudi 
context, as evidenced by the significant correlation between them. To affirm the construct 
validity of disclosure indices, another correlation analysis was conducted between CIR 
components indices and several of the company characteristics tested in prior studies. 
According to the majority of disclosure literature, which finds that firm size is a key factor in 
determining disclosure level, the current study chooses this variable to test the validity of the 
disclosure indices in addition to audit type and dividends, which have been documented in 
many studies (e.g. Brudney, 1980; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Archambault and Archambault, 
2003; Xiao et al., 2004; Trabelsi and Labelle, 2006; Al-Shammari, 2007; Kelton and Yang, 
2008; Hussainey and Walker, 2009; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; Albassam, 2014). Table 5-
3 presents the result of the correlation between the indices of CIR components and these 
variables. 
Table 4:5-3: The correlation between the indices of CIR components and some company characteristics 
CIR components 
Firm size Audit type Dividends 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
CIR TOTAL  .583*** .667*** .262*** .290*** .296*** .333*** 
CIR content  .549*** .616*** .249*** .290*** .288*** .311*** 
CIR Presentation  .572*** .620*** .186** .224*** .314*** .328*** 
CIR timeliness  .551*** .573*** .299*** .293*** .354*** .354*** 
CIR usability  .612*** .582*** .324*** .287*** .230*** .233*** 
CIR Audit  .442*** .478*** .163** .246*** .220*** .195** 
                  ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
                    **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 5-3 shows that all the components of CIR are significantly correlated with the three 
company characteristics in both the Pearson and Spearman correlation methods. These results 
agree with most of the prior studies that used a constructed-disclosure index to measure the 
impact of different explanatory variables on disclosure.  
Based on the above discussion, it can be stated that the indices of CIR components have a 
substantial degree of reliability and validity. The results reveal that these indices are accurate 
measures of CIR practices with high levels of consistency. This can provide more confidence 
for the measurement power of these CIR indices and more credibility for the outcomes deduced 
from such indices. The next section reviews the extent of CIR total in the Saudi context.  
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5.3 The extent of CIR total 
 
The extent of CIR total is examined for 170 Saudi listed companies (SLC). In order to measure 
the extent of CIR total, an unweighted checklist containing 196 items is constructed. Table 5-
4 displays the descriptive analyses of CIR total.   
 
Table 5:5-4: Descriptive Statistics for CIR total 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
CIR 170 .110 .720 .5157 .1593 -.927 -.336 
 
As indicated in Table 5-4, the mean CIR is 51.57% in 2014, which suggests a moderate overall 
extent of CIR. This can be attributed to the voluntary nature of CIR in the Saudi context. 
Moreover, the table shows a minimum score of 0.11 and a maximum of 0.72, which means that 
the range of the CIR index is relatively wide (61%). Furthermore, the negative skewness value 
indicates a pile-up on the right, and the negative kurtosis value indicates a flat distribution 
(Field, 2013). To shed more light on the understanding of the results of the CIR total extent in 
the Saudi context, a summary of the frequencies of CIR total scores is presented in Table 5-5. 
Table 6:5-5: Frequencies of CIR total scores 
CIR total score % No. of companies Cumulative no. of companies % Cumulative percent 
0 – 9.9 0 0 0 % 0% 
10 – 19.9 8 8 4.71% 4.7% 
20 – 29.9 20 28 11.76% 16.5% 
30 – 39.9 13 41 7.65% 24% 
40 – 49.9 12 53 7.06% 31% 
50 – 59.9 53 106 31.18% 62.4% 
60 – 69.9  56 162 32.94% 95% 
70 – 79.9 8 170 4.71% 100% 
80 – 89.9  0 - - - 
90 – 99.9 0 - - - 
TOTAL  170 170 100% 100% 
 
As shown in Table 5-5, 53 companies (31%) score below 50%, while the majority of the 
companies (109 companies) score between 50% and 70%, which is reflected in the negative 
value of the skewness. This indicates a moderate internet usage as a disclosure means in the 
Saudi context, which might be due to the rapid expansion of internet usage in Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, this indicates that SLC are aware of the importance of the internet as a tool for 
disclosing information. However, a few companies scored above 70% (only 8 companies), 
which reveals that more attention should be paid to the effective use of the internet as a 
disclosure tool. However, none of the sample companies satisfied 100% of the 196 index items, 
thereby highlighting the opportunity for further improvement in CIR practice in Saudi Arabia. 
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Noticeably, only one company, namely the Umm Al-Qura Cement Company, discloses less 
than 15% of the items included in the index (11%).  
Almost all the Saudi listed companies (99.4% or 170 company out of 171 list companies)5	have 
a website, clearly showing that although the Saudi market is an emerging market, it reflects the 
growing interest in the use of internet disclosure among Saudi companies. Comparing this 
percentage with the international context, many previous international studies have 
demonstrated various percentages of companies having a website. The IASC published a study, 
Business Reporting on the internet (1999), to examine the current level of internet reporting 
and the actual practice of companies’ reporting around the world. Using a survey of a total of 
the 660 largest firms listed by 22 countries, the study reveals that 86% of these firms had a 
website, though they varied in the level of reporting from high levels in most developed 
countries (100% for the USA, Canada, Sweden and Germany) to relatively low levels in 
developing countries (53% in Chile, for instance). Moreover, Craven and Marston (1999) 
conducted a study with a sample of the 206 largest UK companies listed by market 
capitalization in the Financial Times and found that 153 (74%) of the sample companies had 
websites or home pages on the internet. Xiao et al. (2004), using a sample of 300 largest 
Chinese companies, found that 203 (68%) companies have an accessible website. In Ireland, 
Brennan and Hourigan (2000) found that only 37% of the sampled companies have a website, 
in Gulf Co-operation Council countries the percentage was 39% (Ismail, 2002), in New 
Zealand 54% (Oyelere et al., 2003), in Spain 32% (García-Borbolla Fernández et al., 2005), in 
Jordan 45% (Momany and Al-Shorman, 2006), in Malaysia 47% (Hamid, 2005) find that 
percentage is 40%. In Egypt, Aly et al. (2010) revealed that nearly 69% of the sampled 
companies have websites, while Ahmed et al. (2017) reported that 120 (69.8%) of the surveyed 
companies in 2010 and 119 (69.6%) of them in 2011 have usable websites.  Furthermore, , 
Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek (2018) conducted a study using a sample of 192 large 
companies in Slovenia. They found that 52% of the sampled companies use IFR.  
Regarding the Saudi context, Tawfik (2001) surveyed 69 joint-stock companies (listed and 
unlisted) in Saudi Arabia and found only 6 companies utilizing the internet for the reporting of 
financial information (9%), while 49% of all SLC had a website as reported by Abu Al-Azm 
                                                
 
5 Bishah Agricultural Development Company does not have a website, this company with accumulated losses of 
100% or more of its capital according to Tadawul website. This company has been excluded from the current 
study’s sample.   
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(2001). Al-Saeed (2006b), examines CIR using a sample of 46 Saudi firms. The study shows 
that nearly 87% of sampled companies have websites. Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2006) finds 
that 75% of listed companies on the Tadawul website have an accessible website. Hussainey 
and Al-Nodel (2008) report that only 64 company (83%) have a website from the total 77 
companies listed at that time. Al-Motrafi (2008) concludes that 84% of all Saudi companies 
have websites and 93% of the listed companies have an internet presence. Based on the above 
Saudi results, it can be concluded that there has been a noticeable increase in companies that 
have a website in the Saudi market over the last few years, which reflects the increased interest 
in CIR by Saudi listed companies over the recent period. According to the respondents in 
Alshowaiman’ study (2008), internet reporting is considered a very important channel for users 
in Saudi Arabia because many users are no longer interested in reading the newspaper and they 
depend more on CIR to deal with financial statements easy and economically. To add a more 
in-depth understanding to the extent of CIR, the extent of CIR components is demonstrated in 
detail in the next section.  
5.4 The extent of corporate internet reporting components 
 
It might be useful to analyse the extent of each component of CIR. Five main components of 
CIR are examined in this study: content, presentation, timeliness, usability and audit. Table 5-
6 presents the variation in the level of scores of these components.  
                                              
















As indicated in Table 5-6, there is a variation in the level of information disclosed on the 
companies’ websites. While the range of CIR content, presentation and timeliness almost varies 
 Content Presentation Timeliness Usability Audit 
Mean 0.5548 0.4464 0.4288 0.5491 0.4737 
Minimum 0.029 0.115 0 0.241 0 
Maximum 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.68 
 Frequencies of CIR components indices 
CIR score % No.  % No.  % No.  % No. % No.  % 
0 – 9.9 3 1.8 1 .59 5 2.9 0 0 36 21.2 
10 – 19.9 13 7.7 10 5.9 19 11.2 0 0 2 1.2 
20 – 29.9 14 8.2 18 10.6 28 16.5 4 2.4 3 1.8 
30 – 39.9 9 5.3 17 10 27 15.9 8 4.7 3 1.8 
40 – 49.9 9 5.3 42 24.7 13 7.7 35 20.6 4 2.4 
50 – 59.9 18 10.6 68 40 36 21.2 69 40.6 21 12.4 
60 – 69.9  59 34.7 12 7.1 29 17.1 38 22.4 101 59.4 
70 – 79.9 43 25.3 1 .59 13 7.7 16 9.4 0 0 
80 – 89.9  2 1.2 1 .59 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90 – 99.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL  170 100% 170 100% 170 100% 170 100% 170 100% 
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between 0 and 0.81, thus scoring the widest range, CIR audit ranges only from 0 to 0.68. CIR 
usability was the lowest range, scoring between 0.24 and 0.78. The highest mean disclosure 
score was content (55.48%) followed by usability with a slight difference (54.91%), which 
suggests that content and usability are the most important tools for CIR by Saudi listed 
companies, whereas the lowest score was timeliness (42.88%). It is worthwhile that the mean 
scoring of all CIR components are close to each other, reflecting the moderate disclosure of 
CIR components. Moreover, it is noticed that most SLC disclose on average 40-70% of the 
content (50.6%), presentation (71.8%), timeliness (46%), usability (83.6%) and audit (74.2%) 
information via the internet. Noticeably, not too many SLC (14% or less) score less than 20% 
of each of the CIR components’ items (with the exception of audit, where 22% of SLC disclose 
less than 20%). This indicates the growing use of an online disclosure strategy for SLC and 
shows that there is a rational awareness of its importance for companies’ stakeholders. 
Interestingly, no single company scored more than 81% for any of the CIR components, which 
shows the need for more emphasis on, and recognition of, the importance of CIR. 
Due to the variation in the level of CIR components, more analysis is conducted for each 
component of CIR to gain awareness of the online disclosure practices of SLC. The following 
points present these components’ analyses.   
5.4.1 Content 
 
The content checklist consists of 70 items measuring the CIR content of Saudi listed companies 
(SLC). It covers general corporate information (e.g. date company established and company 
profile), financial information (e.g. quarterly reports, annual report, financial statements and 
share price) and social responsibility (e.g. the existence of a social responsibility section, 
donation, and product quality and safety). The findings of the extent of CIR content are 
presented in appendix 8.  
It is noticeable that most of the companies (72%) disclosed between 50% and 80% of content 
items, and only 3 companies (1.8%) scored less than 10% of content index items, which shows 
the alertness of SLC towards disseminating such information on their websites. The highest 
score was 80%, giving room for more improvement in companies’ performance related to 
content disclosure.   
Overall, the results indicate that the most frequently disclosed content items are those related 
to general company information. The first common items disclosed are date company 
established and company profile (99% each), followed by corporate citizenship (98%), services 
or products provided (98%), phone number for investors (96%), postal address for investors 
 
131 
(94%), news summaries (92%), and human resources information/employee profile (91%). At 
the other end of the spectrum, the least frequently disclosed items were mailing lists of the 
company's key personnel (7%), market share of key products (6%), the display of names and 
details of analysts following the company (3%), and privacy policy when personal information 
is required (2%). Some items were disclosed by only one company, which were text of speeches 
and presentations, monthly or weekly sales or operating data, earnings or sales forecast, and an 
exchange or a link to a currency converter site if financial information is presented in 
alternative currencies (1%). None of the sampled companies displayed financial information 
in alternative GAAP. The following section discusses some of these items in more detail, 
starting with the most commonly disclosed items then the more rarely disclosed ones, and 
compares the study results with the previous research (see appendix8 for CIR content items 
results).  
The most frequently disclosed general information items were the date company established 
and company profile. A corporate profile details the history of the company as well as its 
geographical reach, company goals and objectives. The result shows that 99% of companies 
provided a company profile and the date company established online. This item has been the 
subject of some previous studies conducted in different parts of the world. For example, in 
developed countries, 94% of New Zealand companies offered a company profile and date of 
establishment (Oyelere et al., 2003), 96% of Malaysian companies did so (Khadaroo, 2005), 
as did 41% of the IASC sample (1999), 69% of the FASB (2000) sample, while in developing 
countreis 94.4% and 65% of the Egyptian companies according to (Elsayed, 2010) and (Ahmed 
et al., 2017) respectively and 80% of Saudi companies (Al-Motrafi, 2008). This comparison 
suggests that SLC appear to be recognizing the importance of offering such information to their 
investors and other users, and that this dissemination of information has improved in the last 
few years. 
It can also be noticed that both corporate citizenship and services or products provided are 
disclosed by the majority of the companies (98%). These findings are consistent with prior 
studies in developed countries; for example, corporate citizenship was reported by Hindi and 
Rich (2010), who stated that 97% of the largest US companies disclosed corporate citizenship. 
Similarly, UK and Canadian companies scored 94% and 80%, respectively (Allam and Lymer, 
2003) whereas 88% of Australian companies revealed it (Lodhia et al., 2004). The disclose of 
services or products is very frequently provided (98%), which is expected as some prior studies 
have argued that marketing services and products is deemed as the main reason to adopt internet 
disclosure (Xiao et al., 2000; Hassan et al.,1999) This result is consistent with the results of 
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some studies in the disclosure literature. In developed countries, Oyelere et al. (2003) report 
that 99% of New Zealand companies provide information about their services and products 
and 74% of US companies disclose this (FASB, 2000). While in developing country, 93.3% of 
Egyptian companies disclosed information about services or products provided (Elsayed, 
2010). Al-Motrafi’s study (2008) shows that 81% of Saudi companies disclosed this item, 
which might be influenced by the study sample that includes both listed and unlisted 
companies.   
Regarding advertisements for the company’s products or services, not surprisingly, 152 
companies disclose such information (89%), which demonstrates that most of the companies 
use the internet as a means to advertise their services or products to customers. This finding is 
consistent with FASB (2000), which report that 84% of US companies disclosed this 
information via websites, which increased to 100% according to Hindi and Rich (2010).  
The vision statement is one of the most common pieces of social information. Of the sampled 
companies, 134 (79%) disclose their vision statement via the internet. This finding is 
comparable to those of developed countries. For example, Lodhia et al. (2004), who indicate 
that 62% of Australian companies revealed this item, and Allam and Lymer (2003), who find 
that 94% of US companies disclose a vision statement, while the figures are 74% for the UK, 
82% for Canada, 62% for Australia, and 43% for Hong Kong. However, Hindi and Rich (2010) 
report that 86% of the largest US companies disclosed such information in 2006, which 
increased to 97% in 2009.  
Regarding contact details information, the result of the study reveals that 96% of companies 
provide a phone number for investors, and 94% disclose postal address for investors.  
Some companies make a separate section for investor relations (84%) to ease obtaining the 
required information from the company’s website. It can be seen that the majority of SLC 
realize the importance of contact details of their investor relation department by disclosing this 
information to their stakeholders. However, few companies provide the name of the investor 
relations officer and mailing list of the company's key personnel (18% and 7%, respectively).  
Disclosing these items by SLC represents an advancement in CIR. Most of the companies in 
the developed countries disclose a separate section for investor relations to isolate the critical 
information from other general information. This isolation enables various stakeholders to 
obtain their required information efficiently and effectively. For example, Hindi and Rich 
(2010) find that 97% of US companies have a link to an investor relations section and 100% 
provide a phone number, postal address and email address. FASB (2000) reports that 67% have 
a direct link to investor relations and 56%, 62%, 54% provide email, phone number and postal 
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address, respectively, while 82% of Australian companies have a separate section for investor 
relations (Lodhia et al., 2004) and in Slovenia, 17% of the companies provide investor contacts 
(Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek, 2018). In the Saudi context, Al-Motrafi (2008) reveals that 
69% of all listed and unlisted Saudi companies have an investor relations section. Alshowaiman 
(2008) reports that 65% of Saudi companies disclose a phone number and 61% a postal address. 
The results of the study show that SLC are close to their counterparts in the developed 
countries, and are much improved compared to the findings of Saudi companies from a few 
years ago. It is also remarkable that SLC disclose more contact details information than other 
developing countries; for example, in Egypt, Elsayed (2010) indicates that 13% of Egyptian 
companies have a separate section for investor relations, 18% provide email address, 12% the 
names of investor relations officers, 13% a phone number and 9% a postal address, Desoky 
(2009) reports that 33% of companies have investor relation section, while Arafa (2012) finds 
that 63% of Egyptian companies have an investor relations section, 18% an email address, 16% 
a phone number and 15% a postal address. Later, Ahmed et al. (2017) report that 11.7% of 
Egyptian companies disclose the names of investor relations officers, 14.6% email address, 
8.7% phone number and 7.6% postal address. Xiao et al. (2004) reveal that 15%, 16% and 15% 
of Chinese companies disseminate email address, phone number and postal address, 
respectively.  
It can be noted that information about board of directors (names, profile and classification) is 
disseminated by the majority of SLC (91%). This finding is consistent with the findings of 
developed countries. Hindi and Rich (2010), report that 95% of US companies disclose board 
of directors’ and officers’ names and profiles. Moreover, 79% of Irish companies show 
directors’ names online (Smith and Peppard, 2005), 85% of UK companies display the 
experience of directors and executives (Abdelsalam et al., 2006) and 55% of German 
companies present directors’ information (Marston and Polei, 2004). With similar percentages, 
the FASB (2000) reports that 71% of their sample offer board of directors’ and officers’ names 
and 64% of Malaysian companies offer the names and composition of their boards (Khadaroo, 
2005). However, developing countries’ studies indicate lower percentages than this study. 
Elsayed (2010) states that only 42% of Egyptian companies displayed names of board of 
directors and 14% gave profiles and classifications, while Al-Motrafi (2008) found only 8% 
and 7% of the sampled companies report education and experience of board directors, 
respectively. The high percentage showed by SLC can be related to the mandatory nature of 
disclosing such information (Article 9), which has taken place since the end of 2008. This 
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article requires the disclosing of the formation of the board of directors and the classification 
of its members. 
Furthermore, risk management is one of the most common pieces of corporate governance 
information. 79% of SLC provide this information in their website. This high percentage 
reflects the desire of SLC to inform their investors about their corporate risks, showing that the 
company has full knowledge of the risks and has taken all the necessary actions to counter 
them. This might be linked to Article 10 of SCCG, which states that the board should disclose 
information about the strategy, the main work plans, and the policy related to risk management. 
This finding is much better than that by Aly (2008), who reports that 35.5% of Egyptian 
companies reveal such information, Ahmed et al. (2017) who mention that only 20% of the 
companies do so and Despina and Demetrios (2009), who find that only 10.6% of Greek 
companies provide information about corporate risks. 
Regarding financial information, it can be stated that there is a considerable variation in the 
financial information disclosed by SLC, ranging between 92% and 0%. The most common 
item disclosed was news summaries (92%). This finding indicates that most SLC websites 
contain a section for a news summary, which is a vital part of the corporate website since it 
provides news about the company and keeps the website users informed about the important 
events of the company. This result is consistent with Hindi and Rich’s (2010) finding that 99% 
of US companies disclose news summaries as well as that of Despina and Demetrios (2009), 
who find that 93% of Greek listed companies disseminate this item via the internet. However, 
Oyelere et al. (2003) state that 67.5% of New Zealand companies provide a news summary and 
only 42% and 40% of US companies (FASB, 2000) and Egyptian companies (Arafa, 2012) do 
so, respectively.  
Moreover, it was found that 140 companies (82%) provide the date of financial year-end; 
providing such information is helpful since financial reporting and budgeting conform to this 
date. In addition, many of the compensation schemes and bonuses in most companies are 
measured and linked to the timing of the financial year. Oyer (1998) studied the effect of 
financial year-ends on US companies, concluding that revenue seasonality and price are 
affected by year-end timing. Alshowaiman (2008) found that 43% of SLC disclosed this item 
at that time, indicating the extent of improvement when comparing this result with the results 
of the current study.  
In addition, it was found that 134 of SLC are keen to disclose earning release on their websites 
(79%). However, only 7.5% of Saudi listed and unlisted companies (Al-Mulhem, 1997), 37% 
and 8% of Egyptian companies (Aly, 2008; Ahmed et al., 2017) and 31% of Malaysian 
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counterparts (Hamid, 2005) disseminate this item via the internet.    
A remarkable percentage of SLC discloses information about which GAAP basis is used in the 
year reported and the usage of comparative figures are at the same percentage (78%) which is 
comparable to those of developing countries. This percentage is close to the finding by Xiao et 
al. (2004) that 69% of Chinese companies provide the GAAP basis used, while Aly (2008) 
reveals that only 37% of Egyptian companies provide information about which GAAP is used 
and 55% disclose comparative figures. In addition, Erer and Dalgic (2011) report that 9% of 
Turkish companies use comparative figures on their websites. Al-Mulhem (1997) found that 
100% of Saudi listed and unlisted companies disclose comparative figures in their reports. This 
high percentage can be attributed to the sampled companies and the fact that Al-Mulhem’s 
study was concerned with paper-based disclosure.  
With respect to the financial statements, balance sheets and income statements of the current 
and last years are, to some extent, the most commonly disclosed statements (76%), followed 
by cash flow statements (71%, 72% current and last years, respectively) and, lastly, statements 
of changes in stockholders’ equity (70%, 71% current and last years, respectively). These 
findings are comparable with those by the FASB (2000), which finds that 74% of US 
companies disclose balance sheets in their websites, 70% give income statements and cash 
flow statements, and 66% provide statements of changes in stockholders’ equity. However, 
Allam and Lymer (2003) report considerably higher percentages, which might be due to the 
market capitalization criterion that they choose to select sampled companies. For example, in 
the UK, 98% of companies disseminate balance sheets and income statement, 96% disclose 
cash flow statements, and 92% disclose statements of changes in stockholders’ equity, while 
100% of Canadian companies disclosed all the statements and 90% of Hong Kong companies 
provide balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements, and 88% provide 
stockholders’ equity statement. Recently, Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek (2018) find that, in 
Slovenia, 99% of the companies provide balance sheets and income statements and 95% 
provide both cash flow statements and statements of changes in stockholders’ equity.  Previous 
studies on developing countries indicate lower percentages for providing financial statements 
than the current study. Xiao et al. (2004) find that Chinese companies disclose both balance 
sheets and income statements at the same percentages (44% and 64% for current and past 
statements, respectively), while cash flow statement were 42% for the current year and 64% 
for the past year, and 69% of the companies disclose current stockholders’ equity statements. 
Moreover, only 27% of Egyptian companies disclose balance sheets of the current year and 
26.7%, 21%, 20% disclose income statements, cash flow statements and stockholders’ equity 
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statements, respectively (Elsayed, 2010). Similar percentages were found by Ahmed et al. 
(2017) in Egyptian companies which are (22%, 21.6%, 19% and 18% respectively). 
Likewise, 72% of SLC provide annual reports for the current year and 70% provide annual 
reports for the past year. These results are slightly low compared with those of developed 
countries. Kelton and Yang (2008) state that 93% of NASDAQ listed companies disseminate 
annual reports for the current year and around 90% provide last year’s report as well. Similarly, 
Marston and Polei (2004) find that 89% of Dutch companies disclose such reports, Erer and 
Dalgic (2011) report that 89% and 87% of Turkish companies provide current and past year 
reports, respectively and Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek (2018) find that 96% of Slovenian 
companies disclose annual reports for the current year and 60% for previous periods. In 
contrast, a few companies in the developing countries disseminate these reports: 33% in China 
(Xiao et al., 2004), 45%, 8% in Egypt (Arafa, 2012; Ahmed et al., 2017), and in Saudi Arabia 
4% for the current year and 31% for the past year (Alshowaiman, 2008). Moreover, it was 
found that 76% of the sampled companies disclose excerpts of financial reports, which is still 
comparable to Arafa (2012), who reports that 87% of Egyptian companies disclose excerpts of 
their financial reports. 
Moreover, it was found that 76% of SLC declared their dividend payout policy. Disclosure of 
dividend payout policy helps to alleviate the information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders (Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010) and benefits investors to improve their decision-
making. Article 43 (part 8) of Tadawul’s Listing Rules states that the annual board report must 
contain a description of the company’s dividend policy. This result is in line with Albassam’s 
study (2014), which finds that on average 77% of SLC disclose their dividend policy. However, 
Kelton and Yang (2008) reveal that only 23.2% of NASDAQ listed companies provide such 
information, and Erer and Dalgic (2011) show a similar result for Turkish companies (23.1%).  
With regard to performance analysis, 125 companies (74%) provide this analysis on their 
websites. This finding is comparable to Xiao et al. (2004), who find that 69.5% of Chinese 
companies disclose their performance analysis. Similarly, Kelton and Yang (2008) report that 
69% of US companies do so. However, Egyptian companies show a lower percentage (15%) 
than that in the current study (Elsayed, 2010).  
On the other hand, the present study finds that some items related to CIR content are rarely 
disclosed by SLC. It is noticeable that none of the sampled companies in the current study 
display financial information on alternative GAAP. All the companies in Saudi Arabia provide 
financial information based on domestic accounting standards. Few studies have examined this 
feature. For example, Jones and Xiao (2004) conclude that by 2010 more companies will 
 
137 
disclose reports in multiple measurements, currencies and GAAPs. FASB (2000) report that 
only 6% of their sample offered financial information in alternative GAAP and Ahmed et al. 
(2017) find 2% of Egyptian companies do so. Although Al-Motrafi (2008) finds that 16% of 
Saudi companies report their financial information in alternative GAAP, this difference might 
be attributed to the inclusion of unlisted companies in Al-Motrafi’s sample and the fact that 
foreigners are not allowed to invest in the Saudi Exchange Market (Tadawul). In May 2015, 
foreigner investors were allowed to invest in Tadawul, which is expected to support foreign 
listing and, hence, encourage companies to display financial information in alternative GAAP. 
Since the internet facilitates the global dissemination of corporate information, users need 
comparability based on different GAAP. 
Moreover, the rarest disclosed financial items by SLC are monthly or weekly sales or operating 
data, earnings or sales forecasts, and exchange or a link to currency converter site if the 
information is given in alternative currencies. Only one company discloses each of these items 
(1%) in different industries. The Saudi Real Estate Company in the real estate development 
sector is the only company providing information about their monthly or weekly sales or 
operating data. This finding is close to that of Xiao et al. (2004), who find that 3% of Chinese 
companies disseminate such information. Kelton and Yang (2008) report that 7% of US 
sampled companies disclose this item, while this percentage raises to 12% in the FASB’s study 
(2000).  
Earnings or sales forecasts were disclosed only by Takween, an industrial investment company 
(1%); this result is confirmed by Xiao et al. (2004), who state that 1% of companies in China 
provide this item, while Matherly and Burton (2005) find that 16% of US companies do so. 
This is an acceptable differentiation due to the differences between developing and developed 
countries.   
With respect to an exchange or a link to currency converter site if the information is given in 
alternative currencies, one insurance company (1%) provides this item, namely Solidarity 
Takaful. This percentage is still comparable to Arafa (2012), who finds that 1.7% of Egyptian 
companies disclose this information on their website. Al-Motrafi (2008) also reports that 1% 
of Saudi companies reveal such information, while 8% of UK companies (Abdelsalam et al., 
2006) and 83% of Slovenian companies do so (Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek, 2018). 
In addition, only two SLC disclose text of speeches and presentations, which is a low 
percentage (1.2%) compared with prior studies. For example, 10% in the US (FASB, 2000), 
15% in NASDAQ listed companies (Kelton and Yang, 2008), and almost 5% in China (Xiao 
et al., 2004) provide this item via the internet. A similar result was found regarding explaining 
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privacy policy if personal information is required (2%) and displaying the names and details 
of analysts (3%). The previous studies are not closely comparable with the current study; for 
example, in terms of explaining privacy policy Abdelsalam et al. (2006) report that 75% of 
their sample provide this information, in comparison to 13% according to Arafa (2012) and 
12% according to Elsayed (2010). The same situation applies to displaying the names and 
details of analysts; Kelton and Yang (2008) find that 63% of US companies reveal this item, it 
is 17% in the FASB’s study (2000) and 34% of German companies do so in Marston and 
Polei’s study (2004). However, Al-Motrafi’s results (2008) are consistent with the current 
study (0% and 2%, respectively) since both studies are conducted in the Saudi context whereas 
the other studies included developed countries and targeted the largest companies.  
Only 10 companies (6%) provide industry statistics or data on their websites. This finding is 
consistent with Allam and Lymer (2003), who find the 4% in US, 6% in UK, 8% in Canada, 
and 2% of companies in Australia disseminate these statistics and data on their websites. 
However, the current study’s percentage is low compared with other studies; for example, the 
FASB (2000) finds that 13% of the sampled companies disclose this information via the 
internet, and Elsayed (2010) reports that 15% of Egyptian companies reveal industry statistics. 
More recently, Hindi and Rich (2010) find that 100% of their sampled companies disclose such 
information.  
Similarly, 6% of SLC supply information about the market share of key products. This item 
has been examined in several studies reporting different results. For example, Xiao et al. (2004) 
find that no Chinese companies provide such information, while Matherly and Burton (2005) 
report that 40% of US sampled companies disclose the market share of their key products, 
while only 8%, 19% of Egyptian companies offer this information according to Aly (2008) and 
Elsayed (2010), respectively.  
Moreover, a minority of the companies (7%) included in this study offered information 
regarding the mailing list of the company's key personnel. The finding regarding mailing list 
again varies among developed countries in the previous studies. While the highest percentage 
was 80% in Germany (Marston and Polei, 2004), followed by 64% in the US, 64% in the UK, 
50% in Canada, 52% in Australia and 14% in Hong Kong (Allam and Lymer, 2003) while only 
8% of Irish companies disclose the mailing list (Smith and Peppard, 2005). In developing 
countries, Xiao et al. (2004) find that only 3% in China provide a mailing list; in contrast, this 
was given by 58% of Egyptian companies (Aly, 2008).  
Furthermore, only 8% of the sampled companies have a facility to compare company share 
prices with peers and the industry on their websites. This finding is confirmed by Al-Motrafi 
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(2008), who found that 7% of SLC provided this facility at that time. However, previous studies 
indicate various percentages of disclosing such information; for example, Abdelsalam et al. 
(2006) find that 58% of UK companies provide it and Arafa (2012) reports that none of the 
Egyptian companies offer this facility. 
Only 25 companies (15%) in the current study sample display the names and details of the 
Sharia6 committee. All these companies belong to the financial sector (all 12 banks and 13 
insurance companies). Saudi Arabia as an Islamic country and adopts a legal system that is 
derived from Islamic law (Sharia) (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008); hence, SLC endeavour to 
attract investors by showing their compliance with Sharia through the existence of a Sharia 
committee and by disclosing details regarding this committee on their website, under the 
consideration that the main role of the Sharia committee is to ensure that the company is 
following Islamic Sharia in their transactions. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, Al-
Motrafi’s study (2008) is the only one that has examined the disclosure of details of Sharia 
committees on the internet. His study reveals that 5% of Saudi companies provide information 
about this committee.  
Furthermore, another item unique to the current study is the provision of social media links. 
Not surprisingly, the majority of SLC (65%) provide a link to one or more social media 
accounts (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.). Recently, social media has been widely used, 
especially in the Saudi society, which is one of the largest social media markets in the Middle 
East. According to Al-Khalifa and Garcia (2013), statistics show that 47.5% of the Saudi 
population is engaged on the internet, whereby 82% of these internet users use Facebook and 
80% utilize YouTube. The number of Twitter users in Saudi Arabia has increased from June 
2012 to June 2013 by 3000% (Al-Khalifa and Garcia, 2013), Saudi users, according to the 
Economist, have the world’s highest Twitter penetration7. Therefore, Saudi companies are 
trying to keep pace with the technological revolution to easily reach out to investors and satisfy 
their needs through the most widespread advertising channels on social media. To the best of 
the researcher’s knowledge, no single study so far has examined this item.  
Based on the above findings, it can be indicated that SLC have begun to recognize the 
importance of disclosing content items and they seem to be in line with their counterpart 
                                                
 
6 Sharia is “the Islamic law of human conduct, which regulates all matters of the lives of Muslims. It is based on 
God’s holy word in the Qur’an, the deeds and sayings of the prophet Mohammed (Sunah), and the consensus of 
Islamic religious scholars” (Maali et al., 2006, P.267) 
7 http://www.statista.com/statistics/284451/saudi-arabia-social-network- penetration/ Accessed on 15 March 
2016 on 3:35 
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companies in the developed countries, which might be linked to the issuing of the Saudi 
corporate governance code in 2006 and its mandatory amendments in 2010. Most of the content 
items (47) are disclosed on the website of more than half of SLC, and the content disclosure 
level was below 10% in only 11 items. Moreover, some items are disclosed by almost all the 
companies, such as company profile and date company established. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the current study identifies some areas where content disclosure needs more 
attention. A few items need to be considered, as none or just one company disclosed them, such 
as earnings or sales forecasts and monthly or weekly sales or operating data. In general, content 
disclosure demonstrates a remarkable improvement compared with previous studies in the 
Saudi context (for example, Al-Motrafi, 2008; Alshowaiman, 2008). Assessing the content 
level of the information disclosed on the SLC websites answers the first sub-question 1.1. The 




The second part of the disclosure index consists of 26 items to measure the CIR presentation 
index. The results of this index are illustrated in appendix 9.  
Surprisingly, disclosing most of the presentation items is either high, that is, 76% or more of 
the companies provide them, or low to the extent that only 6% or less of the companies disclose 
some items, leaving some room for in-between. It can be noticed that 12 of the presentation 
items are disclosed by 67% or more SLC; on the other hand, 9 items are disclosed by less than 
6% of the companies and 5 items are disclosed by 10% to 48% of companies.   
The most common presentation item disclosed was a hyperlinked table of contents. 169 
companies (99%) provide a hyperlinked table of content via their website. This finding is 
similar to those of developed countries. It is consistent with the finding of Kelton and Yang 
(2008), who find that 98.6% of US sampled companies disclose it. Erer and Dalgic (2011) 
report a close percentage for Turkish companies (83%), while Oyelere et al. (2003) find that 
63% of New Zealand companies provide such information. Dividing a page into frames is also 
another popular presentation item and it was disclosed at the same percentage (99%) by SLC. 
This result again is confirmed by Hindi and Rich (2010), who state that 100% of US companies 
provide frames and Marston and Polei (2004) who find that, in Germany, 98% of companies 
do so. In contrast, Xiao et al. (2004) indicate that only 7% of Chinese companies use frames 
on their websites and 26% do so in Egypt according to Aly (2008), while Ahmed et al. (2017) 
report that none of the Egyptian sampled companies use frames.  
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Regarding presenting a multilingual home page, it was found that 89% of sampled companies 
(151) provide their home page in both Arabic and English, since the English language is the 
dominant internet language. Furthermore, just 11 companies offer an Arabic-only website and 
8 companies present an English-only website. Many previous studies examined the use of more 
than one language in disclosing information via the internet; for example, Hindi and Rich 
(2010) state that in the US 100% of the companies use multiple languages, while 95% do so in 
Germany (Marston and Polei, 2004) compared to 88% in Greece (Despina and Demetrios, 
2009), 81% in Turkey (Erer and Dalgic, 2011), 47% in China (Xiao et al., 2004), 37% in Egypt 
(Elsayed, 2010) and 61% in Saudi Arabia (Al-Motrafi, 2008). The current study result is close 
to those of developed countries; it shows that the Saudi companies are keen to enhance their 
presentation of disclosed information using multiple languages, which makes the website more 
user-friendly. In addition, the presentation of disclosed information in English, which is the 
most commonly used language on the internet, by 94% of the sampled companies indicates the 
awareness of those companies of the globalization of the internet as a channel to attract 
investors.  
One of the most frequently disclosed items is the existence of clear boundaries for annual 
reports. The absence of boundaries on web pages could obstruct the distinguishing financial 
information from other corporate information (Debreceny et al., 2002). The result of this study 
reveals that the majority of SLC (82%) provide boundaries for annual reports, which is higher 
than the results of previous studies. The FASB (2000) finds that 33% of sampled companies 
offer clear boundaries for annual reports, while Marston and Polei (2004) mention that only 
5% of German companies provide this feature. However, 30% of Chinese companies (Xiao et 
al., 2004) and 34% of Egyptian companies (Aly, 2008) do so. These low percentages might be 
reasoned to the time gap between these studies and the current study. Moreover, clear direction 
for annual reports was among the popular disclosed items. It was found that 138 companies 
(81%) have a clear direction for their annual reports on the websites. Alshowaiman (2008) 
reports this percentage as 31%, which reflects the improvement of companies’ performance.  
Furthermore, it can be seen that most SLC (79%) offer hyperlinks to data on a third-party 
website. This finding again shows the noteworthy performance of the sampled companies 
compared with some prior studies. For example, the FASB (2000) states that 18% of US 
sampled companies provide this hyperlink, 21% in Turkey (Erer and Dalgic, 2011), 16.6% in 
Greece (Despina and Demetrios, 2009) and none of the SLC offered such links in 2005 
(Alshowaiman, 2008).    
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Regarding the format type of annual reports, Parker and Carey (2003) mention that, in order to 
enhance transparency, companies need to present reports in multiple formats to make the 
disclosed information more usable and valuable. The PDF format was found to be the most 
common format for the web version of annual reports used by SLC. This format type allows 
users to download or print the disclosed information easily. In the current study sample, 129 
companies (79%) provide an annual report in PDF format, which is in the middle rank 
compared with prior studies. For example, Marston and Polei (2004) report that 98% of 
German companies disclosed their annual reports in PDF format, while 61% in the US (FASB, 
2000), 64% in the UK offer their annual reports as PDF files (Abdelsalam et al., 2006) and 
100% in Slovenia (Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek, 2018). In developing countries, Xiao et al. 
(2004) reveal that 29% of Chinese companies use the PDF format to provide annual reports, as 
do 43% and 27% of Egyptian companies (Arafa, 2012; Ahmed et al., 2017), while only 31% 
of Saudi companies did so in 2006 (Al-Motrafi, 2008). On the other hand, HTML format was 
less commonly used on Saudi companies’ websites, and only 17 SLC (10%) offer their reports 
in HTML format. In terms of developed countries, Allam and Lymer (2003) state that 2% in 
the US, 2% in the UK, 0% in Canada, 2% in Australia and 8% in Hong Kong use HTML, while 
Marston and Polei (2004) find that 57% of German companies offer this format and the FASB’s 
study reports a similar result (59%). The current study’s finding is relatively comparable to that 
of Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek (2018), who state that 9% of Slovenian companies use the 
HTML format and Ahmed et al. (2017), who report the same percentage. Al-Motrafi (2008) 
reports that 15% of Saudi companies use it and Elsayed (2010) finds that 9% use it in Egypt, 
while Xiao et al. (2004) find that HTML is more frequently used by Chinese companies (49%).  
Not surprisingly, other format types were rarely used in SLC websites. Only one company (0.6 
%) provides reports in XLS or similar format that can be processed and none of the sampled 
companies use the XML format. These types of format are in general rarely used in most 
countries. For example, Allam and Lymer (2003) find that only 2% in the US and UK use the 
XLS format and did not found it at all in Canada, Australia or Hong Kong. In addition, Despina 
and Demetrios (2009) report that 5% and 1.3% of Greek companies used the XLS and XML 
formats, respectively. Xiao et al. (2004) find that only 0.5% of the sampled companies offer 
reports in a format that can be processed, Desoky (2009) fInds 2%, and it was 14% in Marston 
and Polei’s study (2004). In light of these results, it can be concluded that SLC and their 
counterpart companies have not yet realized the advantages of using XML, XLS or other 
formats that can be processed and they still provide their reports in the PDF format.  
Regarding the use of technical means inside annual reports. It was found that 17% of SLC 
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provide hyperlinks inside the annual report, one company offers flashes and none of them 
present video or audio files in the annual report. Prior studies report different results in respect 
of presenting information in multimedia format; Marston and Polei (2004) find that 30% of 
their sample have hyperlinks inside the annual report, 9% provide flashes and 50% offer video 
and audio files on their websites, whereas Kelton and Yang (2008) mention that 50% of the 
companies use hyperlinks inside the annual report, 82% present audio files and only 2.5% have 
video files on the website. However, a lower percentage was reported by Dolinšek and Lutar-
Skerbinjek (2018), who report that 8% of Slovenian companies have an interacive annual report 
and Despina and Demetrios (2009), who state that only 4.6% and 8% of Greek companies 
provide audio and video files, respectively. Similarly, the results of FASB (2000) study show 
that 7% of companies’ websites include audio files and 6% include video files. The same 
percentage (7% for video or audio files) was found on Turkish companies’ websites as well 
(Erer and Dalgic, 2011). Moreover, the lowest percentages were reported in developing 
countries; for example, in China 2% of the companies use flashes, 0.5% use audio files and 
none use video files or hyperlinks inside the annual report (Xiao et al., 2004). In Egypt, the 
result was 3.5% for video or audio files (Arafa, 2012) and 2% for hyperlinks inside annual 
reports (Desoky, 2009), and in Saudi Arabia none of the sampled companies use video or audio 
files and only one company uses both of flashes and hyperlinks inside the annual report 
(Alshowaiman, 2008). Although internet reporting offers the advantages of presenting 
information in more dynamic forms using multimedia technology, the results reveal that 
disclosing this type of information is rarely used in annual reports via companies’ websites in 
SLC, and still very low in general.  
Providing slide presentations (PDF/ PPT) was one of the less common presentation items. 
Although internet reporting allows companies to improve their ways of disclosing information 
using visual aids such as slide presentations, only 10 companies (6%) offer such slides to users 
of their websites. This result is considered low compared with previous studies; for example, 
Abdelsalam et al. (2006) find that 75% of sampled companies in the UK offer this type. 
However, this percentage is much lower in Egypt at 11.4% (Aly, 2008) and Saudi Arabia at 
12% (Al-Motrafi, 2008).   
One of the least frequently disclosed items is the display of financial information in alternative 
currencies, whereby only 3% of sampled companies present this feature. Although Jones and 
Xiao (2004) expect that by 2010 companies will be using multiple measurements, languages, 
currencies and GAAPs in their internet reporting, offering such reports are have still been rarely 
provided in previous studies. The current study finding is closely comparable with the study 
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by Abdelsalam et al. (2006), who report that 10% of the sampled companies include reporting 
in alternative currencies on their website, Al-Motrafi (2008), who find that only 1% of Saudi 
public companies present this feature and Ahmed et al. (2017), who report that only 0.6% of 
the Egyptian companies do so. 
Conference calls are considered one of the most important and valuable forms of technology-
aided dissemination tools via company’s website (Frankel et al., 1999). Offering a conference 
call via the internet enables disclosed information to spread widely, increasing accessibility to 
a wider range of investors (FASB, 2000). It was found that only one company of the SLC 
provides conference calls. Providing such a tool is more often used by companies in developed 
countries; Frankel et al. (1999) state that 6.2% of the sampled companies in the US use 
conference calls and Kelton and Yang (2008) find that 82% of their sample offers conference 
calls. However, this practice in developing countries still lags far behind their counterparts; for 
example, Elsayed (2010) find that only one company (0.6%) offers conference calls, which 
increases to 2.9%, 3% and 4.8% according to Ahmed et al. (2017), Aly (2008) and Arafa 
(2012), respectively.  
Based on the above findings, it can be concluded that there is a variety in the percentages of 
disclosing presentation items. The majority of SLC (over 70%) disclosed almost half of the 
presentation items, showing their awareness of the importance of utilizing different 
presentation tools, however, the percentages of the remaining items are relatively low, 
especially those items related to the use of multimedia and high-tech formats. These 
technology-aided features were rarely used; for example, none of the sampled companies 
provide reports in XML or use video or audio files in the annual report, and merely one 
company uses each of these features: reports in XLS format or other processible format, using 
flashes in the annual report, and conference calls. These areas need more attention from SLC 
in order to satisfy the needs of investors and other users of their websites and obtain the most 
advantages of using the internet to disclose information. The previous discussions clearly 
answer the second sub-question 1.2 about the presentation of the disclosed information on the 
SLC websites.  
Investors and other internet users regard the internet as an opportunity to enhance corporate 
disclosure and expect a speed of delivery of information, whereby the most recent information 
should be available on the corporate’s website. The next section discusses the extent of CIR 






Providing timely information is one of the most important benefits of internet disclosure; this 
is handled in the third part of the disclosure checklist, CIR timeliness. CIR timeliness consists 
of 18 items; appendix 10 presents the disclosure of each item of this index. The most commonly 
disclosed item is the date of the last website update; 80% of the SLC clearly provide this date. 
Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) report that only 7% of Irish companies present this item, 
compared to 9% in Germany (Marston and Polei, 2004), 13.6% in Greece (Despina and 
Demetrios, 2009), 4.6% in Turkey (Erer and Dalgic, 2011), 2% in China (Xiao et al., 2004), 
20% in Saudi Arabia (Al-Motrafi, 2008) and in Egypt this percentage increases from 16% 
(Elsayed, 2010) to 55% (Arafa, 2012). The finding of the current study reveals that the 
percentage for SLC is considerably higher than for their counterparts in other countries. 
Moreover, the FASB’s study (2000) mention that some companies evaluate the reporting 
section of their websites by applying certain measures, including offering current press releases 
on the company’s website. It was found that current press releases and news are one of the 
most frequently disclosed items; 75% of sampled companies provide this information. The 
current finding is consistent with previous studies; for example, Marston and Polei (2004) state 
that 74% in 2000 and 100% in 2003 of German companies disclose the most recent press 
releases or news. Xiao et al. (2004) find a similar result (60%), while Elsayed (2010) reports a 
lower percentage (31.7%).  
Furthermore, in order to assist users of websites to easily find the most current information, 
74% of SLC provide hints to find current information directly. Lybaert (2002) reports that 42% 
of Dutch companies offer hints for their website users to direct them to current disclosed 
information. In Egypt, only 14% of the companies provide such information (Elsayed, 2010) 
but this percentage has risen to 24% (Ahmed et al., 2017). In addition, many SLC (66%) allow 
investors and other users of their websites to register for future email or social media alerts to 
make sure that they are receiving the most up-to-date information without delay. This finding 
is comparable to studies on developed countries (61% in Ireland (Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 
2008), 70.8% in the US (Kelton and Yang, 2008), 75% the UK (Abdelsalam et al., 2006) and 
80% in Germany (Marston and Polei; 2004)). In contrast, studies of developing countries show 
lower percentages; for example, 13.9% and 12% of Egyptian companies provide this feature 
(Elsayed, 2010; Ahmed et al., 2017), while 3% of Chinese companies (Xiao et al., 2004) and 
15% of Saudi companies do so (Al-Motrafi, 2008). These results clearly reveal that SLC are 
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responding satisfactorily to the needs of internet users regarding the disclosure of such up-to-
date information. 
The majority of SLC provide current financial highlights and summaries (68%) and current 
key financial ratios (62%), which indicates that SLC recognise the importance of providing 
timely information to investors and other users. Similarly, Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek 
(2018), state that 64% of sampled companies disclose financial summaries and 71% provide 
financial ratios. Elsayed (2010) mentions that 15.6% of Egyptian companies provide both of 
current financial highlights and current key financial ratios. Moreover, providing the most 
recent interim financial report is one of the most common frequently disclosed items by SLC. 
It was found that 55% of the sampled companies disclose the latest interim financial report on 
their websites. In developed countries, Kelton and Yang (2008) report that 60.9% of their 
sample disclosed the most recent interim report, Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek (2018) state 
that 29% of Slovenian companies disclose it and Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) find that 
89% of Irish companies present such a report on their website. However, in developing 
countries, Elsayed (2010) and Ahmed et al. (2017) report similar percentages (19.4% and 
19.8% respectively) for providing this report by Egyptian companies, while 33% of Arafa’s 
sample (2012) do so. Al-Motrafi (2008) mentions that 13% of Saudi companies disseminate 
the latest interim report.  
Both current dividends announcements and providing a link to the share price on Tadawul (or 
other SEs) are equally disclosed by SLC (42%). This finding is close to that of Despina and 
Demetrios (2009), who report that 53% of Greek companies disclose current dividends 
announcements. However, 25% of Turkish companies (Erer and Dalgic, 2011) and 5.6% of 
Egyptian companies (Elsayed, 2010) provide such information. Moreover, Arafa (2012) 
mentions that only 7.8% of the sampled companies in Egypt provide a link to the share price 
on the stock exchange.  
The current study reveals some indication for disclosing other CIR timeliness items such as 
disclosing the latest share price (27%), disclosing the specific update time for the share price 
data (23%), providing a link to the online regulatory news service (20%) and offering a 
calendar of future financial events (19%).  
At the other end of spectrum, the current study’s findings reveal a few areas where timeliness 
is far from the required level. It was found that the most rarely disclosed items are providing 
webcasts, providing a link to a calendar on Tadawul (or other SEs) and informing user when 
to expect a response for email or online requests.  
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With regard to providing webcasts, none of the SLC provide webcasts on their websites. Allam 
and Lymer (2003) report that, on average, 60% of sampled companies provide webcasts (84% 
in the US, 68% in the UK, 84% in Canada, 62% in Australia and 4% in Hong Kong) and 42% 
of Irish listed companies offer webcasting (Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008). In the developing 
countries, studies report much lower results. For example, Elsayed (2010) finds only one 
company (0.6%) that provides webcasts, while 3% and 2% of Egyptian companies (Arafa, 
2012; Ahmed et al., 2017) and 1% of Saudi companies (Al-Motrafi, 2008) offer webcasts on 
their websites.  
Moreover, only 6% of SLC provide a link to a calendar on Tadawul (or other SE) and the same 
percentage of companies inform the users when to expect a response to their email or online 
request. Although these results are very low (6%), they are still comparable to other previous 
studies. Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) report that only 9% of their sample told the users 
when to expect a response to their email or online request and Abdelsalam et al. (2006) find 
that 3% of UK companies provide such information, while none of the sampled companies 
investigated by either Arafa (2012) or Al-Motrafi (2008) told the user when to expect a 
response to an email or online request and only 1.7% of the sample provide a link to a calendar 
on other stock exchanges (Arafa, 2012). 
In the light of the above discussions, it can be concluded that SLC should concentrate more on 
providing a satisfactory timeliness level. Nevertheless, a comparison of the current results with 
the results of studies in developed countries shows that Saudi companies are close to their 
counterparts in many areas of CIR timeliness. 
Although a considerable number of companies are not yet aware of the needs of investors and 
other users to acquire the most recent information about the company, SLC timeliness level 
has increased since the previous Saudi studies (see Al-Motrafi, 2008; Alshowaiman, 2008). 
Among the 18 items deemed to measure CIR timeliness, 8 items scored 55% or above and only 
one item, namely webcasting, was not disclosed at all by any company. In general, the variation 
between companies regarding timeliness leaves room for the implementation of more 
improvements to enhance the timeliness level, taking into account the fact that timeliness is 
considered one of the most important elements of the quality of disclosure (AIMR, 2000). 
These findings answer the third sub-question 1.3 about presenting the disclosed information on 
the SLC websites at a time when stakeholders need it.  
Considering that one of the main features of any sound and well-founded website is how easy 
it is to search, navigate, obtain and locate information on the site (Abdelsalam et al., 2006), 
companies should provide means that ease the use of their websites. The next section discusses 
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the usability of SLC websites.  
5.4.4 Usability 
 
The forth section of the CIR disclosure index measures CIR usability, including 54 items. The 
percentages of companies that include each item of this index are presented in appendix 11. 
Most SLC (93%) disclose on average between 40% and 80% of the usability items and no 
company scored under 20% in total (see Table 5-6). These results reflect that, in general, SLC 
are acknowledging the importance of site usability and are designing their websites in a way 
that makes obtaining, understanding and using information easier for all website users. 
Interestingly, four items were utilised by all the SLC, namely using a common natural language 
of the company name in the URL address, the page being not wider than the screen (no 
horizontal scrolling required), the text stands still (no moving, blinking or zooming required) 
and there is a consistent use of arrows. In addition, another 4 items were utilised by 99% of 
SLC, which are user feedback or contact us, the name or logo of company is easy to spot on 
the website, the site uses standard font sizes as well as a high contrast between foreground and 
background colours.  
One of the popular usability items is using a common natural language for the company name 
in the URL address. Using a simple website address makes access easier, and this occurs when 
the URL address is short enough for users to remember or is a logical extension of the 
company's name or brand (Al-Motrafi, 2008). All the SLC in this study use a common company 
name in their URL addresses. Abdelsalam et al. (2006) mention that 81% of the sampled 
companies use a common URL address and Al-Motrafi (2008) reports a similar percentage 
(80%) for Saudi public companies.  
Moreover, all SLC have web pages not wider than the screen, a stand still text that does not 
move, blink or zoom and a consistent use of arrows, which reflects that SLC are clearly taking 
the importance of those features of usability into consideration. The results of previous studies 
are slightly lower than the current study; for example, Abdelsalam et al. (2006) find that 99% 
of the UK companies provide a page not wider than screen and 84% of Saudi public companies 
do so (Al-Motrafi, 2008). Consistent with this study, all Abdelsalam et al.’s sample (2006) use 
a static text, while only 84% of companies use a stand still text according to Al-Motrafi (2008). 
With regard to a consistent use of arrows, such as having some arrows control scrolling while 
others expand and collapse lists, Arafa (2012) reports that 77% of the sample has this feature, 
as do 83% (Al-Motrafi, 2008) and 98% (Abdelsalam et al., 2006).  
One of the most common features of usability utilized by SLC is a ‘contact us’ facility or user 
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feedback. The importance of a feedback facility arises from the fact that it enables more 
communication and personal contact with website users, which could help in service/product 
improvement (Al-Motrafi, 2008). 99% of SLC provide this feature to the users of their website. 
This finding is in line with Abdelsalam et al. (2006), who state that 95% of UK companies 
provide a feedback facility online, and Arafa (2012), who reports that 97% of the sample offer 
this feature. Similarly, the survey conducted by Desoky (2009) finds that 89% of Egyptian 
companies offer this and Al-Motrafi (2008) finds that 82% of Saudi companies do so, while 
only 37% of companies in Elsayed’s sample (2010) make the feedback channel available 
online.  
Additionally, it can be seen that most SLC (99%) are keen to ease the use of website by using 
standard font sizes, utilising a high contrast between foreground and background colours to aid 
colour-blind users, and making the name or logo of the company easy to spot on the website. 
Similar results have been found in previous studies; for example, Abdelsalam et al. (2006) 
mention that 99% of the total sample include these tools on their website and Al-Motrafi (2008) 
reports that 83%, 82%, 84% of Saudi public companies use standard font sizes, utilise high 
contrast between foreground and background colours, and ease in spotting the company name 
or logo on the website, respectively.  
In order to help users navigate the websites easily, the majority of SLC provide a table of 
contents (95%) and place the navigation area in a suitable position (on right/top side of screen 
for Arabic website 95%, and on left/top side of screen for English website 92%). These results 
are comparable to other studies in developed countries; for example, FASB (2000) reports that 
88% of US sampled companies offer a table of contents. This percentage increases to 100% in 
Hindi and Rich’s study (2010). Marston and Polei (2004) find that 77% of German companies 
provide table of contents. In developing countries, the percentage vary from 79% in Egypt 
(Elsayed, 2010) to 31% in China (Xiao et al., 2004) and only 17.5% in Saudi (Alshowaiman, 
2008). Regarding navigation areas, Abdelsalam et al. (2006) mention that 94% of their sample 
position the navigation area on left/top side of screen for more comfort use and Al-Motrafi 
(2008) finds these percentages to be 64% and 77% for Arabic and English websites, 
respectively.   
One of the most frequent usability items disclosed by SLC is providing one click/link to a press 
release from the home page. 157 companies (92%) offer this link via the internet to their 
stakeholders, which is comparable to the finding by Abdelsalam et al. (2006), who find that 
98% of their sample do so. However, lower percentages were found in other studies; for 
example, Marston and Polei (2004) find that 89% of sampled companies provide one click/link 
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to press releases from the home page, while Xiao et al. (2004) report that 63% of Chinese 
companies offer this feature, Aly (2008) mentions that only 32% of sampled companies provide 
this tool, as do 36.5% in Arafa’s study (2012), 41% reported by Ahmed et al. (2017)  and 57% 
reported by Al-Motrafi (2008).   
Examining appendix 11 again indicates that the other popular usability items are having a 
language menu or changing the language option on the home page (90%), one click to reach 
investor relations or financial information (89%), ability to download information (89%), 
avoiding making the user scroll to get important navigation or submit buttons (88%), visibility 
of directors’ and executives’ details (88%) having the website working effectively in all 
languages (82%) and information that enables Muslims to determine the amount of Zakat 
(79.4%). All these tools facilitate the acquiring of the required information and help 
stakeholders to use the company’s website easily. Many previous studies check for the 
utilization of such tools (e.g. Al-Modahki, 1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; FASB, 2000; Allam and 
Lymer, 2003; Lodhia et al., 2004; Marston and Polei, 2004; Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; 
Xiao et al., 2004; Abdelsalam et al., 2006; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Aly, 2008; Desoky, 2009; 
Elsayed, 2010; Hindi and Rich, 2010; Othman and Thani, 2010; Aribi and Gao, 2011; Alkhtani, 
2012; Arafa, 2012; Ahmed et al., 2017; Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek, 2018). In the light of 
these findings, it can be clearly seen that SLC have perceived the importance of utilising 
usability tools in their websites and are keen to provide more features to make their websites 
more user-friendly.  
On the other hand, there are some items of usability that were rarely disclosed by SLC. The 
lowest provided item is a link to the main table of contents from each page of the annual report; 
the current study reveals that none of the sampled companies offer this link. This result is 
similar to that of Arafa (2012), who finds that only one Egyptian company (0.87%) provides a 
link from each page to the main table of contents, while Al-Motrafi (2008) reports a higher 
percentage (9%). A different result was reported by Abdelsalam et al. (2006), who find that 
37% of UK sampled companies provide such a link in their annual reports.  
Among the lowest offered usability items on the websites of the SLC are having the option to 
download a PDF document in smaller sections, displaying a presentation's length and current 
progress to complete a webcast, and providing a gateway page that gives a description of the 
content and size of a PDF file. Only one company (0.6%) offers the option to download a PDF 
document in smaller sections; this result represents a low percentage compared with previous 
studies (Al-Motrafi, 2008, 12%; Abdelsalam et al., 2006, 15%). With respect to providing a 
screen to display a presentation's length and current progress to complete a webcast, again only 
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two companies (1.2%) do so. This result is close to that of Al-Motrafi (2008), who mentions 
that none of the Saudi public companies provide this feature; whereas Abdelsalam et al. (2006) 
report a totally different result (41%) for UK sampled companies. Of the total sample, four 
companies (2.4%) provide a gateway page that describes the content and file size of a PDF 
document. Unlike the current study’s finding, 8% of Al-Motrafi’s sample (2008) and 28% of 
Abdelsalam et al.’s sample (2006) offer this information.  
In addition, another failure to address the importance of usability tools is not displaying audio 
clips or recorded speeches from shareholder meetings on the website. Only 1.8% of SLC 
present such audio clips or recorded speeches to their websites’ users. Heterogeneous results 
were found in previous studies, while the percentages for developed countries are considerably 
higher than those for the current study; for example, 36% in the UK (Abdelsalam et al., 2006) 
and 77% in Germany (Marston and Polei, 2004), while developing countries show significantly 
lower percentages, for example, only 3.5% of Egyptian companies (Arafa, 2012) and none of 
Saudi public companies (Al-Motrafi, 2008) offer this tool.  
Furthermore, a few SLC (2.9%) change links colours to distinguish between visited and 
unvisited areas. This finding is comparable to that by Abdelsalam et al. (2006), who state that 
only 2% of the sample links change colours to show visited and unvisited links. Similarly, 
Arafa (2012) reports a similar percentage (3.48%), whereas Al-Motrafi’s result (2008) is 
relatively higher (8%). In addition, only 2.9% of the sampled companies make analysts’ details 
visible on their websites. Considerable variation was found in the prior studies regarding the 
visibility of analysts’ details; while in developing countries the percentage ranged from 0% in 
Saudi Arabia (Al-Motrafi, 2008) to 8.7% in Egypt (Arafa, 2012). In developed countries, the 
percentage was 16.9% in Greece (Despina and Demetrios, 2009) 45% in the UK (Abdelsalam 
et al., 2006), 63% in the US (Kelton and Yang, 2008) and 100% in the US two years later 
(Hindi and Rich, 2010).     
Providing a spell checker inserted into the search engine is very important for users who have 
spelling difficulties or are foreign language users. This study indicates that 7% of SLC provide 
a spell checker in the search engine. Although the percentage of offering a spell checker by the 
SLC is quite low, previous studies reveal lower percentages than the current study. Abdelsalam 
et al. (2006) find that only 5% of UK sampled companies include this tool on their websites, 
while 1% of Saudi public companies (Al-Motrafi, 2008) and none of the Egyptian companies 
offer this feature (Arafa, 2012). 
One of the lowest common usability items provided by SLC is offering a help site for users in 
order to facilitate the usage of websites. Only 14 companies (8%) of SLC offer this tool on 
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their websites. A comparison of the finding of the current study with previous studies reveals 
that providing a help site is relatively low. For example, Marston and Polei (2004) find that 
20% of their sample offer help sites on the website. Similarly, Xiao et al. (2004) report the 
same percentage (20%) for Chinese companies, while Despina and Demetrios (2009) report a 
lower percentage (2.7%) and so do Elsayed (2010), who finds that only 3.9% of Egyptian 
companies provide such a tool. Moreover, a close percentage (7.6%) was found regarding 
utilizing other disability aids, such as a zooming font. Arafa (2012) reveals a low percentage 
compared with the current study, that is, 4.35% of Egyptian companies provide this feature to 
their stakeholders.  
Based on the above findings, it can be indicated that there is a considerable variation regarding 
the percentages of disclosing usability items between the SLC. However, the current study 
results show that SLC performance has improved over time and that, in general, it is 
comparable to their counterparts in developed countries for most usability items. Not only that 
the majority of the SLC (72%) score above 50% in total usability items, and no company 
disclosed less than 24% in total, but also some usability tools items are utilized by all SLC via 
their websites. These findings reflect the growing interest of SLC in satisfying the needs of 
their stakeholders to use the website easily and to introduce more dynamic and interactive 
websites for them. Illustrating the CIR usability features which are provided on SLC websites 
clearly answer the fourth sub-question 1-4 concerning how easy it is to obtain the required 
information from the company’s website.  
The recent increase in both number of companies and types of information disseminated via 
the internet necessitates an improvement in the quality of internet reporting information 
provided to users. Xiao et al. (2000) state that auditing features have been considered an 
important means of quality assurance. Hence, including audit items in the internet disclosure 
improves the website credibility and provides more certainty to the disclosed information as 
well as protects the interests of website users. The next section discusses the extent of CIR 
audit disclosed by SLC. 
5.4.5 Audit 
 
Twenty-eight items were included in the checklist to measure the CIR audit of SLC. These 
audit items were included in the disclosure index since the reliability and credibility of 
information disclosed on the internet represent a substantial concern to online users (Xiao et 
al., 2002). The results of these items’ disclosure are presented in appendix 12. 
The most frequently reported item on SLC websites is the name of the external auditors, being 
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disclosed by 81% of the sampled companies. Previous studies are clearly low compared with 
the current study result; for example, Aly (2008) finds that 30.6% of the sampled companies 
publish the auditor’s name on their website, and 28.4% of Alshowaiman’s sample (2008) do 
so. Although Al-Mulhem (1997) reports that 98% of Saudi companies disclose the external 
auditor’s name, the reasons for this high percentage might be that the sample consists of only 
40 companies and it is conducted for paper-based disclosure. 
Highlighting which GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Standards) and which GAAS 
(Generally Accepted Auditing Standards) are used in the audit report are the most often 
disclosed audit items. 132 SLC (77.6%) point out which GAAP is used via their websites. 
Similarly, 131 companies (77%) highlight the GAAS that the auditor uses in the report. In 
developed countries, Abdelsalam et al. (2006) find that 100% of UK sampled companies 
disclose the GAAP basis in the audit report, whereas none of the sampled companies in Fisher 
et al.’s study (2004) point out this feature. In developing countries, lower percentages were 
reported by Aly (2008) 37%, Al-Motrafi (2008) 35%, and Arafa (2012), who mentions that 
36% of Egyptian companies reveal the GAAP basis and 35% report the GAAS basis in the 
audit report, while Xiao et al. (2004) report that 69% of Chinese companies do so. These 
findings clarify that the quality of Saudi websites has improved over time regarding these 
features.  
Moreover, the majority of SLC (77%) make the audit report’s background or use borders 
consistent with those used in the audited financial statements. Considerable variation was 
found in the previous studies in developed countries; while Abdelsalam et al. (2006) and Fisher 
et al. (2004) report high percentages (98% and 91%, respectively), Marston and Polei (2004) 
find that only 5% of German companies use consistent borders. Yet, in developing countries, 
relatively low percentages (35%, 34%) of companies using this feature were found in Egypt 
(Arafa, 2012) and in Saudi Arabia (Al-Motrafi, 2008), respectively.   
It can be indicated that both displaying audited financial statements accompanied by an audit 
report and the date of the auditor report are equally disclosed by SLC (76%). Abdelsalam et al. 
(2006) find that 100% of UK sampled companies provide an audit report along with audited 
financial statements. Al-Motrafi (2008) and Arafa (2012) report the same percentage, 35%, 
regarding posting audited financial statements and audit report together. However, only 25.7% 
of SLC in Alshowaiman’s study (2008) display both audited financial statements along with 
the audit report and the date of auditor report. The results of the current study show the 
remarkable improvement of Saudi companies’ websites compared with prior studies in the 
Saudi context.  
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One of the most frequently disclosed audit items is providing charters of the audit committee. 
75% of SLC display audit committee charters on their websites. Similarly, Kelton and Yang 
(2008) mention that 76% of their sample publishes the charter of the audit committee via the 
internet. Abdelsalam et al. (2006) find that a slightly lower percentage of their surveyed 
companies disclose this information (54%); this percentage is close to that of Al-Motrafi 
(2008), who states that 51% of Saudi public companies provide the charter of the audit 
committee. Other studies reveal even lower percentages than the current study; for example, 
only 7.8% of the sample of Arafa (2012) and 6.7% of Elsayed’s study (2010) report charters 
of the audit committee in the website.  
Furthermore, the majority of SLC (75%) have the auditor’s report available online all the time. 
Of the total sample, 74% provide a complete audit report. Several studies examine the presence 
of the auditor’s report on the website. Fisher et al. (2004), for example, reveal that 98% of the 
sampled companies provide the auditor report online and an almost similar result (93%) was 
reported by Hindi and Rich (2010). However, lower percentages were found in many previous 
studies regarding the availability and completion of the audit report (FASB, 2000, 65%; Xiao 
et al., 2004, 40.9%; Alshowaiman, 2008, 25.7%; Aly, 2008, 25.8%; Elsayed, 2010, 17.8%; 
Erer and Dalgic, 2011, 83.8%). A comparison of these findings with the current study’s 
findings makes it clear that SLC performance has increasingly improved in this respect.  
The audit firm logo is an important means for website’s users that aid them to distinguish 
between the audit report and other parts of the financial statements. This feature is offered by 
75% of SLC. Fisher et al. (2004) report a relatively similar result (62%), while previous studies 
indicate lower results of placing the audit firm logo in the audit report. For example, 
Abdelsalam et al. (2006) find that only 6% of their sample include the audit firm logo in the 
audit report, while 25.2% in Arafa’s study (2012), 29% of Al-Motrafi’s sample (2008) and 
none of Alshowaiman’s sampled companies (2008) provide this logo. It also seems clear that 
the percentage of Saudi companies that include the audit firm logo in the audit report is growing 
incrementally. 
Amongst the highest disclosed items on the websites of the SLC are distinguishing audited 
financial statements from non-audited statements (74%), names and/or qualifications of the 
audit committee members (72%), avoiding hyperlink(s) from/to the audited financial 
statements to external unaudited websites or sections of the company website (71%), auditor 
report for the current year (69%), auditor report for the past year (69%), auditor scanned 
signature/seal of current year report (67%), auditor scanned signature/seal of last year’s report 
(67%), and the interim reports accompanied by auditor limited report (61%). Many prior 
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studies include these items in their disclosure checklist (e.g. FASB, 2000; Fisher et al., 2004; 
Xiao et al., 2004; Abdelsalam et al., 2006; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Alshowaiman, 2008; Aly, 2008; 
Desoky, 2009; Hindi and Rich, 2010; Erer and Dalgic, 2011; Arafa, 2012; Ahmed et al., 2017; 
Dolinšek and Lutar-Skerbinjek, 2018).  
On the other hand, none of the SLC disclose the following items: external auditor details, links 
from the auditor’s report to the company’s home, links from the auditor’s report to the 
company’s financial statements, links from the auditor’s report to the company’s other web 
pages, indication if the company’s website is audited by one of the Big4 audit firms, and HTML 
audited financial statements pages being clearly labelled as “Audited”. 
Regarding external auditor details, it seems that SLC settle for providing the name of the 
external auditor, as mentioned above, without publishing any further details. Similarly, 
Alshowaiman (2008) reports that none of the sampled companies provide details on the website 
about the external auditor. Likewise, as indicated in previous studies, links from the auditor’s 
report to other parts in the website are rarely offered. For instance, Fisher et al. (2004) find that 
90% of listed companies’ websites in New Zealand do not provide links from or to the auditor’s 
report, Abdelsalam et al. (2006) state that only 2% of UK sampled companies offer this feature, 
and Al-Motrafi (2008) reports that 1% of Saudi public companies do so. However, none of the 
sample companies offer such links according to Alshowaiman (2008) and Arafa (2012). With 
respect to an indication on the company’s website whether it is audited by one of the Big4 audit 
firms, Alshowaiman’s study (2008) shows better performance than the current study, whereby 
47% of the sample disclose this information. Similar to the current study, Arafa (2012) reports 
that none of the listed Egyptian companies clearly labelled each page of the audited financial 
statements (in HTML) as “Audited”. 
Both warning users when leaving audited pages and displaying a note on language translation 
and audit are equally disclosed by SLC (1%). Previous studies reveal comparable results to the 
current study with respect to the display of warning messages to users when leaving audited 
pages; for example, none of the sampled companies in the studies by Fisher et al. (2004), 
Abdelsalam et al. (2006), Alshowaiman (2008) and Arafa (2012) display this feature and only 
1% in Al-Motrafi’s study (2008) do so. Furthermore, Xiao et al. (2004) report that only 0.5% 
of the sample offer a note on language translation and auditing, which is close to this study’s 
result, whereas Aly (2008) finds a slightly higher percentage (6.5%).  
Only 4 companies provide a direct link to the auditor’s report from the company’s home page 
or other webpages (2%). Fisher et al. (2004) find that 11 companies (9%) offer the link, while 
none of the sampled companies in Alshowaiman’s study (2008) provide a direct link from any 
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webpage of the company to the auditor’s report. In addition, links to the external auditor’s 
website was provided by 8% of SLC whereas previous studies show a total absence of this 
feature in all of the sampled websites (e.g. Abdelsalam et al., 2006; Al-Motrafi, 2008; 
Alshowaiman, 2008; Arafa, 2012).  
Based on the above findings, it can be concluded that there is a remarkable variation in 
disclosing audit items among SLC. However, 18 out of the 28 audit items were disclosed by 
more than 60% of the companies, which reveals that SLC performance in this respect is quite 
satisfactory and, in general, close to their counterparts in other countries. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the other remaining 10 audit items score less than10%, though are still 
comparable to previous studies, as these in general show similar score levels. Surprisingly, all 
the companies’ scores for audit items are either higher than 60% or lower than 10%, leaving a 
huge gap in-between. More investigation in this area is required to find the reason for such 
results. Determining the extent of CIR audit clearly answers the fifth sub-question 1-5.  
5.5 Summary  
 
This chapter presents a summary of the descriptive statistics of the CIR index and its 
component sub-indices. By doing so, the first objective of this study, which is to understand 
the actual CIR practices in Saudi listed companies, will be achieved. The first section of this 
chapter deals with the reliability and validity tests, which are carried out to confirm the 
goodness of the CIR index and its component sub-indices. The findings ensure that the research 
instrument is reliable and valid for the measurement of and its components. The second section 
examines the extent of CIR total in Saudi listed companies and reveals that all the sampled 
companies have a website. It shows an increased interest in using CIR over the last decade 
which is reflected in the moderate extent of CIR total in SLC compared with other countries. 
Section three attempts to add a more in-depth understanding of CIR practice by exploring the 
extent of each CIR component. The results show that, on average, the mean disclosure level of 
CIR components is moderate and close to each other, whereby content has the highest level 
(55%) and timeliness has the lowest (43%). However, a considerable variation was found in 
the extent of each CIR element among companies, which requires examining each element 
separately. Despite the variation among SLC, the findings reveal that the extent of CIR 
components, in general, has improved over time and is comparable to the counterparts in 
developed countries. This chapter provides an answer to the first research question and its sub 
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questions by assessing the actual practice of CIR total and its five components. The next 



























EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: CORPORATE 
INTERNET REPORTING: TOTAL   
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter five presents the descriptive statistical analysis of corporate internet reporting and its 
components. This chapter demonstrates the statistical tests used to investigate the relationship 
between CIR total and the explanatory variables. The chapter particularly aims to answer the 
second question of this study: what are the significant factors that motivate CIR decision-
making by Saudi listed companies, that is, to assess the extent of the relationship, if any, 
between CIR total and the explanatory variables. Multi-analyses are performed to achieve this 
purpose.  
This chapter is organised as follows: section 6.2 represents the univariate descriptive statistics 
of the continuous and dummy independent variables, as univariate analysis is concerned with 
describing each variable individually. This is followed by section 6.3, which explores the 
relationship between CIR total and each explanatory variable using the bivariate analysis that 
examines the association between two variables separately. To explain this relationship, both 
parametric and non-parametric tests are used. Section 6.4 deals with multivariate analysis, 
which examines the relationship between CIR total and the entire explanatory variables at the 
same time. This analysis is conducted to explore the relationship between one variable and two 
or more variables simultaneously. Three regression models are applied: un-transformation 
model, log transformation model and the bootstrap model as robustness for the obtained results. 
Section 6.5 reports the results of all multivariate regression analyses models. A detailed 
discussion is provided in section 6.6, and finally section 6.7 presents a summary of the chapter.   
6.2 Univariate descriptive statistics 
 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the independent variables are of two types: continuous variables 
and dummy variables. The following table summarises the descriptive statistics of the 







Table 8:6-1: Descriptive Statistics of the Continuous Variables 
Variables 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Firm size 4.894 8.577 6.37428 .809613 .873 .316 
Firm growth -.718 5.570 .22442 .811386 5.293 30.000 
Leverage .005 1.527 .47429 .273037 .296 -.109 
Liquidity .15 105.56 3.1966 10.07379 8.935 82.979 
Board size 4 12 8.43 1.503 -.286 -.155 
Board independence 25 % 100 % 49.6571% 16.93494% .957 .182 
Board frequency of meeting 1 16 5.40 2.184 1.628 4.844 
Block holder ownership 0 % 98.75% 37.463% 26.09472% .241 -.848 
Director ownership 0 % 95.442% 12.7166% 18.098944% 1.895 3.567 
Institutional ownership 0 % 100 % 23.2801% 25.28789% .715 -.757 
Government ownership 0 % 81.24% 7.4769% 16.8687% 2.771 7.315 
Audit committee size 3 5 3.36 .641 1.544 1.116 
Audit committee frequency of meeting 1 15 5.63 2.266 1.338 3.154 
Audit committee independence 25 % 100% 77.2157% 21.51004% -.386 -.814 
 
 
 As shown above in Table 6-1, the firm size mean is 6.37428 with a small variation range 
(4.894-8.577). Moreover, firm growth is 22.4 %, which represents a rational percentage in 
general. Additionally, Saudi listed companies show a fairly ideal leverage ratio (0.47) with a 
maximum of 1.527. The liquidity level appears to be acceptable (3.196), indicating healthy 
liquidity among Saudi listed companies. Furthermore, the mean board size is 8 members, with 
a minimum of 4 members and a maximum of 12 members, taking into consideration that article 
12 of the Saudi Corporate Governance code, which states that the number on the board of 
directors should be not less than 3 and not more than 11, is not yet mandatory. Regarding board 
independence, Saudi listed companies range from a completely independent board (100%) to	
25% independent members. The average frequency of board meeting is 5.4, whereby the 
overall frequency of meeting falls between 1 and 16. In addition, the ownership structure of 
Saudi listed companies is concentrated to some extent (approximately 37.5 %), whereby 
institutional ownership represents the highest structure (23.28 %) and government ownership 
is the lowest (7.48%). The compulsory article number 14 of the Saudi Corporate Governance 
code states that the members of the audit committee should be not less than 3 members, thus 
the minimum size of the audit committee is 3, while the maximum is 5 members. The audit 
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committee frequency of meeting is 5.68, which is close to the frequency of board meetings 
(5.4). Finally, similar to board independence, the independence of the audit committee ranges 
from 100% to 25% with an average of nearly 77%. Moreover, it can be seen in Table 6-1 that 
some of the continuous variables are highly skewed, which indicates that these variables are 
not normally distributed. The following table summarises the descriptive statistics of the 
dummy variables. 
                                                                
Table 9:6-2: Descriptive Statistics of the Dummy Variables 
Variables  Frequency Percent 
Dividends 0 85 50.0 
1pay 85 50.0 
Industry type 0 107 62.9 
1 financial 63 37.1 
Audit type 0 36 21.2 
1 big-4 134 78.8 
Role duality 0 160 94.1 
1 CEO is chairman 10 5.9 
 
    Regarding paying dividends, the result in the above table (6-2) reveals that half of the Saudi 
listed companies pay dividends during the financial year to their shareholders. Table 6-2 also 
indicates that more than two-thirds of Saudi listed companies are non-financial companies. 
Furthermore, high proportions of Saudi listed companies (78.8%) had a Big4 auditor. With 
respect to role duality, most of the Saudi listed companies (94%) separate the role of CEO from 
that of chairman, leaving a small proportion of companies (5.9%) where the CEO is the 
chairmen as well.  
The next section examines the extent of the relationship between CIR total and each 
independent variable individually. 
6.3 Bivariate analysis 
 
To assess the relationship between the dependent variable CIR total and each independent 
variable, parametric and non-parametric tests are conducted. Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
is used as a parametric test while Spearman's correlation coefficient is used as a non-parametric 
test for continuous independent variables, whereas the T-test as a parametric test and Mann-
Whitney as a non-parametric test are used for the dummy independent variables. table 6-3 
shows the test results regarding these individual relationships between the dependent variable 
                                                
 
8 The new amendment of the SCGC in 2/2017 stipulates that the audit committee should hold at least four 
meetings during the financial year. 
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CIR total and the continuous independent variables, while table 6-4 shows this for the dummy 
independent variables. 
 
Table 106-3: Bivariate analysis between corporate internet reporting and continuous variables 
Variables Pearson Correlation Spearman's rho 
Firm size  .583*** .667*** 
Firm growth -.051 -.002 
Leverage .168** .192** 
Liquidity -.236*** -.050 
Board size .386*** .331*** 
Board independence -.193** -.225*** 
Board frequency of meeting -.060 -.082 
Block holder ownership .167** .198*** 
Director ownership .011 -.033 
Institutional ownership .019 .008 
Government ownership .204*** .416*** 
Audit com. size .284*** .334*** 
Audit frequency of meeting -.055 -.039 
Audit committee independence -.321*** -.318*** 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
It can be seen from tables 6-3 and 6-4 that the parametric test shows that most of the firm 
characteristics variables are significantly correlated at the 1% level. While firm size is the only 
variable that has a fairly high significantly positive correlation, the other firm characteristics 
(leverage, liquidity, dividends and audit type) have a medium to small significant correlation 
at the 1% and 5% levels. According to Cohen (1988) and Field (2013), Pearson correlation 
coefficient values of ± .1 represent a small effect,	± .3 is a medium effect and ± .5 is a large 
effect.     
As most of previous studies have shown (e.g. Alshowaiman, 2008; Allam, 2006; Xiao et al., 
2004; Oyelere et al., 2003; Marston, 2003; Debreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge et al., 2001), large 
companies tend to disclose more information in total; likewise, companies with less liquidity 
and those that pay dividends are more likely to increase their level of CIR total. Furthermore, 
companies audited by the Big4 are correlated significantly at 1% level, which implies a greater 
level of disclosure for those companies than companies audited by local firms. The non-
parametric coefficient test shows similar results regarding firm characteristics variables in 
terms of the significant of correlation, with the exception of liquidity, which is not significant 
for the Spearman coefficient.  
With respect to corporate governance variables, only two of the board of directors’ variables 
have a significant correlation with CIR total. Companies with a large board of directors are 
correlated positively and significantly with CIR total at the 1% level, and highly independent 
board companies have a significant and negative correlation at the 5% level. Although the non-
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parametric coefficients are slightly different from the parametric coefficients, the significance 
and direction of the correlation are still the same for all board of directors’ variables. Block 
holder ownership is positively correlated with CIR total at the 5% significant level, however, 
the Spearman coefficient shows a barely higher level of correlation at the 1% level of 
significance. Among the other types of ownership structures, that is, director and institutional 
ownership, only government ownership is correlated positively and significantly at the 1% 
level for both the Pearson and Spearman coefficients. This indicates that companies with higher 
government ownership tend to use the internet more to disseminate information on their 
websites. 
Regarding audit committee variables, both audit committee size and independence are 
significantly correlated with CIR total at the 1% level. It can be stated that large audit 
committee companies are more interested in disclosing further information on their websites, 
while companies with less audit committee independency disclose more information via the 
internet. Spearman coefficients reveal the same results for audit committee size and 
independence at the same level of significance, yet with different values. It is interesting to 
find that the results of correlation coefficients of both the Pearson and Spearman tests are nearly 
the same for most variables, thus giving more confidence and strength to the obtained results.  
Although applying univariate and bivariate analyses to describe each independent variable and 
assess the relationship between CIR and each of its explanatory variables is a very informative 
analysis, using multivariate analysis is also important to examine these relationships 
simultaneously. Multivariate analysis considers the relationship between all of the explanatory 
variables and CIR total at the same time. Thus, multivariate analysis is discussed in the 
following section.  
Table 11:6-4: T- and Mann Whitney tests for dummy variables 
Variables Mann Whitney test T-Test 
 Mean Rank  Z value Mean  T. value 
Role Duality  .689  .559 
0 84.85  .51406  
1  95.90  .54200  
Audit type   3.771***  3.276*** 
0 58.06  .43556  
1 92.87  .53724  
Dividends  4.324***   4.017*** 
0 69.19  .46871  
1 101.81  .56271  
Industry type  .044  .190 
0 85.37  .51393  





6.4 Multivariate analysis 
 
Multivariate analysis consists of a number of techniques that can be used to explain the relation 
between several variables at the same time. This analysis allows the inclusion of multiple 
variables and examines the contribution of each variable, taking into account the 
interrelationship between the independent variables (Rencher, 2002).  
Multiple regression analysis is a multivariate analysis technique that is commonly used in 
statistics studies in general and accounting disclosure studies in particular (Cooke, 1998). 
Using this analysis is useful to assess the linear combination between several independent 
variables (either continuous or dummy) that significantly explain the changes in the dependent 
variables (Field, 2013). Hence, as mentioned in chapter 4, the multiple regression analysis is 
conducted in this study using the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS) to determine the 
association between the level of CIR total and the explanatory variables. To apply the OLS 
method, many assumptions have to be considered. The next section demonstrates these 
assumptions in detail. 
6.4.1 OLS assumptions 
 
For the OLS regression model to generalize, several fundamental assumptions must be 
satisfied. OLS assumptions include linearity, multicollinearity, normality and 
homoscedasticity. Considering such assumptions helps in developing the best predictable 
models that examine relationships between independent variables and dependent variables. 
However, failure to comply with these assumptions may result in misleading or inaccurate 
consequences.  
6.4.1.1 Linearity 
To check the linearity of the variables, Osborne and Waters (2002) suggest that the preferable 
method of assessing non-linearity is by examining residual plots. Detecting a funnel pattern 
means that linearity is violated. However, figure 6-1 indicates that linearity is not violated in 
this model. Furthermore, non-linearity can be detected by plotting each independent variable 
against the dependent variable and drawing the regression line that illustrates the relationship 
between the two variables. The patterns of independent variables in the plots show that the 
assumption of linearity has been met (see appendix 13).  









 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .28894 .77377 .52259 .102557 162 
Std. Predicted Value -2.278 2.449 .000 1.000 162 
Standard Error of Predicted Value .025 .075 .041 .011 162 
Adjusted Predicted Value .28849 .78429 .52356 .106656 162 
Residual -.338299 .249461 .000000 .117382 162 
Std. Residual -2.716 2.003 .000 .942 162 
Stud. Residual -3.222 2.130 -.004 1.013 162 
Deleted Residual -.475983 .282094 -.000970 .136514 162 
Stud. Deleted Residual -3.334 2.157 -.006 1.021 162 
Mahal. Distance 5.564 56.704 17.889 10.639 162 
Cook's Distance .000 .222 .009 .024 162 
Centered Leverage Value .035 .352 .111 .066 162 
a. Dependent Variable: C total  
 
6.4.1.2 Multicollinearity  
 
Multicollinearity occurs when there is a strong correlation between two or more independent 
variables in the regression model. The presence of a perfect or strong linear relationship among 
the variables may pose a problem regarding the accuracy of the regression model. To determine 
if multicollinearity exists, two ways are commonly used: the correlation matrix and variance 
inflation factors (VIF). The correlation matrix is used to check all the independent variables’ 
correlation. A high correlation coefficient between any two variables indicates the existence of 
multicollinearity. Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) and Field (2013) state that multicollinearity 
could be a major concern if it exceeds 0.80, while Fotheringham (1982) and Cortina (1993) 
suggest that correlation coefficients exceeding 0.70 are worthy of concern. The Pearson 
correlation coefficients (parametric) and Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric) 
between the independent variables are presented in Table 6-5 and Table 6-6. Both the Pearson 
and Spearman correlation coefficients seem to be relatively similar. According to tables 6-5 
and 6-6, it can be concluded that there is no serious threat of multicollinearity between the 
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independent variables in the current study as the correlations among the variables are fairly 
low, and the largest correlation coefficient is 0.66.  
 
Table 12:6-5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Explanatory Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 1                  
2 -.060 1                 
3 .288** .015 1                
4 -.148 -.023 -.274** 1               
5 .334** -.217** -.313** -.088 1              
6  .044 .209** .381** -.008 -.402** 1             
7 .285** .120 .313** -.119 -.029 .219** 1            
8 .403** .050 .180* -.250** .137 .195* .273** 1           
9 -.214** -.050 -.153* .082 -.014 .009 -.309** -.130 1          
10 .121 -.019 -.039 -.052 .151 .001 -.052 -.055 .048 1         
11 .017 .099 -.143 -.007 .050 -.140 -.054 .062 .046 .209** 1        
12 .300** .036 .235** -.006 .018 .142 .394** .214** -.508** .012 -.023 1       
13 -.027 -.007 -.135 -.015 .125 -.124 .091 .092 -.108 -.130 .033 .242** 1      
14 -.045 .121 .219** .055 -.203** .252** .307** .153* -.420** -.154* -.052 .668** -.027 1     
15 .554** -.024 .049 -.062 .200** .020 .167* .172* -.028 .328** .036 .269** -.009 -.292** 1    
16 .499** -.065 .125 -.068 .129 .115 .206** .346** -.078 .154* .092 .245** -.172* .064 .419** 1   
17 .066 .179* .107 -.049 -.005 .104 .051 .025 .000 .458** .130 .095 .031 -.015 .273** .076 1  
18 -.245** .099 -.089 .116 -.176* .137 -.093 -.192* .354** -.111 .064 -.117 -.021 -.029 -.075 -.123 -.052 1 
 
Table 13:6-6: Spearman Correlation Coefficients of Explanatory Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 1.000                  
2 -.122 1.00                 
3 .199** .230** 1.00                
4 -.114 -.131 -.619** 1.00               
5 .392** -.250** -.314** .201** 1.00              
6  -.075 .283** .399** -.220** -.402** 1.00             
7 .249** .205** .347** -.098 -.029 .219** 1.00            
8 .380** .121 .202** -.088 .119 .224** .253** 1.00           
9 -.211** -.040 -.172* .012 -.027 .014 -.316** -.140 1.00          
10 .069 -.134 -.081 .069 .100 .045 -.065 -.056 .100 1.00         
11 .038 .032 -.145 .057 .050 -.140 -.054 .035 .068 .163* 1.00        
12 .253** .174* .248** -.044 .031 .148 .397** .210** -.524** -.049 -.019 1.00       
13 .030 -.003 -.126 -.013 .194* -.158* .094 .107 .016 -.147 .046 .043 1.00      
14 -.049 .331** .279** -.029 -.196* .300** .333** .203** -.377** -.195* -.034 .628** -.062 1.00     
15 .594** -.143 -.001 -.025 .325** -.005 .157* .335** .016 .211** .049 .131 -.046 -.313** 1.00    
16 .396** -.110 .073 -.023 .141 .089 .201** .342** -.115 .203** .114 .222** -.189* .072 .361** 1.00   
17 .012 -.035 .064 -.132 -.023 .099 .018 .057 .028 .358** .153* .026 -.076 -.054 .118 .115 1.00  
18 -.298** .150 -.090 .029 -.183* .131 -.113 -.191* .361** -.080 .061 -.138 .055 -.030 -.186* -.131 -.024 1.00 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: (1) firm size (2) firm growth (3) leverage (4) liquidity (5) dividends (6) industry type (7) audit type (8) board size (9) 
board independence (10) board frequency of meeting (11) role duality (12) block holder ownership (13) director ownership 
(14) institutional ownership (15) government ownership (16) audit com. size (17) audit frequency of meeting (18) audit 
committee independence 
 
Furthermore, two additional tests are calculated to investigate multicollinearity presence: 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics. VIF and its reciprocal tolerance 
(1/VIF) are indicators of the strength of a linear relationship between any two independent 
variables (Field, 2013). Though there is no agreed threshold for the value of VIF or tolerance 
to be considered problematic, Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) suggests that any independent 
variables that have a VIF value of 5 or higher, or a tolerance of 0.2 or lower, are a potential 
problem of multicollinearity. However, Field (2013) and Saunders et al. (2012) report that a 
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value of VIF more than 10 or 5 and a value of tolerance less than 0.1 or 0.2 represent a major 
multicollinearity problem. Table 6-7 presents the VIF and tolerance calculations for all the 
independent variables. As it can be seen from the table, all the VIF values are less than 5 (the 
maximum value is 4.49) and the tolerance values are higher than 0.2 (the minimum value is 
0.223) for all the explanatory variables, which means that in this case multicollinearity is not a 
serious problem. Based on the preceding results, it can be concluded that multicollinearity does 
not pose a threat among the variables in interpreting the results of the OLS regressions in the 
current study. 
Table 14:6-7: VIF and tolerance multicollinearity tests 
Variables Collinearity Statistics 
VIF Tolerance 
Firm size 2.492 .401 
Firm growth 1.193 .838 
Leverage 2.340 .427 
Liquidity 1.408 .710 
Dividends 1.815 .551 
Industry type  1.666 .600 
Audit type 1.385 .722 
Board size 1.480 .676 
Board independence 1.630 .613 
Board frequency of meeting 1.498 .668 
Role duality 1.162 .860 
Block holder ownership 4.490 .223 
Director ownership 1.566 .639 
Institutional ownership 3.963 .252 
Government ownership 3.125 .320 
Audit committee size 1.632 .613 
Audit committee frequency of meeting 1.432 .699 
Audit committee independence 1.305 .766 
Note: VIF - Variance Inflation Factor 
6.4.1.3 Normality  
 
OLS regression assumes that the variables are normally distributed. Non-normal distribution 
variables may result in an inefficient regression model and misleading conclusions. Normality 
assumption can be determined using skewness and kurtosis tests, P-P and Q-Q plots and 
histograms. However, Gujarati (2009) claims that it is expected for some of the data to have a 
level of non-normality since it is hard to have perfectly normally distributed data. Normality 
plots such as P-P plots, Q-Q plots and histograms, skewness and kurtosis tests are performed 
in the current study to check the normality assumption. With regard to normality plots, the data 
is said to be normal if the points in the normal probability plot lie more or less in a straight line 
and the histogram is shaped like a normal distribution. In figure 6-2, the histogram for the 
residual of dependent variable shows a slightly negative skewness of the dependent variable, 
which corresponds to where the P-P plot indicated that some points seem to be deviated from 
the straight line. However, the P-P and Q-Q plots, along with the histograms of the independent 
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variables, illustrate that some variables such as board size and board frequency of meeting were 
fairly normally distributed, others like audit frequency of meeting were slightly normally 
distributed, while some variables suffered from non-normal distribution, such as ownership 
variables (see appendix 13). Regarding skewness and kurtosis tests, no agreement was reached 
on the acceptable limits of skewness and kurtosis values. For example, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) state that normality is met if the skewness value is within ± 1.96 and the kurtosis value 
of ± 3.0. Kline (2014) suggests that the criteria in social science is less strict, hence, data with 
a skewness value of ±3.0 and kurtosis value within ± 8.0 are considered acceptable. 
Furthermore, Field (2013) proposes that data with a skewness or kurtosis above an absolute 
value of 2.0 are considered problematic. Following Field (2013), it can be seen in table (6-8) 
that all the variables are normally distributed where the skewness value fall between 0.241 and 
1.895, except government ownership, firm growth and liquidity as their skewness values were 
2.77 and above. In addition, the kurtosis values for most of the variables range from 0.109 to 
1.12, whereas some variables have values from 3.154 and above, such as firm growth and 
liquidity, indicating that these variables are not normally distributed.  
Based on the preceding results, it can be said that the normality assumption has been violated 
for some variables; therefore, these variables were transformed, as suggested by the literature, 
to avoid the violation of normality assumption and alleviate the problem of non-normality 
(Osborne and Waters, 2002). Section 6.4.2 discusses the data transformation. 













Table 15:6-8: Skewness and kurtosis values 
Variables 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Board size  -.286 .186 -.155 .370 
Board independence  .957 .186 .182 .370 
Board frequency of meeting 1.628 .188 4.844 .374 
Block holder ownership .241 .186 -.848 .370 
Director ownership 1.895 .186 3.567 .370 
Institutional ownership .715 .186 -.757 .370 
Government ownership 2.771 .186 7.315 .370 
Audit com. size 1.544 .186 1.116 .370 
Audit frequency of meeting 1.338 .188 3.154 .374 
Audit com. independence -.386 .186 -.814 .370 
Firm size .873 .186 .316 .370 
Firm growth 5.207 .189 29.518 .376 
Leverage .296 .186 -.109 .370 
Liquidity 8.935 .186 82.979 .370 
C total  -.927 .186 -.336 .370 
 
6.4.1.4 Homoscedasticity  
 
Homoscedasticity means that the variance of the residual terms of the dependent and 
independent variables is constant (Field, 2013). Therefore, if the variances differ, the model is 
suffering from heteroscedasticity. Homoscedasticity can be assessed by the scatter-plot of the 
standardised residuals against standardised predicted variables of the dependent variable (ibid). 
The homoscedasticity assumption is met if the residuals are quite tightly scattered around a 
horizontal line. Figure 6-1 indicates that the current data seem to be homoscedastic and, 
consequently, the homoscedasticity assumption is not violated.  
After checking the OLS model’s assumptions, another important issue should be considered 
before running the model: the outliers. These outliers can bias the regression model as they 
affect the coefficient values of the estimated regression (ibid). The next section will discuss 
outliers and how to reduce the bias if detected.   
6.4.2 Outliers  
 
“Outlier is an observation which appears to be inconsistent with the remainder of that set of 
data” (Barnett and Lewis, 1994). Such extreme values which substantially deviate from most 
of the other data can bias the results of regression analysis and may possibly violate the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumptions, particularly if the sample size is small (Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009). Outliers can be detected by a visual examination of graphs, such as boxplots, 
histograms or scatter-plots, and by finding the extreme value that differs from the general trend 
of the data. Alternatively, outliers can be identified using statistical methods such as z-scores, 
Mahalanobis distances, Cook's distance and Leverage statistics. Regarding z-scores, Field 
(2013) indicates that z-scores (standardized residuals) should be within the limit of ±3.29 
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otherwise there may be too many outliers in the data that might bias the regression results. In 
addition, 95% of the sample cases have to be within about	±2 and 99% between -2.58 and 
+2.58 for the model to be acceptable. The current study results reveal that 96.5% of the cases 
have values within the limits of ±2 and only 2 cases (1%) have absolute values more than 2.5, 
which may be a cause for concern. However, all the sample’s z-scores are less than the absolute 
value of 3.29 (see table 6-9). Consequently, it can be stated that the current model appears to 
be fairly accurate and that the extreme values do not distort the regression accuracy. 
Mahalanobis is another method of detecting outliers which measures the distance of cases from 
the means of predictor variables (Field, 2013). The highest values cases should be examined 
as they might indicate the presence of outliers. To find the cut-off point to identify outliers, 
Field (2013) suggests the use of the critical value of chi-square with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of predictors as a cut-off point. A distance greater than this critical value may be 
considered as a potential problem. Only a few cases of the current sample were above the 
critical value, which is 34.81(see appendix 14).  
Moreover, Cook's distance can be applied to assess the overall influence of a case on the model 
as a whole. Cook and Weisberg (1983) proposed that a Cook’s distance value that exceeds 1 
would be a cause for concern. It can be seen from the current results that Cook’s distance values 
for the model are between 0.00 and 0.222, which is clearly less than the rule of thumb, and 
again it seems that the outliers pose no serious threat in the current model. The final method to 
identify outliers is Leverage statistics. This method measures the effect of the observed value 
of the dependent variable over the independent variables. Vaus (2002) recommends that any 
case exceeding the critical Leverage value, which is 0.5, indicates a serious problem and has 
to be excluded. While Hoaglin and Welsch (1978) recommend using two times the average 
value (2(k+1)/n)9 as a cut-off point for detecting cases with outlying values. Stevens (2002) 
suggests that values greater than three times the average (3(k+1)/n) should be checked. The 
results of the current model show that all cases are less than the critical value suggested by 
Vaus (2002). Moreover, most of the cases are lower than two times the average (0.223) and 
only one case is slightly above the boundary of three times the average (0.335). In addition, the 
current study performs histograms and boxplots for each independent variable to detect 
outliers. These graphs demonstrate that outliers are not a major concern, as evidenced by the 
previous statistical methods.                                                            
                                                
 





Table 16 6-9: Casewise Diagnostics 
Case Number Std. Residual C Total  Predicted Value Residual 
30 -2.183 .240 .51195 -.271947 
42 -2.197 .210 .48364 -.273636 
66 -2.707 .200 .53719 -.337194 
113 2.003 .700 .45054 .249461 
163 -2.204 .150 .42457 -.274565 
168 -2.716 .290 .62830 -.338299 
a. Dependent Variable: CIR total  
 
There are several methods to reduce the impact of the outliers on the model (see: Vaus, 2002; 
Field, 2013): 
• Trim the data: This involves deleting some of the extreme scores. That is to remove 
certain outlier cases using either percentage-based rule or standard deviation rule. 
• Winsorizing: Which is to replace the outlier value to be close to the highest value that 
is not an outlier.  
• Using robust methods: By applying a set of tests that are robust to deviations from 
assumptions and outliers. 
• Transformation: This entails applying a mathematical function to the data to correct 
distributional problems or outliers. 
The first two options, deleting some cases and winsorizing the data, are not preferable options 
unless there is a good reason justifying these methods, as if the case is strongly believed to not 
be from the intended sample population or if the deleted or winsorised data are very 
unrepresentative of the sample, then this may bias the statistical model (Field, 2013). Therefore, 
it seems that the best of these options is to use robust methods or to transform the data. Robust 
tests apply some tests which are unaffected by data problems and appear to be reliable, even 
when the normal assumption is violated; this choice usually involves bootstrapping technique 
or M-estimators (ibid). With regard to transformation, this method is suitable in regression 
analysis when there is a non-linear relationship between the dependent and explanatory 
variables, the distribution of the errors is to some extent not normal, and where there is a lack 
of homoscedasticity (Cooke, 1998). Furthermore, transformation changes the measurement 
scale of a variable but not the relationship between the variables (Field, 2013). In addition, 
Osborne and Waters (2002) point out that when outliers are distorting the data and removing 
them is not desirable, transformations can be used to improve normality and reduce the impact 
 
171 
of outliers as well. Several common transformation methods are used to explain the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables, such as log transformation, square root 
transformation, reciprocal transformation and reverse score transformations (Field, 2013). 
Based on the above discussion, the current study prefers to perform transformation, namely, 
log transformation10. Considering that the normality assumption in the current study, as 
mentioned before, was not met in addition to some cases of outliers being found, although these 
outliers do not pose a major problem, the log transformation method can be used to correct 
these problems and reduce the influence of outliers. Moreover, it can be said that, in general, 
log transformation is appropriate and widely used in previous disclosure studies (Vaus, 2002). 
Specifically, log transformation will be applied only to the continuous independent variables 
on the grounds that the results show that the assumption of normality is not violated with regard 
to the dependent variable; hence, transforming the dependent variable is not necessary. In 
addition, Cooke (1998) mentioned that transforming the dependent variable might alter the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
To deal with the violation of linear regression assumption, Draper (1988) suggests four basic 
approaches: 
1- The “do nothing” approach, that is, to apply analysis to the data without any changes 
(untransformed), 
2- The data-analytic approach, which is using deferent techniques to detect any violation 
of the assumptions. If any assumption is not met, then the data are altered by elimination 
or transformation. 
3- The model expansion approach; this involves identifying any departures from 
assumptions. Such departures are modelled directly on the raw data scale by extending 
the parametric model. 
4- The robust approach, that is, to perform non-classical methods which are not sensitive 
to deviation from the assumptions. Thus, the analysis is conducted on the raw data scale 
without alteration or modification such as M-estimators, bootstrap and rank-based 
methods.     
Accordingly, the current study runs three regression models: the un-transformation OLS, the 
log transformation OLS and bootstrap as a robust method. The next section discusses the 
                                                
 
10 The current study conducts the other types of transformation (square root, reverse score and reciprocal) to the 




regression results in details. 
6.5 Regression results  
 
The three regression models were performed (the un-transformation model and the log 
transformation and bootstrap method)11 to examine the relationship between CIR total and the 
explanatory variables; the firm characteristics and corporate governance variables. In the 
following sections the results of these models will be presented. 
6.5.1 The first model: un-transformation model 
 
The un-transformation model is still widely accepted, which can be attributed to the fact that it 
is straightforward to apply and the findings are easy to interpret. In addition, each of the data-
analytic, model expansion and robust approaches have some weaknesses as inferential 
strategies in general and in the linear model particularly in addition to their strengths (Draper, 
1988). As explained before, this model aims to answer the second research question: What are 
the significant factors that motivate CIR total decision-making (the key determinants) of by 
Saudi listed companies. The model was tested using the forced entry method in SPSS V.22, 
which means that all the variables that have been hypothesized theoretically to be related to the 
level of internet reporting were entered into the regression model simultaneously. Table 6-10 
provides a summary of the results of the un-transformation OLS model. 
Based on table 6-10, the results of the un-transformation model reveal that the current model 
has significantly improved the prediction of CIR total (F = 6.064, p< 0.01). In addition, the 
adjusted R2 (0.362) shows a moderate explanatory power for this model, whereas 36.2% of the 
variation in CIR total accounts for the explanatory variables. Firm size has the highest 
standardized B (0.535), which indicates that a change by one standard deviation of firm size 
results in a 0.535 change in CIR total.  
It was found that firm size is the only firm characteristics variable that is significantly and 
positively associated with CIR total at the 1% significance (P< 0.01). Moreover, the results 
demonstrate that none of the board of directors’ variables are associated significantly with CIR 
total.   
 
                                                
 
11 The current study also performs stepwise, backward, forward regression and factor analysis. Log 











t Sig. B S.E. Beta 
 (Constant) -.093 .137  -.674 .501 
Board size .007 .008 .063 .826 .410 
Board independence .000 .001 .027 .337 .737 
Board frequency of meeting -.009 .006 -.125 -1.628 .106 
Role duality .046 .044 .071 1.050 .296 
Block holder ownership .000 .001 .036 .266 .790 
Director ownership .000 .001 -.027 -.337 .736 
Institutional ownership .000 .001 -.044 -.347 .729 
Government ownership -.001 .001 -.129 -1.156 .250 
Audit committee size -.007 .020 -.028 -.349 .727 
Audit frequency of meeting -.001 .005 -.013 -.167 .868 
Audit committee independence -.001 .001 -.189 -2.632 .009*** 
Firm size .102 .019 .535 5.378 .000*** 
Firm growth -.001 .013 -.006 -.089 .929 
Leverage .014 .055 .025 .256 .799 
Liquidity .008 .006 .098 1.314 .191 
Dividends .037 .026 .118 1.396 .165 
Industry type  .016 .026 .049 .607 .545 
 Audit type .040 .028 .105 1.421 .157 
 Adjusted R Square 0.362 
 F 6.064 
 Sig. 0.000 
*** Significant at 1%  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
 
However, board frequency of meeting has a nearly insignificant negative association (.106). 
Regarding audit committee variables, audit committee independence has a significant and 
negative relationship with CIR total at the 1% significance level. Both audit committee size 
and audit committee frequency of meeting have an insignificant relationship with CIR total. 
Further, the regression findings reveal that no evidence is found to support the significant 
association between ownership structure variables and CIR total.   
In order to overcome the violation of normality assumption and to reduce the influence of 
outliers, log transformation method was chosen. The following section represents the results 




6.5.2 The second model: log transformation model 
 
As mentioned before, log transformation will only be used for the continuous independent 
variables. Table 6-11 summarises the model results. 
 
Table 18:6-11: log transformation model Coefficients 
Variables 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -.103 .138  -.742 .459 
Board size .007 .008 .067 .878 .382 
Board independence .000 .001 .017 .214 .831 
Board frequency of meeting -.009 .006 -.130 -1.687 .094* 
Role duality .049 .044 .075 1.115 .267 
Block holder ownership .000 .001 .031 .233 .816 
Director ownership .000 .001 -.033 -.420 .675 
Institutional ownership .000 .001 -.059 -.474 .637 
Government ownership -.001 .001 -.141 -1.271 .206 
Audit committee size -.004 .020 -.018 -.222 .825 
Audit frequency of meeting -.002 .005 -.029 -.393 .695 
Audit committee independence -.001 .001 -.181 -2.526 .013** 
Firm size .104 .019 .538 5.423 .000*** 
Firm growth 8.355E-5 .000 .075 1.139 .257 
Leverage .029 .055 .049 .520 .604 
Liquidity .008 .006 .098 1.314 .191 
Dividends .038 .026 .120 1.441 .152 
Industry type  .010 .026 .030 .376 .707 
Audit type .037 .028 .098 1.328 .186 
Adjusted R Square .366 
F 6.170 
Sig. .000*** 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
From the above table, it can be seen that the adjusted R2 is slightly improved compared with 
the un-transformation model (from 36.3% to 36.6%). Furthermore, the F-ratio has barely 
increased (from 6.064 to 6.170), yet is still significant. Regarding the independent variables, 
the log transformation model shows similar results to the un-transformation model. The results 
indicate that only firm size has a significant positive relationship at the 1% significance level, 
while the other firm characteristics variables are insignificantly associated with CIR total, 
which is similar to that of the un-transformation model. With a little difference from the 
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previous model results, board frequency of meeting is marginally negatively associated with 
CIR total (at the 10% significance level), while the other board of directors variables still have 
an insignificant relationship with CIR total. In addition, audit committee independence has 
nearly the same significant negative relationship but at a different significance level (5%). 
However, neither audit committee size nor audit committee frequency of meeting is 
significantly associated with CIR total. Moreover, as found in the un-transformation model, 
none of the ownership structure variables is found to be significant.  
It can be concluded that both un-transformation and log transformation models give almost 
similar results. Thus, bootstrapping method is applied to add more robustness to the findings.  
6.5.3 The third model: bootstrap model 
 
Bootstrap sampling means using the original sample to generate several new samples. The 
bootstrap method can be used nearly to any statistical estimation problem without great 
concerns about normality assumption (Efron and Tibshirani, 1991). Bootstrapping is a 
technique that gets over the non-normality problem by estimating the parameters of a statistical 
model by taking repeated samples with replacement from the original data set. The sample data 
are considered as a population from which small samples (called bootstrap samples) are 
generated. The parameter of interest (e.g. the mean or b coefficient) is calculated for each 
bootstrap sample, from which the sampling distribution of the parameter is estimated. The 
standard error of the parameter is estimated as the standard deviation of the sampling 
distribution generated from the bootstrap samples (see: Field, 2013; Gujarati, 1999; Efron and 
Tibshirani, 1997; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1999). Thus, the current study performs the 
bootstrapping method to retest the results of the aforementioned models and to enhance the 
robustness of the findings. Table 6-12 presents the results of this model.   
Table 6-12 illustrates that the results of the bootstrapping model are much similar to the results 
of the un-transformation and log transformation models. Consistent with the two previous 
models, the results show that only two independent variables, namely audit committee 
independence and firm size are significantly associated with CIR total. According to this 
model, firm size was found to be positively associated at the 1% level. The other firm 
characteristic variables had been found to have an insignificant association with CIR total, 
which is similar to the un-transformation and log transformation models. All board of director 
variables indicate the same insignificant relationship, except for board frequency of meeting 
variable. Although board frequency of meeting was found to be negatively associated at the 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -.093 .144  -.674 .504 
Board size .007 .008 .063 .826 .415 
Board independence .000 .001 .027 .337 .708 
Board frequency of meeting -.009 .006 -.125 -1.628 .169 
Role duality .046 .053 .071 1.050 .358 
Block holder ownership .000 .001 .036 .266 .843 
Director ownership .000 .001 -.027 -.337 .733 
Institutional ownership .000 .001 -.044 -.347 .765 
Government ownership -.001 .001 -.129 -1.156 .278 
Audit com. size -.007 .018 -.028 -.349 .707 
Audit frequency of meeting -.001 .007 -.013 -.167 .888 
Audit committee independence -.001 .000 -.189 -2.632 .006*** 
Firm size .102 .018 .535 5.378 .001*** 
Firm growth -.001 .023 -.006 -.089 .957 
Leverage .014 .058 .025 .256 .803 
Liquidity .008 .007 .098 1.314 .181 
Dividends .037 .027 .118 1.396 .163 
Industry type  .016 .027 .049 .607 .547 
Audit type .040 .027 .105 1.421 .146 
Adjusted R2  .362 
F 6.064 
Sig. .000b 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
in bootstrapping model, as with the un-transformation model. With regard to audit committee 
variables, the results were similar to that of un-transformation and log transformation models. 
Audit committee independence reveals the same significant negative relationship with CIR 
total at the 1% significance level. In addition, audit committee size and audit committee 
frequency of meeting are not significantly associated with CIR total. Furthermore, the 
ownership structure variables show results similar to the results of the other two models, 
whereby no significant association was found for any of the variables with CIR total.   
In short, it can be concluded that the results of the bootstrapping model are consistent with the 
results of the un-transformation and log transformation models. Draper (1988) suggests that it 
is beneficial to perform both the original model and one or more robust methods in parallel and 
compare the results. If these methods produced major differences, then applying other 
approaches is advisable. If not, this adds to the model robustness. Since the bootstrapping 
model confirms these results, it adds more robustness of the findings of this study. Thus, it 
seems that almost the same two variables, audit committee independence and firm size, were 
found to be significant in all the three models. 
In addition to conducting the full regression models, reduced models were also conducted in 
this study to enhance the fit of the model and overcome the problem related to including too 
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many independent variables. The next section describes reduced models and the results of these 
models.  
6.5.4 Supplemental analysis: reduced model 
 
Although having too many independent variables in the model may be beneficial, it can be 
argued that this inclusion might add more difficulties in terms of assessing which variables 
have a significant effect as it is possible to find minor multicollinearity between the variables 
(Curwin and Slater, 2007). However, Johnson et al. (1987) state that including too many 
independent variables should not be a major concern as long as the decision to include any 
variable is made on a rational basis and advanced computer programs are available. Hence, to 
deal with the issue related to having many independent variables and to determine the most 
significant variables that explain the variability in CIR, reduced regression models were 
conducted in the current study. Debreceny et al. (2002) illustrated that reduced models improve 
the fit of the model as well as enhance the explanatory power, which better justifies the findings 
compared to the complete model. Therefore, the independent variables were refined by 
reducing the full regression models based on variables found to be significant in the full 
regression models besides the inclusion of additional variables, which are the most significant 
factors with higher contribution value to the model as indicated by (t) values. This approach 
was utilized following a number of researchers, such as Hanifaa (1999), Debreceny et al. 
(2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Abdelsalam et al. (2007) and Arafa (2012), unlike Wallace 
and Naser (1995), who included the variables in the reduced regression models based on the 
importance of the independent variables, as inferred from previous research (that is if the 
variable found to be significant in four or more countries). Table 6-13 summarises the results 
of the reduced models.  
As demonstrated in Table 6-13, the adjusted R2 has been enhanced in all the reduced models 
from the full regression models, which improves the potential of explaining variability in CIR 
total. The un-transformation reduced model produced the highest adjusted R2, which is 0.422 
(0.362 in the full un-transformation model), followed by the log transformation reduced model, 
where its adjusted R2 is 0.420 and the lowest adjusted is R2 (0.413), which was found in the 
bootstrapping reduced model. With regard to significance of variables, three variables (firm 
size, liquidity and audit committee independence) were found to be significant in all the 
reduced models compared to only two significant variables (firm size and audit committee 
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independence) in all the full models. The results indicate that firm size in all the three reduced 
models is associated positively at the same 1% significant level, which is identical to the full 
models’ results. However, unlike the full regression models, liquidity is found to be negatively 
associated at the 10% significance level in all reduced models. The un-transformation reduced 
model is the only model that shows a significant positive relationship between dividends and 
CIR total at the 10% significance level. Similar to the full regression models, no significant 
association was found between the other firm characteristics variables and the CIR in the three 
reduced models. In terms of board of director variables, only board  
frequency of meeting is found to be significantly associated with CIR total in both the un-
transformation and log transformation reduced models at the 10% significance level, which is 
similar to the full log transformation model. Concerning the ownership structure variables, the 
results indicate that government ownership has the same insignificant association with CIR 
total in all the reduced models, which is consistent with the full regression models.    
Similar to the full regression models, only audit committee independence has a significant 
negative association with CIR total at a slightly different level of significance (1% in the un- 
transformation and log transformation reduced models and 5% in the bootstrapping reduced 
model). Consequently, it can be stated that the findings of the reduced models are consistent – 
to some extent – with the results of the full regression models (see table 6-14). The results 
indicate that two variables, namely firm size and audit committee independence, were found 
 
Table 20:6-13: Reduced models (un-transformation, log transformation and bootstrapping) 
Variables 
Un- transformation model Log transformation model Bootstrapping model 
B Std. E. Beta t Sig. B Std. E. Beta t Sig. B Std. E. Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.074 .117  -.637 .525 -.082 .118  -.698 .486 -.096 .112  -.820 .405 
Board size .010 .007 .093 1.368 .173 .010 .007 .090 1.324 .188 .010 .008 .095 1.378 .180 
Board frequency of meeting -.009 .005 -.129 -1.967 .051* -.009 .005 -.128 -1.939 .054* -.009 .005 -.118 -1.778 .103 
Role duality .044 .041 .065 1.072 .286 .045 .041 .066 1.085 .279 .046 .056 .068 1.110 .391 
Government ownership -.001 .001 -.109 -1.444 .151 -.001 .001 -.123 -1.635 .104 -.001 .001 -.114 -1.493 .179 
Audit committee independence -.001 .000 -.168 -2.677 .008*** -.001 .000 -.169 -2.699 .008*** -.001 .000 -.177 -2.807 .010** 
Firm size .098 .016 .500 6.123 .000*** .100 .016 .508 6.212 .000*** .104 .015 .532 6.661 .001*** 
Liquidity -.002 .001 -.116 -1.895 .060* -.002 .001 -.116 -1.891 .060* -.002 .004 -.120 -1.936 .072* 
Dividends .034 .020 .108 1.689 .093* .033 .020 .102 1.597 .112 .003 .006 .030 .486 .627 
Audit type .035 .025 .090 1.411 .160 .034 .025 .087 1.370 .173 .029 .025 .076 1.201 .244 
Adjusted R2 .422 .420 .413 
F 14.487 14.370 13.964 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.  
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to be significant in all the full models and confirmed by the reduced models. The difference 
between the full regression models and the reduced models is with regard to the three variables 
of board frequency of meeting, liquidity and dividends. Board frequency of meeting was 
significant only in the full log transformation model and un-transformation and log 
transformation reduced models. Moreover, liquidity is significant merely in all reduced models 
and dividends is found to be significant in only the un-transformation reduced model. The next 
section will discuss these results in detail.  
Table 21:6-14: Full and reduced regression models for CIR total 
Variables Full regression Reduced Regression 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(Constant) 





















   






























   






   






   


















   






   

















































































Adjusted R2 0.362 .366 .362 .422 .420 .413 
F 6.064 6.170 6.064 14.487 14.370 13.964 
Sig. 0.000 .000*** 0.000 .000 .000 .000 
- 1. Un-transformation model / 2. Log transformation model / 3. Bootstrap model / 4. Reduced model un-transformation model/  
    5. Reduced model log transformation model / 6. Reduced model bootstrap 
- Upper value is Coefficient and lower value is T value. 
- *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
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6.6 Discussion of the regression results  
 
The findings of the full and reduced regression models, as illustrated in the previous section, 
show that those models – to a large extent – are consistent. This section discusses in detail the 
results of all the models for each group of independent variable.  
6.6.1 Firm characteristics variables 
 
This category includes seven variables that have been examined in this study to determine their 
influence on CIR total using two means of analysis, namely bivariate and multivariate. Table 
6-15 demonstrates a summary of the findings of both the bivariate and multivariate (regression) 
analyses of the relationships between the firm characteristics variables and CIR total.  
 
Table 22:6-15: A summary of the findings of firm characteristics variables 
Variables Bivariate analysis Full regression Reduced Regression 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Firm size +/*** +/*** +/*** +/*** +/*** +/*** +/*** +/*** 
Firm growth - - - + -    
Leverage +/** +/** + + +    
Liquidity -/*** - + + + -/* -/* -/* 
Dividends +/*** +/*** + + + +/* + + 
Industry type  + + + + +    
Audit type +/*** +/*** + + + + + + 
Note: 1. Pearson correlation / 2. Spearman's rho / 3. Un-transformation model / 4. Log transformation model / 5. Bootstrap model / 6. 
Reduced model un-transformation model/ 7. Reduced model log transformation model / 8. Reduced model Bootstrap 
- *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
Based on the results in table 6-15, five variables are found to have a significant relationship 
with CIR total under bivariate and multivariate analyses at different levels. Firm size was the 
only variable that has been significant in all models. Moreover, two variables (liquidity and 
dividends) show different results in the two models of analysis and the other two variables 
(leverage and audit type) are found to be significant in only the bivariate analysis. It has been 
suggested that if a significant relationship exists in the bivariate analysis but not in the 
multivariate analysis, then this may be an indication of multicollinearity among the 
independent variables, even though it is a minor one, which affects the significance of the 
variable when multiple regression is conducted (Hossain et al., 1994).  
The variation in the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses appears in many previous 
studies (e. g. Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa, 1999; Ghazali, 2004; Abdel-Fattah, 2008). 
However, the current study will depend mainly on the results of the multivariate analysis, 
considering that the purpose of the study is to assess the extent of the relationship, if any, 
between CIR and groups of explanatory variables simultaneously. 
Consistent with the mainstream prior CIR research (e.g. Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Debreceny and 
Gray, 1999; Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Craven and Marston, 1999; Ettredge et al., 2001; Debreceny 
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et al., 2002; Marston, 2003; Marston and Polei, 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; Kelton and Yang, 
2008; Aly et al., 2010; Allam, 2006; Oyelere et al., 2003; Joshi and Al-Bastak, 2000; 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999; Ettredge et al., 2002a; Oyelere et al., 2003;; Barako and 
Tower, 2008, Al-Motrafi, 2008; Elsayed, 2010 and Al-Janadi et al., 2013), the finding of the 
current study shows that firm size has a positive impact on CIR total at the 1% significance 
level in both the multivariate and bivariate analyses. Hence, large Saudi listed companies are 
more likely to disseminate more information online than small companies are. This relationship 
can be explained according to the widely used theories in the disclosure literature: agency, 
legitimacy and cost benefit theories. Based on agency theory, large companies are more likely 
to have a higher proportion of outside equity, which results in higher agency costs. These high 
agency costs can be reduced by increasing the level of disclosure. In addition, it is assumed 
that larger companies naturally are subject to more information asymmetry among different 
groups, such as investors, suppliers, customers and managers; this in turn increases the demand 
for more disclosure to alleviate this information asymmetry problem (Debreceny et al., 2002). 
Moreover, larger companies in general have a diverse range of products and complicated 
distribution networks. Thus, their management information systems and databases are more 
complicated than those of small companies. Therefore, based on agency theory, disclosure 
costs may be generally lower for larger companies (Oyelere et al., 2003).   
To explain the positive relationship between firm size and CIR, legitimacy theory assumes that 
the managers of large companies hope that disclosing more information could lead to reducing 
monitoring and other costs. Moreover, large companies are subject to several political costs, 
such as nationalization, regulation, or expropriation, and therefore tend to disclose more 
extensive information to overcome the threat of government intervention and reduce these costs 
(Oyelere et al., 2003).    
Finally, according to cost benefit theory, collecting, presenting and publishing information 
online requires a high cost, thus large companies are more likely than small ones to have the 
ability to afford such high-cost disclosure and benefit from large volume products, which result 
in reducing the unit cost regarding disclosed information. Furthermore, small companies are 
more concerned about disclosing extensive information on their websites as this may threaten 
their competitive position (Buzby, 1975). As a result, the hypothesized positive relationship 
between firm size and CIR total in Saudi listed companies (hypothesis H1.1) is accepted in this 
study. This finding is consistent, as mentioned above, with most of the previous studies, where 
firm size was found to be a significant explanatory variable.       
Regarding firm growth, the results of both the bivariate and multivariate analyses reveal a non-
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significant and negative (except for the full log transformation model, where it is insignificant 
and positive) relationship between the Saudi listed companies’ growth and CIR total. The 
results show that firm growth has no impact on CIR total. This result is consistent with McNally 
et al., (1982), Eng and Mak (2003), Ronnie lo (2009), Albassam (2014) and Soriya and 
Dhaigude (2016), but not in line with Ahmed (2015) Bollen et al. (2006) and Debreceny et al. 
(2002), who found a significant relationship between firm growth and CIR total. The negative 
relationship that is found between firm growth and CIR total (positive in only the full log 
transformation model) supports the argument that, for firms with higher rates of growth, 
proprietary cost associated with disclosing more information increases since information 
disclosure may cause the loss of competitive advantages, hence, managers will be barely 
willing to disclose. Another explanation for the negative relationship could be that the fast-
growing companies are disclosing enough information through other means, such as analysts 
and media followings, which result in less demand for additional disclosure (Debreceny et al., 
2002). In addition, high-rate growing companies have to assign substantial human and financial 
resources to manipulate their high growth, which may result in a lack of investment in adequate 
internet reporting facilities (Bollen et al., 2006). This negative result is consistent with several 
prior studies, such as La Rosa and Liberatore (2014), Nekhili et al., (2016), Albassam (2014), 
Bollen et al. (2006) and Debreceny et al. (2002). Based on the above arguments and findings 
of this study, the hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between firm growth and 
CIR total of Saudi listed companies (hypothesis H1.2) is rejected.  
In terms of company leverage, contradictory results are indicated between the bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. Although the findings show a positive relationship in all models, only 
the bivariate analysis reveals a positive significant association between leverage and CIR total 
at the 5% level. None of the multivariate analyses have supported the influence of leverage on 
CIR total by Saudi listed companies. This positive relationship can be explained according to 
the widely used agency theory, which presumes that high rate leverage creates agency costs; 
therefore, managers may disclose additional information via the internet to increase the level 
of monitoring and help mitigate the conflict between debt-holders and shareholders (Debreceny 
et al., 2002; Schipper, 1981). The empirical findings regarding the impact of leverage on 
corporate disclosure are contradicted. However, some prior studies, consistent with the current 
study’s result, report no significant association between leverage and CIR practices such as 
Larrán and Giner (2002), Debreceny et al. (2002), Oyelere et al. (2003) Bollen et al. (2006), 
Nekhili et al. (2016), Richardson and Welker (2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Abdelsalam 
and Street (2007) and Aly et al. (2010). While Ettredge et al.  (2002a), Ismail (2002), Xiao et 
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al. (2004), Al-Saeed, (2006b), Barako et al. (2006), Alshowaiman (2008), Elsayed (2010) and 
Omar and Simon (2011) find that leverage has a positive influence on internet reporting. As 
the study depends mainly on the results of multivariate analysis, as mentioned earlier, and 
considering that multivariate analyses reveal that leverage is not significantly associated with 
the extent of internet reporting, the hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between 
leverage and CIR total of Saudi listed companies (H1.3) is rejected. 
According to liquidity, the obtained results were conflicted between the bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. Liquidity shows its negative relationship with CIR total at the 1% and 
10% levels of significance in bivariate (Pearson) and multivariate reduced models, 
respectively. This result may be explained from the agency theory perspective, which assumes 
that companies may disclose more information on their websites if their liquidity ratio is low, 
in order to satisfy shareholders’ and creditors’ needs for information. In addition, by 
introducing more disclosure, managers of low liquidity ratio companies alleviate the fears of 
shareholders and creditors and show their awareness of this problem (Wallace et al.,1994). 
While a significant negative relationship has been documented in Wallace et al. (1994) and 
Wallace and Naser (1995), other prior studies report no association between liquidity and the 
level of corporate disclosure, such as Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Elzahar and Hussainey 
(2012), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) and Aly et al. (2010). However, the positive relationship 
revealed in the full regression models is consistent with Oyelere et al. (2003), Elshandidy et 
al., (2013) and Ahmed (2015). Based on the results of reduced models of the multivariate 
analysis, it can be stated that hypothesis 1.4 on the significant association between liquidity 
and CIR is accepted.        
The statistical analyses regarding the association between dividends and the level of internet 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia reveal the same results, although the levels of significance are 
different. Although the bivariate analyses indicate a positive relationship at the 1% significance 
level, the reduced un-transformation model reports this relationship at the 10% significance 
level. Other multivariate analyses show a positive but insignificant association between 
dividends and CIR total. This positive relationship can be explained through agency and 
signalling theories, which suggest that managers of high dividend companies may tend to 
disclose more information to justify the compensation payment (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013); 
to ensure the financial ability of the company and its contribution to the society (Ntim et al., 
2012); and to attract investors and signal shareholders’ confidence (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
In line with this study’s results, some prior studies (Archambault and Archambault, 2003; 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010) find that dividends have a positive and significant influence on 
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disclosure. Based on the statistical results of the current study, the hypothesis that suggests a 
significant relationship between dividends and CIR total (H1.5) is accepted.  
No empirical evidence has been found to support the prediction that financial companies are 
more likely to disclose more information in their websites. Both the bivariate and multivariate 
analyses (full regression models only) show insignificant and positive relationship between 
industry type and CIR total. The reason for the insignificant association may be attributed to 
the same disclosure requirements that all Saudi listed companies follow in the Saudi 
environment. The results of previous studies regarding this association are mixed. While a 
number of studies (Wallace et al. 1994; Craven and Marston,1999; Trabelsi and Labelle, 2006; 
Barako and Tower, 2008; Owusu-Ansah,1998; Joshi and Al-Bastaki, 2000; Abdelsalam et al., 
2007; Eng and Mak, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Desoky, 2009) are consistent 
with the current study’s finding, where they found no association between industry type and 
CIR total, other studies reveal that this relationship seems to be significant using different 
categories for industries (e.g. financial and non-financial, IT industry or not, or industry sector), 
such as Ismail (2002), Oyelere et al. (2003), Xiao et al. (2004), Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) 
and Alshowaiman (2008). Consequently, the proposed significant relationship between 
industry type of Saudi listed companies and CIR total, which is represented by H 1.6, is rejected 
in the current study. 
Only weak evidence was found to support the effect of audit type on the level of internet 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia. The bivariate analyses show a positive association between audit 
type and CIR total at the 1% significance level. However, audit type was found to have a 
positive relationship, although not significant in all of the multivariate analyses models. Most 
of the prior studies documented either a positive or no significant relationship. Many studies, 
consistent with the current study’s finding, found no evidence for the significance of the 
relationship between the Big4 companies and the level of CIR such as Hossain et al. (1994), 
Barako et al. (2006), Eng and Mak (2003), Aly et al. (2010), Hassan et al. (1999), Al-Modahki 
(1995), Al-Saeed (2006b), Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) and Aly et al. (2010). Likewise, 
Forker (1992) and Wallace et al. (1994) observed a positive yet insignificant relationship. 
However, on the other hand, Xiao et al. (2004); Trabelsi and Labelle (2006), Al-Shammari, 
(2007), Craswell and Taylor (1992), Ahmed (1996), Mahmood (1999), Al-Motrafi (2008) and 
Kelton and Yang (2008) found a significantly positive relationship. Presumably, the rationale 
justification for this result might be that the auditors’ responsibility is limited to the 
requirements of mandatory disclosure. Thus, in general, auditors do not request their clients to 
report additional information that exceeds the requirements of the accounting standards (Al-
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Saeed, 2006a). This may also indicate that auditors in Saudi Arabia are not so far involved in 
the CIR practices. 
Based on above arguments and the multivariate analyses results of the current study, the 
hypothesis that assumes a significant relationship between audit type and CIR total of the Saudi 
listed companies (H1.7) is rejected. 
Although the findings regarding firm characteristics are contradicted, three of them, namely 
firm size, liquidity and dividends, are found to be significantly associated with CIR total. 
According to the above discussion, the current study’s findings conclude that firm 
characteristics are considered significant factors that motivate the decision-making regarding 
CIR by Saudi listed companies. This answers the first sub-question Q.2-1, and H1 on the 
influence of firm characteristics variables on CIR total is accepted. 
Table 6- 16 illustrates a summary of the tested hypotheses and the findings of the regression 
analysis of the relationships between firm characteristics variables and CIR total. 
 
Table 23:6-16: A summary of the hypotheses and findings of firm characteristics variables 
Variables Hypothesis No.     
 
Expected sign Finding 
sign 
Finding significance Hypothesis status 
Firm size 1.1 + + Significant at 1% level  Accepted 
Firm growth 1.2 +/- - Insignificant Rejected  
Leverage 1.3 +/- + Insignificant Rejected 
Liquidity 1.4 +/- - Significant at 10% level  Accepted* 
Dividends 1.5 +/- + Significant at 10% level Accepted ** 
Industry type  1.6 +/- + Insignificant Rejected 
Audit type 1.7 +/- + Insignificant Rejected 
             *   In reduced models only. 
             ** Only in un-transformation reduced model. 
 
6.6.2 Corporate governance variables  
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, corporate governance variables include three main sets of variables: 
board of directors’ variables, ownership structure variables and audit committee variables. The 
results of each group are discussed in detail in the following sections.  
6.6.2.1 Board of Directors 
 
To explore the impact of corporate board of directors’ characteristics variables on CIR total, 
four variables, namely board size, board independence, board frequency of meeting and role 
duality, were investigated. A summary of the results of these variables is provided in Table 6-






Table 24:6-17: A summary of the findings of board of directors variables 
Board Variables Bivariate analysis Full regression Reduced Regression 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Board size +/*** +/*** + + + + + + 
Board independence -/ ** -/*** + + +    
Board frequency of meeting - - - - /* - -/ * -/* - 
Role duality + + + + + + + + 
Note: 1. Pearson Correlation / 2. Spearman's rho / 3. Un-transformation model / 4. Log transformation model / 5. Bootstrap model / 6. 
Reduced model un-transformation model/ 7. Reduced model log transformation model / 8. Reduced model bootstrap 
- *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
   As indicated in Table 6-17, bivariate and multivariate analyses reveal contradictory results 
regarding board size variable. Only the bivariate analysis shows a significantly positive 
relationship at the 1% level; however, the multivariate analysis shows that board size has a 
positive relationship with CIR total although this is not statistically significant. This means that 
the size of the board of directors in Saudi listed companies has no influence on the level of CIR 
total. Agency theory provides an explanation for the positive relation between board size and 
CIR total. As the shareholders select the board of directors to represent their interests, these are 
expected to provide a high level of disclosure (Davidson et al., 1996). Moreover, by increasing 
the board size, the chance of widening the experiences diversity on the board may increase, 
which in turn can improve the disclosure practice (Abdel-Fattah, 2008). In the Saudi context, 
the insignificant relationship could be attributed to the notion that the geographic location of a 
country can mitigate the relationship between board size and the level of voluntary disclosure 
(Samaha et al., 2015). This insignificant relationship is consistent with many prior studies (e.g. 
Lakhal, 2003; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008; Al-Motrafi, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Al-Shetwi et al., 2011; Arafa, 2012). 
Based on the statistical findings of the multivariate analysis, the current study finds no evidence 
on the influence of board size on CIR total in the Saudi context. Accordingly, H2.1 is rejected. 
Similarly, board independence is found to be significantly negative in only the bivariate 
analysis at the 5% level and at the 1% level in the first and second models, respectively. In 
contrast, the multivariate analysis found no evidence of a significant influence of board 
independence on CIR total of Saudi listed companies. These different results may be attributed 
to the variation in the legal and institutional environments of countries, which affect the 
independent directors’ role on the board (Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Furthermore, the concept of 
board independence is considered a new concept in developing countries that have recently 
implemented corporate governance practices, which makes it more difficult to apply these 
(Mahadeo et al., 2012). Independence of the board may be subject to question since a sense of 
loyalty may occur between the independent directors and those members who appointed them 
in the companies. Hence, the independent directors may not monitor management behaviour 
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as adequately as they should do, and therefore they may have no influence on the level of online 
disclosure. Another concern that may affect board independency is that those independent 
directors may lack the appropriate information about the company. This may result in the loss 
of effective monitoring and independence, which in turn limits the independent directors’ 
incentives to increase the quantity and quality of disclosed information via the website of the 
companies (Weir and Laing, 2000). In developing countries, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
these criticisms are increasing where there is no clear rule or criterion for appointing 
independent directors (Abdel-Fattah, 2008). In particular, culture, informal social relations and 
political connections have a crucial influence on the Saudi corporate environment to a large 
extent (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008 and Albassam, 2014). 
Although the current study’s findings are consistent with many previous studies (Ho and Wong, 
2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Lakhal, 2003; Xiao et al., 2004; Mangena and Pike, 2005; 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Barako and Tower, 2008; Elsayed, 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan, 2010; Arafa, 2012; Zabri et al., 2016), other studies have reported mixed results. For 
example, while Eng and Mak (2003), Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Abdel-Fattah (2008) and 
Albassam (2014) find a negative relation, Forker (1992), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Lim et 
al. (2007), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Kelton and Yang (2008) and Samaha et al. (2015) find 
a positive relationship between board independence and level of disclosure. Based on the 
statistical findings of the multivariate analysis, no evidence is found in the current study for 
the influence of board independence on CIR total in the Saudi context. Consequently, H 2.2 is 
rejected in this study. 
Board frequency of meeting has been found to have a negative and marginally significant 
relationship with CIR total in the multivariate analysis only at the 10% level of significance. 
This implies that more frequent board meetings may not enhance the level of corporate 
disclosure and reducing board frequent meetings may increase the level of disclosure. This 
negative association can be explained by stewardship theory, which proposes that executive 
mangers are expected to be trustworthy, thus, there is no need for the board of directors to 
participate in the company’s routine activities (Letza et al., 2004; Monks and Minow, 2011). 
Furthermore, more frequent board meetings can raise the cost in the form of meeting fees, 
travel expenses and managerial time, which may negatively affect the disclosure level (Vafeas, 
1999). Jensen (1993) supports this by stating that frequent board meetings are not necessary 
unless the company is facing difficulties. This result is in line with many studies (Xie et al., 
2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Jackling and Johl, 2009). In the light of the above discussion, 
the multivariate analysis findings provide evidence that the frequency of board meetings has a 
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significant influence on CIR total hence, H 2.3 is accepted.  
Regarding role duality, the results of the current study indicate that none of the role duality 
coefficients are statistically significant. This means that the segregation between the chairman 
and CEO roles in Saudi listed companies has no influence on the level of CIR total although 
most of the Saudi listed companies (94.1%) separate the two roles of chairman and CEO, as 
recommended by the SCGC. However, the results reveal a positive relationship between role 
duality and CIR level. According to stewardship theory, CEOs are trustworthy people who aim 
to work in the best interests of the company and shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). Thus, the 
combination of the two roles should not impair the board’s effectiveness in governing and 
monitoring management and may lead to enhancing the disclosure level (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002). Moreover, role duality enables CEOs, due to their good knowledge of the company, to 
facilitate communication and information flow between the board and management, which in 
turn could improve the decision-making process by the board and ensure a higher level of 
disclosure (Baliga et al., 1996; Brickley et al., 1997; Mathieu et al., 2006). Additionally, 
Samaha et al. (2015) suggest that the geographic location of a country can moderate the 
relationship between role duality and disclosure level, which is worth taking into consideration 
in the Saudi context. Consistent with the current study, many studies that examine the 
relationship between role duality and CIR find this relationship to be insignificant (e.g. Haniffa, 
1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; 
Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Al-
Motrafi, 2008; Kent and Stewart, 2008; Abdel-Fattah, 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 
2010; Elsayed, 2010; Arafa, 2012; and	Kamalluarifin, 2016). Based on the statistical findings, 
H 2.4 on the significant association between role duality and CIR total is rejected in the current 
study.  
In brief, as can be seen from the discussion above, the results indicate a weak association 
between board characteristics variables and the CIR total in Saudi listed companies, whereby 
only one variable, namely board frequency of meeting, is marginally significant. This means 
that H2, which postulated a significant relationship between board of directors variables and 
CIR total by Saudi listed companies, is not supported in the current study and this also answers 
the third sub-question Q2.3. Table 6-18 summaries the hypotheses and findings of the board 

















Finding significance Hypothesis 
status 
Board size 2.1 +/- + Insignificant Rejected 
Board independence 2.2 +/- + Insignificant Rejected  
Board frequency of meeting 2.3 +/- - Significant at 10% level Accepted 
Role duality 2.4 +/- + Insignificant Rejected 
 
 
6.6.2.2 Ownership structure 
 
Table 6-19 shows the results related to the four ownership features examined in this study, 
which are block holder ownership, director ownership, institutional ownership and government 
ownership. As can be seen from the table, the results indicate the absence of the relationship 
between ownership structure and CIR total. The following paragraphs discuss the results of 
each variable. 
 
Table 26:6-19: A summary of the findings of ownership structure variables 
Ownership structure 
variables 
Bivariate analysis Full regression Reduced Regression 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Block holder ownership    
 +
** +*** + + +    
Director ownership 
 + - 
- - -    
Institutional ownership 
 + + 
- - -    
Government ownership 
 +
*** +*** - - - - - - 
Note: 1. Pearson Correlation / 2. Spearman's rho / 3. Un-transformation model / 4. Log transformation model / 5. Bootstrap model / 6. 
Reduced model un-transformation model/ 7. Reduced model log transformation model / 8. Reduced model bootstrap 
- *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
With respect to block holder ownership, only the bivariate analysis shows a significant 
relationship between block holder ownership and CIR total at the 5% and 1% level in the first 
and second models, respectively, yet the multivariate analysis fails to provide any evidence for 
the significance of this relationship. This result implies that the percentage of shareholders who 
hold 5% or more has no influence on the level of corporate internet disclosure. This result finds 
support in the prior research by Ashbaugh et al. (1999); Eng and Mak (2003); Al-Saeed 
(2006b); Ghazali and Weetman (2006); Abdelsalam et al. (2007); Al-Motrafi (2008); Abdel-
Fattah (2008); and Arafa (2012). In contrast, other studies (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; and Desoky, 2009) find a positively significant association 
between block holder ownership and level of disclosure. Also, this finding is in contrast to 
Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Kelton and Yang (2008) and Elsayed (2010), who report a 
significant negative relationship. These inconsistent results of previous studies may be due to 
contextual differences. While developed countries obtain efficient external governance 
structures that can improve corporate disclosure, developing countries experience, in general, 
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poor legal systems, which may affect the quality and level of disclosure (Bauwhede and 
Willekens, 2008; Robertson et al., 2012; Salterio et al., 2013). However, it may be worthwhile 
to note that other factors may influence the association between block holder ownership and 
CIR total, such as the type of block holders, i.e. internal, external, and the company’s 
performance. Moreover, Ghazali (2004) suggests that the non-significant relationship of block 
holder ownership with CIR total could be attributed to include other aspects of ownership 
structure (director, institutional, and government) in the regression models, even though no 
high correlation is found between them. According to the findings of the multivariate analysis, 
hypothesis 3.1, which posited a significant relationship between block holder ownership and 
CIR total in the Saudi listed companies, is rejected. 
Another conflict in the results between bivariate and multivariate analyses is related to 
government ownership. Based on the findings of the bivariate analysis, it is found that 
government ownership is positively significant at the 1% level. In contrast, all statistical results 
of the multivariate analysis reveal that there is no significant association between government 
ownership and CIR total and that the direction of this relationship is negative. This means that 
government ownership does not affect the online disclosure of Saudi listed companies. A 
possible explanation of this result is that in a developing country like Saudi Arabia, it may be 
expected that companies with high government ownership have a strong political connection; 
hence, according to the political theory, they may disclose less detailed information online to 
protect the political interests of their beneficial government owner (Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006). In addition, the governmental owners are more likely to obtain the required information 
internally as they probably have easier access to the company’s different sources (Eng and 
Mak, 2003). Based on information cost theory, as long as the needed information is available 
on demand internally, there is no reason to expend additional costs to disclose more 
information on the company’s website (Xiao et al., 2004). In the Saudi context, government 
owners in companies with a high proportion of governmental ownership, such as SABIC and 
the Saudi Electricity company, are foreseen as long-term investors and their shares are not 
traded in public; therefore, they lack the incentive for internet-based voluntary disclosures due 
to the weak demand for disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003 and Xiao et al., 2004). This finding is 
in line with many prior studies that report the same negative and insignificant relationship (e.g. 
Xiao et al., 2004; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Al-Motrafi, 2008; 
Alshowaiman, 2008; Arafa, 2012). Based on the empirical findings of the multivariate analysis, 
this study fails to find any support for a significant association between government ownership 
and CIR total in Saudi listed companies. Consequently, H 3.4 is rejected in the current study. 
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Both director and institutional ownership show a non-significant relationship; however, the 
bivariate and multivariate analyses show differences in direction. Regarding director 
ownership, no empirical evidence is found to support the association between director 
ownership in Saudi listed companies and CIR total. The results suggest that the percentage of 
total shares owned by the director has no influence on CIR total in the Saudi stock exchange. 
It is likely that the logic for the negative result is that director ownership is expected to support 
the interests of shareholders and, therefore, decrease the need for monitoring and controlling 
management behaviour by shareholders (Kelton and Yang, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012). Thus, 
companies with higher percentage of director ownership may have less incentive to provide 
more voluntary disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). Furthermore, the absence of an association 
between director ownership and CIR total may be attributed to the low proportion of director 
ownership in the Saudi context (the mean of director ownership is only 12.72 %), which is not 
enough to promote managers to produce more disclosure to substitute shareholder monitoring 
(Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Many previous studies confirm the findings of this study (e.g. 
Wallace and Naser, 1995; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Nagar et al., 2003; 
Mangena and Pike, 2005; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Samaha 
et al., 2012; Arafa, 2012; Nekhili et al., 2016). The statistical findings of the current study 
provide no evidence for the significant influence of director ownership on CIR total. Hence, H 
3.2 is rejected. 
In terms of institutional ownership, the same negative and insignificant results are found where 
institutional ownership seems to have no explanatory power over CIR total in Saudi listed 
companies. A possible justification for this insignificant relationship is proposed by Ruiz-
Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011), who state that institutional owners may focus on short-
term investments, which results in less incentive to affect the level of disclosure. Xiao et al. 
(2004) also suggest that institutional ownership influence does not exceed the boundaries of 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Therefore, larger shareholding by institutional owners has 
no effect on motivating voluntary online disclosure. In addition, it is argued that institutional 
investors have internal access to the required information through their appointed 
representatives on the board; hence, disclosing more information on the company’s website is 
worthless (Abdel-Fattah, 2008). These findings are consistent with those of Haniffa (1999), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Celik et al. (2006), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Abdel-Fattah 
(2008) and Arafa (2012). Accordingly, as the results of both the bivariate and multivariate 
analyses suggest no association between institutional ownership and CIR total in Saudi listed 
companies, hypothesis 3.3 is rejected.   
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In summary, it is found that all ownership structure variables have no significant relationship 
with CIR total and no direct impact on the online disclosure practices exercised by Saudi listed 
companies. This leads to the rejection of H3, which proposed that there is a significant 
relationship between ownership structure variables and CIR total by Saudi listed companies, 
and answering the fifth sub-question Q2.5. Table 6-20 presents the hypotheses and results of 
the ownership structure variables.  











Finding significance Hypothesis 
status 
Block holder ownership  3.1 +/- + Insignificant Rejected 
Director ownership 3.2 +/- - Insignificant Rejected  
Institutional ownership 3.3 +/- - Insignificant Rejected 
Government ownership 3.4 +/- - Insignificant Rejected 
 
6.6.2.3 Audit committee 
 
Three variables related to audit committee have been examined in this study to investigate their 
impact on CIR total in Saudi listed companies. Mixed results have been found in the statistical 
analyses of audit committee variables. While the bivariate analysis indicates a significant 
relationship for two variables, only one variable is found significant in the multivariate 
analysis. The findings of both the bivariate and multivariate analyses are presented in Table 6-
21. 
Table 28:6-21: A summary of the findings of audit committee variables 
Audit committee variables  Bivariate analysis Full regression Reduced Regression 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Audit committee size +*** +*** - - -    
Audit committee frequency of meeting - - - - -    
Audit committee independence -*** -*** -*** -** -*** -*** -*** -** 
 
 
The results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses show disagreement in both the 
significance and the direction of the relationship between audit committee size and CIR total. 
While audit committee size is found to be a positively significant variable in the bivariate 
analysis at the 1% level of significance, multivariate analysis, on the other hand, shows that it 
has a negative but insignificant relationship with CIR total. This suggests that the size of the 
audit committee is not an influential factor in motivating internet-based disclosure in the Saudi 
context. It is possible that this negative association indicates that an audit committee with a 
large size can suffer from poor communication, coordinating problems and slow decision-
making, which result in a less efficient impact on disclosure (see: Felo et al., 2003; Bédard and 
Gendron, 2010b; and Kent and Stewart, 2008). Small-sized committees, on the other hand, are 
more likely to have effective monitoring and coordinating and can focus on their 
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responsibilities (Felo et al., 2003). Moreover, Kent and Stewart (2008) claim that small-sized 
audit committees are also expected to have greater reliance on the external auditors, which can 
substitute the influence of audit committee size on the corporate disclosure practice. In 
addition, Saudi listed companies, adhering the compulsory article of SCGC (no.14), which 
mandates that the audit committee should consist of at least three members, have almost 
committed to this minimum size (the mean is 3.36, see Table 6-1), which possibly reduces the 
effect of audit committee size on CIR. This suggests that audit committee quality is more 
effective than its size in providing more corporate disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). This 
finding is similar to the results of many prior studies, such as Felo et al., 2003, Magena and 
Pike, 2005; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Bédard and Gendron, 2010b; Katmun, 2012; and Ahmed, 
2015. Based on the statistical results of the multivariate analyses, H. 4.1 on the significant 
association between audit committee size and CIR total is not supported, and is therefore 
rejected.  
 
Regarding audit committee frequency of meeting, identical results are found from the bivariate 
and multivariate analyses. The statistical results reveal the same insignificant and negative 
relationship between audit committee frequency of meeting and CIR total indicating that this 
variable does not have any impact on the level of internet reporting in the Saudi context. It is 
proposed in the literature that more frequent meetings are, to some extent, related to effective 
monitoring, which may result in high-quality transparent disclosure. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that the high number of meetings will lead to an effective disclosure, as it 
may be a sign of lack of efficiency (Bédard and Gendron, 2010b). For example, meeting more 
frequently may be needed to discuss issues arising from the required disclosure of internal 
control difficulties or to approve a large number of non-audit services (ibid). Bédard and 
Gendron (2010b) report that 32% of their reviewed studies found a positive relationship 
between audit committee frequency of meeting and corporate disclosure, 3% found a negative 
relationship, while the remaining (66%) found no significant relationship. However, the 
empirical findings of the current study are consistent with many previous studies (e.g. Felo et 
al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Bédard and Gendron, 2010b; 
Ahmed 2015). Since no empirical evidence is found to support the significant influence of audit 
committee frequency of meeting on CIR total of Saudi listed companies, hypothesis 4.2 is 
rejected. 
With respect to audit committee independence, the findings of the bivariate analysis are nearly 
similar to those of the multivariate analysis. The percentage of independent members in the 
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audit committee is the only audit committee characteristic that has an explanatory power over 
CIR total at the 1% level of significance (at the 5% level in the full log transformation model 
and reduced bootstrap model). The result implies that the extent of total voluntary internet 
disclosure decreases with the higher percentage of independent members in the audit 
committee. Interestingly, this negative association is in contrast to the findings of most of the 
previous studies (Xie et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Bédard and Gendron, 2010b; 
Nelson et al., 2010; Katmun, 2012; Ahmed, 2015; Samaha et al., 2015 and Nekhili et al., 2016). 
Many possible reasons for this negative result are suggested. One suggested justification is that 
the concept of audit committee independence is in its initial stages in developing countries 
which have recently implemented corporate governance practices, which may cause such a 
negative relationship (Mahadeo et al., 2012). Another reason is related to the fact that the 
independent members themselves may either have limited time for active participation in the 
committee or have previous experiences in very different industry sectors, which could 
negatively influence corporate disclosure (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Jiraporn et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the independence of the audit committee may be a debatable issue in developing 
countries, as the appointment of the independent members is affected by political connections 
and informal social relations, which dominate, to a large extent, the Saudi business 
environment (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Albassam, 2014). 
Finally, it is proposed that independent members in the audit committee may play a substitute-
monitoring role regarding voluntary disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). That is, the increased 
percentage of independent members in the audit committee reduces the need for voluntary 
disclosure. This substitute association between audit committee independence and voluntary 
disclosure may lead to such a negative relationship. In Saudi listed companies, there is a great 
independence of audit committees12 (88% have more than 50% independent members and 41% 
of them have 100% independent members), which is consistent with the notion of substitution.  
However, some studies find the same negative relationship, albeit insignificant (e.g. Felo et al., 
2003; Kent and Stewart, 2008). This study provides evidence that audit committee 
independence has a significant influence on CIR total. Therefore, hypothesis H 4.3 is 
supported. 
In light of the abovementioned discussions, it can be concluded that audit committee variables 
have a little effect on disclosing more voluntary information on the Saudi listed companies’ 
                                                
 
12 Also, Saudi companies comply with the mandatory article 14 of SCGC, which affirms that executive board 
members should not be included in the audit committee. 
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websites. The result of the current study indicates some support for H4, which postulated a 
significant relationship between corporate governance variables and CIR total by Saudi listed 
companies, and answers the seventh sub-question Q 2.7. A summary of the hypotheses and 
results of audit committee variables is illustrated in Table 6-22.  
 
     Table 29:6-22: A summary of the hypotheses and findings of audit committee variables 
Audit committee variables Hypothesis 
No. 








Audit committee size 4.1 +/- - Insignificant Rejected 
Audit committee frequency of meeting 4.2 +/- - Insignificant Rejected 
Audit committee independence 4.3 +/- - Significant at 1% level Accepted 
6.7 Summary  
 
This chapter aims to determine the significant factors that affect CIR practice by Saudi listed 
companies. It discusses the empirical findings of the association between CIR and the 
explanatory variables. The chapter starts with the descriptive statistics for the independent 
variables, after which two types of analyses, bivariate and multivariate, are conducted to 
determine the significance of their relationships with CIR total. Regarding the bivariate 
analysis, both parametric and non-parametric tests are used to ensure that the same inferences 
are reached. Pearson's correlation as a parametric test and Spearman's correlation as a non-
parametric test are used for the continuous variables, whereas T-test as a parametric test and 
Mann Whitney test as a non-parametric test are used for the dummy variables. The multivariate 
analysis is based on the multiple regression analyses. By examining the assumptions of the 
OLS model, it has been found that the normality assumption is violated. Thus, the log 
transformation model has been performed in addition to the un-transformation model, while 
the bootstrapping model is performed as a robustness check for the results and the reduced 
model as a supplemental analysis. The findings show that a number of firm characteristics are 
significantly affecting CIR total, namely firm size, liquidity and dividends. That is, large size 
companies, which have low liquidity ratio and give out dividends are more likely to increase 
the level of internet reporting.  However, board characteristics variables reveal a weak 
association with CIR total whereby only board frequency of meeting barely has a significant 
relationship. It was found that less frequent board meetings may enhance the level of internet 
reporting. On the other hand, all the ownership structure variables have no direct influence on 
CIR total, while of the three audit committee variables, committee independence is the only 
significant variable at the 1% level. This result implies that the extent of total internet reporting 
decreases with the higher percentage of independent members in the audit committee. By 
highlighting the relationship between CIR total and the explanatory variables, this chapter 
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answers the second research question and its sub-questions. The next chapter discusses the 
empirical findings that analyse the relationship between each of the CIR components and the 
































EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: CORPORATE 
INTERNET REPORTING COMPONENTS   
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, the association between the independent variables and the main components of 
CIR will be examined. The aim is to provide a more in-depth understanding of the determinants 
of internet reporting practice in Saudi listed companies. It is also intended to answer the second 
question of this study concerning the relationship between the CIR components and the 
independent variables. The first section, 7.2, represents the findings of the bivariate analysis, 
whereby both parametric and non-parametric tests are provided. Next, section 7.3 demonstrates 
the multivariate analysis that investigates the relationship between the components of CIR and 
the independent variables using the un-transformation, log transformation, and bootstrap 
models. The results obtained from the regression models for all CIR components are discussed 
in detail in this section as well. Finally, a summary for this chapter is given in the last section, 
7.4.  
7.2 Bivariate analysis  
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient as a parametric test and Spearman's correlation coefficient as 
a non-parametric test were performed to test the individual relationships between components 
of CIR and the independent continuous variables. The results of these tests are summarised in 
appendix 15.   
Most of the continuous variables are significantly correlated with all the components of CIR 
according to the results of Pearson and Spearman tests. However, some variables reveal an 
insignificant correlation in both tests, namely firm growth, board frequency of meeting, 
director ownership, institutional ownership and audit frequency of meeting. Both the Spearman 
and Pearson correlation coefficients state that firm size is correlated with all CIR  
groups at the 1% level of significance, while leverage is significantly correlated at different 
levels with all CIR components, except for timeliness, where the correlation is insignificant in 
both tests. Moreover, the Pearson coefficients demonstrate that liquidity is significantly 
correlated with content, presentation, and usability of CIR at the 1% level of significance and 
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with timeliness and audit at the 5% level. In contrast, the Spearman coefficients indicate an 
insignificant correlation between liquidity and all CIR components. Furthermore, firm growth 
is the only firm characteristic continuous variable that is insignificantly correlated with all CIR 
components in both correlation tests. Regarding board of directors variables, it can be noted 
that companies with large boards tend to disclose more information of all types on their website 
at the 1% level of significance in both the Pearson and Spearman tests. Similarly, board 
independence shows the same significant correlation with all CIR components but at different 
levels of significance in the Pearson and Spearman tests. In contrast, board frequency of 
meeting is insignificantly correlated with all CIR components in both tests. Both block holder 
and government ownership are significantly correlated with CIR components, but at different 
levels. While block holder ownership correlates only with content, timeliness and usability at 
the 5% level of significance in the Pearson test, it is correlated with all CIR components in the 
Spearman test at the 1% level (content), the 5% level (timeliness, usability and audit) and the 
10% level (presentation). On the other hand, government ownership is correlated at the 1% 
level of significance with all types of CIR except audit in the Pearson test, which shows an 
insignificant correlation. However, both correlation tests reveal that director ownership and 
institutional ownership are insignificantly correlated with the entire components of CIR, with 
only one exception regarding institutional ownership, which is correlated with audit at the 5% 
level of significance in the Spearman correlation test only. With respect to audit committee 
variables, companies with large audit committees are more interested in disclosing all types of 
information at the 1% level of significance in both the Pearson and Spearman tests. Similarly, 
audit committee independence shows a significant correlation at the same level (1%) with all 
CIR components in both correlation tests, with the exception of timeliness in the Pearson test 
(correlated at the 5% level). According to both the Pearson and Spearman tests, audit frequency 
of meeting is the only audit committee variable that is insignificantly correlated with all CIR 
components.  
To examine the relationship between all CIR components and categorical variables, both a 
parametric test (T-test) and a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney test) were performed. The 
tables 7-1 and 7-2 illustrate the findings of these two tests, which are identical to a large extent 
in both tests.  
Regarding role duality, no considerable difference was found in the mean and mean rank 
between companies that separate the roles of CEOs and chairmen and those which have a dual 
role. Both the T-test and the Mann Whitney test indicate that role duality has an insignificant 
correlation with all CIR components. Considering firm characteristics variables, only industry 
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type is insignificantly correlated with all types of CIR in both the T-test and Mann Whitney 
test, while audit type and dividends are significantly correlated with all CIR components in 
both tests. The significance level for the correlation between audit type and CIR components 
is 1% in both tests except for presentation and audit in the T-test, which is 5%. Similarly, both 
tests show that the dividends variable is significantly correlated at the 1% level of significance 
with all components of CIR but at the 5% level for audit in the Mann Whitney test.  
Table 30:7-1:  Mann-Whitney test for the correlation between CIR components and categorical variables 
Mann-
Whitney test 
content presentation timeliness usability audit  
 Mean rank  Z value Mean rank  Z value Mean rank  Z value Mean rank  Z value Mean rank  Z value 
Role duality  1.077  -.760  .498  .756  .188 
0 84.48  86.21  85.03  84.79  85.33  
1  101.75  74.10  93.00  96.90  88.25  
Audit type  3.764***  2.908***  3.803***  3.729***  3.203*** 
0 58.11  64.46  57.90  58.39  62.85  
1 92.86  91.15  92.91  92.78  91.59  
Dividends  4.045***  4.263***  4.604***  3.024***  2.537** 
0 70.25  69.51  68.18  74.11  76.20  
1 100.75  101.49  102.82  96.89  94.80  
Industry type  .136  .011  - .567  .929  .096 
0 85.11  85.47  87.14  82.81  85.23  
1  86.17  85.56  82.72  90.06  85.96  
 
Table 31:7-2: T-test for the correlation between CIR components and categorical variables 
T- test content presentation timeliness usability audit  
 Mean  T value Mean  T value Mean  T value Mean  T value Mean  T value 
Role duality  .750  -.663  .440  .833  .324 
0 .55188  .44784  .42708  .54769  .47210  
1 .60143  .42308  .45556  .57222  .50000  
Audit type  3.081***  2.288**  4.272***  4.142***  2.061** 
0 .45873  .39850  .31790  .48302  .39385  
1 .58060  .45924  .45854  .56689  .49520  
Dividends  3.895***  4.293***  4.901***  3.057***  2.930*** 
0 .49731  .40452  .36078  .52484  .41765  
1 .61227  .48824  .49673  .57342  .52983  
Industry type  .049  -.320  -.532  1.354  .117 
0 .55421  .44896  .43458  .54084  .47196  
1 .55578  .44200  .41887  .56320  .47676  
 
The above-discussed findings of bivariate analysis suggest that there is a significant 
relationship between independent variables and all the components of CIR, although at 
different levels of significance. To investigate these relationships simultaneously, a 
multivariate analysis is conducted for each CIR components. The following section discusses 
the results of this analysis in details.  
7.3 Multivariate analysis for CIR components 
 
To examine the relationship between the independent variables and each category of CIR, three 
multivariate analyses will be applied; these are: the un-transformation, log transformation, and 
bootstrap models. The results of these models are presented in Tables 7-3, 7-4 and 7-5. In 
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addition, the supplemental analysis results, that is, the findings of reduced regression models, 
are presented as well in Tables 7-6, 7-7, 7-8.  
Table 32:7-3: Un-transformation model for CIR components 
Variables content presentation timeliness usability audit 
Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) 
Constant (-1.06) (-.43) (-1.72)* (1.52) (-.83) 
Firm size .52(5.04)*** .50(4.97)*** .53(5.22)*** .47(4.72)*** .45(4.08)*** 
Firm growth .02(.22) -.002(-.03) -.01(-.17) .03(.41) -.06(-.84) 
Leverage .03(.25) .06(.64) -.10(-1.05) .08(.83) .03(.27) 
Liquidity .10(1.35) .08(1.06) .06(.85) .09(1.14) .08(1.03) 
Dividends .12(1.32) .14(1.68)* .20(2.28)** .08(.98) .06(.68) 
Industry type  .03(.33) .01(.09) .06(.71) .09(1.12) .06(.62) 
Audit type .10(1.26) .03(.37) .19(2.47)** .15(2.01)** .05(.56) 
Board size .06(.74) .11(1.41) -.01(-.15) .03(.44) .08(.96) 
Board independence .05(.58) -.003(-.03) -.09(-1.04) .01(.09) .05(.62) 
Board frequency of meeting -.13(-1.60) -.129(-1.66)* -.11(-1.38) -.13(-1.72)* -.07(-.84) 
Role duality .08(1.18) -.026(-.37) .05(.70) .09(1.30) .07(.90) 
Block holder ownership .04(.25) .09(.67) -.001(-.01) .07(.51) -.02(-.13) 
Director ownership -.01(-.12) -.09(-1.14) -.03(-.42) -.03(-.43) -.02(-.20) 
Institutional ownership -.02(-.14) -.16(-1.24) .004(.03) -.14(-1.09) .03(.23) 
Government ownership -.13(-1.15) -.15(-1.34) -.12(-1.06) -.04(-.33) -.12(-1.002) 
Audit com. size -.03(-.36) -.01(-.18) -.03(-.30) .05(.61) -.09(-.97) 
Audit frequency of meeting .01(.13) -.02(-.31) .001(.01) -.03(-.38) -.04(-.51) 
Audit committee independence -.20(-2.73)*** -.14(-1.95)* -.02(-.24) -.11(-1.55) -.26(-3.30)*** 
Adjusted R2 .324 .345 .337 .366 .228 
F 5.295 5.718 5.540 6.156 3.634 
sig .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Table 33:7-4: Log transformation model for CIR components 
Variables content presentation timeliness usability audit 
Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) 
Constant (-1.16) (-.52) (-1.42) (1.49) (-.97) 
Firm size .52(5.14)*** .5(4.95)*** .53(5.21)*** .47(4.76)*** .46(4.17)*** 
Firm growth .09(1.35) .04(.63) .03(.41) .03(.43) .10(1.35) 
Leverage .04(.40) .09(.88) -.07(-.75) .08(.81) .06(.59) 
Liquidity .10(1.30) .09(1.12) .07(.96) .08(1.10) .08(1.01) 
Dividends .12(1.36) .14(1.61) .19(2.22)** .08(.95) .08(.91) 
Industry type  .02(.21) -.02(-.18) .04(.44) .09(1.15) .04(.42) 
Audit type .09(1.21) .02(.30) .17(2.20)** .15(2.04)** .03(.41) 
Board size .06(.79) .12(1.52) .01(.09) .04(.46) .08(.92) 
Board independence .04(.53) -.01(-.17) -.09(-1.07) .01(.07) .06(.66) 
Board frequency of meeting -.14(-1.76)* -.13(-1.59) -.11(-1.43) -.14(-1.80)* -.08(-.96) 
Role duality .09(1.27) -.02(-.30) .05(.78) .09(1.37) .07(.89) 
Block holder ownership .02(.17) .1(.70) .01(.07) .06(.46) -.03(-.18) 
Director ownership -.01(-.09) -.11(-1.35) -.04(-.44) -.03(-.41) -.01(-.06) 
Institutional ownership -.03(-.21) -.18(-1.38) -.01(-.08) -.14(-1.08) .02(.11) 
Government ownership -.14(-1.21) -.18(-1.64) -.13(-1.13) -.04(-.32) -.12(-1.02) 
Audit com. size -.02(-.29) .00(-.01) -.03(-.31) .05(.59) -.07(-.84) 
Audit frequency of meeting .01(.09) -.05(-.65) -.03(-.46) -.02(-.31) -.05(-.65) 
Audit committee independence -.20(-2.64)*** -.14(-1.88)* -.04(-.53) -.11(-1.51) -.26(-3.25)*** 
Adjusted R2 .331 .347 .341 .366 .234 
F 5.424 5.761 5.632 6.158 3.726 
sig .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Table 34:7-5: Bootstrapping model for CIR components 
Variables content presentation timeliness usability audit 
Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) 
Constant -.19(-1.06) -.05(-.43) -.30(-1.72)* .14(1.52) -.20(-.83) 
Firm size .12(5.04)*** .09 (4.97)*** .13(5.22)*** .06(4.72)*** .14(4.08)*** 
Firm growth .004(.22) -.00 (-.03) -.003(-.17) .004(.41) -.02(-.84) 
Leverage .02(.25) .03(.64) -.07(-1.05) .03(.83) .03(.27) 
Liquidity .01(1.35) .01(1.06) .01(.85) .01(1.14) .01(1.03) 
Dividends .05(1.32) .04(1.68)* .08(2.28)** .02(.98) .03(.68) 
Industry type  .01(.33) .002(.09) .02(.71) .02(1.12) .03(.62) 
Audit type .05(1.26) .01(.37) .09(2.47)** .04(2.01)** .03(.56) 
Board size .008(.74) .01(1.41) -.002(-.15) .002(.44) .01(.96) 
Board independence .001 (.58) .00(-.03) -.001(-1.04) .000(.09) .001(.62) 
Board frequency of meeting -.01 (-1.60) -.01 (-1.66) -.01(-1.38) -.01 (-1.72) -.01(-.84) 
Role duality .07 (1.18) -.01(-.37) .04(.70) .04(1.30) .07(.90) 
Block holder ownership .00(.25) .00(.67) .00(-.01) .000(.51) .000(-.13) 
Director ownership .00(-.12) -.001(-1.14) .000(-.42) .000(-.43) .000(-.20) 
Institutional ownership .00(-.14) -.001(-1.24) .000(.03) -.001(-1.09) .000(.23) 
Government ownership -.002(-1.15) -.001(-1.34) -.001(-1.06) .000(-.33) -.002(-1.002) 
Audit com. size -.01(-.36) -.003(-.18) -.01(-.30) .01(.61) -.03(-.97) 
Audit frequency of meeting .001(.13) -.001(-.31) .000(.01) -.001(-.38) -.01(-.51) 
Audit committee independence -.002(-2.73)*** -.001(-1.95)* -.000(-.24) -.001(-1.55) -.003(-3.30)*** 
Adjusted R2 .324 .345 .337 .366 .228 
F 5.295 5.718 5.540 6.156 3.634 
sig .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
              
Table 35:7-6: Un- transformation reduced model for CIR components 
Variables content presentation timeliness usability audit 
Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) 
Constant (-.87) (-.43) (-2.22)** (1.78)* (-1.05) 
Firm size .47(5.52)*** .50(6.00)*** .48(5.61)*** .51(6.21)*** .40(4.33)*** 
Liquidity -.11(-1.77)* -.14(-2.29)** -.05(-.74) -.14(-2.24)** -.09(-1.34) 
Dividends .11(1.66)* .13(2.05)**  .22(3.25)*** .03(.44) .06(.84) 
Audit type .09(1.35) .00(-.002) .17(2.56)** .15(2.34)** .02(.23) 
Board size .10(1.37) .11(1.53) .02(.30) .03(.50) .12(1.62) 
Board frequency of meeting -.13(-1.88)* -.14(-2.06)** -.12(-1.76)* -.10(-1.56) -.10(-1.35) 
Role duality .08(1.32) -.03(- .44) .06(.86) .08(1.22) .05(.69) 
Government ownership -.11(-1.44) -.09(-1.13) -.11(-1.44) .01(.07) -.15(-1.80)* 
Audit committee independence -.17(-2.69)*** -.14(-2.21)** -.04(-.61) -.10(-1.59) -.22(-3.18)*** 
Adjusted R2 .385 .407 .366 .416 .280 
F 12.556 13.662 11.654 14.114 8.188 
sig .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Table 36:7-7: log transformation reduced model for CIR components 
Variables content presentation timeliness usability audit 
Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) 
Constant (-.90) (-.56) (-1.93)* (1.78)* (-1.08) 
Firm size .47(5.54)*** .51(6.08)*** .49(5.73)*** .51(6.21)*** .40(4.38)*** 
Liquidity -.11(-1.75)* -.14(-2.20)** -.06(-.92) -.14(-2.24)** -.09(-1.35) 
Dividends .11(1.62) .12(1.88)* .21(3.13)*** .03(.44) .06(.80) 
Audit type .09(1.33) -.004(-.06) .15(2.32)** .15(2.34)** .02(.26) 
Board size .10(1.36) .11(1.51) .03(.43) .03(.50) .12(1.58) 
Board frequency of meeting -.13(-1.87)* -.13(-2.00)** -.13(-1.95)* -.10(-1.56) -.10(-1.35) 
Role duality .08(1.32) -.02(-.38) .06(.92) .08(1.22) .05(.70) 
Government ownership -.12(-1.54) -.12(-1.55) -.13(-1.62) .01(.07) -.15(-1.81)* 
Audit committee independence -.18(-270)*** -.15(-2.27)** -.07(-1.00) -.10(-1.59) -.22(-3.16)*** 
Adjusted R2 .383 .398 .374 .416 .281 
F 12.470 13.190 12.018 14.114 8.199 
sig .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Table 37:7-8: Bootstrap reduced model for CIR components 
Variables content presentation timeliness usability audit 
Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) Coefficients (T value) 
Constant (-.13) (-.04) (-.33)** (.14)* (-.22) 
Firm size .11(5.52)*** .08(6.00)*** .11(5.61)*** .07(6.21)*** .12(4.33)*** 
Liquidity -.002 (-1.77)* -.002 (-2.29)** -.001(-.74) -.001 (-2.24)** -.002(-1.34)* 
Dividends .04(1.66) .04 (2.05)*  .08(3.25)*** .01(.44) .03(.84) 
Audit type .04(1.35) .00(-.002) .08(2.56)*** .04 (2.34)** .01(.23) 
Board size .01(1.37) .01 (1.53) .003(.30) .002(.50) .02(1.62) 
Board frequency of meeting -.01(-1.88)* -.01 (-2.06)** -.01(-1.76)* -.01(-1.56) -.01 (-1.35) 
Role duality .07(1.32) -.02(- .44) .05(.86) .03(1.22) .05(.69) 
Government ownership -.001(-1.44) -.001(-1.13) -.001(-1.44) .00(.07) -.002 (-1.80)* 
Audit committee independence -.002(-2.69)*** -.001 (-2.21)** .00(-.61) .00(-1.59) -.003(-3.18)*** 
Adjusted R2 .385 .407 .366 .416 .280 
F 12.556 13.662 11.654 14.114 8.188 
sig .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
- *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
From the above tables, it can be seen that the highest adjusted R2 was usability in both the full 
and reduced models (.336 and .416, respectively). However, the lowest adjusted R2 (.23 and 
.28, respectively) was for the audit element of CIR. The other categories (presentation, content 
and timeliness) show an acceptable rate of adjusted R2 which is close to the adjusted R2 of 
usability, ranging from 0.347 to 0.324 in full regression models and from 0.407 to 0.366 in 
reduced models. A detailed discussion of each independent variables group follows.   
7.3.1 Firm characteristics variables 
 
In this section the findings of the association between firm characteristics variables and each 
category of CIR are presented. Table 7-9 summarises the results of both the bivariate and 
multivariate analyses.  
 
   Table 38:7-9: The findings of the relationship between firm characteristics variables and CIR components 
Variables content Presentation 
Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  
Firm size *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Firm growth                 
Leverage * **       ** **       
Liquidity _***     _* _* _* -
*** 
    -** -** -** 
Dividends *** ***    *   *** *** *  * ** * * 
Industry type                  
Audit type *** ***       ** ***       
 
     -Note: 1. Pearson Correlation / 2. Spearman's rho / 3. Un-transformation model / 4. Log transformation model / 5. Bootstrap model / 6.  
     Reduced model un-transformation model/ 7. Reduced model log transformation model / 8. Reduced model bootstrap 








Table 7-9: The findings of the relationship between firm characteristics variables and CIR 
components(Continued) 
Variables Timeliness Usability 
Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Firm size *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Firm growth                 
Leverage         *** ***       
Liquidity -**        -***     -** -** -** 
Dividends *** *** ** ** ** *** *** *** *** ***       
Industry type                  




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Firm size *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Firm growth         
Leverage * **       
Liquidity -**       -* 
Dividends *** **       
Industry type          
Audit type ** ***       
-Note: 1. Pearson Correlation / 2. Spearman's rho / 3. Un-transformation model / 4. Log transformation model / 5. Bootstrap model / 6.  
     Reduced model un-transformation model/ 7. Reduced model log transformation model / 8. Reduced model bootstrap 
     - *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
It can be seen from the above tables that firm size is the only variable to have a strong 
significant association with all CIR components in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses 
at the 1% level of significance, while firm growth and industry type show no relation to any of 
the components of CIR. The relationship of the firm characteristics variables with each CIR 
component individually will be discussed in the following. 
7.3.1.1 Content  
 
According to the results of both the bivariate and multivariate analyses, firm size is found to 
have a positive and significant association with CIR content at the 1% level. In other words, 
the findings suggest that large companies tend to enrich the content of online disclosed 
information more than small companies do. This positive relationship between firm size and 
CIR content can be justified based on agency theory, which proposes that large companies tend 
to disclose more information to reduce high agency costs and to mitigate the information 
asymmetry problem. This result finds support in previous research, such as Marston and Polei 
(2004), Xiao et al. (2004), Al-Motrafi (2008), Kelton and Yang (2008), Aly et al. (2010), 
Elsayed (2010) and Arafa (2012). Based on the empirical evidence on the significant 
association between firm size and CIR content, H1.1 regarding CIR content is accepted. 
Moreover, two variables, namely liquidity and dividends are significantly associated with CIR 
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content at different levels. While liquidity is significantly associated with CIR content at the 
1% level of significance in the bivariate parametric model (Pearson) and at the 10% level in all 
reduced models, the dividends variable is significantly associated at the 1% level in both the 
bivariate models and at 10% level in the reduced un-transformed model. Agency theory can 
explain the relationships between CIR content and both liquidity and dividends. Regarding 
liquidity, companies with a low liquidity ratio tend to disclose more content information online 
to satisfy the needs of shareholders and creditors and to assure them that the liquidity problem 
is being recognized. This finding is similar to that of Wallace et al. (1994). Therefore, H1.4 for 
CIR content is approved. With respect to dividends, agency theory suggests that companies 
that pay dividends may consider the provision of more content information to assure about the 
company’s financial ability and its contribution to the society, to attract investors as well as to 
justify compensation payment. The same result was found in the studies by Archambault and 
Archambault (2003), Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) and Albassam et al. (2015). 
Consequently, H1.5 for CIR content is accepted.  
Although leverage and audit type were found to be significantly associated with CIR content 
in the bivariate models at different levels (at the 10% level and the 5% level for leverage and 
the 1% level for audit type), no support was found in any of the multivariate models. The 
insignificant relationship between leverage and CIR content is consistent with Debreceny et al. 
(2002), Oyelere et al. (2003), Eng and Mak (2003), Al-Saeed (2006b) and Aly et al. (2010). 
While Wallace et al. (1994), Eng and Mak (2003), Xiao et al. (2004), Al-Saeed (2006a) and 
Aly et al. (2010), supporting the result of the audit type variable. Therefore, H1.3 and H1.7 are 
rejected.  
Similarly, the empirical finding showed that CIR content is insignificantly associated with both 
firm growth and industry type in all models. The finding of firm growth is supported by Eng 
and Mak (2003), Ronnie lo (2009) and Albassam (2014), while Eng and Mak (2003), 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Al-Saeed (2006b), Al-Motrafi (2008) and Desoky (2009) found no 
evidence on a significant relationship between CIR content and industry type. Based on the 
above results, H1.2 and H1.6 are rejected.  
7.3.1.2 Presentation  
 
The relationships between CIR presentation and firm characteristics variables are similar to a 
large extent to those of CIR content. Firm size again shows a significant association with CIR 
presentation at the 1% level of significance in all models, indicating that large Saudi companies 
tend to use more presentation tools on their websites to disseminate information. As cost 
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benefit theory explains, presenting and publishing information on the website involves 
facilitating highly cost resources, which large companies are usually able to afford. This 
finding is in line with Debreceny et al. (2002), Marston and Polei (2004), Xiao et al. (2004), 
and Kelton and Yang (2008) and Elsayed (2010). Hence, hypothesis H 1.1 regarding CIR 
presentation is accepted. 
Similar to the CIR content results, both liquidity and dividends are significantly associated with 
CIR presentation, yet at different levels. Liquidity reveals a negative association with CIR 
presentation at the 1% level of significance in the Pearson test and at the 5% level in the three 
reduced models. From the agency theory perspective, companies with a low liquidity ratio tend 
to use different tools of presentation to disclose more information online to meet shareholders’ 
and other users’ needs and to show the company’s awareness of this issue as part of their 
accountability to different users. This result is supported by Wallace et al. (1994). 
Consequently, H1.4 for CIR presentation is accepted. Regarding dividends, the results indicate 
that there is a positive relationship between CIR presentation and dividends at the 1% level of 
significance (in the bivariate models), at the 5% level (in reduced un-transformed model) and 
the 10% level (in the un-transformed, bootstrap, reduced log transformed and reduced bootstrap 
models). This association can be attributed to signalling theory, which proposes that companies 
that pay dividends may use different means of presentation to disclose information on their 
websites to attract investors and signal shareholders’ confidence. Archambault and 
Archambault (2003) and Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) find the same results. Therefore, H 
1.5 is approved.  
Moreover, the multivariate analysis demonstrates that both leverage and audit type variables 
are insignificantly associated with CIR presentation. These findings are consistent with Eng 
and Mak (2003), Al-Saeed (2006b) and Aly et al. (2010). Therefore, H1.3 and H1.7 are 
rejected. Likewise, no evidence was found to support the significant influence of firm growth 
or industry type on CIR presentation. These results are supported by Eng and Mak (2003) and 
Albassam et al. (2015) for firm growth, whereas Eng and Mak (2003), Al-Saeed (2006b) and 
Desoky (2009) present the same insignificant result for industry type. Hence, hypotheses H1.2 
and H1.6 regarding CIR presentation are rejected.    
7.3.1.3 Timeliness 
 
The results of the relationship between CIR timeliness and firm characteristics variables seem 
to fall only into two discrete categories. While three variables, namely firm size, dividends and 
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audit type, are significantly associated with CIR timeliness in all models, the remaining 
variables are insignificantly associated in all models. Regarding the firm size variable, again it 
is significantly associated with CIR timeliness in all models at the 1% level of significance. 
Presumably the logic for this positive result is that large companies are more likely to be 
motivated to disclose timely information since they may encounter more pressure from external 
parties such as investors, governments and the public to report information in a timely manner, 
which requires allocating more resources in adopting the internet to do so. This result is 
supported by the studies of Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008), Ezat 
and El-Masry (2008) and Arafa (2012). Consequently, H 1.1 regarding timeliness is accepted.  
Furthermore, dividends have been found to have a significant and positive relationship with 
CIR timeliness in all models at the 1% level of significance (in the bivariate and reduced 
models) and at the 5% level (in the full regression models). This result can be attributed to 
signalling theory, which assumes that companies that pay dividends may tend to disclose timely 
information on their websites to attract investors and signal both the company’s financial 
ability and shareholders’ confidence. This result is consistent with Archambault and 
Archambault (2003) and Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010). Therefore, H 1.5 is accepted. 
Similarly, audit type reveals a positive influence on CIR timeliness in all models at the 1% 
level of significance in the bivariate and bootstrap reduced models and at the 5% level in the 
remaining models. A possible justification for this result is that the Big4 companies may 
influence their clients, ensuring that they disclose timely information on the website since they 
thus obtain high skills and great experience, while they also seek to protect their reputation. 
The same positive and significant result was found in Abdel-Fattah (2008), Alshowaiman 
(2008) and Kelton and Yang (2008). According to this result, H 1.7 is accepted.  
Although liquidity has been found to have a significant relationship with CIR timeliness at the 
5% level of significance in only one model of bivariate analysis (Pearson), the multivariate 
analysis shows insignificant association in all models. Moreover, no evidence was found for 
the significant association of CIR timeliness with firm growth, leverage or industry type in all 
models. Based on these findings, H 1.2, H 1.3 H1.4 and H 1.6 are rejected.   
7.3.1.4 Usability 
 
The CIR usability findings show that three firm characteristics variables are significantly 
related to CIR usability in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses. While firm size and 
audit type show a significant association with CIR usability in all models, liquidity is 
significantly associated in the Pearson test and reduced regression models only. Firm size, 
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again, reveals a significant and positive association with CIR usability at the 1% level of 
significance. Due to their significant capacities, large companies are more likely than small 
companies to invest more resources in developing useful websites which have many tools to 
ensure the ease of use by large different stakeholders at a low cost. This result is consistent 
with Bollen et al. (2006), Al-Motrafi (2008), Elsayed (2010), Arafa (2012). Hence, hypothesis 
1.1 for CIR usability is accepted.  
Regarding audit type, the bivariate analysis reports a significant relationship between CIR 
usability and audit type at the 1% level of significance. Multivariate analysis confirms this 
relationship at the 5% level in all models. This implies that companies audited by the Big4 are 
more associated with CIR usability than other companies, which may be attributed to the notion 
that the Big4 companies can influence the quality of internet disclosure. Having great 
experience and a high level of skills means that Big4 audit companies are able to provide 
assistance to companies to guarantee greater usability of their websites. This result is similar 
to that of Abdel-Fattah (2008), Kelton and Yang (2008) and Albassam et al. (2015). Therefore, 
hypothesis 1.7 for CIR usability is accepted.  
 Moreover, liquidity has been found to have a negative impact on CIR usability in both the 
bivariate analysis (Pearson) and the multivariate analysis (reduced models) at the 1% and 5% 
levels of significance, respectively. As agency theory suggests, companies with weak liquidity 
may tend to satisfy stakeholders’ needs and mitigate the liquidity problem by designing a useful 
website with more usability features which allow quick and easy access to the required 
information by all users. This negative association was supported by Wallace et al. (1994) and 
Wallace and Naser (1995). Based on this finding, hypothesis 1.4 for CIR usability is accepted.    
Two variables, namely leverage and dividends, have been found to be significantly associated 
with CIR usability in the bivariate analysis at the 1% level of significance. However, these 
relationships are insignificant for all models in the multivariate analysis. Both variables showed 
an insignificant relationship in the study of Albassam et al. (2015), while Bollen et al. (2006) 
report the same association for leverage. In addition, this study fails to find any empirical 
evidence for a significant relationship of firm growth or industry type with CIR usability. The 
same insignificant association between CIR usability and these two variables, firm growth and 
industry type, was reported by Arafa (2012) and Al-Motrafi (2008), respectively. Accordingly, 






The associations between firm characteristics variables and CIR audit are similar to a large 
extent to those of CIR content. Only two variables of firm characteristics have revealed a 
significant association with CIR audit at different levels. Regarding firm size, it appears that 
large Saudi listed companies disclose more audit items on their websites than small companies 
do, at significant level of 1% in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses. Both legitimacy 
and cost benefit theories support this significant association between CIR audit and firm size. 
Since high quality reports and detailed disclosure via the internet are costly, only large 
companies can afford them. These companies tend to increase the level of disclosure for certain 
information, such as audit-related information, so that monitoring costs may be reduced (Gray 
et al., 1995). In addition, as they more visible to the public, large companies consider disclosing 
more information, especially audit items, to enhance their public image and reduce government 
intervention (Debreceny et al., 2002; Oyelere et al., 2003). This result is consistent with many 
studies, such as Archambault and Archambault (2003), Eng and Mak (2003) Xiao et al. (2004), 
Al-Motrafi (2008), Alshowaiman (2008), Kelton and Yang (2008), Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan (2010). Therefore, hypothesis H 1.1 for CIR audit is accepted.  
Furthermore, liquidity has been found to have a significant association with CIR audit in the 
bivariate analysis (Pearson) at the 5% level of significance and in the multivariate analysis 
(reduced bootstrapping model) at the 10% level. This indicates that Saudi listed companies 
with a low liquidity ratio seem to disclose more detailed audit information on their websites in 
comparison to companies with a high liquidity ratio. By disclosing more information, these 
companies try to reassure shareholders and other users while providing the required 
information. The same negative result was reported by Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace and 
Naser (1995) and Abdel-Fattah (2008). Hence, hypothesis H1.4 is accepted.  
The results of the bivariate analysis show that leverage, dividends and audit type are 
significantly associated with CIR audit. However, the multivariate analysis reveals these 
relationships insignificantly. These insignificant relationships were reported by Archambault 
and Archambault (2003) and Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) for leverage, Albassam et al. 
(2015) for dividends, Eng and Mak (2003) for audit type, and Aly et al. (2010) for both leverage 
and audit type. Therefore, hypotheses H1.3, H1.5 and H1.7 for CIR audit are rejected. 
Similar to the results of other CIR components, both firm growth and industry type are found 
to be insignificantly associated with CIR audit in all models of the bivariate and multivariate 
analyses. Arafa (2012) finds the same result for firm growth, while Eng and Mak (2003) and 
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Desoky (2009) report an insignificant association for industry type. Hence, H 1.2 and H 1.6 
regarding CIR audit are rejected.    
In the light of the above discussion, it can be stated that some of the firm characteristics 
variables have been shown to be related to the components of CIR which, answers research 
question 2.2. Accordingly, H1 regarding the significant relationship between firm 
characteristics and CIR components is accepted. In the next section, the relationship between 
CIR components and the first group of corporate governance variables, namely the board 
variables, is discussed in detail.  
 
7.3.2 Board variables 
  
In this group, four variables were examined to determine their association with CIR 
components. The results are presented in Table 7-10. As it can be seen from the table, board 
variables show similar relationship with each CIR component; these relations are demonstrated 
in the following points.   
Table 39:7-10: The findings of the relationship between board variables and CIR components 
Variables Content Presentation 
Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  
Board size *** ***       *** ***       
Board independence (**) (***)       (**) (***)       
Board frequency of meeting    (*)  (*) (*) (*)   (*)   (**) (**) (**) 
Role duality                 
 
Variables Timeliness Usability Audit 
Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Board size *** ***       *** ***       *** ***       
Board 
independence 




     (*) (*) (*)   (*) (*)             
Role duality                         
 
-Note: 1. Pearson Correlation / 2. Spearman's rho / 3. Un-transformation model / 4. Log transformation model / 5. Bootstrap model / 6.  
     Reduced model un-transformation model/ 7. Reduced model log transformation model / 8. Reduced model bootstrap 
 -*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
7.3.2.1 Content 
 
The results of the association between CIR content and board variables in the bivariate and 
multivariate analyses show a noticeable dissimilarity. Only board frequency of meeting shows 
a negative relationship in the multivariate analysis at a 10% level of significance in the log 
transformed model and in all reduced models, while the bivariate analysis reveals an 
insignificant association. This implies that companies with a high frequency of board meetings 
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are less likely to disclose more content information on their websites. Stewardship theory 
attributes this negative relationship to the notion that directors are trustworthy, hence more 
frequent board meetings may not increase the level of content disclosure. More frequent 
meetings are required only if the company is experiencing difficulties. Moreover, it is argued 
that more frequent board meetings may result in high agency cost which, in turn, may decrease 
content disclosure. This negative association was documented by Xie et al. (2003) and Nelson 
et al. (2010). Therefore, H 2.3 regarding CIR content is accepted.  
Again, there is a disagreement among the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses 
results regarding the significant association of board size and board independence with CIR 
content. Concerning board size, while the bivariate analysis reveals a significant relationship 
at the 1% level of significance, the multivariate analysis shows an insignificant relationship 
between CIR content and board size. This suggests that board size is not necessarily an 
influential factor in improving CIR content in Saudi listed companies. This finding is consistent 
with Al-Motrafi (2008), Kent and Stewart (2008) and Arafa (2012). Similarly, board 
independence was found to be negatively associated with CIR content at the significance levels 
of 5% and 1% in the bivariate models, respectively, and no association was found in all the 
multivariate models. This implies that board independence has no explanatory power over CIR 
content. Xiao et al. (2004), Kent and Stewart (2008), Elsayed (2010), Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan (2010), Arafa (2012) and Ahmed (2015) report the same insignificant association 
between CIR content and board independence. Based on these findings, hypotheses H2.1 and 
H2.2 regarding CIR content are rejected.  
With respect to role duality, the current study fails to provide any empirical evidence for the 
significant association with CIR content in all the bivariate and multivariate models. This result 
is supported by Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Abdel-Fattah (2008), Al-Motrafi (2008), 
Elsayed (2010), Kelton and Yang (2008) and Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010), who find 
that role duality has no influence on CIR content. Consequently, H2.4 regarding CIR content 
is rejected.  
7.3.2.2 Presentation 
 
The same results of the relationship between CIR content and board variables have been noted 
for CIR presentation. Once again, board frequency of meeting is the only variable that shows 
a negative and yet significant association with CIR presentation in only the multivariate 
analysis at the 10% level of significance in the un-transformed model and at the 5% level in all 
reduced models. That is, more frequent board meetings are not likely to improve CIR 
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presentation and reducing board frequent meetings may lead to enhanced CIR presentation, 
which may be attributed to the increasing cost associated with more frequent meetings. This 
result is consistent with Xie et al. (2003) and Nelson et al. (2010), who state a negative 
relationship, while Kent and Stewart (2008) and Ahmed (2015) report a significant yet positive 
relationship. Accordingly, 2.3 regarding CIR presentation is accepted. 
Similar to content, only the bivariate analysis shows that both board size and board 
independence are significantly associated with CIR presentation. While board size is positively 
associated at the 1% significance level, board independence is negatively associated at the 5% 
and 1% levels in the Pearson and Spearman tests, respectively. However, the multivariate 
analysis shows that these associations are insignificant. This implies that neither board size nor 
board independence have an impact on CIR presentation in the Saudi context. The result is 
consistent with Elsayed (2010) for board size. Further, Kent and Stewart (2008), Elsayed 
(2010) and Ahmed (2015) confirm the same insignificant relationship for board independence. 
Therefore, hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2 are rejected. Moreover, role duality has been found to 
have no explanatory power over CIR presentation in both the bivariate and multivariate 
analyses. Kelton and Yang (2008) and Elsayed (2010) report the same insignificant relationship 




As seen in Table 7-10, the results of the relationship between CIR timeliness and board 
variables are almost similar to those of CIR content and presentation. Only the multivariate 
reduced models show that board frequency of meeting is negatively associated with CIR 
timeliness at the 10% level of significance. This finding indicates that more frequent meetings 
by the board of directors may lead to the less timely disclosure of information on the 
companies’ websites. To justify this negative relationship, Vafeas (1999) suggests that boards 
may respond to problems present by meeting more often, thus, boards are more likely to meet 
less frequently and disclose timely information when corporate performance has improved. 
This is supported by Xie et al. (2003) and Nelson et al. (2010), who report a negative yet 
insignificant relationship, whereas Kent and Stewart (2008) and Katmun (2012) find a 
significant yet positive association. Consequently, H 2.3 regarding CIR timeliness is accepted.  
Furthermore, both variables of board size and board independence reveal similar results to 
those of CIR content and presentation. While board size has been found to be positively 
associated with CIR timeliness at the 1% level of significance in the bivariate analysis only, 
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board independence has a negative association at 1% level in the bivariate analysis as well. 
None of these two variables has a significant association with CIR timeliness in the multivariate 
analysis. The same findings are reported by Kent and Stewart (2008), Elsayed (2010) and Arafa 
(2012), however, Ahmed (2015) confirms the insignificant association for board independence 
only. Accordingly, hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2 for CIR timeliness are rejected.  
Regarding role duality, as with the results of CIR content and presentation, no evidence was 
found for the significance of the relationship between CIR timeliness and role duality in either 
the bivariate or multivariate analyses. This indicates that role duality is not relevant to the 
effectiveness of timely disclosure practice on the internet by Saudi listed companies. This result 
is consistent with Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008), Ezat and 
El-Masry (2008) and Arafa (2012). Therefore, H2.4 regarding CIR timeliness is not supported.   
7.3.2.4 Usability 
 
Among the four board variables, again only board frequency of meeting shows a significant 
relationship with CIR usability at the 1% level of significance in both the un-transformed and 
log models; however, bivariate analysis shows insignificant association. As such, more 
frequent meetings of the board of directors may result in a decrease in the usability of the 
company’s website. This finding is consistent with Xie et al. (2003) and Nelson et al. (2010), 
who report the same negative result; however, they find this relationship to be insignificant. 
Based on the empirical findings, H2.3 regarding the significant association between board 
frequency of meeting and the CIR usability of Saudi listed companies is accepted. 
In addition, the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses were conflicted regarding the 
significance of the association of board size and board independence with CIR usability. While 
the bivariate analysis reveals that board size has a significant impact on CIR usability at the 
1% level of significance and board independence at the 5% level, all multivariate models show 
that these two variables are insignificant. These results imply that board size and board 
independence are not influential factors on CIR usability. Al-Motrafi (2008) and Arafa (2012) 
support the insignificant relationship between CIR usability and board size, whereas 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Elsayed (2010) and Arafa (2012) confirm the board independence 
result. Hence, hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2 for CIR usability are rejected. In addition, all models 
of the bivariate and multivariate analysis indicate an insignificant association between role 
duality and CIR usability. The current study results suggest that the variation in CIR usability 
of Saudi listed companies cannot be explained by the separation between the CEO and the 
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chairman, which is in line with the studies by Abdel-Salam et al. (2007), Al-Motrafi (2008), 
Elsayed (2010) and Arafa (2012) who report an insignificant association between CIR usability 
and role duality. H2.4 for CIR usability accordingly is thus rejected.  
7.3.2.5 Audit 
 
None of the board variables seem to have an influence on disclosing audit items on the websites 
of Saudi listed companies. The results of the bivariate analysis indicate that board size is 
significantly associated with CIR audit at the 1% level of significance, board independence at 
the 10% level (Pearson) and the 1% level (Spearman), and no association was found for board 
frequency of meeting or role duality with CIR audit. Moreover, all multivariate models show 
an insignificant relationship between the four board variables and CIR audit. According to 
these findings, board variables have proven to be not related to CIR audit in the Saudi context. 
Therefore, hypotheses H2.1, H2.2, H2.3 and H2.4 for the significant association between board 
variables and CIR audit are not supported.  
From the above discussion it can be concluded that only one of board variables, namely board 
frequency of meeting, is considered to be relevant to the components of CIR except for CIR 
audit. The other board variables, i.e. board size, board independence and role duality, have no 
effect on CIR components. Based on these results, H2 regarding the significant relationship 
between board variables and CIR components is not supported and the answer to research 
question 2.4 is clarified. The following section demonstrates the association between 
ownership structure variables, which is the second group of corporate governance variables, 
and CIR components.  
7.3.3 Ownership structure variables 
 
In this study, ownership structure is classified into four variables: block holder ownership, 
director ownership, institutional ownership and government ownership. The results of the 
relationship between those owner structure variables and each CIR components are presented 
in Table 7-11. According to the results, ownership variables show a very weak association with 
all CIR components, which is discussed in detail.    
7.3.3.1 Content 
 
None of the ownership structure variables have been found to have a significant relationship 
with CIR content. Considering block holder ownership and government ownership, the 
bivariate analysis indicates a positive relationship between CIR content and both variables at 
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Table 40:7-11: The findings of the relationship between Ownership structure variables and CIR components 
Ownership variables Content Presentation 
Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  
 1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  
Block holder ** ***        *       
Director   - - - -    - - - - -    
Institutional    - - -    - - - - -    




Timeliness Usability Audit 
Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  
 1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Block holder ** ** -  -    ** **        ** - - -    
Director    - - -    - - - - -    - - - - -    
Institutional     -     - - - - -     **       
Government  *** *** - - - - - - *** *** - - -     *** - - - (*) (*) (*) 
-Note: 1. Pearson Correlation / 2. Spearman's rho / 3. Un-transformation model / 4. Log transformation model / 5. Bootstrap model / 6.  
     Reduced model un-transformation model/ 7. Reduced model log transformation model / 8. Reduced model bootstrap 
-*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
the 5% and 1% levels of significance in the two models, respectively. In contrast, all 
multivariate models show that block holder ownership and government ownership have an 
insignificant relationship with CIR content. This positive and insignificant relationship for 
block holder ownership is supported by Abdel-Fattah (2008), while Abdel-Salam et al. (2007) 
Arafa (2012) and Ahmed (2015) find a negative and yet insignificant relationship between 
block holder ownership and CIR content. Furthermore, the same negative and insignificant 
association between government ownership and CIR content is reported by Al-Motrafi (2008) 
and Arafa (2012). Abdel-Fattah (2008) and Alshowaiman (2008) also report an insignificant 
yet positive association between government ownership and CIR content. Moreover, the results 
of the bivariate and multivariate analyses identically reveal that director ownership and 
institutional ownership are insignificantly associated with CIR content. The insignificant 
relationship between CIR content and these two variables may be attributed to the ease of 
access to the required information that directors have due to their positions and that institutional 
investors have through their representative members on the board. Kelton and Yang (2008), 
Arafa (2012) and Ahmed (2015) indicate that director ownership is associated insignificantly 
with CIR content, whereas Xiao et al. (2004) and Arafa (2012) find no association between 
institutional ownership and CIR content. The results suggest that CIR content in Saudi listed 
companies is not affected by ownership structure. Based on these results, hypotheses H3.1, 
H3.2, H3.3 and H3.4, which relate to the impact of ownership structure on CIR content, are not 







Two ownership variables, block holder ownership and government ownership, show a 
significant relationship with CIR presentation in the bivariate analysis only at the significance 
levels of 10% and 1%, respectively. However, all multivariate models reveal that these 
relationships are insignificant. Block holder ownership is the only ownership variable that has 
a positive relationship with CIR presentation in all models. The insignificant result of block 
holder ownership is consistent with Elsayed (2010) and Ahmed (2015), who find that the 
percentage of shareholders who own 5% or more is not related to CIR presentation.  
In addition, the bivariate and multivariate analyses provide contradictory results regarding 
government ownership regarding both significance and direction. While the bivariate analysis 
shows a positive relationship at the 1% level of significance, the multivariate models reveal a 
negative and insignificant relationship with CIR presentation. The cost benefit theory suggests 
that as long as government shareholders can acquire the required information internally, there 
is no need to bear any additional costs resulting from using presentation tools in online 
disclosure. This result is consistent with Xiao et al. (2004) and Alshowaiman (2008), who 
report an insignificant relationship between government ownership and CIR presentation.  
Furthermore, it is notable that both the bivariate and multivariate analyses reveal identical 
results regarding the direction and the significance of the association between CIR presentation 
and both director and institutional ownership. Concerning director ownership, all statistical 
models show a negative and insignificant relationship with CIR presentation, which is 
supported by Kelton and Yang (2008) and Elsayed (2010). Similarly, institutional ownership 
has the same negative and insignificant association with CIR presentation, which is confirmed 
by Xiao et al. (2004). In summary, it was found that all ownership structure variables have no 
significant or direct influence on the CIR presentation exercised by Saudi companies. 
Consequently, hypotheses H3.1, H3.2, H3.3 and H3.4 regarding the significant relationship 
between ownership variables and CIR presentation are rejected in the current study.  
7.3.3.3 Timeliness 
 
Similar to CIR content and presentation, all ownership variables are insignificantly associated 
with CIR timeliness. With respect to block holder ownership, while the bivariate analysis 
shows a significant association with CIR timeliness at the 5% level of significance, the 
multivariate finds this association to be insignificant. Similarly, government ownership also 
has an insignificant impact on CIR timeliness in only the multivariate analysis, whereas the 
 
216 
bivariate analysis reveals a significant relationship with CIR timeliness at the 1% level. 
Regarding director and institutional ownership, the findings of both the bivariate and 
multivariate analyses fail to provide any empirical evidence on the significant relationship 
between CIR timeliness and director ownership or institutional ownership. This implies that 
the structure of ownership is not an important factor affecting the timeliness of internet 
reporting in Saudi listed companies. However, the negative associations indicate that 
companies that are owned by more concentrated owners, government, directors or institutions, 
are more expected to disclose less timely information in their websites. The insignificant 
association between ownership variables and CIR timeliness finds support in previous research. 
While Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Elsayed (2010) and Arafa (2012) report that ownership 
concentration has no impact on CIR timeliness, Elsayed (2010) and Arafa (2012) report the 
same relationship regarding director ownership. Likewise, Arafa (2012) provides evidence that 
institutional ownership and government ownership do not affect the decision regarding the 
timeliness of CIR. Therefore, hypotheses H3.1, H3.2, H3.3 and H3.4 regarding the significant 
influence of ownership variables on CIR timeliness are rejected.  
7.3.3.4 Usability 
 
As with all the previous components of CIR, block holder ownership has been found to have 
no explanatory power over CIR usability in the Saudi context. Although the bivariate analysis 
demonstrates a positive and significant relationship between block holder ownership and CIR 
usability at the 5% level of significance, the multivariate analysis finds this association to be 
insignificant. This result is in line with Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Elsayed (2010) and Arafa 
(2012), who state that the percentage of shareholders who own 5% or more does not affect CIR 
usability. Further, government ownership is insignificantly associated with CIR usability in the 
multivariate analysis only. However, the results of the bivariate models show a significant 
association at the 1% level of significance. This is supported by Al-Motrafi (2008) and Arafa 
(2012), who report the same negative and insignificant impact for government ownership on 
CIR usability in Saudi and Egyptian companies, respectively.  
Regarding director ownership, the results of all the statistical methods indicate a negative and 
insignificant association with CIR usability. Eng and Mak’s (2003) study states that, in the case 
of small and emerging markets, director ownership has a negative and significant association 
with the level of voluntary disclosure. That is, when director ownership is low, the need for 
monitoring may increase in order to mitigate the agency problem. The cost of monitoring can 
be reduced by increasing the disclosure level as a substitute for monitoring (Eng and Mak, 
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2003), which justifies the negative association. In line with this study’s result, Arafa (2012) 
reports an insignificant relationship between director ownership and CIR usability. Moreover, 
institutional ownership is negatively insignificantly associated with CIR usability in both the 
bivariate and multivariate analyses. The negative relationship indicates that companies with a 
low percentage of institutional ownership are more likely to provide more usable websites. 
Companies with a high percentage of institutional ownership are expected to have a large 
proportion of representative members in the board of directors, which means a flexible and 
well-eased accessibility to the required information without the need to use the website, thus, 
the usability of the website will be lower. The current study’s result is consistent with Elsayed 
(2010) and Arafa (2012), who find that institutional ownership is insignificantly associated 
with CIR usability. Based in the above findings, the current study fails to find evidence for the 
effect of ownership variables on CIR usability; consequently, hypotheses H3.1, H3.2, H3.3 and 
H3.4 related to the impact of ownership variables on CIR usability are rejected.   
7.3.3.5 Audit 
 
In contrast to the other CIR components, government ownership has a significant relationship 
with CIR audit. The reduced multivariate models show a negative association at the 10% level 
of significance, while the Spearman model reveals a positive relationship at the 1% level. This 
implies that Saudi listed companies with a high percentage of government ownership tend to 
disclose less audit items on their websites. A possible explanation for the negative association 
is that governmental shareholders can obtain the required audit information internally as they 
have easy access to such information; hence, there is no need to burden the companies with a 
detailed disclosure on the websites. This result agrees with Alshowaiman (2008), who reports 
a significant association between CIR audit and government ownership in Saudi listed 
companies, and Xiao et al. (2004), who finds government ownership associated negatively and 
significantly with online disclosure and its components. As the finding proves that disclosing 
audit items on the website is affected by government ownership, this leads to the acceptance 
of hypothesis H3.4, which is related to the significant relationship between government 
ownership and CIR audit.  
With regard to block holder ownership, only one bivariate model, namely the Spearman model, 
reveals a significant relationship between CIR audit and block holder ownership at the 5% level 
of significance. This association is found to be insignificant in the Pearson model and in all 
other multivariate models. Thus, it can be stated that concentrated ownership structure has no 
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influence on CIR audit in the Saudi context. Further, Abdelsalam et al. (2007) and Abdel-Fattah 
(2008) also document this insignificant association of block holder ownership.  
Similarly, institutional ownership was found to have a significant association with only the 
Spearman model at the 5% level of significance, while all the other models show an 
insignificant relationship with CIR audit. Again, the result of this study indicates that the 
percentage of shares held by institutional owners does not affect the online disclosure of audit 
items by Saudi listed companies. Abdel-Fattah (2008) confirms this insignificant association 
in Egyptian listed companies, which may be due to the availability of required information that 
institutional investors obtain by using their representatives on the board of directors. In 
addition, no evidence was found in either the bivariate or multivariate analysis for a significant 
relationship between director ownership and CIR audit. This result is consistent with 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007), who find that director ownership is negatively and insignificantly 
associated with CIR credibility. Therefore, hypotheses H3.1, H3.2 and H3.3, which proposed 
block holder ownership, director ownership and institutional ownership are related 
significantly to CIR audit, are not supported.  
Based on the above results, it can be concluded that the current study finds no support for the 
proposition that ownership variables have a significant effect on CIR components in Saudi 
listed companies, except for the significant association between government ownership and 
CIR audit, which help in answering the sixth sub-question Q2.6. Therefore, H3 regarding the 
significant relationship between ownership variables and CIR components is rejected. The 
relationship between audit committee variables, the third group of corporate governance 
variables, and CIR components is discussed in the next section.   
 
 7.3.4 Audit committee variables 
 
Three audit committee variables are examined to explore their association with the components 
of CIR. The findings of both the bivariate and multivariate analyses are presented in Table 7-
12. Noticeably, the audit committee variables show, to some extent, similar results for each 
CIR component. The next points illustrate these relationships in more detail.  
7.3.4.1 Content 
 
Audit committee independence is the only variable of this group which shows a strong 
significant association with CIR content at the 1% level of significance in all the statistical 









Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  
 1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  
Audit committee size *** *** - - -    *** *** - - -    
Audit frequency of meeting -        - - - - -    































Timeliness Usability Audit 
Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  Bivariate  Multivariate  
 1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Audit committee 
size 
*** *** - - -    *** ***       *** *** - - -    
Audit frequency 
of meeting 
- -  -      - - - -    - - - - -    
Audit committee 
independence 




















-Note: 1. Pearson Correlation / 2. Spearman's rho / 3. Un-transformation model / 4. Log transformation model / 5. Bootstrap model / 6.  
     Reduced model un-transformation model/ 7. Reduced model log transformation model / 8. Reduced model bootstrap 
-*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
 
 
that Saudi listed companies with a high percentage of independent members in the audit 
committee are more likely to disclose less content in their websites. This relationship may be 
due to the proposed substitution association between CIR content and audit committee 
independence, where independent members in the audit committee are perceived as monitors, 
which decreases the need for more online content disclosure. Felo et al. (2003) and Kent and 
Stewart (2008) report the same negative yet insignificant association, while Ahmed (2015) and 
Nekhili et al. (2016) find a significant yet positive association. Accordingly, H4.3 regarding 
CIR content is accepted.  
Moreover, only the bivariate analysis shows a significant and positive association between 
audit committee size and CIR content at the 1% level of significance. In contrast, the 
multivariate analysis finds this relationship to be negative and insignificant. A possible reason 
for the insignificant relationship is the lack of variation in audit committee size among Saudi 
companies. The majority of Saudi companies are committed to the minimum audit committee 
size required, which is compulsory under Saudi corporate governance code, thus probably 
reducing the influence of audit committee size on CIR content. Another suggested reason is 
that audit committees with fewer members are more likely to rely heavily on their external 
auditor, which implies a substitution effect between audit committee size and external auditor, 
thus limiting the effect of audit committee size (Kent and Stewart, 2008). This result is 
consistent with Felo et al. (2003), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Ahmed (2015), who also find 
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an insignificant relationship between audit committee size and disclosure. Consequently, H4.1 
regarding CIR content is rejected.  
Regarding audit committee frequency of meeting, the statistical results of both the bivariate 
and multivariate analyses fail to provide evidence for the impact of frequent meeting of audit 
committee on CIR content. This result is consistent with Felo et al. (2003) and Ahmed (2015), 
who find an insignificant association. Although Kelton and Yang (2008) and Kent and Stewart 
(2008) report the same direction as the current study's result for the US and Australian 
companies, they find this relationship to be significant. Such a result leads to the rejection of 
H4.2, which suggests a significant relationship between audit committee frequency of meeting 
and CIR content in Saudi listed companies.   
7.3.4.2 Presentation 
 
It was found that the results of CIR presentation are similar, to a large extent, to those of CIR 
content. Audit committee independence, again, is associated negatively with CIR presentation 
at the 1% level of significance in the bivariate analysis, at the 10% level in the multivariate 
analysis and at the 5% level in the reduced models. This indicates that Saudi listed companies 
with more independent audit committees are less likely to use internet presentation tools to 
disclose information on their websites. This may be attributed to the lack of experiences or 
active participations that the independent members of the audit committee may have, which 
results in less use of presentation tools for online disclosure. Further, it is possible that the 
substitution effect of the external auditors (most of the Saudi listed companies are audited by 
the Big4) encourage independent members to rely more on them and thus they reduce their 
CIR presentation. Felo et al. (2003) and Kent and Stewart (2008) find that audit committee 
independence is negatively yet insignificantly associated with disclosure. Based on the 
statistical findings, H4.3 regarding CIR presentation is accepted. 
The results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses regarding the relationship between audit 
committee size and CIR presentation are contradictory. While the bivariate analysis shows a 
positive association at the 1% level of significance, the multivariate analysis reveals that the 
size of the audit committee is negatively and insignificantly associated with CIR presentation. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there are no previous studies examining the 
relationship between audit committee size and CIR presentation; however, Felo et al. (2003), 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Ahmed (2015) report an insignificant relationship between audit 
committee size and disclosure. Therefore, hypothesis H4.1, which proposed that audit 
committee size has a significant association with CIR presentation, is rejected.  
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With respect to audit committee frequency of meeting, this study reveals an insignificant 
relationship with CIR presentation in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses. This result 
indicates that, in the Saudi context, the frequent meeting of the audit committee has no impact 
on using more presentation tools to disclose information on the internet. This result is in 
contrast to the findings of Kelton and Yang (2008), who find a positive and significant 
association between audit committee frequency of meeting and CIR presentation. However, 
Felo et al. (2003) report the same insignificant association with disclosure. Consequently, H4.2 
regarding CIR presentation is rejected.  
7.3.4.3 Timeliness 
 
None of the three audit committee variables have a significant relationship with CIR timeliness. 
However, audit committee size and audit committee independence have a similar significance 
level, yet a different direction. Both variables are significantly associated with CIR timeliness 
at the 1% level in the bivariate analysis (5% level for independence in Pearson model only), 
while the multivariate analysis shows insignificant relationships. With respect to the 
association direction, audit committee size was found to have a positive association in the 
bivariate analysis but a negative one in the multivariate analysis, whereas, audit committee 
independence is negatively associated in both analyses. Likewise, no evidence was found for 
any significant association between CIR timeliness and audit frequency of meeting in both the 
bivariate and multivariate analyses. That is, audit committee variables have no significant or 
direct influence on the timeliness of CIR practices exercised by Saudi companies. To the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge, the relationship between audit committee variables and CIR 
timeliness has not previously been examined, although Felo et al. (2003) and Ahmed (2015) 
find an insignificant relationship between audit committee size, independence and frequency 
of meeting and disclosure practices. Based on these results, hypotheses H4.1, H4.2 and H4.3 




The same results of CIR timeliness have been found for CIR usability. Audit committee size 
has been found to have a positive association with CIR usability in all models; however, this 
association is significant at the 1% level of significance in the bivariate analysis but is 
insignificant in the multivariate analysis. Similarly, while the bivariate analysis reveals a 
significant association between audit committee independence and CIR usability at the 1% 
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level, the multivariate analysis shows this association to be insignificant. Further, it was found 
that the independence of the audit committee is negatively associated with CIR usability in 
both analyses. Again, the result of the current study fails to find any support for a significant 
relationship between audit frequency of meeting and CIR usability. These findings suggest that 
the size, independence or frequent meeting of audit committee have no significant impact on 
disclosing more usable information on the website. Although the insignificant relationship 
between audit committee variables and disclosure has been documented by many prior studies, 
such as Felo et al. (2003), Kent and Stewart (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Ahmed 
(2015), to the researcher’s knowledge, no previous study has examined the direct relationship 
between CIR usability and audit committee variables. Based on the empirical findings, 
hypotheses H4.1, H4.2 and H4.3 regarding the significant association between audit committee 
variables and CIR usability are rejected in this study. 
7.3.4.5 Audit  
 
As seen from Table 7-12, the audit committee variables present mixed results in both the 
direction and significance of their relation with CIR audit. Similar to CIR content and 
presentation, audit committee independence shows a significant and negative relationship with 
CIR audit at the 1% significance level in all models of the bivariate and multivariate analyses. 
This indicates that Saudi listed companies that have audit committee with less independent 
members disclose more audit information on their websites than those companies with more 
independent members on their audit committees. Again, it seems that this result can be justified 
in light of the substitute-monitoring role of independent members of the audit committee, who 
tend to disclose less information to their stakeholders. Ahmed (2015) and Nekhili et al. (2016) 
find a significant yet positive influence of audit committee independence on disclosure. On the 
other hand, Felo et al. (2003) and Kent and Stewart (2008) report the same direction of this 
study’s result; however, they find this association to be insignificantly associated with 
disclosure. Based on the empirical results, hypothesis H4.3 regarding the significant impact of 
audit committee independence on CIR audit is accepted. 
Regarding audit committee size, contradictory results have been found in the bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. While the bivariate analysis reveals a significant and positive 
relationship at the 1% level of significance, the multivariate analysis shows an insignificant 
and negative association with CIR audit. This result implies that the size of the audit committee 
is not relevant to CIR audit in the Saudi context. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the 
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relationship between audit committee size and CIR audit has not been investigated before; 
however, Felo et al. (2003), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Ahmed (2015) find an insignificant 
relationship between audit committee size and disclosure. Consequently, hypothesis H4.1 for 
CIR audit is rejected.  
 Moreover, no evidence is found to support the relationship between audit committee frequency 
of meeting and CIR audit. Both the bivariate and multivariate analysis reveal a negative and 
insignificant association. Such a result implies that H4.2 regarding the significant impact of 
audit committee frequency of meeting on CIR audit is not supported and is thus rejected.   
In brief, it can be stated that the above findings do not suggest a significant relationship between 
audit committee variables and CIR components as has been proposed in the Saudi context. 
Audit committee independence is the only variable found to have a strong significant 
association with each of CIR content, presentation and audit variables. As such, the current 
study’s results provide limited support for H4, which proposed a significant association 
between audit committee variables and CIR components by Saudi listed companies, and also 
answers sub-question Q 2.8. 
Presumably, the reason for these non-significant findings, particularly regarding the board and 
audit committee variables, can be the compliance with the SCGC and its new modifications, 
which leads to similar practices among Saudi companies. According to Albassam (2014), the 
compliance of Saudi companies with the SCGC measured by the corporate governance index 
has improved from 17% in 2004 to reach 73% in 2010, which can be attributed to reforms in 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia.  
7.4 Summary  
 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of the association between each CIR component 
and firm characteristic, board of directors, ownership structure and audit committee variables 
in the Saudi context realising the importance of analysing CIR based on its different 
components. The relationship between each group of variables and all CIR components has 
been investigated. The findings reveal slight differences in the significance of these variables 
among CIR components. While a number of firm characteristics variables can explain the 
variations in the extent of each of CIR components, none of the other variable groups show a 
significant association with any of the CIR components, except for board frequency of meeting, 
government ownership and audit committee independence, whereby these have significant 
relationships with some of the components of CIR. Particularly, the results reveal that large 
companies are more likely to achieve high level of all CIR components, while companies with 
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low liquidity ratio show high level of CIR content, CIR presentation, CIR usability and CIR 
audit. Moreover, companies which pay dividends have higher level of CIR content, CIR 
presentation and CIR timeliness, whereas Big4 companies present higher quality CIR 
timeliness and CIR usability.  Furthermore, it was found that reducing board frequent meetings 
may improve CIR content, CIR presentation, CIR timeliness and CIR usability. In addition, 
companies with a high percentage of government ownership tend to disclose less audit items 
online and finally, companies with more independent audit committee disclose less CIR 
content, CIR presentation and CIR audit items online. A possible justification for the non-
significant results, especially regarding board and audit committee variables, is the lack of 
variation in practice among Saudi listed companies due to the compliance with SCGC 
requirements. This chapter’s findings can help answer the current study’s second question and 
its sub questions. The next chapter discusses the impact of CIR and its components on firm 





















THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE INTERNET 
REPORTING ON FIRM FINANCIAL 




  The growing use of the internet provides companies with the ability to disseminate 
information to wide range of users. Potentially, internet technology has the power to develop 
corporate reporting as a cheap and useful communication means (Jones and Xiao 2004). Using 
a corporate website to disclose information has a number of great benefits in terms of the 
amount of information available on the website, the easy access for all investors and the 
timeliness of the disclosed information (Hurtt et al., 2001). However, disclosing information 
online requires a high cost to collect, present, publish and maintain such information on the 
company’s website, which companies should take into consideration. Companies are keen to 
adopt internet disclosure whenever the advantages of using it overweigh the disadvantages, i.e. 
when the benefits of utilizing online disclosure exceed the costs. 
It has been suggested by many researchers that more disclosed information and low 
information asymmetry result in preferable economic consequences; one of these is an 
improvement in corporation performance (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 1993; Healy et al., 1999; 
Hassan et al., 2009; Aly et al., 2010; Schoenfeld, 2017). Based on the capital market 
perspective, whenever there is an information asymmetry between managers and investors, 
managers have motivations to provide more voluntary disclosure in order to moderate this 
problem. By increasing voluntary disclosure, information risk is decreased, hence the cost of 
capital can be reduced, which leads to an increase in the company’s value (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Moreover, it is claimed that increased disclosure affects information asymmetry and 
thereby stock performance and liquidity. That is, expanded disclosure and the availability of 
more information on the company’s website reduce information asymmetry between the 
management and stakeholders, which leads to an improvement of the stock liquidity and makes 
it more attractive to different types of investors (Healy et al., 1999). Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the increase in the company’s voluntary disclosure is associated with a decrease 
in the cost of capital or an increase in the liquidity of its shares, however, both positions result 
in an improvement in the company’s performance.   
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To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is a lack of direct empirical studies regarding 
the association between voluntary internet disclosure and firm financial performance in general 
and for emerging markets in particular. Therefore, this chapter aims to investigate the potential 
economic consequences of adopting CIR that encourage Saudi listed companies to use the 
internet in disclosing information to their stakeholders; this can be fulfilled by assessing the 
influence of CIR total and its components on firm financial performance. By doing so, the third 
question of this study is answered. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: 
section 8.2 reviews prior studies on CIR economic consequences, section 8.3 introduces the 
theories used to explain the impact of CIR and its components on firm financial performance 
and the hypotheses for these relationships, section 8.4 describes the models that examine the 
relationships between firm financial performance and CIR and its components, section 8.5 
reports and discusses the statistical results of the relationship between CIR total and firm 
financial performance in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses, section 8.6 discusses the 
consequence of CIR components on firm financial performance and, finally, section 8.7 
presents the summary of this chapter.   
8.2 Prior studies 
 
Many empirical studies on disclosure have attempted to identify the association between 
disclosed information and firm performance. However, these studies vary in terms of disclosure 
types and firm performance proxies. Several studies have examined the relationship between 
paper-based disclosure, either mandatory or voluntary, and firm performance (Healy and 
Palepu, 1993; Healy et al., 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Haggard et al., 2008; Wang et al., 
2008; Hassan et al., 2009; Nekhili et al., 2106 and Schoenfeld, 2017), while a number of recent 
studies have investigated the relationship between corporate governance disclosure and firm 
performance (Padgett and Shabbir, 2005; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Ronnie Lo, 2009; Ammann 
et al., 2011; and Albassam, 2014). However, only a few studies have examined the impact of 
internet disclosure on firm performance (Hunter and Smith, 2009; Lai et al., 2010; Elsayed, 
2010). With respect to firm performance, many proxies have been used in the prior studies. 
Although some studies use one measure for firm performance, such as market-to-book ratio, 
cumulative stock returns, return on assets (ROA) or Tobin's Q (see: Healy et al., 1999; Vafeas, 
1999; Baek et al., 2004; Haggard et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2008; Chi, 2009; Hassan et al., 2009; 
Ronnie Lo, 2009; Ammann et al., 2011; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011; Mahadeo 
et al., 2012), the mainstream among the previous studies use a combination of measures such 
as: Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), stock return, dividend yield and 
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Z-score by Altman (see for example, Hax, 2003; Padgett and Shabbir, 2005; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Epps and Cereola, 2008; Al-Hussain, 2009; Al-Saidi, 
2010; Elsayed, 2010; Azim, 2012; Zhang, 2012; He, 2013; Albassam 2014; Qasim, 2014; Vo 
and Nguyen, 2014; Ahmed and Hamdan, 2015; Al-Saidi and  Al-Shammari, 2015; Rostami et 
al., 2016; Zabri et al., 2016; Abdallah and Ismail, 2017). 
Among those few studies that have investigated the influence of internet disclosure on firm 
performance is the study of Hunter and Smith (2009), who apply a longitudinal study from 
1991 to 1997 to examine the effect of adopting internet financial reporting practices in five 
securities markets, namely Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa, at both the 
macro-economic and micro-economic levels. Using market returns (the Mean Returns, the 
Market, and the Market Adjusted Returns models), the results of this study show that market 
performance of securities listed on emerging market stock exchanges improved after the 
commercialization of the internet in India, Indonesia and South Africa. By using electronic 
disclosure, those companies can attract more outside investors to invest in their stocks. Further, 
the study offers evidence for a positive reaction of the market (through the positive abnormal 
returns) to the announcement of website launching by companies in emerging markets. 
Furthermore, Lai et al. (2010) conducted a study to explore the economic consequences of 
internet financial reporting of Taiwan listed companies. Using stock price as a proxy for the 
economic consequence and the Final Prediction Error (FPE) methodology, they find that 
disclosing information via the internet has a positive and significant impact on stock prices. In 
addition, this study applies the event study methodology to examine the expected impact of 
internet financial reporting on the abnormal return of the firm’s stocks. The results suggest that 
firms that disclose financial information on the internet experience abnormal returns 
significantly higher than those without IFR. That is, the higher the degree of information 
disclosure, the higher the abnormal return on the stock prices. 
Moreover, to assess the economic consequences of corporate internet reporting, Elsayed (2010) 
investigates the impact of corporate internet reporting and its components on firm performance 
in the Egyptian context. Two multivariate models are used in this study, depending on two 
different measures of firm value, namely Tobin's Q ratio and market-to-book equity ratio. The 
findings reveal that internet reporting by Egyptian listed companies has a significant and 
positive influence on firm value. Recently, Bin-Ghanem and Ariff (2016) examined the 
influence of IFR on firm value in 152 financial companies in the GCC countries. They use a 
disclosure index includes 35 items to measure the extent of IFR. The findings of multiple 
regression analysis, after controlling for firm characteristics and country of origin, reveal that 
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IFR has no effect on firm value for GCC countries financial companies. However, this study 
is subject to some limitations, including restricting the sample to financial companies and the 
relatively limited number of items in the IFR index.  
As mentioned above, most of the prior studies have investigated the consequences of printed 
disclosure, mandatory or voluntary or both. However, limited studies have addressed the 
consequences of internet reporting. Further, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior 
empirical study was found concerning the impact of internet reporting on firm financial 
performance in Saudi listed companies. Accordingly, since the consequence of internet 
reporting is still an empirical issue and needs more consideration, this study aims to fill the gap 
in the literature on the consequences of CIR by examining the impact of CIR and its 
components on the firm financial performance of Saudi listed companies. The theoretical base 
for the association between CIR and firm financial performance as well as the hypotheses 
formulation are presented in the following section.  
8.3 Theoretical foundations and hypotheses  
  
The relationship between disclosure and firm financial performance can be clarified in light of 
various theories. As agency theory explains, the problem of information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts between managers and investors increases the need for more improved disclosure 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Therefore, management tends to disclose more information to 
mitigate these problems and reduce agency costs, which may lead to an increase in firm 
performance (Wang et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, based on signalling theory, managers, especially in emerging markets, prefer to 
signal good news, such as positive abnormal returns, in the form of voluntary disclosure to 
distinguish themselves from other counterpart companies (Watson et al., 2002), whereby the 
higher influence of the signal may lead to attract more investors and greater effect on firm's 
value (Jizi, 2013). That is, companies that achieve higher profitability levels are motivated to 
disclose more information to demonstrate their ability to increase the value to shareholders and 
to give a good impression of their performance to the public (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). In 
contrast, companies that are experiencing lower profitability levels may feel threatened and 
attempt to obscure their poor performance by disclosing less information (Wang et al., 2008). 
In addition, as many investors tend to rely more heavily on information disclosed on the 
company’s website to make their investment decisions (ibid), companies attempt to attract 
those investors by investing more in internet technology, which may increase stock liquidity 
and, in turn, influence firm performance.  
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Regarding the diffusion of innovation theory, the growing adoption of the internet as an 
information dissemination tool arises from its distinctive features such as timeliness, constant 
availability, wide-reaching and easy access. By using the internet to disclose more useful and 
relevant information, the company effectively makes its performance information available to 
all stakeholders. Many benefits can be obtained when the company discloses information via 
the internet. This adoption leads to attracting more investors, and hence increasing stock 
liquidity, reducing the cost of capital and enhancing firm value (Lai et al., 2010). Thus, 
adopting the internet as a disclosure means satisfies the company’s needs and attains the 
compatibility feature of being an adoption of an innovation (Elsayed, 2010). However, some 
researchers argue that firm performance is inversely influenced by the level of disclosure since 
a high level of disclosure may be considered as a signal of bad news. Hence, this detailed 
disclosure might be perceived as a way of justifying a firm’s weak results and reduces the 
likelihood of legal liability, which may negatively affect firm performance (Wang et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, a low level of disclosure may give investors and other stakeholders the 
impression that the results are satisfactory and there is no need for more information which, in 
turn, increases the performance level of the firm (Wallace et al., 1994). 
Previous disclosure literature provides inconclusive results concerning the economic 
consequences of disclosure. While some empirical studies suggest a positive and significant 
relationship between disclosure and firm performance (e.g. Healy et al., 1999; Haggard et al., 
2008; Chi, 2009; Elsayed, 2010; Lai et al., 2010; Schoenfeld, 2017), others reveal mixed 
results. Hunter and Smith (2009) report that some of their sample countries, (i.e. Indonesia, 
India and South Africa) show a positive and significant association; however, this association 
is negative and significant in Brazil and Russia. Similarly, Hassan et al. (2009) demonstrate 
that the association between disclosure and firm value differ depending on the type of 
disclosure. With regard to mandatory disclosure, a negative and significant impact was found 
on firm value, yet voluntary disclosure shows a positive and insignificant relationship with firm 
value. A significant negative influence was found on firm value when both types of disclosure 
are jointly considered in the same model. Further, an insignificant result was reported by Wang 
et al. (2008) and Nekhili et al. (2016), who find no empirical evidence to support the 
relationship between disclosure and firm performance.  
Although the impact of disclosure on firm performance has been documented in many prior 
studies, the direction of this association remains rather unclear. Knowing that the empirical 
literature on the relationship between CIR and firm financial performance is very limited, the 
current study aims to assess the consequences of internet reporting on firm financial 
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performance in Saudi listed companies. That is, whether Saudi listed companies are likely to 
benefit from adopting CIR and thereby increase their performance. As far as the researcher is 
aware, no previous study investigates the consequences of CIR and its components on firm 
financial performance except Elsayed (2010), who examines this relationship in Egyptian listed 
companies. Based on the above discussion, it can be hypothesised that: 
H5: There is a significant association between CIR (total, content, presentation, timeliness 
usability and audit) and firm financial performance of Saudi listed companies. 
This main hypothesis can be divided into the following two sub-hypotheses:  
H5.1: There is a significant association between CIR total and firm financial performance. 
H5.2: There is a significant association between CIR content, presentation, timeliness usability 
and credibility and firm financial performance 
In order to determine the relationship between firm financial performance and CIR and its 
components, the appropriate models are estimated. The following section discusses the models 
used to test the hypothesis related to the association between CIR total and firm financial 
performance. 
8.4 Firm financial performance and CIR total models 
 
 This section focuses on the relationship between CIR total and firm value. The impact of CIR 
total on firm financial performance is examined using bivariate and multivariate analyses. In 
addition, three models are used to measure firm financial performance: Tobin's Q ratio, as a 
market-based measure, and return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as accounting-
based measures. This study adopts three different measures for many reasons. First, there is a 
lack of consensus between researchers about the optimal proxy to measure firm financial 
performance as each proxy has its own strengths and weaknesses (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
There are many proxies that have been used to measure firm financial performance in the 
literature, such as Tobin's Q ratio, return on assets, return on equity, market-to-book value, the 
price-earnings ratio and dividend yield (Bacidore et al., 1997). However, this study chooses 
Tobin's Q ratio, ROA and ROE due to their wide used in disclosure studies (e.g., Lo, 2003; 
Baek et al., 2004; Padgett and Shabbir, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008; Al-Hussain, 2009; Ronnie Lo, 2009; Al-Saidi, 2010; Ammann et al., 2011; Ruiz-
Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011; Azim, 2012; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Zhang, 2012; He, 
2013; Albassam, 2014; Qasim, 2014; Vo and Nguyen, 2014; Ahmed and Hamdan, 2015; Al-
Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2015; Rostami et al., 2016 and Zabri et al., 2016; Abdallah and Ismail, 
2017). Second, as they are used in most of the previous studies, it is easier and better to compare 
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the current study’s results with the existing studies’ results using these measures (Albassam, 
2014). Third, using both accounting and market-based measures is more effective to check the 
results’ robustness (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) and to improve the measurement of the impact 
of CIR total on firm accounting and market performance.   
Tobin's Q (Q ratio) has gained wide-ranging acceptance as a measure of firm financial 
performance. It is defined by Lewellen and Badrinath (1997, P.77-78) as "the ratio of the 
market value of the outstanding financial claims on the firm to the current replacement cost of 
the firm's assets", or as Lang and Stulz (1994, P.1249) define it, “the ratio of the present value 
of future cash flows divided by the replacement cost of tangible assets”. Following many 
previous studies, Tobin’s Q is calculated as the book value of total assets minus the total book 
value of equity plus total market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets (e.g. 
Baek et al., 2004; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Elsayed, 2010; Ammann et al., 2011 and 2013; 
Albassam, 2014 and Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2015). Tobin’s Q helps to assess the impact 
of CIR practices on enhancing the market returns of shareholders; the higher the value of Q, 
the more effective the CIR and the improved market’s perception of the firm’s 
performance (Weir et al., 2002). However, when using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm financial 
performance, its weaknesses should be considered carefully. For example, the high market 
value of a company is not a conceded indicator of the managers’ efficiency in managing the 
company’s assets. It may lead, mistakenly, to the overvaluing of some companies (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007). Further, measurement biases or an unfair assessment of a company’s assets 
may affect the precision and accuracy of the Q-ratio (Lev and Sunder, 1979). Additionally, the 
impact that depression may have on financial markets can affect the market value of firms as 
it is closely related to the global economic situation (Mangena et al., 2012 and Albassam, 2014). 
Both return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) have been commonly used together 
as a measure of firm financial performance by many researchers (e.g. Padgett and Shabbir, 
2005; Azim, 2012; Zhang, 2012; Abdallah and Ismail, 2017; Vo and Nguyen, 2014; Ahmed 
and Hamdan, 2015 and Zabri et al., 2016). ROA is defined as “income before extraordinary 
items for the fiscal period divided by total assets for that same period” (Epps and Cereola, 
2008, P.1139). It informs the investors regarding the total earnings that the firm manages to 
generate from its invested capital assets (ibid). As with the Q-ratio, ROA also has some 
advantages and disadvantages. It is claimed that ROA is a well-understood measure of the 
corporations and fairly represents the actual corporate performance (Kim, 2005 and Ponnu, 
2008). Moreover, Mangena et al. (2012) argue that ROA is a more powerful performance 
measure than other accounting measures as it possesses distributional properties, i.e. the total 
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assets are strictly positive, while firm’s equity might be negative or zero (Albassam, 2014). 
Finally, when ratios are used to express financial performance, the systematic effect of size on 
the variables under examination is controlled (Lev and Sunder, 1979). Nevertheless, some 
criticism has been aimed at ROA, such as: first, it depends on the estimated value of a firm’s 
assets, which may be biased or subjective; second, the value of assets is associated with the 
accounting policies, and changes in those policies can lead to changes in assets value; and third, 
it is possible that the management manipulates the figures to enhance the company’s image 
(Lev and Sunder, 1979). With respect to ROE, it is “generally defined as a ratio of net profit to 
net worth” (Ronnie Lo, 2009, P.212). Zabri et al. (2016) define it as “the income before interest 
expense for the fiscal period divided by total shareholders’ equity for that same period”. Return 
on equity shows an investor the amount of profit the company can generate from the money 
invested by its shareholders (Epps and Cereola, 2008). ROE has been proven to be a reliable 
performance measure for stakeholders (Johnson and Greening, 1999) and for most investors, 
it is perceived as an appropriate measure in both the short and long term (Brealey and Myers, 
2000). However, the corporate equity value can be negative or zero (due to restructuring, for 
example), which will lead to a negative ROE. With a negative ROE, this can be considered as 
if the firm is making a loss, which is not true in this case (Ronnie Lo, 2009). Table 8-1 presents 
the dependent variables used in the model.  
To overcome the limitations in the aforementioned performance proxies, a set of control 
variables that have been widely used in prior studies is examined in this study to consider the 
possible impact of other factors on firm financial performance. These variables are firm size, 
leverage, board size, role duality, board independence, block holder ownership, director 
ownership and audit committee independence. The same proxies that have been previously 
provided in chapter three are applied to measure these independent variables. The 
operationalisation of the independent variables is summarized in Table 4-1(see chapter four).  
Therefore, to examine the association between firm financial performance and CIR total, three 
models are used: 
Q= e +	g3CIRk + glhF~ijk + grsjtk + guÄhFijk + gwGx{sk +	gyÄFzxjÇk +
g}ÄsnEÑk +	gxnozjG	k + gÅ~{FzxjÇ	k + 	Ö	9k.  
 
ROA= e +	g3CIRk + glhF~ijk + grsjtk + guÄhFijk + gwGx{sk +	gyÄFzxjÇk +
g}ÄsnEÑk +	gxnozjG	k + gÅ~{FzxjÇ	k + 	Ö	9k 
 
ROE= e +	g3CIRk + glhF~ijk + grsjtk + guÄhFijk + gwGx{sk +	gyÄFzxjÇk +






c: company identifier. 
The dependent variables are: 
Q: Tobin’s Q. 
ROA: return on assets. 
ROE: return on equity. 
The independent variables are: CIR = total index of corporate internet reporting, SIZE = firm 
size, LEV = leverage, BSIZE = board size, RDUL = role duality, BINDEP = board 
independence, BLOCK = block holder ownership, DOWNER = director ownership and 
AUINDEP = audit committee independence and Ö = error term.  




Tobin’s Q  Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets 
 ROA Operating profit to total assets 
 ROE Operating profit to total book value of equity 
 
To investigate the impact of CIR total on firm financial performance, statistical analysis was 
applied. Univariate descriptive statistics is presented, followed by bivariate and multivariate 
analyses to evaluate and assess this relationship. The next section discusses these analyses in 
detail.  
8.5 Data analysis  
 
8.5.1 Univariate analysis 
 
  The descriptive statistics for firm financial performance measures are summarised in Table 
8-2 (see chapter five for the descriptive statistics for the independent variables). As shown in 
Table 8-2, the highest Tobin’s Q ratio among the sampled companies is 8.339, whilst the lowest 
is .737 and the mean is 2.069. As the mean of this ratio exceeds “1”, it indicates that Saudi 
listed companies, on average, use their resources effectively. The mean of the Tobin’s Q is 
comparable with prior studies in developing countries. For example, Albassam (2014) finds a 
Q ratio of 2.63 in Saudi Arabia, while Baek et al. (2004) in South Korea, Ronnie Lo (2009) in 
Hong Kong, Elsayed (2010) in Egypt and Abdallah and Ismail (2017) in GCC countries report 
Q-ratios of 1.099, 1.40, 1.421 and 1.156, respectively. Further, both Qasim (2014) in the UAE 
and Vo and Nguyen (2014) in Vietnam find Q ratio less than 1 (0.880 and 0.739, respectively). 
Similar to this study’s result, in the developed countries, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) report a Q 
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ratio of 2.072 in the US. Based on ROA, there is a noticeable deviation between sampled 
companies as ROA varies from -0.207 to 0.417 with an average of 0.053. This result reveals 
the management’s ability to generate profit from firm assets. However, the minimum value of 
ROA reveals a negative figure, which implies that some of the companies experienced a 
financial loss during the sample period. The mean value of ROA is consistent with existing 
studies in emerging markets. A very similar result was reported by Al-Hussain (2009) in Saudi 
banks, which is 0.04, while 0.056 was found by Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2015) in Kuwait. 
In Malaysia, Zabri et al. (2016) recently found the average ROA of 0.087, while Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) found it to be 0.0256. However, a higher average of ROA is reported by Padgett 
and Shabbir (2005) in the UK and Rostami et al. (2016) in the Tehran stock exchange, namely 
0.0978 and 0.0803, respectively. In Bahrain, Ahmed and Hamdan (2015) find that the mean 
value of ROA fluctuates from 0.52% to 8.08% in the sampled period of 2007–2011. 
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics of ROE show that it ranges between -0.27% and 1.22% 
with an average of 0.016%. This mean value of ROE shows the poor performance of Saudi 
listed companies in creating profit from shareholders’ equity compared with prior studies. The 
average ROE varies in prior studies; Padgett and Shabbir (2005), Abdallah and Ismail (2017) 
and Ahmed and Hamdan (2015) report an average of 4.50%, 4.20 % and 4.58%, respectively, 
while He (2013), Vo and Nguyen (2014) and Zabri et al. (2016) find a higher average of 
10.47%, 15. 90% and 19.88%, respectively.  
 
Table 43:8-2: Descriptive statistics for firm financial performance measures 
Measures Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Tobin's Q .737 8.339 2.0686 1.25099 
ROA -.207 .417 .05303 .10137 
ROE -.0027 .0122 .000164 .001109 
 
To examine the influence of CIR total on firm financial performance, bivariate and multivariate 
analyses are used. The next section discusses the bivariate analysis. 
 
8.5.2 Bivariate analysis 
 
The current study uses both parametric and non-parametric tests to examine the association 
between firm financial performance and each independent variable. Table 8-3 shows the 
relationship between firm financial performance measured by Tobin's Q ratio, ROA and ROE 
and the continuous independent variables using the Pearson test as a parametric test and the 
Spearman test as a non-parametric test. Similarly, Table 8-4 presents the results of the T-test 
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(parametric test) and Mann-Whitney test (non-parametric test) for the association between role 
duality as a dummy variable and firm financial performance measures.  
Table 44:8-3: Bivariate analysis between firm financial performance measures and continuous variables 
Variable Pearson Spearman 
Tobin’s Q ROA ROE Tobin’s Q ROA ROE 
CIR total -.348*** .095 .007 -.444*** .136* .234*** 
Firm size -.435*** .100 .048 -.546*** .210*** .350*** 
Leverage -.293*** -.353*** -.104 -.350*** -.374*** -.084 
Board size -.214*** .042 .028 -.142* .035 .092 
Board independence .034 -.107 -.160** .017 -.132* -.189** 
Block holder ownership  -.010 .069 .255*** -.038 .031 .176** 
Director ownership -.007 .132* -.022 .005 .232*** .194** 
Audit committee independence .176** -.065 -.008 .177** -.065 -.109 
 
Table 45:8-4: Bivariate analysis between firm financial performance measures and role duality (dummy 
variable) 
Role duality Tobin’s Q ROA ROE 
T test 
  Mean  T value Mean  T value Mean  T value 
yes 10 1.79336 -1.515 .05021 -.199 .0000830 -.925 
No  160 2.08582 .05320 .0001688 
Mann-Whitney test 
  M. Rank Z value M. Rank Z value M. Rank Z value 
yes  10 87.00 .099 89.90 .291 72.20 -.881 
no 160 85.41 85.22 86.33 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level and *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
 
   The tables above show that the correlation levels vary among the variables for these two tests. 
While CIR total is negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q at the 1% significance level in both 
tests, it reveals a positive relationship with ROA and ROE, but at different significant levels 
(insignificant for the Pearson test and at the 10% and 1% levels for the Spearman test). 
Likewise, firm size has a negative and significant relationship with Tobin’s Q at the 1% level, 
yet it is positively associated with ROA and ROE, insignificantly in the Pearson test and at the 
1% significance level in the Spearman test. Further, both tests reveal similar results regarding 
leverage, board size, block holder ownership and audit committee independence with a slight 
difference in the significance level. Leverage is negatively correlated only with Tobin’s Q and 
ROA at the 1% significance level, whereas board size is associated negatively with Tobin’s Q 
only at the 1% and 10% levels. However, block holder ownership has a positive relationship 
with ROE at the 1% and 5% levels and audit committee independence is positively associated 
with Tobin’s Q only at the 5% level in both tests. Concerning board independence, a negative 
and significant relationship has been found with ROE at the 5% level in both tests and with 
ROA at the 10% level in the Spearman only. Moreover, director ownership shows a positive 
association with ROA at the 10% and 1% levels in the Pearson and Spearman tests, 
respectively, and at the 5% level with ROE in the Spearman test. Finally, role duality is the 
only variable that is insignificantly correlated with all models in both the parametric and non-
parametric tests.   
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The next section presents the results obtained by performing the multivariate regression, which 
is used to examine the impact of CIR total on firm financial performance. The same procedures 
that were used in chapter six are applied.  
 
8.5.3 Multivariate analysis 
 
To investigate the relationship between CIR total and firm financial performance measured by 
Tobin's Q ratio, ROA and ROE in greater depth, three regression models are used. The OLS 
assumptions including linearity, multicollinearity, normality and homoscedasticity were 
tested13.  These assumptions are met, except the normality of some variables, which are 
transformed using the log transformation method. Table 8-5 presents the results of the three 
regression models.  
                Table 46:8-5: The multivariate analysis findings of the firm financial performance models 
variable Model 1(Tobin’s Q) Model 2 (ROA) Model 3 (ROE) 
 Coefficient 
 T value 
VIF Tolerance Coefficient 
 T value  
VIF Tolerance Coefficient 
 T value 
VIF Tolerance 
CIR total -.106 
-1.226 1.654 .604 
.051 
.557 1.654 .604 
-.018 
-.184 1.654 .604 
Firm size -.347  
-3.890*** 1.754 .570 
.159 
1.70* 1.754 .570 
.012 
.126 1.754 .570 
Leverage -.238 
-3.231*** 1.194 .838 
-.439 
-5.67*** 1.194 .838 
-.208 
-2.556** 1.194 .838 
Board size -.007 
-.087 1.289 .776 
.013 
.164 1.289 .776 
.014 




-.483 1.537 .651 
-.092 
-1.053 1.537 .651 
-.060 
-.647 1.537 .651 
Role duality -.074 
-1.078 1.038 .963 
-.071 
-.989 1.038 .963 
-.036 




2.084** 1.592 .628 
.050 
.563 1.592 .628 
.304 




-1.279 1.124 .890 
.056 
.745 1.124 .890 
-.129 





.949 1.267 .789 
-.001 
-.017 1.267 .789 
.030 
.359 1.267 .789 
Constant 6.637***   -.033   .148   
F 6.666***   4.375***   2.266**   
Adjusted R2 .232   .152   .063   
 ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level and *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
 
The above table shows that the VIF values range from 1.038 to 1.754, which are less than the 
critical value of 5, and the tolerance values fall between 0.570 and 0.963, which are greater 
than 0.2 for all the variables. This suggests that multicollinearity is not a serious problem for 
these models. Besides, the result of correlation test shows that autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity problems do not exist (see appendix 17 for the correlation matrix). The F 
values vary from 6.67 in Tobin’s Q model to 2.27 in ROE model with a significance level of 
1% and 5%, which indicates that the independent variables used in the models barely explain 
                                                
 
13 Appendix 16 show the result of linearity, normality and homoscedasticity tests for the three models. 
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part of firm financial performance. The highest value of adjusted R2 is 23.2% for Tobin’s Q 
model followed by 15.2% for the ROA model. These relatively low values of adjusted R2 imply 
the low explanatory power of the three models, especially for ROE model, where the model 
accounts for only 6.3% of the variation in firm financial performance.14  
The results of the firm financial performance models show that CIR total has no significant 
association with firm financial performance. Further, a few significant variables were 
introduced by these models; leverage is the only variable that shows a significant relationship 
with firm financial performance in all models at the 1% and 5% levels, whereas firm size is 
negatively associated at the 1% level with Tobin’s Q and has a positive relationship at the 10% 
level in the ROA model. Moreover, block holder ownership reveals a positive association at 
the 5% level with Tobin’s Q and the 1% level with ROE. However, the other variables, namely 
board size, board independence, role duality, director ownership and audit committee 
independence, are insignificantly associated with firm financial performance in all models. A 
summary of the results of both the bivariate and multivariate analyses are combined in Table 
8-6. The next section provides a detailed discussion of the results of both analyses.   
Table 47:8-6: The bivariate and multivariate analyses findings of the firm financial performance models 
variable Bivariate analysis Multivariate analysis 
Parametric tests Non-parametric tests 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CIR total (-)*** + + (-)***  * *** (-) + (-) 
Firm size (-)*** + + (-)*** *** ***  (-)*** * + 
Leverage (-)*** (-)*** (-) (-)*** (-)*** (-) (-)***  (-)*** (-)** 
Board size (-)*** + + (-)* + + (-) + .+ 
Board independence + (-) (-)** + (-)* (-)** (-) (-) (-) 
Role duality + (-) (-) + + (-) (-) (-) (-) 
Block holder ownership (-) + *** (-) + ** ** + *** 
Director ownership (-) * (-) + *** ** (-) + (-) 
Audit committee independence ** (-) (-) ** (-) (-) + (-) + 
 *Model 1: firm financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q; Model 2: firm financial performance measured by ROA; and Model 3: firm financial 
performance measured by ROE. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level. 
 
8.5.4 Discussion  
 
Based on the results in Table 8-6, the statistical results of the relationship between CIR total 
and firm financial performance are inconclusive. While the bivariate analysis shows a negative 
and significant association when firm financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q in both 
parametric and non-parametric tests and a positive relationship at the 10% and 5% levels with 
ROA and ROE in the non-parametric test only; the multivariate analysis fails to provide 
empirical evidence for the significant influence of CIR total on firm financial performance 
                                                
 
14 The study examined the potential bias caused by omitted variables in Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE models. The 
three models were re-estimated with some different sets of the variables and without control variables. The 
results remain relatively the same for all the models whether some control variables are excluded or included.   
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regardless of the method of measurement. This finding indicates that CIR total has no effective 
impact of the firm financial performance of Saudi listed companies. Probably, the justification 
for such a result is that in emerging countries such as Saudi Arabia, where most individuals are 
economically marginalized, the use of the internet as an information dissemination tool may 
not be perceived as a value relevant to a large group of investors (Bhattacharya et al., 2002); 
hence, it has no effect on firm financial performance. Further, Hassan et al. (2009) state that 
the lack of a statistical significant relationship between firm financial performance and 
disclosure may reflect the complex nature of this relationship, which depends on many 
interplay factors such as disclosure type, the investigated context and the cost and benefit trade-
off that is related to disclosure. This insignificant result agrees with Hassan et al. (2009), who 
find an insignificant but positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm 
performance, and Nekhili et al. (2016), who report that R&D voluntary disclosure has an 
insignificant association with firm performance. However, Elsayed (2010) finds a positive and 
significant relationship between CIR total and firm performance. Depending on the statistical 
results, it can be concluded that H5 regarding the significant association between CIR total and 
firm financial performance is not supported; thus, H5.1 regarding CIR total is rejected. This 
should answer research sub-question 3.1.  
Regarding control variables, firm size shows a significant and negative relationship with firm 
financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q at the 1% level, yet this relationship is positive 
with ROA and ROE at different significance levels, fluctuating from 1% in the Spearman test 
to 10% with ROA only in the multivariate analysis and insignificant in the Pearson test for both 
models and ROE in the multivariate analysis. This is in line with Zhang (2012), who finds the 
same association (negative and significant between firm size and Tobin’s Q and ROA and an 
insignificant relationship with ROE) in Chinese companies. He attributes the insignificant 
relationship with ROE to the serious insider control problem that affects corporate governance 
quality, especially in large companies, causing a decrease in firm performance (ROE); hence, 
firm size will have an insignificant relationship with ROE. Further, large companies will have 
a high replacement value because total assets value is used as a proxy for replacement value, 
which will lower Tobin’s Q value and show this negative relationship (Zhang, 2012). In 
addition, consistent with this study’s results, firm size was found to be negatively and 
significantly associated with Tobin’s Q by Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011) and 
Abdallah and Ismail (2017), positively and significantly with ROA by Azim (2012) and Qasim 
(2014), and insignificantly associated with ROE by Padgett and Shabbir (2005), Azim (2012) 
and Abdallah and Ismail (2017). In contrast, leverage shows a strong negative and significant 
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relationship at the 1% level of significance with all firm financial performance measures in all 
models except with ROE, which is insignificant in the bivariate analysis and at the 5% level in 
the multivariate analysis. This implies that high performance companies prefer to use less debts 
as these may restrict the financial flexibility of the company (Padgett and Shabbir, 2005). 
Similar results are reported by many researchers, such as Padgett and Shabbir (2005), Ronnie 
Lo (2009), Zhang (2012), Abdallah and Ismail (2017), Qasim (2014) and He (2013). 
Concerning block holder ownership, a positive and significant association was found at the 1% 
level of significance (5% in the Spearman test) with firm financial performance (ROE) and at 
the 5% level with Tobin’s Q model in the multivariate model only. This is confirmed by 
Elsayed (2010), He (2013), Zhang (2012) and Ahmed and Hamdan (2015). However, Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) report a significant relationship between block holder ownership and 
Tobin’s Q, but in the negative direction.  
Moreover, contradictory results were obtained regarding the other variables in terms of 
direction and significance. Only the bivariate analysis shows some significant relationships for 
these variables. Board size is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q only at the 1% and 10% 
levels in the Pearson and Spearman tests, while board independence has a negative and 
significant relationship with ROE at the 5% level in both tests and at the 10% level with ROA 
in the Spearman test. Similarly, director ownership has a positive relationship with ROA at the 
10% and 1% levels in the Pearson and Spearman tests, respectively, and at the 5% level with 
ROE in the Spearman test. Audit committee independence is also positively associated with 
only Tobin’s Q at the 5% level of significance and, finally, role duality has an insignificant 
relationship with all models. These findings are consistent with the results of many prior 
studies, for example Ronnie Lo (2009), Azim (2012), Mahadeo et al. (2012), Zhang (2012) and 
Vo and Nguyen (2014), who find an insignificant relationship between board size and firm 
performance, while Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Ronnie Lo (2009), Azim (2012), Zhang (2012) 
and Vo and Nguyen (2014) report the same insignificant relationship with board independence. 
Similarly, an insignificant relationship between firm financial performance and role duality 
was reported by Azim (2012), Zhang (2012), Vo and Nguyen (2014), Ahmed and Hamdan 
(2015) and Nekhili et al. (2106). Further, Padgett and Shabbir (2005), Ronnie Lo (2009), 
Nekhili et al. (2106) find director ownership insignificantly associated with firm performance. 
Audit committee independence also has been found to have an insignificant relationship with 
firm performance by Azim (2012) and Nekhili et al. (2106). In summary, only three variables 
are found to have a significant association with firm financial performance; those are firm size, 
leverage and block holder ownership.  
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The next point worth revealing is the influence of CIR components on firm financial 
performance. The following section presents the results of these relationships in details.  
8.6 The consequence of CIR components on firm financial 
performance 
 
 After examining the impact of CIR total on firm financial performance, it may be useful to 
examine the influence of CIR components on firm financial performance as well. This section 
provides the results of both the bivariate and multivariate analyses of the association between 
firm financial performance (measured by Tobin's Q, ROA and ROE) and each component of 
CIR. Table 8-7 shows the bivariate analysis results of the relationship between CIR 
components and firm financial performance, while Table 8-8 presents multivariate findings for 
these relations.  
    Table 48:8-7: Bivariate analysis between firm financial performance measures and CIR components 
CIR components 
Pearson Correlation Spearman  
Tobin's Q ROA ROE Tobin's Q ROA ROE 
Content -.326*** .085 -.012 -.411*** .111 .205*** 
Presentation -.300*** .125 .062 -.372*** .149* .254*** 
Timeliness -.304*** .214*** .051 -.352*** .241*** .284*** 
Usability -.309*** .045 -.001 -.374*** .051 .147* 
Audit -.327*** .044 .008 -.361*** .074 .129* 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level. 
As can be seen from Table 8-7, all CIR components are strongly associated with firm financial 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q in both bivariate tests at the 1% level of significance. 
However, when firm financial performance is measured by ROA, it is only associated with 
CIR timeliness at the 1% level in both tests and with CIR presentation at the 10% level in the 
Spearman test only. Further, just the Spearman test shows a significant association between all 
CIR components and firm financial performance (ROE) at different levels, whereas no 
significant relationship was found in the Pearson test. Moreover, the multivariate analysis 
results in Table 8-8 reveal that CIR timeliness is marginally related to ROA, and similarly CIR 
audit is related to Tobin’s Q at the 10% level. Apart from this, all the other CIR components 
are insignificantly associated with firm financial performance measures.    
         Table 49:8-8: Multivariate analysis between firm financial performance measures and CIR components 
CIR 
components 
Model: Tobin's Q Model 2: ROA Model 3: ROE 
R2 F Cof T value R2 F Cof T value R2 F Cof T value 
Content  .232 6.661*** -.102 -1.212 .151 4.344*** .026 .291 .065 2.301** -.052 -.559 
Presentation .227 6.506*** -.057 -.669 .158 4.525*** .106 1.182 .067 2.339** .074 .785 
Timeliness .234 6.728*** -.115 -1.383 .168 4.790*** .158 1.820* .063 2.262** .005 .060 
Usability .225 6.447*** -.021 -.239 .151 4.338*** .018 .193 .063 2.269** -.023 -.243 
Audit .239 6.906*** -.139 -1.757* .151 4.333*** -.001 -.012 .063 2.262** .004 .045 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level. 
 
As can be seen from Table 8-8, the CIR components show similar values of adjusted R2 and F 
to those of CIR total regarding each firm financial performance measure. The explanatory 
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power of each component varies among the different models. The highest adjusted R2 was 
found in Tobin’s Q model (.225 ~ .239), whereas the lowest was reported in the ROE model 
(.063 ~ .067). The findings of the consequences of the components of CIR agreed, to a large 
extent, with the results of the consequences of CIR total, whereby CIR components have 
proven to be not related to firm financial performance. Many potential reasons can explain such 
findings. First, the Saudi market does not seem to be affected by internet disclosure, in 
contradiction to the efficient market theory, which states that firm value will respond, in an 
equilibrium, to any useful information disclosed if the market is efficient. This possibly means 
that the Saudi market, as an emerging and inefficient market, is not familiar with analysing 
firms’ performance using the disclosed information on their websites, hence, firm financial 
performance does not respond to any information disclosed via the internet (Lai et al., 2010). 
Second, as the Saudi market is still underdeveloped, investors are unlikely to place greater 
reliance on the internet as a communication medium, which implies that firm financial 
performance is not expected to be influenced by CIR and its components (Hunter and Smith, 
2009 and Wang et al., 2008). Finally, the insignificant relationship between CIR components 
and firm financial performance may be attributed to the interaction of the different and 
conflicting factors that affect this relationship, such as the environment being examined, 
disclosure type and disclosure cost-benefit considerations (Hassan et al., 2009). However, the 
negative association between some firm financial performance measures and CIR components 
might be due to costs of CIR outweighed its benefits. Another explanation is that disclosing 
more information may cause a competitive disadvantage and lead to negative net benefits, 
which may reduce firm financial performance. Moreover, investors may perceive the greater 
CIR by the management as a negative signal, since they misinterpret management intentions 
in producing more information and believe that these actions signal intentions for undesirable 
events in the future, hence investors may change their behaviour accordingly, causing a decline 
in firm financial performance (ibid). 
Based on the above results, H5.2, regarding the significant impact of CIR content, presentation, 
timeliness, usability and audit on firm financial performance, is rejected. Consequently, the 
research sub-question 3.2 is answered. 
In brief, the aforementioned findings indicate that CIR total and its components have no 
explanatory power over the firm financial performance of the Saudi listed companies and the 
influence of CIR total and its components on firm financial performance is rather ambiguous; 
therefore, hypothesis H5 is rejected. This argument answers the third question of the current 





This chapter seeks to determine the impact of CIR and its components on firm financial 
performance in Saudi listed companies to answer the third research question and its sub 
questions. After reviewing the prior studies and discussing the related theories, the hypotheses 
that explain the effect of CIR on firm financial performance are formulated. Both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses are employed to examine the relationship between CIR and its 
components and firm financial performance. Further, three models are used to measure firm 
financial performance: Tobin's Q ratio, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). On 
average, the results of the two tests which are used in the bivariate analysis, parametric and 
non-parametric, show a significant relationship between CIR and firm financial performance. 
However, regarding the multivariate analysis, all the three models indicate that CIR total has 
no impact on firm financial performance after controlling for some variables. Similarly, the 
findings reveal that the association between each CIR component and firm financial 
performance, in general, is insignificant. Comparing these findings with the literature shows 
some varations. In developed countries, CIR has no effect on firm financial performance of 
French companies (Nekhili et al., 2016), however, it improves firm financial performance in 
Taiwan (Lai et al., 2010). In developing countries, it was found that CIR enhances firm 
financial performance in India, Indonesia, South Africa (Hunter and Smith, 2009) and Egypt 
(Elsayed, 2010), though, CIR has no impact on firm financial performance for GCC countries 
(Bin-Ghanem and Ariff, 2016). Presumably, the logic for this study’s results is that the Saudi 
market, as an emerging and inefficient market, barely relies on the internet as the main source 
of information, which implies that it is less likely that CIR influences firm financial 
performance. Such findings suggest that other factors, such as cultural, social or professional 
















 This study investigates the extent and determinants of CIR by Saudi listed companies and the 
influence of CIR on firm financial performance. Although the CIR practice is widely used in 
the developed countries, there little attention has been paid to this phenomenon in the 
developing countries. However, the recent technological development in developing countries 
has introduced the internet as a useful channel for companies to communicate timely and low-
cost information to their stakeholders. In Saudi Arabia, as a developing country, the internet 
has the potential to improve corporate reporting. Given the rapid growth of the Saudi security 
market and the new changes, such as the issuance of the SCGC in 2006 and its subsequent 
modifications, the transition to IFRS starting in 2017 and the increased foreign investment, it 
is essential to provide reliable information for users by enhancing transparency, reporting 
requirements and disclosure practices. As such, Saudi companies have started to adopt CIR as 
a means of disseminating information to satisfy their investors’ needs and to support their 
competitive position in the market. Thus, this study aims to assess the actual CIR practice by 
SLC and explore the different factors that affect this practice. Moreover, the impact of CIR on 
firm financial performance is identified to obtain a clear understanding of the economic 
consequences of CIR implementation. This chapter provides a summary of the main findings 
of this study in section 9.2. Then, the contributions to the literature on disclosure is presented 
in section 9.3 and the limitations of the study are addressed in section 9.4. Finally, section 9.5 
offers suggestions for future research.    
9.2 Research findings 
 
 This section summarises the findings of the current study obtained from statistical tests that 
are used to answer the research questions regarding the extent of CIR by Saudi listed companies 
(SLC), the relationships between CIR and both firm characteristics and corporate governance, 
and the impact of CIR on firm financial performance. To evaluate the level of CIR, the study 
uses a sample that includes 170 listed companies on the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) and 
a self-constructed checklist of 196 items. The findings reveal that the extent of CIR for SLC – 
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on average – is moderate (51.57%), whereby most of the companies (64%) score between 50% 
and 70% and only one company (Umm Al-Qura Cement Company) discloses below 15% of 
the disclosure index items. This can be attributed to the growing interest in internet usage 
among Saudi companies, as evidenced by the increased number of companies that have a 
website (170 out of 171 SLC). Moreover, the extent of each CIR component was explored, and 
some variation was found between these categories. While content scores the highest level of 
disclosure (55.48%), timeliness scores the lowest level (42.88%). These results fulfil the first 
objective and answer the first research question and its sub-questions.  
Based on the statistical findings, examining the association between CIR and firm 
characteristics shows that three firm characteristics are significantly associated with CIR total, 
which are firm size, liquidity and dividends. However, firm growth, leverage, industry type 
and audit type have insignificant relationships with CIR total. Regarding the association with 
CIR components, firm size is the only variable that shows a strong significant and positive 
association with all CIR components and, in contrast, firm growth, leverage and industry type 
reveal am insignificant association with all CIR components. The other variables have different 
levels of significance; while liquidity has a significant and negative impact on CIR content, 
presentation and usability, dividends has a positive and significant relationship with CIR 
content, presentation and timeliness and audit type has the same relationship with CIR usability 
and timeliness. These results provide answers for questions 2.1 and 2.2 of this study.   
With respect to board characteristics variables, the findings show a weak relationship between 
them and CIR total and its components. Only board frequency of meeting has a negative and 
significant impact on CIR total and its components except CIR audit. However, the other 
variables of board size, board independence and role duality have no influence. As such, 
questions 2.3 and 2.4 are answered. Further, all ownership structure variables have insignificant 
associations with either CIR total or its components. The only exception is the significant 
relationship between government ownership and CIR audit. This provides answers to questions 
2.5 and 2.6 related to the extent of the relationship between ownership structure variables and 
CIR total and its components. Similarly, the findings indicate that two of the audit committee 
variables have insignificant relationship with CIR total and its components, which are audit 
committee size and audit committee frequency of meeting, while committee independence is 
the only variable that has a strong significant association with CIR total, CIR content, 
presentation and audit. These results show clearly the low impact of audit committee variables 
on CIR and its components in the Saudi context which answer questions 2.7 and 2.8 of this 
study. Based on these findings, it is approved that some firm characteristics, in addition to other 
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factors, can explain the variation in the extent of CIR practices by SLC, thus achieving the 
second objective of this study. Moreover, the findings reveal that, after controlling for some 
variables, neither CIR total nor its components have a significant impact on firm financial 
performance measured by three different methods: Tobin's Q ratio, return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE). Demonstrating these results answers questions 3.1 and 3.2 and fulfils 
the third objective.  
To conclude, the study evaluates the extent of CIR practice among SLC, highlights the effect 
of some explanatory variables on it, and assesses the impact of CIR on firm financial 
performance. However, the weak relationships of a number of these variables proposes that 
there are other variables, such as cultural, social or professional variables, may explain more 
variations in CIR in Saudi Arabia.      
9.3 Research Contributions 
  
The current study contributes to the internet disclosure literature in several ways: theoretically 
and empiricaly. 
9.3.1  Theoretical Contributions 
 
Theoretically, the study uses a multiple-theoretical framework to get an in-depth explanation 
of CIR practice and its association with some main factors in an emerging market. Some studies 
claim that theories which are used to explain voluntary disclosure in developed countries may 
not be relevant to developing countries. This necessitates investigating these theories in an 
emerging market context, namely the Saudi market, which has many distinctive features in the 
political, cultural, economic, and social domains. The findings indicate that some theories that 
apply in developed countries are applicable in developing countries and that they can be used 
to justify the association between the components of CIR and the explanatory factors, which 
have rarely been explored in prior studies. Consequently, this study helps to fill the gap in this 
area by employing a multiple-theoretical framework in Saudi Arabia as a developing country.  
 
9.3.2  Empirical  Contributions 
 
Moreover, the study has many empirical contributions to the literature on CIR.  
First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there are no previous studies in the Saudi 
context that explore the link between CIR and all the board of directors variables or between 
CIR and audit committee variables. Since both board variables and audit committee variables 
are essential in shaping CIR practice, as they are human aspects that contribute to the disclosure 
 
246 
process, concerns are raised for more in-depth studies to explore these potential determinants. 
It can be argued that little contribution has been made to addressing the implication of these 
variables on CIR and no single study, as far as the researcher is aware, examines the 
relationship between CIR and board variables (independence and frequency of meetings) or 
audit committee variables (size, independence and frequency of meetings) in the Saudi context. 
Therefore, this research hopes to fill this gap by examining the association between the detailed 
board structure and audit committee variables and CIR in the SLC. 
 Second, another area of concern are the economic consequences of corporate disclosure, 
which have been explored in many studies; however, only a very limited number address the 
economic consequences of disclosure on the internet, suggesting that much attention should be 
paid to investigate this association and further research needs to be undertaken to consider this 
important area. This study, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, is the first to evaluate the 
economic consequences of CIR and its components in the Saudi context by assessing its effects 
on the firm value of Saudi listed companies.  
Third, the current study expands the CIR classification for the first time into five 
components: content, presentation, timeliness, usability and audit. CIR components have been 
rarely considered in previous studies and most of the studies which considered them use two 
or three of these components in their model. This study considers all the CIR components, 
which contributes to the disclosure studies by offering insight into CIR practice and its 
association with the key factors.  
Fourth, the checklist used to measure the CIR contains non-financial information, which has 
not been widely tested in the previous studies. Most of the prior studies concentrate on the 
extent of internet financial reporting and neglect the disclosure of non-financial information 
and, also, all the previous studies conducted in Saudi Arabia focus on IFR and not CIR. 
Furthermore, the checklist includes two items related to the use of social media, which are new 
and not found in prior studies because of the growing interest in social media and most 
companies tend to use them significantly. Providing that most of the literature in the internet 
disclosure field has been conducted in the developed countries, hence, it is important to 
consider these issues in developing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, to add more depth to the 
exploring of CIR practice.  
Fifth, prior studies in the Saudi context use relatively smaller sample sizes than this study. 
For example, 46 (Al-Saeed, 2006b) 113 listed and unlisted companies (Al-Motrafi, 2008), 74 
(Alshowaiman, 2008) and 52 (Al-Sartawi, 2016). Therefore, this study may be deemed as an 
extension of prior studies in terms of sample size, which can enhance the ability to generalise 
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the current findings. In this regard, the study may be useful to understand CIR and its 
determinants and generalise its findings not only to other Saudi companies, but also to other 
companies of other developing countries, particularly, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, 
which share a similar background, cultural and institutional factors with Saudi Arabia, together 
with other Middle Eastern countries. Due to the limited number of empirical studies on CIR 
and its determinants in the GCC countries, the fact that the few studies concerning CIR in the 
region attempt to describe the only actual practices, and the fact that only some firm 
characteristics are identified as potential explanatory variables for CIR, this study provides an 
important contribution to filling this gap in the CIR literature. Especially in this period, where 
there is a growing interest in investments in the GCC countries, which have shown an 
exceptional economic development and new regulations in favour of foreign investors over the 
past few years.  
Finally, although CIR is growing rapidly and attracting more attention from various 
interested parties such as investors, regulators, companies and academics, research in this 
subject is very limited, especially in Saudi Arabia. The findings of this study may contribute 
to the literature by providing a more in-depth understanding to investors and regulators about 
reasons for firms to adopt CIR and what the key determinants of such adoption are. Further, 
accountants and auditors can benefit from these results in making decisions related to the 
disclosure of financial and non-financial information on the internet to improve the 
communication function of corporate reports.  
9.4 Research limitations 
 
It is expected that any study is subject to some limitations. Thus, the current study has few 
limitations, which are discussed as follows: First, one of the limitations of this study is that the 
research sample is restricted to listed companies in the Saudi exchange market. Although 
almost all the listed companies are included in the sample (just one company was excluded), it 
would be more informative to include all listed and unlisted companies. However, unlisted 
companies were excluded in this study for two reasons: (1) the study mainly relies on the 
availability of a company’s website whereby, in general, these companies are medium-sized or 
small and less likely to have a website; and (2) listed companies are expected to use CIR to 
disclose more information voluntarily and to implement corporate governance mechanisms. 
Therefore, this should be considered when trying to generalise the findings of this study, even 
though the sample size used in this study is relatively large compared to prior studies. 
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Second, this study uses the quantitative and not the qualitative method to collect and analyse 
numerical data. Given that the aim of this study is to examine the actual CIR practice and 
determine the key factors that affect it, the quantitative method is considered more appropriate 
to this objective. Despite their benefits, qualitative methods were not used due to the difficulties 
encountered in making interviews and obtaining the required data. 
Third, a self-structured checklist is used in this study to measure CIR. Although caution was 
taken when selecting the items included in the CIR index, its objectivity is not guaranteed, 
considering that disclosure is an abstract concept that is difficult to measure. However, several 
steps were taken in this study to ensure the validity of the index and overcome the subjectivity 
problem. Additionally, this study uses un-weighted scoring, which considers all the disclosed 
items in the CIR index as equally important. Thus, using a weighted index may improve the 
validity of the index. Choosing an un-weighted index in this study can be justified for many 
reasons: (1) un-weighted scoring is more common in prior disclosure studies, which makes 
comparisons between findings possible; (2) many previous studies indicate that there are no 
significant differences in using weighted or unweighted methods; (3) a weighted index needs 
experienced judgment to assess each item’s weight, and many researchers may lack such 
experience; and (4) the un-weighted scoring method is more suitable and justified for this 
study. Further, the disclosure index may need to include other dimensions and more relevant 
items in order to be more comprehensive.  
Finally, the study concentrates on the explanatory variables that are mostly expected to 
influence CIR practice in the Saudi context; however, some important variables which may be 
more relevant to CIR practice could not be included because of either difficulties in measuring 
or the unavailability of data such as social norms, cultural values, political relations and Islamic 
business transactions. It would be interesting to incorporate such variables that can explain the 
changes in CIR in the Saudi context. These limitations draw attention to new avenues for future 
research.     
9.5 Recommendations for future research  
 
The findings and limitations of this study suggest some opportunities for future CIR research. 
One of the suggestions for future research is including unlisted companies in the sample, which 
would allow a comparison of the extent of CIR between listed and unlisted companies. It also 
would be possible to examine whether the effect of the explanatory variables on CIR is the 
same for listed and unlisted companies. Further, a study with a larger sample size encompassing 
listed and unlisted companies can improve the generalisability of the results. 
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Another opportunity is to apply mixed methods in future research to examine CIR practice. 
Adopting both qualitative methods (e.g. interviews and case studies) and quantitative methods 
may add a more in-depth understanding to CIR and voluntary disclosure in general. The wide 
use of mixed methods research may improve the integration between the findings of qualitative 
and quantitative methods. Moreover, future research may broaden the extent of this study to 
include Gulf Cooperative Council countries or Middle Eastern countries instead of focusing on 
only one country, namely Saudi Arabia. It would be fruitful to compare the findings of this 
study even with other developed or developing countries, which may provide more insight into 
CIR practices.  
Also, considering the time horizon of the research, this study is cross-sectional and is related 
to a specific year; thus, a longitudinal study may be helpful in assessing the CIR extent over 
more than one year and taking into account the development and new regulations in the Saudi 
market. A new research avenue could investigate CIR from different perspectives. Although 
this study is interested in CIR from the perspective of information providers, it may be useful 
to concentrate on other perspectives, such as those of auditors, policy-makers or investors.  
It would also be beneficial if future research tries to explore the possibility of performing 
online audits to add more credibility and reliability to companies’ websites. Furthermore, this 
study considers only online reporting as a disclosure channel. Future research can investigate 
different channels of disclosure and decide whether these channels have the same determinants. 
Also, research making a comparison between CIR and hard copy reporting can be very useful 
for both users and providers.  
Further, it would be a good opportunity for future research to extend the current study by 
adding a new set of information items to the CIR index, examining new potential influence 
variables, such as the company's location, the age and level of education of the director and 
culture value and social variables, or measuring some variables by other proxies. Such issues 
may affect CIR practice significantly.  
Finally, the current study examines CIR comprehensively; future research can focus on a 
specific type of disclosure such as social reporting, environmental reporting, risk management 
and forward-looking financial disclosure. Moreover, such studies can be conducted in Islamic 
countries to determine the difference of online disclosure between Islamic and non-Islamic 
companies regarding these types of disclosure. Recently, interests in these aspects of disclosure 
have increased. Many studies investigate the different types of disclosure and how to measure 
them in developed countries; however, few studies address these aspects in developing 
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countries. Thus, it is worthwhile paying more attention to those specific types of disclosure, 
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Appendix 1: summary of CIR studies 
Research Country Variables Major findings 
Xiao et al. 
(1997) 
UK user type, size, listing 
status, gearing ratio, and 
management 
compensation plan. 
the contingency perspective is a useful 
framework to investigate the impact of 
IT on CFR and that IT use is correlated 
more with internal reporting change 
than with external reporting change. 
Craven and 
Marston (1999) 
UK CIR, company’ size and 
industry type 
Size, but not industry type, is a 
significant determinant of the extent of 
internet disclosure 
IASC (1999) 22 countries The level of CIR A significant number of corporations 
use the internet, with variation in the 
level of reporting from developed to 
developing countries 
Ismail (2002) GCC IFR, size, leverage, 
profitability, industry 
type, and country 
some factors that affect the probability 
of a firm to disseminate financial 
information on the Internet which are a 
combination of firm characteristics 
(size, leverage, and profitability), 
industry type, and country 
Xiao and et al. 
(2002) 
UK the extent and nature of 
CIR 
that internet technology will 
significantly affect the future of 
corporate reporting and will be 




U.S.  Website content, type of 
disclosure, the 
company's industry, and 
its size 
company websites contain fewer 
business data, prospective data, and 
intangibles disclosures. 
Kelton (2006) USA format and type of 
presented information 
presentation format and type of Internet 
disclosures have considerable effects on 
investor judgments and asserted that 
there is a vital demand for taking 





the Republic of 
Croatia 
Reports format   PDF is the predominant format in the 
published reports, whereas some other 
more advanced formats, such as XBRL, 







IFR, Stock price, 
abnormal returns 
the Internet has positive effects in 
emerging markets and that market 
performance on stock exchanges does 




USA web-based reporting 
features 
surface features of website can 
significantly impact users’ perceptions 





Aly et al. 
(2010) 
Egypt CIR practice, 
profitability, foreign 
listed and industrial 
sector 
nearly more than half of these 
companies use the websites to disclose a 




India level of internet 
disclosure  
there is a satisfied and adequate level of 
disclosure on the firms’ websites 
Hindi and Rich 
(2010) 
U.S. The extent of CIR number of companies having websites 
has increased over time, yet these 
websites varied significantly in both 




Jordan CIR practice paper-copy of annual reports is the 
primary source of information for users 
in Jordan, two economic concerns affect 
the use of CIR; internet access cost and 
printing accounting reports cost 
Arafa (2012) Egypt CIR practice CIR is a whole process that integrated 
the perspective of the different involved 
participants to acquire a comprehensive 





Egypt and UK the nature web-based 
corporate disclosure 
CIR practices in Egypt is still lagging 
beyond the UK and the determinants of 
voluntary adaption of CIR in Egypt are 
diverse from those documented in the 
UK 
Kuruppu et al. 
(2015) 
Sri Lanka The level of CIR 59% of the sampled companies have a 
website, while only 43% of them 




India  The level of CIR both public and private sectors use 






Slovenia IFR, size, profitability, 
age, legal form, 
ownership dispersion 
and industry sector 
there is a substantial difference 
between the companies that use or 
do not use IFR. profitability and age 
are insignificantly associated with 
IFR. While size, legal form, 
ownership dispersion and industry 
sector are associated with IFR 
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Appendix 2: summary of firm characteristics and CIR studies 
Research Country Variables Major findings 
Ashbaugh et al. 
(1999) 
USA CIR, firms’ size and 
profitability 
firms’ size and profitability are crucial 
factors in the CIR engagement decision 




 size, listing on US 
securities markets, Foreign 
listing, the level of 
technology, Growth 
prospects and intangibles, 
Firm-specific market risk, 
leverage, Internet 
penetration and national 
disclosure level) 
disclosure environment and technology 
level are associated with CIR 
presentation more than CIR content 
Ettredge et al. 
(2002a) 
USA compulsory disclosures, 
voluntary disclosure, size 
and information asymmetry 
size and information asymmetry are the 
vital aspects to determine the level of 
required disclosures on the corporate 
website, whereas size, information 
asymmetry, demand for external capital, 
and disclosure reputation are the main 
determinants of internet voluntary 
disclosure 
Ettredge et al. 
(2002b) 
USA CIR, profitability, providing 
multiple report’ formats, 
high earnings 
announcement, link to 
EDGAR, numbers of 
shareholders, financial 
analysts and firm size 
the speed of updating corporation’ 
website is associated with profitability 
and providing multiple report formats 
more than high earnings announcement 
and link to EDGAR. While numbers of 
shareholders, financial analysts and firm 
size are not explanatory variables for 
updating speed. 
Xiao et al. (2004) China the proportion of 
institutional ownership,  
ownership by domestic 
private investors, foreign 
investors, and the state 
there is a significant and positive 
relationship between the proportion of 
institutional ownership and CIR, while 
ownership by domestic private investors, 
foreign investors, and the state are less 
associated with CIR 
Matherly and 
Burton (2005) 
US size, industry type, and type 
of disclosure 
the amount of disseminated information 
varies substantially based on size, 
industry type, and type of disclosure  
Aly et al. (2010) Egypt size, profitability, leverage, 
liquidity, sector type, 
auditor size and foreign 
listing. 
  
the main factors that have an impact on 
the content and presentation of internet 
reporting in Egypt are profitability, 
foreign listing, and industrial sector 
(communications and financial services) 
Elsayed (2010), Egypt company size, Profitability, 
 leverage, Company age, 
  legal form, assets in place, 
activity type, foreign listing, 
audit type, share volatility, 
share activity, share 
CIR in Egypt is affected by: company 
size, leverage, legal form, assets in 
place, financial type, foreign listing, 
audit type, share volatility, share 












ownership, board size, Role 
duality, family members 
and foreign members. 
 
 
ownership, managerial ownership, 
governmental ownership, board size and 
family members on the board. Moreover, 
the study revealed that there is a 
considerable variation in these 
determinants among the main 
components of CIR, namely content, 
presentation, timeliness and usability. 
Finally, the study indicates that firm 
value is positively influenced by CIR. 
AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2012) 
Jordan reputation and image 
enhancement, firm 
promotion, international 
impacts, top management 
believes or attitudes, 
management change, lack 
of competition and 
relatively long period of 
listed on the Jordanian stock 
exchange. 
 
website presences heavily depend on 
several factors, viz., reputation and 
image enhancement, firm promotion and 
international impacts.  The absence of a 
corporate website is attributed to top 
management believes or attitudes, 
management change, lack of competition 
and relatively long period of listed on the 
Jordanian stock exchange. 
 
Hossain et al. 
(2012) 
Qatar firm size, age, liquidity, 
profitability, assets in-place 
and business complexity 
There is a significant association 
between CIR and firm size, assets in-
place and business complexity 
Miniaoui and 
Oyelere (2013) 
UAE size, leverage, liquidity 
industry sector, diffuseness 
of ownership and 
profitability 
 
The results reveal that size, leverage, 
profitability and being in the financial 
sector are the main predictors of IFR 
adoption 
Dolinšek et al. 
(2014) 
Slovenia size, age, profitability, legal 
form, ownership 
concentration, age and 
sector 
The findings suggest that size, 
ownership concentration, legal form and 
sector of operation significantly affect 
the level of IFR 
Soriya and 
Dhaigude (2016) 
India size, profitability, 
productivity, liquidity, 
growth and leverage 
The findings reveal that size, 
profitability, productivity and liquidity 
are significantly associated with CIR, 
while growth and leverage are not. 
Ahmed et al. 
(2017) 
Egypt size, industry type,  
profitability and foreign 
listing, leverage, audit 
type, liquidity 
The results show that size, industry 
type and foreign listing are 
significantly associated with CIR 
total, content and user support, while 
profitability has a significant and 




Appendix 3: summary of corporate governance and CIR studies 
 
Research Country Variables Major findings 
Barako et al. 
(2006) 
Indonesia Size, age, profitability, 
ownership structure, leverage, 
industry type, audit committee 
independency, and percentage 
of independent directors 
CIR is positively associated 
with size and age of listed 
companies, whereas 
profitability, ownership 
structure, leverage, industry 
type, audit committee 
independency, and percentage 
of independent directors are not 
significantly affect CIR 




UK CIR and corporate governance 
measures (director holding, 
director independence, and 
CEO duality) size, 
profitability, industry, and high 
growth/intangibles 
the comprehensiveness of CIR 
disclosure is associated with 
analyst following and other 
measures of corporation 
governance such as: director 
holding, director independence, 




UK Timeliness, corporate 
governance: board experience, 
board independence, block 
ownership and role duality 
U.K. listed companies need to 
enhance the timeliness of CIR 
in order to provide the types of 





Ireland  CIR timeliness, board 
independence, ownership 
structure, size, audit fees and 
profitability 
positive association between 
CIR timeliness and both board 
independence and CEO 
ownership, firm size plays a 
significant role in assessing the 
CIR timeliness behaviour 
Ezat and El-
Masry (2008) 
Egypt firm size, service 
activity,  profitability,  leverage 
 issuance of shares, role 
duality, type of industry, 
liquidity, ownership structure, 
board composition and board 
size 
the findings indicated that CIR 
timeliness is significantly and 
positively related to firm size, 
service activity type of 
industry, liquidity, ownership 
structure, board composition 
and board size 
Kelton and 
Yang (2008) 
USA CIR and corporate governance 
measures: ownership structure, 
shareholder rights, board 
composition, and audit 
committee  
corporate internet disclosure 
practice is influenced by 
corporate governance 
mechanisms and that firm size 
plays a critical role in 
determining the association 




Turkey company size, the percentage 
of the independent directors, 
corporate governance rating, 
board size, foreign listing, 
managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership. 
the results show that company 
size, the percentage of the 
independent directors and 
corporate governance rating are 
positively and significantly 
related to IFR. No significant 
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association was found between 
IFR and board size, foreign 





Kuwait board size, board composition, 
role duality, size, leverage, 
profitability, liquidity, industry 
type and ownership structure. 
Kuwaiti listed companies 
disclose only 39% of the 
timeliness index’s items. 
Further, it was found that 
disclosing timely information 
on the website of Kuwaiti 
companies is associated with a 
smaller board, more non-
executive directors, the 
separation of CEO and 
chairman roles, larger financial 





Malaysian board independence, board 
experience, role duality, size, 
leverage and profitability 
There is a significant 
association between board 
independence, board 
experience, leverage and 






Mauritius size, liquidity, leverage, 
industry type, profitability, 
board size and audit quality 
Only company size, liquidity 
and board size show a 




Bahrain CEO duality, board size, board 
independence, directors’ 
ownership, ownership of top 3 
shareholders, size, leverage, 
return on assets, sector type 
and audit type. 
 
Only board size and Big4 audit 
firms have a positive 



















Appendix 4: summary of CIR in Saudi Arabia studies 
 
Research Country Variables Major findings 
Al-Motrafi 
(2008) 
Saudi Arabia CIR, size, stock 




profitability, type of 
industry, type of 





float, and board 
structure 
84% of the Saudi companies have a 
website but only 45% of them have a 
financial information section, a 
significant association between 
financial internet reporting and size, 
stock market listing, and the proportion 
of institutional ownership structure; 
profitability, type of industry, type of 
auditor, level of government 
ownership, individual ownership, free 
float, and board structure show no 
significant relation with internet 









ownership and the 
proportion of 
foreign ownership 
Saudi companies have poor and insufficient 
performance in 
 their internet reporting, and that IFR needs to be 
linked 
more with auditing to improve audit efficiency 
and 
 effectiveness. IFR is positively associated with 
the 




Saudi Arabia CIR, profitability 
and firm size 
87% of sampled companies have websites, 
noting that the 
 cement sector has the best implementation of 
CIR.  
Furthermore, the utilization of CIR can be 
explained  
significantly by profitability and firm size 
Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel (2008) 
Saudi Arabia CIR and corporate 
governance 
the disclosed corporate governance 
information considerably vary among 
corporations depending on industry 
type with bank sector placed in the 
highest level and industry and service 








the level and 
content of internet 
disclosure 
these regional countries vary to some extent in 
heir  







Saudi Arabia  the overall level of online disclosure in the GCC  
countries is 77% and that it varies according to  
country and industry type. However, this study 
did  
not investigate the effect of any variables, such 
as  
firm characteristics or corporate governance, on 
the  





Appendix 5: Classification of Saudi listed companies in December 2014 according to 
industry* 
 
 Industrial composition of companies listed on 
Tadawul December 2014 
 
No. in each 
industry 
Percentage of sample 
1 Banks  12 %7 
2 Petrochemical Industries 14 %8.2 
3 Cement 14 %8.2 
4 Retail 15 %8.8 
5 Energy & Utilities 2 % 1.2 
6 Agriculture & Food Industries 16** % 9.4 
7 Telecommunication & Information 
Technology 
4 %2.3 
8 Insurance 35 %20.5 
9 Multi-Investment 7 %4.1 
10 Industrial Investment 15 %8.8 
11 Building & Construction  17 %9.9 
12 Real Estate Development 8 %4.7 
13 Transport 5 %2.9 
14 Media and Publishing 3 %1.8 
15 Hotel & Tourism 4 %2.3 
 Total  171 %100 
 
* In 8th Jan 2017 a new industry classification has been adopted by Tadawul containing 20 
sectors.   














Appendix 6: The final checklist of CIR with its 5 categories 
 
Content items 
1 Date company established 
2 Company profile  
3 Vision statement  
4 Mailing list of the company's key personnel  
5 Phone number for investors 
6 Postal address for investors 
7 Human resources information/ employee profile (names, qualifications…)   
8 Corporate citizenship  
9 Statement of management responsibility  
10 There is a social responsibility section and/or environmental section  
11 The existence of investor relations section  
12 Name of Investor Relations Officer 
13 Discussing on product quality and safety  
14 Certificate of quality assurance (ISO)or awards of best practice (for service companies) 
15 Donations/sponsoring to community groups  
16 Chairman’s message/letter to shareholders  
17 Services or products provided 
18 Sales of key products  
19 Market outlook  
20 Advertisements for their products or services  
21 Promotional items (i.e., t-shirts)  
22 Investor Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)  
23 Annual shareholders' meeting agenda and notice 
24 Text of speeches and presentations 
25 News summaries   
26 Press releases  
27 Displays names and details of Sharia committee  
28 If personal information is required, privacy policy is explained 
29 Quarterly reports of current year  
30 Quarterly reports of past years  
31 Semi-annual report of current year  
32 Semi-annual report of past years  
33 Annual report of current year (full text) 
34 Annual report of last year (full text) 
35 Annual report of three years ago (full text) 
36 Balance sheet of current year 
37 Balance sheet of last year 
38 Income statement of current year 
39 Income statement of last year 
40 Cash flow statement of current year 
41 Cash flow statement of last year 
42  Statement of changes in stockholders’ equity of current year  
43  Statement of changes in stockholders’ equity of last year  
44 Notes to financial statements of current year 
45 Notes to financial statements of last year 
46 Management Report/Analysis of current year 
47 Management Report/Analysis of last year 
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48 Supplement or amendment to current year annual report  
49 The date of financial year end 
50 Historical share prices 
51 Share price performance in relation to stock market index 
52 There is a facility to compare company share prices with peers and industry leaders  
53 Displaying names and details of analysts following company 
54 Dividend payout policy  
55 Dividend history 
56 Excerpts of financial reports or statements  
57 Usage of comparative figures  
58 Which GAAP basis is used in the year reported  
59 Displays financial information in alternative GAAP 
60 Disclosure of risk or risk management 
61 Earnings per share/Earning release   
62 Summary of key financial ratios  
63 Market share of key products  
64 Monthly or weekly sale or operating data  
65 Earnings or sales forecast 
66 Industry statistics or data  
67 Performance analysis 
68 Contains link to Tadawul database  
69 An exchange or link to currency converter site if financial information is presented in 
alternative currencies 
70 Social media links  
 
Presentation items 
1 Multilingual of home page  
2 English language Web pages. 
3 Arabic language Web pages. 
4 Hyperlinks inside the annual report. 
5 Annual report in PDF-format. 
6 Annual report in html-format. 
7 Reports in XLS Format. 
8 Reports in XML.  
9 Clear direction for annual report. 
10 Graphic images/ Graphic images exist  
11 Use video files in the annual report. 
12 Use audio files in the annual report. 
13 Use flash files in the annual report 
14 Financial data in processible format 
15 Hyperlinked table of contents 
16 Hyperlinks to data on a third-party’s website 
17 Direct e-mail to investor relations 
18 Dynamic graphic images 
19 Conference calls.  
20 Use of frames/ Page divided into frames  
21 Clear boundaries for annual reports.  
22 Displays financial information in alternative currencies 
23	 Provides slide presentations [PDF/ PPT]  
24 File format of the audit report in PDF 
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25 The auditor's report in English  




1 Is the date of the last web site update provided 
2 Is the latest (i.e. today’s) share price disclosed 
3 Is the specific update time for the share price data disclosed 
4 Does the company provide a calendar of future financial events   
5 Does the company provides feature to register for future email, social media alerts regarding 
press releases, newsletters, etc. 
6 For email or online requests, is the user told when to expect a response to their question 
7 Does the company provide webcasts  
8 Is the most recent interim financial report provided on the web site 
9 Does the company provide a quarterly interim report  
10 Current press releases or news (up to date) 
11 Hints for finding current information directly  
12 Current key financial ratios 
13 Current financial highlights and summaries 
14 Current dividends announcements 
15 There is a link to the share price on the Tadawul (or other SEs)  
16 There is a link to a calendar on Tadawul (Or other SEs)  
17 There is a link to the online regulatory news service (e.g. regular/ad hoc announcements 
/notifications, stock exchange announcements, press releases)  
18 The updating dates are obviously disclosed  
 Usability 
1 Link to annual report on home page  
2 Help site 
3 Pull-down menu  
4 Internal search box 
5 Site Map 
6 Table of contents 
7 User feedback or contact us 
8 Next/previous/top buttons to navigate sequentially  
9 One click to get to investor relations or financial information 
10 One click to get to press releases or news/ link to press releases from Home page  
11 Change in printing friendly format possible (Text-only)  
12 Ability to download information  
13 Privacy statement is provided 
14 Legal statement is provided 
15 Financial or investor glossary 
16 External links (other than Tadawul) 
17 Online investor information order services 
18 The website in all languages working effectively  
19 Avoid making the user scroll to get important navigation or submit buttons  
20 Have a language menu or change language option on the home page  
21 There is a link to social responsibility section from home page  
22 Link to Corporate governance section from home page  
23 Link to Investor Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) from Home page or IR page  
24 Provides separate print version for any long page. 
25 There are different colour graph lines, for the comparison in the chart  
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26 Other disability aids such as zooming font  
27 Spelling checker embedded in the search engine which gives list of clickable possible correct 
spelling  
28 Common natural language of company name is used in URL address (URL short, simple 
name)  
29 Name or logo of company easy to Spot on Website   
30 Page not wider than screen (no horizontal scrolling required)  
31 Uses standard font sizes.  
32 Text stands still (no moving, blinking or zooming required) 
33 Search facility available on every page in Website  
34 Hyperlinks change colours to distinguish between visited and unvisited links  
35 High contrast between foreground and background colours utilized to aid colour-blind users  
36 Consistent use of arrows such as having some control scrolling, while others expand and 
collapse lists  
37 Navigation area positioned on right/top side of screen (for Arabic web site).   
38 Navigation area positioned on left/ top side of screen (for English web site). 
39 Provides table of contents or link page at beginning of annual reports, or alphabetical index, 
including notes to financial statements  
40 Each page in annual report links back to main table of contents from each page.  
41 Easy for users to find audit report (e.g. listed in a table of contents/menu) 
42 Visibility of directors and executive details 
43 Visibility of names and details of sharia committee 
44 Visibility of Investor Relations contact details in highly visible area of Investor Relations 
section  
45 Visibility of dividend history 
46 Visibility of interactive stock chart  
47 Visibility of stock exchange(s) link  
48 Visibility of Analysts' details  
49 Visibility of site update  
50 Displays audio clips / recorded speeches from shareholder meetings or press conferences.  
51 Screen displays presentation's length and / or user's current progress toward completing web 
cast.  
52 For large PDF files, Website offers option to download document in smaller sections (more 
than 1 MB) 
53 For each PDF document provides gateway page that gives summary description of content 
and file size 
54 Information that enables Muslims to determine the amount of zakat  
Audit items 
1 The name of the external auditor 
2 Publishing details on the website about the external auditor 
3 Auditor report of current year 
4 Auditor report of last year 
5 Auditor scanned signature/ seal of current year report 
6 Auditor scanned signature/ seal of last year report 
7 Displays audited financial statements accompanied by audit report  
8 Links to the external auditor’s Website 
9 Links from the auditor’s report to the company’s home 
10 Links from the auditor’s report to the company’s financial statements 
11 Links from the auditor’s report to the company’s other web pages 
12 Direct link to auditor’s report from the company’s home page or other Webpages 
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13 Warning users when leaving audited pages/An intermediate warning message is displayed 
when entering / leaving the audited annual report  
14 The auditor’s report is available on-line all the time 
15 Audit firm logo is placed in the audit report 
16 Audited financial statements are distinguished from non-audited statements 
17 Audit report on the website is complete 
18 Indication on the company’s website if it is audited by one of the Big4 audit firms 
19 Charters for the audit committee 
20 Names of the members of the audit committee and/ or qualifications  
21 Note on language translation and audit 
22 Audit report highlights which GAAP (Accounting standards) is used  
23 Audit report highlights which GAAS (Auditing standards) is used  
24 Audit report’s background and /or use of borders consistent with those used in the audited 
financial statements  
25 Hyperlink(s) from / to the audited financial statements to external unaudited websites or 
sections of the company website are avoided  
26 The interim reports accompanied by auditor limited report 
27 Each page of the audited financial in (HTML)statements clearly labeled as "AUDITED" or 
Audited Financial statements.  
28 The auditor’s report is dated. 
 
 




Pearson Correlation C Total C content C Presentation C timeliness C usability C Audit 
C Total 1      
C content .984***      
C presentation .899*** .859***     
C timeliness .822*** .787*** .682***    
C usability .854*** .791*** .765*** .755***   
C Audit .913*** .900*** .813*** .628*** .643*** 1 
 
Spearman's rho Correlation 
 
 C Total C content C Presentation C timeliness C usability C Audit 
C Total 1.000      
C content .959***      
C Presentation .856*** .784***     
C timeliness .860*** .807*** .680***    
C usability .892*** .799*** .781*** .744***   
C Audit .784*** .791*** .623*** .643*** .589*** 1.000 
 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 





Appendix 8: The findings of the extent of CIR content 
 
 
  content item no percent 
1 Date company established 168 0.99 
2 Company profile  168 0.99 
3 Vision statement  134 0.79 
4 Mailing list of the company's key personnel  12 0.07 
5 Phone number for investors. 164 0.96 
6 Postal address for investors. 159 0.94 
7 Human resources information/ employee profile (names, qualifications…)   154 0.91 
8 Corporate citizenship  167 0.98 
9 Statement of management responsibility  82 0.48 
10 There is a social responsibility section and/or environmental section  95 0.56 
11  The existence of investor relations section  143 0.84 
12 Name of Investor Relations Officer 30 0.18 
13 Discussing on product quality and safety  112 0.66 
14 Certificate of quality assurance (ISO)or awards of best practice) 116 0.68 
15  Donations/sponsoring to community groups  75 0.44 
16 Chairman’s message/letter to shareholders  83 0.49 
17  Services or products provided.  167 0.98 
18  Sales of key products.  105 0.62 
19 Market outlook  31 0.18 
20 Advertisements for their products or services  152 0.89 
21 Promotional items (i.e., t-shirts)  37 0.22 
22 Investor Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)  54 0.32 
23  Annual shareholders' meeting agenda and notice 115 0.68 
24 Text of speeches and presentations 2 0.01 
25 News summaries   157 0.92 
26  Press releases.  56 0.33 
27 Displays names and details of Sharia committee  25 0.15 
28  If personal information is required, privacy policy is explained 3 0.02 
29 Quarterly reports of current year 97 0.57 
30  Quarterly reports of past years 97 0.57 
31  Semi-annual report of current year.  101 0.59 
32  Semi-annual report of past years.  100 0.59 
33 Annual report of current year (full text). 123 0.72 
34 Annual report of last year (full text). 119 0.70 
35 Annual report of three years ago (full text). 112 0.66 
36 Balance sheet of current year. 128 0.75 
37 Balance sheet of last year. 129 0.76 
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38 Income statement of current year. 129 0.76 
39 Income statement of last year. 129 0.76 
40 Cash flow statement of current year. 121 0.71 
41 Cash flow statement of last year. 122 0.72 
42  Statement of changes in stockholders’ equity of current year   119 0.70 
43  Statement of changes in stockholders’ equity of last year 120 0.71 
44 Notes to financial statements of current year. 118 0.69 
45 Notes to financial statements of last year. 117 0.69 
46 Management Report/Analysis of current year. 113 0.66 
47 Management Report/Analysis of last year. 105 0.62 
48 Supplement or amendment to current year annual report.  117 0.69 
49 The date of financial year end. 140 0.82 
50 Historical share prices. 42 0.25 
51  Share price performance in relation to stock market index. 38 0.22 
52 There is a facility to compare company share prices with peers and industry   13 0.08 
53 Displays names and details of analysts following company 5 0.03 
54 Dividend payout policy  129 0.76 
55 Dividend history 25 0.15 
56 Excerpts of financial reports or statements.  130 0.76 
57 Usage of comparative figures.  133 0.78 
58  Which GAAP basis is used in the year reported.  132 0.78 
59 Displays financial information in alternative GAAP 0 0.00 
60 Disclosure of risk or risk management.  134 0.79 
61 Earnings per share/ Earning release   134 0.79 
62 Summary of key financial ratios  119 0.70 
63  Market share of key products.  11 0.06 
64 Monthly or weekly sale or operating data.  1 0.0059 
65 Earnings or sales forecast 1 0.0059 
66 Industry statistics or data  10 0.06 
67  Performance analysis 125 0.74 
68 Contains link to Tadawul database  87 0.51 
69 Exchange or link to currency converter site if information in alternative 
currencies 
1 0.0059 















Appendix 9: The findings of the extent of CIR presentation 
 
   
  Presentation item no percent 
1 Multilanguage of home page  151 0.89 
2 English language Web pages 159 0.94 
3 Arabic language Web pages 162 0.95 
4 Hyperlinks inside the annual report. 29 0.17 
5 Annual report in PDF-format. 134 0.79 
6 Annual report in html-format. 17 0.10 
7 Reports in XLS Format. 1 0.006 
8 Reports in XML.  0 0.00 
9 Clear direction for annual report. 138 0.81 
10 Graphic images/ Graphic images exist  114 0.67 
11 Use video files in the annual report. 0 0.00 
12 Use audio files in the annual report. 0 0.00 
13 Use flash files in the annual report/ Flashes (moving pictures) 1 0.006 
14 Financial data in other processible format 1 0.006 
15 Hyperlinked table of contents 169 0.99 
16 Hyperlinks to data on a third-party’s website 134 0.79 
17 Direct e-mail to investor relations 66 0.39 
18 Dynamic graphic images 33 0.19 
19 Conference calls.  1 0.01 
20  Use of frames/ Page divided into frames  168 0.99 
21  Clear boundaries for annual reports.  140 0.82 
22 Displays financial information in alternative currencies 5 0.03 
23 Provides slide presentations [PDF/ PPT]  10 0.06 
24 File format of the audit report in PDF 129 0.76 
25 The auditor's report in English  82 0.48 














































  Timeliness item no percent 
1 Is the date of the last web site update provided 136 0.80 
2  Is the latest share price disclosed 46 0.27 
3 Is the specific update time for the share price data disclosed 39 0.23 
4  Does the company provide a calendar of future financial events  32 0.19 
5 Does the company provides feature to register for future email/ social 
media alerts  
112 0.66 
6  For email or online requests, is the user told when to expect a response 11 0.06 
7  Does the company provide webcasts  0 0.00 
8 Is the most recent interim financial report provided on the web site 93 0.55 
9 Does the company provide a quarterly interim report  105 0.62 
10 Current press releases or news (up to date) 127 0.75 
11 Hints for finding current information directly  126 0.74 
12 Current key financial ratios 105 0.62 
13 Current financial highlight and summaries  116 0.68 
14  Current dividends announcements 72 0.42 
15 There is a link to the share price on the Tadawul (or other SEs)  72 0.42 
16 There is a link to a calendar on Tadawul (or other SEs)  10 0.06 
17 There is a link to the online regulatory news service  34 0.20 
18 The updating dates are obviously disclosed 76 0.45 
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Appendix 11: The findings of the extent of CIR usability  
 
        
  Usability item no percent 
1 Link to annual report on home page  134 78.8% 
2  Help site 14 8.2% 
3 Pull-down menu  119 70.0% 
4 Internal search box 108 63.5% 
5  Site Map 86 50.6% 
6 Table of contents 161 94.7% 
7  User feedback or contact us 169 99.4% 
8  Next/previous/top buttons to navigate sequentially  96 56.5% 
9 One click to get to investor relations or financial information 152 89.4% 
10 One click /Link to press releases from Home page  157 92.4% 
11 Change in printing friendly format possible (Text-only) 29 17.1% 
12  Ability to download information  152 89.4% 
13 Privacy statement is provided 86 50.6% 
14 Legal statement is provided 84 49.4% 
15 Financial glossary/ investor glossary 17 10.0% 
16 External links (other than Tadawul) 125 73.5% 
17 Online investor information order services 76 44.7% 
18 The website in all languages working effectively  140 82.4% 
19 Avoid making the user scroll to get important navigation or submit buttons  150 88.2% 
20 Have a language menu or change language option on the home page  153 90.0% 
21 There is a link to social responsibility section from home page  57 33.5% 
22 Link to Corporate governance section from home page  44 25.9% 
23 Link to Investor Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) from Home page or IR  47 27.6% 
24  Provides separate print version for any long page. 107 62.9% 
25 There are different colour graph lines, for the comparison in the chart  92 54.1% 
26 Other disability aids such as zooming font  13 7.6% 
27 Spelling checker embedded in the search engine   12 7.1% 
28 Common natural language of company name is used in URL address  170 100.0% 
29 Name or logo of company easy to Spot on Website   169 99.4% 
30 Page not wider than screen (no horizontal scrolling required)  170 100.0% 
31 Uses standard font sizes.  168 98.8% 
32 Text stands still (no moving, blinking or zooming required) 170 100.0% 
33  Search facility available on every page in Website  99 58.2% 
34 Hyperlinks change colors to distinguish between visited and unvisited links  5 2.9% 
35 High contrast between foreground and background colours utilized   168 98.8% 
36 Consistent use of arrows such as having some control scrolling  170 100.0% 
37 Navigation area positioned on right/top side of screen (for Arabic web site).  161 94.7% 
38 Navigation area positioned on left/ top side of screen (for English web site). 156 91.8% 
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39 Provides table of contents or link page at beginning of annual reports 110 64.7% 
40 Each page in annual report links back to main table of contents  0 0.0% 
41 Easy for users to find audit report (e.g. listed in a table of contents/menu) 117 68.8% 
42 Visibility of directors and executive details 149 87.6% 
43 Visibility of names and details of sharia committee 25 14.7% 
44 
Visibility of Investor Relations contact details in highly visible area of IR 
section  69 40.6% 
45 Visibility of dividend history 23 13.5% 
46 Visibility of interactive stock chart  26 15.3% 
47 Visibility of stock exchange(s) link  53 31.2% 
48 Visibility of Analysts' details  5 2.9% 
49 Visibility of site update  133 78.2% 
50 Displays audio clips / recorded speeches from shareholder meetings  3 1.8% 
51 Screen displays presentation's length and current progress of web cast.  2 1.2% 
52 
For large PDF files, Website offers option to download document in smaller 
sections 1 0.6% 
53 
For PDF files provides gateway page that gives description of content and 
size 4 2.4% 
































Appendix 12: The findings of the extent of CIR audit 
 
 
      
  Audit item no percent 
1 The name of the external auditor. 137 0.81 
2 Publishing details on the website about the external auditor. 0 0.00 
3 Auditor report of current year. 118 0.69 
4 Auditor report of last year. 117 0.69 
5 Auditor scanned signature/ seal of current year report. 114 0.67 
6 Auditor scanned signature/ seal of last year report. 114 0.67 
7 Displays audited financial statements accompanied by audit report  129 0.76 
8 Links to the external auditor’s Website. 13 0.08 
9 Links from the auditor’s report to the company’s home. 0 0.00 
10 Links from the auditor’s report to the company’s financial statements. 0 0.00 
11 Links from the auditor’s report to the company’s other web pages. 0 0.00 
12 Direct link to auditor’s report from the company’s home page or other Webpages. 4 0.02 
13 Warning users when leaving audited pages/An intermediate warning message is displayed when entering / leaving the audited annual report  2 0.01 
14 The auditor’s report is available on-line all the time. 127 0.75 
15 Audit firm logo is placed in the audit report. 128 0.75 
16 Audited financial statements are distinguished from non-audited statements. 125 0.74 
17 Audit report on the website is complete. 125 0.74 
18 Indication on the company’s website if it is audited by one of the Big4 audit firms. 0 0.00 
19 Charters for the audit committee 128 0.75 
20 Names of the audit committee members / Qualifications of the members of the audit committee  123 0.72 
21  Note on language translation and audit.  2 0.01 
22 Audit report highlights which GAAP (Accounting standards) is used  132 0.78 
23  Audit report highlights which GAAS (Auditing standards) is used  131 0.77 
24 Audit report’s background and /or use of borders consistent with those used in the audited financial statements  131 0.77 
25 Hyperlink(s) from / to the audited financial statements to external unaudited websites or sections of the company website are avoided  121 0.71 
26 The interim reports accompanied by auditor limited report 104 0.61 
27 Each page of the audited financial in (HTML)statements clearly labeled as "AUDITED" or Audited Financial statements.  0 0.00 










Appendix 13: The histogram and Q.Q P.P plot of the variables 
 


































































































Appendix 14: Outliers 
 
 
Casewise Diagnostics a 
Case Number Std. Residual C Total  Predicted Value Residual 
30 -2.183 .240 .51195 -.271947 
42 -2.197 .210 .48364 -.273636 
66 -2.707 .200 .53719 -.337194 
113 2.003 .700 .45054 .249461 
163 -2.204 .150 .42457 -.274565 
168 -2.716 .290 .62830 -.338299 




 Case Number 
Mahalanobis 
Distance Cook's Distance 
Centered 
Leverage Value 
1 1 18.77419 .00008 .11661 
2 2 15.85169 .00024 .09846 
3 3 35.31673 .00002 .21936 
4 4 15.86288 .00728 .09853 
5 5 14.34705 .00164 .08911 
6 6 15.95241 .00375 .09908 
7 7 20.33991 .00721 .12633 
8 8 22.77751 .00095 .14148 
9 9 21.80888 .00265 .13546 
10 10 25.61797 .00101 .15912 
11 11 13.63217 .00013 .08467 
12 12 29.52997 .00253 .18342 
13 13 10.16769 .00439 .06315 
14 15 18.73076 .00753 .11634 
15 16 23.84080 .00696 .14808 
16 17 23.26469 .00284 .14450 
17 18 9.08555 .00002 .05643 
18 19 13.44276 .01209 .08350 
19 20 9.06897 .00452 .05633 
20 21 12.49245 .00151 .07759 
21 22 14.93336 .00099 .09275 
22 23 13.19959 .01237 .08199 
23 24 13.39636 .00117 .08321 
24 25 17.74495 .00646 .11022 
25 26 8.34163 .00003 .05181 
26 27 14.92295 .01088 .09269 
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27 28 23.63219 .02144 .14678 
28 29 10.68475 .00263 .06636 
29 30 16.07221 .03328 .09983 
30 31 51.98573 .04858 .32289 
31 32 15.06596 .00341 .09358 
32 33 45.18851 .01887 .28067 
33 34 9.87541 .00728 .06134 
34 35 24.22808 .01824 .15048 
35 36 10.43141 .00810 .06479 
36 37 27.88840 .02830 .17322 
37 38 10.74906 .00203 .06676 
38 39 10.62590 .00118 .06600 
39 40 14.02455 .00283 .08711 
40 41 22.93452 .00469 .14245 
41 42 7.41088 .01476 .04603 
42 43 12.11417 .00000 .07524 
43 44 11.28356 .00808 .07008 
44 45 13.48387 .00276 .08375 
45 46 10.83633 .00079 .06731 
46 47 13.47881 .00161 .08372 
47 48 12.67863 .00735 .07875 
48 49 15.53063 .00064 .09646 
49 50 39.42849 .00976 .24490 
50 51 23.25099 .00002 .14442 
51 52 10.95658 .00001 .06805 
52 53 11.64735 .00005 .07234 
53 54 10.39662 .00137 .06458 
54 55 10.39617 .00315 .06457 
55 56 10.49952 .00286 .06521 
56 57 12.47929 .00066 .07751 
57 58 12.38008 .00000 .07689 
58 59 12.48028 .00066 .07752 
59 60 9.14077 .00007 .05677 
60 61 20.42219 .00236 .12685 
61 62 21.91246 .00054 .13610 
62 64 25.34535 .00169 .15742 
63 65 15.38184 .00185 .09554 
64 66 13.64708 .04245 .08476 
65 68 7.57839 .00001 .04707 
66 69 15.42846 .00080 .09583 
67 70 17.49822 .00090 .10868 
68 71 24.01631 .00217 .14917 
69 72 26.68002 .02315 .16571 
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70 73 12.87642 .00000 .07998 
71 74 12.52473 .00010 .07779 
72 75 10.58979 .01217 .06578 
73 76 10.23283 .00001 .06356 
74 77 6.70583 .00048 .04165 
75 78 12.95562 .01444 .08047 
76 79 12.71074 .00784 .07895 
77 80 8.96039 .00082 .05565 
78 81 15.91284 .00472 .09884 
79 82 21.31940 .00243 .13242 
80 83 18.75033 .00324 .11646 
81 85 7.37527 .00209 .04581 
82 86 12.29157 .00448 .07635 
83 87 27.51616 .01664 .17091 
84 88 10.16623 .00463 .06314 
85 89 7.26133 .00490 .04510 
86 90 18.79300 .00041 .11673 
87 91 15.87303 .00028 .09859 
88 92 23.78819 .01467 .14775 
89 93 26.31676 .00069 .16346 
90 94 12.23761 .00067 .07601 
91 95 32.76618 .03242 .20352 
92 96 14.54628 .00212 .09035 
93 97 11.51844 .00210 .07154 
94 98 14.37300 .00271 .08927 
95 99 11.77617 .00255 .07314 
96 100 10.99340 .00007 .06828 
97 101 11.65187 .00105 .07237 
98 102 10.89275 .00725 .06766 
99 103 15.54057 .01375 .09653 
100 104 13.43342 .01919 .08344 
101 105 26.63822 .00784 .16545 
102 106 18.85929 .00770 .11714 
103 107 12.58840 .00055 .07819 
104 108 11.38756 .00089 .07073 
105 109 43.57144 .01342 .27063 
106 110 9.48098 .00002 .05889 
107 111 15.54991 .00053 .09658 
108 112 28.35166 .00036 .17610 
109 113 17.63079 .03123 .10951 
110 116 15.45692 .00477 .09601 
111 117 8.26427 .00269 .05133 
112 118 12.71070 .00145 .07895 
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113 119 15.85666 .01969 .09849 
114 120 11.96154 .00848 .07430 
115 121 15.47315 .00293 .09611 
116 122 7.99169 .00066 .04964 
117 123 10.96884 .00687 .06813 
118 124 14.44204 .01448 .08970 
119 125 37.71088 .00141 .23423 
120 126 18.06960 .00068 .11223 
121 127 9.61035 .00187 .05969 
122 128 13.27194 .00289 .08243 
123 129 12.29043 .00706 .07634 
124 130 8.28029 .00193 .05143 
125 131 10.38951 .00069 .06453 
126 132 5.56416 .00031 .03456 
127 133 11.28127 .01404 .07007 
128 134 7.99585 .00050 .04966 
129 135 6.63097 .00301 .04119 
130 136 12.53198 .00001 .07784 
131 137 20.45917 .00085 .12708 
132 138 7.58728 .00537 .04713 
133 139 6.54390 .00529 .04065 
134 140 16.72639 .00747 .10389 
135 141 8.52905 .00506 .05298 
136 142 10.51505 .00296 .06531 
137 143 54.01446 .05069 .33549 
138 144 16.77560 .01249 .10420 
139 145 12.03082 .00732 .07473 
140 147 56.70379 .05890 .35220 
141 148 9.79924 .00396 .06086 
142 149 24.46971 .01176 .15199 
143 150 22.18558 .01156 .13780 
144 151 14.60344 .00502 .09070 
145 152 21.26635 .00790 .13209 
146 153 30.18910 .00406 .18751 
147 154 54.22224 .02653 .33678 
148 155 7.43791 .00163 .04620 
149 157 9.29258 .00229 .05772 
150 158 19.99227 .02597 .12418 
151 159 29.54374 .00394 .18350 
152 160 14.07769 .00001 .08744 
153 161 34.28057 .00000 .21292 
154 162 41.90976 .01972 .26031 
155 163 52.77047 .19253 .32777 
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156 164 20.02704 .00128 .12439 
157 165 28.68992 .00000 .17820 
158 166 22.69106 .00963 .14094 
159 167 18.18123 .00107 .11293 
160 168 45.57759 .22235 .28309 
161 169 18.35212 .00012 .11399 





Appendix 15: Bivariate analysis between CIR components and continuous variables 
 
Variables Pearson Correlation Spearman's rho 
Presentation  timeliness  usability  Audit  content  presentation timeliness usability audit content 
Firm size .572*** .551*** .612*** .442*** .549*** .620*** .573*** .582*** .478*** .616*** 
Firm growth -.084 -.040 -.002 -.100 -.028 -.031 .023 .021 .024 .014 
Leverage .169** .060 .248*** .143* .149* .187** .089 .220*** .171** .164** 
Liquidity -.253*** -.155** -.247*** -.195** -.228*** -.010 .020 -.066 -.061 -.060 
Board size .376*** .303*** .351*** .340*** .374*** .347*** .286*** .293*** .226*** .340*** 
Board independence -.175** -.232*** -.179** -.146* -.184** -.212*** -.234*** -.165** -.223*** -.218*** 
Board frequency of 
meeting 
-.074 -.059 -.011 -.060 -.059 -.099 -.116 -.078 -.123 -.060 
Block holder 
ownership 
.127 .182** .185** .105 .168** .141* .195** .154** .190** .220*** 
Director ownership -.041 .046 -.011 -.008 .027 -.076 .056 -.004 -.085 -.011 
Institutional 
ownership 
-.040 .037 -.036 .040 .036 -.033 .053 -.031 .152** .064 
Government 
ownership 
.208*** .198*** .314*** .099 .183** .343*** .327*** .397*** .206*** .405*** 
Audit committee size .283*** .236*** .333*** .197*** .272*** .302*** .224*** .307*** .196*** .336*** 
Audit frequency of 
meeting 
-.086 -.056 .004 -.096 -.037 -.073 -.046 -.035 -.053 .004 
Audit committee 
independence 









































Appendix 17: the correlation matrix for Tobin's Q ratio, ROA and ROE 
 
 
















Tobin's Q 1.000          
C total  -.348*** 1.000         
Firm size -.435*** .583*** 1.000        
Leverage -.293*** .168** .288*** 1.000       
Board size -.214*** .386*** .403*** .180*** 1.000      
Board independence .034 -.193*** -.214*** -.153** -.130** 1.000     
Role duality -.055 .041 .017 -.143** .062 .046 1.000    
Block holder 
ownership 
-.010 .167** .300*** .235*** .214*** -.508*** -.023 1.000   
director ownership -.007 .011 -.027 -.135** .092 -.108* .033 .242*** 1.000  
 Audit committee 
independence 
.176** -.321*** -.245*** -.089 -.192*** .354*** .064 -.117* -.021 1.000 
 
 
 
 
